

**STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE:
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S EXPANDING
ROLE IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S EXPANDING ROLE IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman, (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. Before the hearing starts, I have a few small housekeeping items. I am most pleased to welcome back, although apparently not personally, Lynn Woolsey, who was appointed to the committee last week. She served as a member of the committee in the last Congress, and I am sure I speak for all my colleagues when I say I look forward to working with her again on the committee this Congress.

So, without objection, she is appointed to serve on the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee on which there is a vacancy made by the leave of absence taken by Adam Smith.

Second, in light of the changes in the membership request, without objection, the size of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee will be conformed to its current membership.

I would like to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses today for the third in a series of hearings that the committee will convene on the foreign assistance reform.

In the last Congress, the full committee held two hearings addressing this issue, and our subcommittee has held several others.

One observation that repeatedly came up during those hearings was the Defense Department's increasing role in foreign assistance. We have heard the same explanation for this over and over again: DoD is filling a vacuum left by the State Department and USAID, which lack the capacity to carry out their diplomatic and development functions.

There is no doubt that these agencies have been weakened by a severe shortage of resources. For example, USAID has only about 2,500 permanent staff today compared to 4,300 in 1975.

The agency is responsible for overseeing hundreds of infrastructure projects around the world, yet employs only five engineers. They have only 29 education specialists to monitor programs in 87 countries.

Likewise, the State Department lacks resource to fill critical diplomatic posts. Today, the agency has a 12-percent vacancy rate in

overseas Foreign Service positions and an even higher vacancy rate here in the United States. This hollowing out of the State Department cripples its ability to aggressively pursue and protect American interests abroad.

President Obama's Fiscal Year 2010 international affairs budget request—which I strongly support, and I hope my colleagues will too—represents an important step forward in addressing these weaknesses. And for our part, the committee plans to tackle these troubling capacity issues when we take up the State Department authorization bill and foreign assistance reform legislation later this year.

But beyond capacity and resources, there are some deeper issues I would like to examine today.

Is providing military assistance to a foreign country a foreign policy decision that should be the primary responsibility of civilian agencies, with appropriate Defense Department involvement in implementation? Or is it a national security mission that should be planned and carried out by the Pentagon?

Does DoD have such a comparative advantage in performing certain non-traditional defense missions that it should be carrying out activities previously reserved for civilian agencies? And what are the implications of putting a military face on development and humanitarian activities?

How does this affect the way we are viewed in the world, and what is the practical impact on USAID's ability to carry out development projects?

The Department of Defense has always played an important role in carrying out certain security assistance activities, particularly implementing military training and military sales directed by the Department of State. However, DoD's role significantly expanded in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, where they took on a direct role in planning, funding, and implementing military and police training, and other non-military activities.

And beyond these two conflicts, the Pentagon began requesting—and receiving—authority to conduct similar activities in other parts of the world.

DoD's goal was to address irregular security threats on a global scale, threats they argued did not fit neatly into traditional State or Defense Department missions, and thus, required new tools of engagement. These include global train and equip authority, also known as the Section 1206 program; a worldwide stabilization and reconstruction fund, also known as the Section 1207 program; and numerous new training programs directly managed by the Defense Department.

In addition, some existing authorities were expanded, including the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance.

DoD's argument that these programs are justified by "military necessity" should be given significant deference. Indeed, I can think of many situations in which it might make sense for military commanders to get involved in activities that, in peacetime, would be considered foreign assistance.

However, many questions remain regarding the utility and implications of such programs. For example, on several occasions this

committee has raised concerns about the use of Section 1206 funds. In some cases it appears they have been used for programs with only a tenuous link to counterterrorism. In others, it looks more like a traditional diplomatic tool designed to curry influence with potential friends.

In the development context, critics have argued the DoD's role erases the distinction between military personnel and civilians carrying out similar development activities, ignores development best practices, such as sustainability and effectiveness, and puts a military face on inherently civilian programs. It can also result in waste, fraud, and abuse, which has been well documented by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Interestingly, in a letter attached to a report submitted last week on one of DoD's international programs, the Pentagon stated,

“Humanitarian assistance activities continue to provide significant peacetime engagement opportunities for Combatant Commanders and U.S. military personnel while also serving the basic economic and social needs of people in the countries supported.”

The question remains: Shouldn't our “peacetime engagement” efforts be carried out by USAID, our Nation's premier development agency? And should our military be responsible for performing the mission of civilian agencies? Do we really want to ask the men and women who go to war to do the mission of both Defense and State?

Some have suggested that a national development strategy would serve as a useful mechanism to help coordinate and establish appropriate roles for various agencies that provide foreign assistance. One of our witnesses supports such a strategy in her written statement.

I welcome this hearing today as an opportunity to shed light on the many important questions surrounding the military's growing role in foreign assistance.

And I now turn to my friend and ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for her opening statement.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

There have been successes in international assistance efforts over the past half-century. The Green Revolution significantly increased food production. Ongoing efforts have raised child survival rates around the world, and survival and prevention of HIV/AIDS is on the rise.

We have helped develop and strengthen independent civil society, and fostered market-based economies in emerging democracies.

Nevertheless, I think that many would agree that the results of decades of foreign aid provided not just by the United States, but by European states, by the U.N. development agencies, by the World Bank and other regional development banks, have been disappointing. In many areas of the world, we wonder why the significant aid provided has not produced the outcome we all want: Stable, secure, free, prosperous states.

Analysts and policymakers today refer to failed or failing states, and in some instances countries in conflict or at risk falling into conflict, all despite our past and continuing assistance to those states.

In conflict situations, we must give our military the tools it needs to help win the support of local populations and fight threats to U.S. national security. I support the military in providing urgent humanitarian aid and in providing assistance to our allies to help fight international narco-trafficking and global Islamic militants.

However, providing the Defense Department with more of a role in providing assistance for the development of impoverished countries raises concerns. It is not because it might prove difficult to coordinate aid provided by our military with aid provided by our civilian agencies; but rather, if the underlying concepts and approaches for development assistance are faulty, and the strategy is based on archaic models, then the Defense Department may prove no more successful at achieving long-term developmental goals than our civilian agencies have been.

I am therefore not sure that the proposals put forth, such as creating a new aid program for reconstruction and stabilization, or those calling for more personnel, or a significant increase in funding, will prove any more productive. Some of the programs being implemented by the State Department's new Reconstruction and Stabilization Office look a lot like the kind of programs that USAID has had in place or that the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has already implemented for many years.

We also should recall that not just the United States, but many other donor countries and agencies have contributed major amounts of assistance over the decades, with mixed results. Providing more funds and more staff may produce some marginal improvement in the immediate term, but it is questionable whether this would ensure long-term sustainable progress in light of the results of the past 50 years.

We understand the desire by the State Department and USAID to reclaim their dominance and counter the growing engagement of the Defense Department in providing assistance. But we should not rush to judgment on such proposals. We first need a careful assessment of our performance in the last five decades through our current programs, and under our current structures; and work toward real and comprehensive reform of our general personnel and procurement systems.

The majority of our aid programs are operating on the basis of a post-World War II approach and concepts that have their roots in the 1950s. If we want to successfully help others, then such concepts need to be updated. Flawed assumptions about how to promote the development of impoverished countries need to be addressed. Otherwise, we may find that we will continue to provide significant taxpayer funds, while the impoverished states that we seek to aid continue to fail, regardless of which of our agencies, military or civilian, we use to provide that assistance.

I hope that our witnesses today will take a moment to consider that overriding question while they provide us with their views on the proper role of the military in providing assistance overseas.

I would like to give my remaining 1 minute to Congressman Smith, if I could, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much to my friend, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Let me just say that I, over the many years that I have been in Congress, 29 years, have observed that the military's finest role is often in the emergency situation. I was there to provide comfort when the Kurds were escaping; I was there 3 days after it happened. I joined friends and some other colleagues on the *U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln* when, without our help and the helicopters that were bringing emergency aid to those in Banda Aceh and that tsunami-affected area, many lives would have been lost.

And then most recently, in Georgia, where the military stepped up and provided an enormous amount of help, and then passed the baton in a timely fashion to the NGOs and to the government in an almost seamless transition. Over the years that has been the key, I think. And I hope we would never lose the fact that when it comes to the ability to muster medicines and food and all of those things that make life possible during an emergency, no one does it better than the military. And then, for a more sustainable approach, in comes the NGOs and those who do it so well.

So I would hope that we would emphasize that going forward. Obviously, our mission as the military remains, first and foremost, the defense of our nation. But as you point out in your statement, General Hagee, there are three pillars of smart power: Coherent, coordinated, and adequately resourced.

I would add a fourth, and that would be cultural sensitivity, so that we never impose values that are antithetical to the local population, except when it comes to fundamental human rights.

Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. What do you—

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If Mr. Burton could have the remaining time.

Mr. BURTON. I would just like to say, in the 29 seconds that I have here, that one of my major concerns is one of our best allies in the world, Israel, is in grave danger over there. And I hope that the Defense Department will do everything they can to make sure they have all of the tools necessary to ward off any kind of an attack from Iran or anybody else. They are our big ally, and we need to support them.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

Two of our witnesses have to leave at noon. We may be interrupted by a couple of votes. Does anybody have a statement, or can we go right to the witnesses?

[No response.]

Chairman BERMAN. Oh, great. I will now introduce the witnesses.

We have a really exceptionally talented panel with us today to discuss the Defense Department's expanding role in foreign assistance.

General Michael Hagee served as the 33rd Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps from 2003 to 2006. During almost 39 years of service as a Marine, he commanded at every level, including platoon, company, battalion, marine expeditionary unit division, and marine expeditionary force.

He served as executive assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, executive assistant to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the liaison to the Presidential Envoy to Somalia, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Hagee serves on the boards of several U.S. and international corporations, and as a member of the U.S. Department of Science Board and the National Security Advisory Council for the Center for U.S. Global Engagement and the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign.

Graduating with distinction from the United States Naval Academy in 1968, he received a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps as an infantry officer.

He holds a master's degree in electrical engineering and a master's degree in National Security Studies.

Nancy Lindborg is the president of Mercy Corps, an international relief and development organization that operates in challenging transitional environments around the globe, including Iraq, the Sudan, Afghanistan, the Balkans, North Korea, and tsunami-affected areas of Southern Asia.

Ms. Lindborg currently serves as co-president of the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign Board, and is a member of the USAID's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. I am not quite sure what mandatory foreign aid is, but—and I have not proposed making it an entitlement program.

She graduated with honors from Stanford University with a B.A. in English literature. She also holds an M.A. in English literature from Stanford, and an M.A. in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Philip Christenson spent half his career in foreign affairs with the executive branch and half with the House Africa Subcommittee and as staff director of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa.

In the executive branch, he was appointed a career Foreign Service Officer in October 1970 at the State Department, and served overseas at the U.S. Embassies in Vientiane, Laos, and Brussels, Belgium, and as an assistant administrator at USAID.

In 2006/2007, he served as a senior advisor to the HELP Commission, counseling on matters relating to African development and personnel procurement practices of U.S. foreign aid agencies.

He is a 1971 graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

Reuben Brigety, II, is the director of the Sustainable Security Program at the Center for American Progress. His work focuses on the role of development assistance in U.S. foreign policy, U.S. national security, human rights, and humanitarian affairs.

Prior to joining American Progress, he served as a special assistant in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance in USAID, and was a researcher with the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch.

Before joining Human Rights Watch, Mr. Brigety was an active-duty U.S. naval officer, and held several staff positions in the Pentagon and in fleet support units. He is a distinguished midshipman graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he earned a B.S. in political science with merit, and served as the Brigade Commander. He also holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Cambridge University, England.

Thank you all for being here. And General Hagee, why don't you start? You can summarize your written testimony, and we look forward to hearing from you.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC,
RETIRED (FORMER COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS)**

General HAGEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you both for inviting me here to discuss what I think is a very important issue, especially today.

I assume that my written statement will be submitted for the record, so I—

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, all the prepared testimony will be included in the record of this hearing.

General HAGEE. That is great. So I don't intend to summarize that. I will just say a couple of words here to try to bring my experience to bear on this particular issue.

It may surprise you that a former Commandant of the Marine Corps and an individual who was in the military for 43 years, a Marine almost for 39 years, is here suggesting, arguing, supporting that we need to increase the resources for our foreign assistance, and for the State Department. And that comes from years of experience on the battlefield.

We have the best military in the world. And these young men and women out there today, they get it. They know there is something more important than themselves. And they do unbelievable things every single day. In many cases, things that they were not trained for, educated for, but they do it. And I am really quite proud of them, as I know everyone on this committee is.

But, when you have this great big, wonderful hammer, everything appears to be a nail when you have a problem. And I think sometimes that is what we see: Everything out there is a nail, and we want to use this hammer on it.

We can, as Mr. Smith said, bring peace, stability to a chaotic situation. He talked about, Mr. Smith talked about Provide Comfort. I was in Somalia, with General Zinni, who was also in Provide Comfort.

At that particular point in time, when we came in on the 10th of December, there were several hundred Somalians dying every, single day. And they were fighting one another. In 14 days—2 weeks—we stopped that. We stopped the dying, we stopped the fighting. By "we," I mean the United States military and some of our coalition partners that came in at that time.

But then they looked to us to provide some assistance and some development. We had NGOs there on the ground. It was really uncoordinated, and primarily thanks to General Zinni, who have learned in Provide Comfort, I think we set up one of the first CMOCs, Civilian Military Operation Centers, and started the coordination with the NGOs and other individuals who were on the ground.

Ambassador Bob Oakley was there with two, two Foreign Service Officers. So most of the heavy lifting, of course, was done by the military. At that point in time, I would argue that it was time to pass it over to civilian leadership, but the military stood up and did what needed to be done there.

Really, all elements of National Powers need to be brought to bear, especially in situations that we have today. As I said, the military can stabilize, but the other elements of national power, especially our diplomacy, our foreign assistance, our economic aid,

need to be brought to bear in some of these very sophisticated and complex problems.

I am not sure, in fact I know from my experience on the battlefield, they do not have the proper resources. And by resources, I mean the capacity, I mean the capability, I mean the education. And I hope we are able to talk about, talk about some of these points during the general question-and-answer period.

In the area of national security, I can think of no other issue more important to this nation right now than the one we are talking about. And that is, how do we properly resource all the elements of national power, and how are we sure that they are properly coordinated so they can carry out the goals and ideas of our National Security Administration.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hagee follows:]

**Testimony of General Michael Hagee, USMC (Ret.)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 18, 2009**

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, members of the Committee. It is a privilege to be here this morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify. You are taking on a most important task, and I appreciate the opportunity to share my views on the need to 'strike the appropriate balance' in our national security policy and in provision of foreign assistance.

I believe the balance the Committee is looking for is in the application of "smart power", an approach that ensures that we have strong investments in global development and diplomacy alongside a strong defense. For the United States to be an effective world leader, and to keep our country safe and secure, we must balance all of the tools of our national power, military and non-military.

Mr. Chairman, I think of smart power as the strategic triad of the 21st Century—the integrated blend of defense, diplomacy and development. But this strategic approach will only be effective if all three smart power pillars are coherent, coordinated, and adequately resourced. While the Department of Defense rightfully has received strong Congressional support over the years, funding and support for the State Department and USAID has been more problematic. It is time to address the imbalance, both in strategic emphasis and in funding.

I am here today as a member of the National Security Advisory Council for the Center for U.S. Global Engagement and the U.S Global Leadership Campaign. I am proud to join with nearly 50 retired senior flag and general officers who share a concern about the future of our country and the need to revitalize America's global leadership. Our allies in this effort include a bipartisan array of some of America's most distinguished civil servants, Congressional leaders and Cabinet Secretaries. This coalition also includes major American corporations such as Boeing, Caterpillar, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, and Pfizer, as well as private voluntary groups such as Mercy Corps, represented here today by my fellow witness, Nancy Lindborg, and hundreds of others such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and World Vision, to name a few.

Despite our diverse backgrounds, we share a common belief that America is under-investing in the array of tools that are vital to our national security, our economic prosperity and our moral leadership as a nation.

Now some may wonder why a Marine, an infantryman, a war fighter, would advocate for empowering the State Department, USAID, and our civilian-led engagement overseas. I am here because I have been on the front line of America's presence in the world, in some of the most difficult security environments, and I know that the U.S. cannot rely on military power alone to keep us safe from terrorism, infectious disease, economic insecurity, and other global threats that recognize no borders. And I know that the military should not do what is best done by civilians.

Mr. Chairman, I have witnessed many of the tough security and global challenges that burden the world today. I have been in nations that have failed to provide the most basic services to their citizens, in areas where tribal and clan divisions threaten unbelievable

violence to the innocent. In Somalia, I saw the consequences of poverty and hunger that result in anger, resentment and desperation. Some people respond with slow surrender to this hardship, while others look for political conspiracies, and or turn to extremist ideologies or crime to seek blame or retribution for a life of frustration.

When that frustration spills over into armed conflict, the alarms go off and too often our military is forced into action. We have the strongest and most capable armed forces in the world, yet as this committee knows so well, the military is a blunt instrument to deal with these sorts of challenges. The U.S. military does have its unique strengths: in times of humanitarian crisis, such as during the Asian tsunami in 2004 or the Pakistani earthquake in 2005. We can provide the logistics and organization to get help humanitarian aid to those in need; no other organization on this earth can respond as quickly or efficiently. We can break aggression, restore order, maintain security and save lives. And where our actions are clearly humanitarian in nature, they have been well-regarded by the people we helped and have bolstered America's image overseas.

But the military is not the appropriate tool to reform a government, improve a struggling nation's economic problems, redress political grievances or create civil society. It is not, nor should it be, a substitute for civilian-led, governmental and non-governmental efforts that address the long-term challenges of helping people gain access to decent health care, education, and jobs.

To be clear, all the military instrument can do is to create the conditions of security and stability that allow the other tools of statecraft—diplomatic and development tools—to be successful. But as my colleague General Zinni has said, when those tools are underfunded, understaffed, and underappreciated, the courageous sacrifice of the men and women in uniform can be wasted. We must match our military might with a mature diplomatic and development effort worthy of the enormous global challenges facing our nation today. We have to take some of the burden off the shoulders of our troops and give them to our civilian counterparts with core competencies in diplomacy and development.

As I look back, we all know how this imbalance came to be. As the funding for the State Department and the development agencies was either flat or declined, going back over many administrations, the military mission expanded to fill the void. The State Department and USAID has been forced to make do, with fewer personnel, more responsibility, less resources and less flexibility in how to spend those resources.

This has not developed overnight. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Shalikashvili warned years ago, "What we are doing to our diplomatic capabilities is criminal. By slashing them, we are less able to avoid disasters such as Somalia or Kosovo and therefore we will be obliged to use military force still more often."¹ General Shalikashvili's comments sound remarkably similar to those of Defense Secretary Gates, who said last July,

In the campaign against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls "kinetic"

¹ Quoted in Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (W.W. Norton, 2003), page 54.

operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit....It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long – relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.²

Mr. Chairman, we all know that some believe it is easier to vote for defense spending than for foreign assistance. But it is time to rethink these patterns. We need a take a comprehensive approach to promote our national security. Strengthening our development and diplomatic agencies and programs will not only reduce the burden on our troops, but will stimulate economic growth which will increase international demand for US goods and products – and in turn will create American jobs. It is in our nation's self-interest to make a larger investment in global development and poverty reduction.

Clearly, the global financial crisis gives new impetus to action. The World Bank reports that the crisis is driving as many as 53 million more people into poverty as economic growth slows around the world, on top of the 130-155 million people pushed into poverty in 2008 because of soaring food and fuel prices.³ This rise in global poverty and instability is complicating our national security threats well beyond the two wars we are already fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although we have a profound economic crisis and budget pressure, I do not believe that we can wait to modernize and strengthen our foreign assistance programs, to make the best use of American skills for the betterment of the world, and the most effective use of taxpayer dollars. It is time to put smart power to work.

Mr. Chairman, there is growing support for this shift in our global engagement strategy. Over the past two years, over 2000 pages and 500 expert contributors in more than 20 reports have concluded that America needs to strengthen its civilian capacity as a critical part of our foreign policy and national security strategy. From RAND to Brookings, AEI to CSIS, the HELP Commission to the Center for American Progress, a diverse, bipartisan group of experts and institutions agree that many of the security threats facing the United States today cannot be solved by the sole use of military personnel and force. These experts conclude that a shift to a smart power strategy is necessary to improve America's image in the world and make our global engagement efforts more effective.⁴

² Secretary Robert Gates, Speech to USGLC Tribute Dinner, July 15, 2008, transcript available at www.usglc.org

³ "Topics in Development: Financial Crisis," World Bank. (March 2009).
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/financialcrisis/

⁴ "Report on Reports -- Putting Smart Power to Work: An Action Agenda for the Obama Administration and the 111th Congress." (March 2009). Center for U.S. Global Engagement.
<http://www.usglobalengagement.org/tabid/3667/Default.aspx>

Among the wide variety of recommendations contained in these studies, seven action areas stand out:

- Formulate a comprehensive national security strategy that clearly articulates the required capacity for ALL elements of national power needed to achieve our national security goals
- Increase substantially funding and resources for civilian-led agencies and programs, especially through USAID and the State Department
- Elevate and streamline the U.S. foreign assistance apparatus to improve policy and program coherence and coordination
- Reform Congressional involvement and oversight, including revamping the Foreign Assistance Act
- Integrate civilian and military instruments to deal with weak and fragile states.
- Rebalance authorities for certain foreign assistance activities currently under the Department of Defense to civilian agencies
- Strengthen U.S. support for international organizations and other tools of international cooperation.

While these reports focus on various tactics to achieve these steps, **there is a broad consensus that we need to go beyond the institutional stovepipes of the past and revitalize and rebuild the civilian components of our national security toolbox.**

Let me focus on three of these areas in particular. The first is increased funding for our civilian-led foreign affairs agencies and programs. As Secretary Gates admonishes us, our civilian have been “undermanned and underfunded” for much too long.⁵ Out of our entire national security budget, over 90% goes to defense and less than 7% to diplomacy and development. Recently, I joined 46 other senior retired generals and flag officers in a letter to President Obama, requesting that he submit a robust International Affairs Budget request for Fiscal Year 2010. We are pleased that his request for the IAB included a 9.5% increase. I believe that this increase is an important step forward, and will provide a critical down payment toward strengthening our diplomatic and development tools. I hope Congress will approve the President’s request.

Second, we must better integrate our civilian and military instruments to deal with weak and fragile states. Both civilian and military capabilities are necessary to respond to the kind of challenges we face in fragile environments, but their respective roles and points of intervention should vary depending on the political and security situation, the scope of the crisis, and the humanitarian needs. As stability and security are assured, the military should be able to withdraw and give civilian agencies the leadership role in providing assistance. However, this can only happen if we give our civilian agencies the resources and capabilities they need to operate effectively in concert with our military. This requires us to invest in building a “civilian surge” capacity that is much more substantial than what State and USAID have today.

Third, we must begin to rebalance authorities for certain foreign assistance activities currently under the Department of Defense to our civilian agencies. In recent years, as much as 25 percent of foreign assistance has been managed by DOD,

⁵ Secretary Robert Gates. Speech to USGLC Tribute Dinner, July 15, 2008. Transcript available at www.usglc.org

due to the military's significantly greater resources, capacity and flexibility as compared to State and USAID.⁶ We must strike the appropriate balance between civilian and military involvement in certain foreign assistance activities by rebuilding civilian capacity and transferring appropriate authorities, such as those covered under Sections 1206 and 1207 of the Defense Authorization Act. This shift cannot and should not happen overnight, but must be phased in gradually and responsibly, as increased civilian capacity permits.

The Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) has been an important tool for the military, allowing for quick response to humanitarian and other foreign assistance needs, like digging wells or fixing bridges, without coming back to Washington each time to get permission. Yet, our military often then turns to the USAID workers or Provincial Reconstruction Teams to implement these projects because they have the necessary expertise. Our ambassadors and civilian Foreign Service officers should have capacity and authority to allocate funds in the field without coming back to Washington to get permission for each expenditure. It just makes sense to give the funds and decision-making in the hands of those the people on the ground who have the best idea of the most urgent needs and how to invest our funds most effectively.

Mr. Chairman, this Committee is poised to take the lead in developing a smart power approach to our nation's national security challenges.

It is clear to me that you have strong support from the Executive Branch for legislative action to promote smart power. President Obama, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of State Clinton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, National Security Adviser Jim Jones—all have called for greater balance between civilian and military components of our policy, for modernized foreign assistance policies, tools and operations, increased staffing level for State, USAID, and the Peace Corps, and higher funding levels. As President Obama said just last week at the National Defense University:

*Poverty, disease, the persistence of conflict and genocide in the 21st century challenge our international alliances, partnerships, and institutions, and must call on all of us to reexamine our assumptions. These are the battlefields of the 21st century. These are the challenges that we face. In these struggles the United States of America must succeed, and we will succeed.*⁷

There is also bipartisan support from the leadership of previous administrations. As former Secretary of State Colin Powell said recently: "The President's request for a robust international affairs budget is a smart and necessary investment in strengthening America's civilian capacities for global development assistance and diplomacy, which augment our defense and are vital to our national security and prosperity."⁸ And Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has argued: "Although the complete prevention of

⁶ Steve Radelet, Rebecca Schutte and Paolo Abarcar. (December 2008). "What's Behind the Recent Declines in U.S. Foreign Assistance." Center for Global Development.

⁷ President Barack Obama. (March 12, 2009). Remarks at Dedication of Lincoln Hall at National Defense University.

⁸ General Colin Powell. (February 26, 2009). USGLC press release on International Affairs Budget. <http://www.usglc.org>

conflict is not attainable, the more versatile we are, the more effective we will be. And this argues for a robust military matched by a much stronger and better-financed civilian national security capability... There's a vast gap between the Marine Corps and the Peace Corps, and we need to fill that gap with people who are skilled in law enforcement, good governance, economic reconstruction, the art of reconciliation and the creation of lasting democratic institutions."⁹

As I noted earlier, there is broad support for this rebalancing from those of us who have served in the military – both retired and active duty. Years of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have underlined what knowledgeable military leaders have known for some time: today's wars, conflicts and complex national security issues can only be "won" with the application of ALL elements of national power. And, in most cases the military element, once the situation is stabilized, is the much less important element. Commanders have also learned that not only do these elements need the right capacities and abilities but they **MUST BE** integrated and coordinated. Furthermore, this integration and coordination should not start on the battlefield.

It is my sense that there is no stronger advocate for diplomacy and development in the field than the active duty military. In fact, in a poll last July, the Center for Global Engagement found that over 80 percent of active duty officers' surveyed say that strengthening non-military tools should be *at least* equal to strengthening military efforts when it comes to improving America's ability to address threats to our national security.¹⁰

In after-action reports and strategy exercises conducted by the various commands around the world, there is a constant theme. We need civilians who know the area, speak the language, bring needed expertise, and most importantly, have long standing personnel relationships with local decision makers. These are not skills and assets that can be developed over night. And they should not be abandoned after a short term assignment. Clearly, we need to tap the talent we already have at the State Department and our USG development agencies as well as in our private and voluntary organizations. The insight and real life experience they bring to the table has too often been ignored in the policy process.

Shifting the emphasis of U.S. foreign policy from one that relies heavily on military might to one that elevates the value of diplomacy and development will, indeed, take strong political leadership, a decisive strategy to guide us, and adequate resources and personnel to ensure we are successful.

Such leadership and shift in strategy is not without precedent. Over 60 years ago, the nation was exhausted from war and worried that the specter of economic depression might return. Yet when the nation faced a new challenge on the horizon, leaders from the State Department, the Services and Congress came together, carefully analyzed the problem at hand and developed a strategy to meet the Soviet threat. They began with "measures other than war"; they structured a strategy later known as containment. Congress designed and funded the institutions and policies to implement that strategy,

⁹ Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. (December 9, 2008). Remarks at "Preventive Priorities for a New Era, Session I." Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17961/preventive_priorities_for_a_new_era_session_i.html

¹⁰ Center for US Global Engagement poll. (July 2008). Highlights available at www.usglobalengagement.org

from the National Security Act of 1947 to the Marshall Plan, to the Truman Plan and the early efforts for post colonial economic development.

Over the years this committee wrote the major foreign assistance legislation for our nation, supported the State Department, USAID and the other departments concerned with foreign relations. You and your predecessors authorized a wide number of programs to address the world's problems.

In the over 50 years that our nation has been at this growing task, our assistance has:

- Created the capacity for millions of people to feed their families through agricultural breakthroughs in crop production and soil conservation
- Contributed to broad based income growth which resulted in demand for American goods and services.
- Nearly eradicated river blindness, polio and smallpox
- Helped war torn nations rebound from civil and ethnic conflict
- Saved millions of lives each year through vaccinations and access to basic health care, access to potable water, and sanitary food preparation education
- Provided hundreds of thousands of HIV patients with life-saving anti-retroviral treatments.

While these are remarkable achievements, we must build on them to lay the foundation for a new era of hope. The National Security Act of 1947 is completely inappropriate for our challenges today. We need a new leadership team from all the agencies and departments with overseas impact. These Departments, working with the NSC and the Congress need to design and implement a new, comprehensive national security strategy, to define and assess the global security challenges facing the United States today, set realistic goals, and provide the resources to achieve those goals.

We must understand the threats from movements of tribes and religious extremists as well as the broader conditions of poverty and despair. We must assess the impact of constrained resources on an ever more challenging and unstable world. Designing a strategy to take on insurgent movements, extremist attitudes, the lack of civil society and good governance requires deep understanding of histories, cultures and values. It may mean a new alliance system with tribes in addition to states, and reviving coalitions with allies who share our values and are prepared to share the burden of world leadership.

Time is of the essence. As we work to get our own economic house in order, we must be able to address the deeper threats in fragile states that can threaten our own security and prosperity. If we are determined to reduce the strain on our troops, respond to the threat of global and political and cultural insurgency, and protect America we must be prepared to make bold changes.

We need to give the brave men and women of both our military and the civilian diplomatic and development communities the resources they need. We need

civilian career paths that include longer tours, in depth preparation, language competency and cultural understanding. Specifically, we need substantial personnel increases at State and USAID, large enough to allow for a float so that they can attend combined and joint professional education and training, as we do for our military personnel. I currently Co-Chair a Defense Science Board Study Group that is addressing how we should change and enhance joint professional military education. This Committee might want to consider the broader need for educational opportunities and how to bring State and USAID officers into a version of this system.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the need is clear and the broad support is evident—from the President, from the State Department, the Defense Department, and the military in the field, as well as from opinion leaders and experts across the political spectrum. It is time to rethink our investments for a better and safer world. It is time to deploy smart power, and increase our support for civilian-led efforts in diplomacy and development. But to achieve this new strategy, which some have referred to as a “whole of government” approach to national security policy, we are going to need a “whole of Congress” response to this challenge. I hope your Committee will form a strategic alliance with the Armed Services Committee, the Defense and State Appropriations Subcommittees, and your Senate counterparts to make smart power a reality. I hope that we see the day soon when Members of Congress see the Defense Authorization, the State Department Authorization and the Foreign Assistance Act together as vital components of a new strategic, smart power triad for our country’s leadership in the world.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, General.
Ms. Lindborg.

**STATEMENT OF MS. NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY
CORPS**

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you very much, Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and members of the committee.

I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I think this is a critical topic, and I very much applaud your leadership in tackling this, and the opening statements, all of which were very thoughtful in raising exactly the right questions.

We are at a pivotal political moment today. There is rising consensus both here in Washington and beyond that we as a nation have an opportunity and a need to rebalance our development, diplomacy and defense capacities, and find ways to apply those to meet the critical foreign policy challenges ahead.

As you mentioned, Mr. Berman, I am here as the President of Mercy Corps. We work in some of the toughest environments around the world, where often the only expatriates on the ground are NGO workers, journalists, and the military. And I have seen first-hand the heroic work of the military, as well as the tasks that they are increasingly pressed to undertake that are far beyond their mission.

General Hagee is one of many thoughtful military voices that has been ringing the alarm on this, as well as the very eloquent statements by Secretary Gates, on the need to create a better-capacitated, better-resourced civilian partner for the military as they tackle some of these tough challenges.

I would just join my voice in the conviction that it is essential that we have a stronger and more vibrant civilian leadership, and that this is critical to fully reflect who we, as a nation, want to be in the world. We need to have greater ability to engage through our civilian tools of diplomacy and development.

I want to just hit two key points in a summary of my testimony today. One is the need to rebalance our authorities and our capacities on the civilian and the military side; and second is the need to create a structure that enables the best of both to be fully harnessed.

On the rebalancing side, I think there has been a chronic underinvestment in our civilian capacities. And despite some important advances that happened under the last administration, we are still completely hamstrung in our ability to fully deploy those civilian capacities, as you noted, Mr. Berman.

And I think the result, as you noted, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, is that we are no longer cutting-edge; we are no longer thinking and experimenting and doing the best possible work that we need to do to tackle the challenges of these failed states. And we see what happens when they are left unattended, as was the experience with Afghanistan.

The civilian gap was starkly illustrated in the Afghanistan-Iraq examples, and the military jumped in. A number of authorities were improvised, including the 1207 and 1206 authorities, and the Commanders Emergency Response Program that have given sig-

nificant funding to the military to do what the civilian side didn't have the capacity to do.

This has led to an increasing role of the military, as we have seen the combatant commands, and particularly the Africa command, set up to not only fill gaps, but in fact begin to overlap where civilian capacity already exists.

We now have the military, our highly trained military forces, drilling wells in Kenya and Uganda, where there is significant access and capacity on the civilian side already present. I would argue this is not a good use of our military troops and it represents a profound shift in how we pursue global assistance. And it is a concern as we look at further expansion of the military into activities that are best undertaken by well-resourced civilian development and diplomacy capacities.

Most importantly, I think it underscores how important it is to rebuild our front-line civilian capacity to enable USAID and the State Department to be more vibrant, more forward-thinking; to come up with innovative new approaches toward these development challenges; and civilianize some of these improvised authorities that accord greater resources for the military to do this work.

As we do this, we need to develop structures that enable the core competencies and the highest values of both our civilian and the military capacities to be brought forward.

We talk a lot about a whole-of-government approach, which is essential to having good coordination. General Hagee noted the chaos that can exist when you don't have good coordination. But we need to do so in a way that understands the importance of differentiating these activities.

Mercy Corps works in many environments where we are side-by-side with the military. It is essential for our security that we are differentiated from the military. Our greatest value, as a non-governmental organization, is, in not being affiliated with the military, that we can begin to pursue the longer-term development challenges in these environments that the military is fundamentally ill-suited for, and our association with them can, paradoxically, actually increase our vulnerability to attacks.

As we look at structures, we need to think about how you create coordination without subordinating the longer-term development objectives to the shorter-term stability and security objectives that the military is pursuing.

Along those lines, I would suggest that we rethink the provincial reconstruction teams, which were set up as an improvisational structure to meet the needs in Afghanistan and Iraq, and think about how to create security and stability without creating greater security threats to the civilian side, and undermine the longer-term development by some of the counter-insurgency methods that the military has adopted to meet these new realities.

We can do it. We did it for some years in Iraq. The models are there to be looked at. I strongly argue we rethink that.

Essentially, the longer-term development challenge that must be focused on, with all the innovative ways that we need to consider must be a community-led process. World Bank President Mr. Zoellick noted, I think quite eloquently, that this essentially means

locally owned. And without that, it is neither effective nor legitimate in the eyes of the local communities.

The military, by definition, has its own agenda that it must pursue. And it is not the appropriate tool for pursuing that longer-term development agenda.

I would just close with five quick recommendations that are more fully noted in my testimony, but I strongly support the need for an increased international affairs budget. I think the recent budget that was submitted begins the journey that was started under the last administration, of rebuilding USAID and the Department of State. And it is critical that we have the civilian capacities as a partner for the military.

I would urge the development of a national strategy for global development that articulates the goals, what we need to accomplish, and funds and invests on the basis of that, not on the basis of what do we already have.

As a part of that, it is essential that we rebuild USAID, especially its capacity to operate with greater flexibility and greater effectiveness in these difficult, complex transitional environments. It does not currently have the authorities for longer-term, more flexible funding that the military has with the CERP. It does not have the ability to have a strong handshake between its disaster funding and its long-term development funding.

As I noted earlier, I think the PRTs—

Chairman BERMAN. You have to—right.

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. And reinforce civilian leadership in the new Foreign Affairs Act.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

**Statement of Nancy Lindborg
President, Mercy Corps**

House Foreign Affairs Committee
U.S. House of Representatives

Hearing on:

"Striking the Appropriate Balance:

The Defense Department's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance"

March 18, 2009, 10:00 am

2172 Rayburn House Office Building.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I want to express my appreciation to Honorable Representative Howard Berman, Chair of the Committee, and to Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for the opportunity to offer testimony today on striking the appropriate balance between civilian and military agencies involved in U.S. foreign assistance activities. I applaud your leadership in tackling this critical issue.

We now have a pivotal political moment, with an emerging and welcome bi-partisan consensus in Washington and beyond around the idea of "smart power – the notion that America's foreign policy is best served when there is a more balanced application and funding of the now familiar "Three Ds" of Diplomacy, Defense, and Development.

I am here today in my capacity as the President of Mercy Corps, an international humanitarian and development nonprofit organization that currently works in 37 conflict-affected and transitional countries, helping to rebuild safe, productive and just societies. Mercy Corps works in some of the world's most challenging and dangerous environments, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka and Colombia. Our efforts are supported by a wide range of public, private, and international donors, including a strong partnership with USAID.

Our teams are often working in tough environments where the only expatriates are aid workers, journalists and military forces. I know firsthand the heroic work of the military as well as the push for them to undertake tasks far beyond the limits of their mandate or core competency.

I also serve as the Co-President of the Board of the US Global Leadership Campaign, a broad-based nationwide coalition of more than 400 businesses, NGOs and community leaders that advocates for a strong U.S. International Affairs Budget. Our corporate leaders include such companies as Caterpillar, Pfizer, Microsoft and Lockheed Martin, and our NGOs involve a wide array of groups such as Care, the International Rescue Committee and Catholic Relief Services, all jointly focused on the importance of ensuring the fundamental tools of diplomacy and development are available for global engagement.

A recent report by the USGLC's sister organization, the Center for Global Engagement, summarizes more than 20 recent reports and commissions calling on the government to revitalize our civilian capacities in global affairs. The need for a modernized, fully funded and smarter approach to global challenges is well documented, with a common clarion call for increasing the resources for civilian agencies.

Perhaps most telling is the overwhelming majority of Americans who believe there must be more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods - 69% in a March 2008 Public Agenda nationwide poll - rather than a reliance on the military in our global engagement.

A stronger, more vibrant civilian leadership is essential to more fully reflect who we, as a nation, want to be in the world.

Secretary Gates has been one of the most eloquent voices on the need to rebalance these authorities and capacities. He noted in a speech given at the USGCL annual dinner last July that:

It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long – relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.

As the House Foreign Affairs Committee and others within the new US Administration and Congress work to improve the overall coherence and structure for US foreign assistance, we have an important opportunity to re-balance and rationalize our investments in the civilian and military agencies.

Today I would like to address two key points: the need to re-balance military and civilian authorities and the need to promote coherence while at the same time protecting the core capacities of both civilian and military actors. I will conclude with five recommendations for action that the US Congress can promote.

Re-balancing military and civilian authorities

As we have faced the increasing need to jumpstart development activities in complex, insecure environments, the lack of civilian capacity has been starkly noted. The military, with its can-do culture and ample resources, has jumped into the void with doctrine and funding mechanisms that have enabled it to play an ever more far-reaching role.

The Pentagon's November 2005 Directive 3000.05 established the importance of stabilization and reconstruction operations on a par with the military's traditional kinetic operations. Although a key provision notes that many stability tasks are best performed by civilian actors, Directive 3000.05 also emphasizes the need for DOD to play these roles when civilian capacity does not exist.

New authorities that expand the military's role include 1206 funding for training and equipping foreign militaries, 1207/1210 funds to support mostly civilian-implemented counter-extremism and conflict prevention programs coordinated by the State Department's Office of Conflict, Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and a vast Commanders Emergency Response Program or CERP, which provides officers with funding for emergency response and reconstruction that is readily accessible.

The Combatant Commands, or COCOMs, are continuing to develop their capacities to implement assistance programming in their regions, particularly in Africa and South and Central America, where there is already ample civilian presence.

As you noted in your invitation to us, Chairman Berman, the result is that the Defense Department's foreign assistance programming has grown from 7% in 2001 to nearly 21% in 2006. As significant, the percentage of overseas development assistance funding controlled by USAID, the government's principle assistance agency, has shrunk during this period from 65% to 40%.

We now see evidence that these temporary authorities are evolving into permanent fixtures: DOD has proposed to expand CERP globally and make both it and authorities like Section 1206 and 1207/10 funding permanent. Instead, we should shift these authorities to the civilian agencies that have the capacity and experience to implement programs that seek to address poverty and conflict in fragile environments.

These developments reflect a profound shift in how we pursue foreign assistance globally and have led to further expansion of the military into activities best undertaken by civilian agencies. A chronic under-investment in civilian capacities has led to an over-reliance on military solutions and military tools, as military leadership has become more vocal in identifying. We have increasingly limited our ability to apply the full array of diplomatic and development approaches to some of the most pressing issues of the day.

Coherent structures that enable core competencies

We urgently need to harness with maximum impact the value and core competencies of both our civilian and military agencies. Terms such as “whole-of-government approach” have become synonymous with the critical need for our nation to act with the full power of its military and civilian agencies directed toward common national goals.

The danger of whole-of-government approaches is that we may create structures and approaches that inadvertently subordinate longer-term development objectives to the urgency of stability and short-term security objectives.

As we look to the future, we have several issues to consider:

The Military’s Role

The U.S. military has extraordinary capacities that are often unmatched. Often, only the military can provide the amount of lift capacity that can mean the difference between life and death in the aftermath of a serious disaster. These capacities were used with great effect in the aftermath of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami and 2005 Pakistan earthquakes.

Most importantly, only the military can be responsible for providing security in conflict. I had the opportunity to participate in the Blue Ribbon Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction convened in 2001 by CSIS and AUSA. The resulting task framework identified security as the precondition for achieving successful reconstruction. Without securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence, there cannot be true recovery.

The military must be able and willing to step aside once the heat of conflict has subsided and create space for well-resourced civilian actors to assume the lead. The main objective should be to keep the military fully focused on what it does best, and what only it can do, which in most cases is to provide security.

As counterinsurgency methods have been refined, the military is increasingly conducting “hearts and minds” activities that seek to promote stability, improve force protection and generate positive local public opinion. While these methods are a cornerstone of the military’s new, adaptive approach to the realities of today, if not well coordinated, they can undermine civilian-led longer term development activities. Increasingly these approaches are also conducted in areas with significant civilian presence and capacity.

AFRICOM provides a good example of the Defense Department’s expansion into humanitarian and development arenas. The military rationale for consolidating operational authority for the continent in one combatant command is of course compelling. Yet Africa remains a continent where civilian agencies and actors have vast experience and significant humanitarian and development resources and

capacity. Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, there appears to be no compelling "gap-filling" rationale for the military's engagement in these arenas. And yet, AFRICOM now engages in assistance projects in multiple countries across the continent. For example, the US military has engaged in well drilling in Uganda and Kenya, two countries where there is ample civilian capacity to carry out such activities – and where, in fact, USAID funds NGOs to carry out similar work.

When the lines blur between military and civilian actors, insecurity can increase for civilians

I know well the increased security threats facing humanitarian workers. I have the responsibility every day for sending aid workers into risky places. And while it may seem logical to work closely with the military in such environments, in fact the opposite is often true.

When NGO programs are confused with efforts supported by the military, in Afghanistan and Iraq most often by association with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), we may face even greater security risks. In Iraq, Mercy Corps has worked without arms since 2003 with USAID funding, based on the strong support of the communities we serve. We have operated with strict separation on the ground from the PRTs and are hopeful this operational approach will continued to be supported by USAID.

Increasingly, insurgents have been invading NGO compounds across Afghanistan in search of evidence of cooperation with PRTs and military units. A recent report by European NGOs cites an example from 2007 when a Danish NGO was told by a community in Faryab that they could no longer protect them because a Norwegian PRT had visited one of their projects. In Iraq, there have been a number of cases when local contractors who "collaborate" with Coalition Forces have been threatened and in some cases killed, and numerous reconstruction projects that have been attacked and destroyed by insurgents.

Of note, a recent poll by WorldPublicOpinion.Org, supported by the Department of Homeland Security, showed widespread opposition in eight Muslim countries to terrorist attacks on civilians. However, strong majorities in most of these countries also showed support for attacks on the US military. When NGOs are associated with the military, we are more likely to be perceived as a legitimate target, and so have a greater vulnerability. Our value and ability to work in insecure environments is thus further compromised.

The importance of civilian-led development

Successful development requires a comprehensive approach that combines both top-down and bottom-up approaches. Especially in post-conflict or fragile environments, it is critical to strengthen the capacity and reach of the national government while simultaneously pursuing community-led development strategies that create constituents for stability and connect citizens to their local government and the private sector. While

community-led approaches to development cannot succeed alone, they are a key component in an overall US strategy that addresses instability in countries impacted by conflict, state weakness, and overall social fragility. World Bank President Robert Zoellick made a similar point in a recent speech, saying that local ownership is “fundamental to achieving legitimacy...and effectiveness” of aid efforts.

However, the military is inherently challenged when it seeks to engage in the longer-term development approaches. It will in most cases be seen by local communities as part of an outside force with interests that diverge from their own. Co-mingling of these distinct roles risks undermining longer term development.

Rethinking the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

The history of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) also illustrates the potentially negative consequences of creating structures that too closely link military and civilian actors. As you all know, the US developed the PRTs to respond to the sudden new state-building challenges it was facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. These hybrid military-civilian units were originally intended to be a temporary method of delivering emergency and reconstruction assistance to communities until civilian agencies and local governments could gain access and assume responsibility. PRTs were first launched in Afghanistan in 2002 with this fairly narrow mission, one that the ISAF PRT handbook describes as assisting the government of Afghanistan in extending its authority to create a stable and secure environment and enable security reform and reconstruction.¹ The PRT concept was transferred to Iraq in 2005 with a somewhat modified mission to increase the capacity of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and, for the more recent embedded (civilian) ePRTs, to support moderate political influences and assist in the military’s counterinsurgency efforts.

A fundamental problem with PRTs is that, as an *ad hoc* and improvised military-based response, they face inherent conceptual and structural challenges to meeting their multiple missions:

- high staff turn-over and rotations that inhibit relationship-building and cultural and environmental awareness;
- negligible links to the community;
- programming that is based on force security rather than community needs;
- extremely expensive operations and projects.

PRTs may in fact have a destabilizing impact on the areas where they work. Poor knowledge of local community structures and opaque and poorly vetted contracting procedures may exacerbate corruption and deform local power dynamics.

Despite these evident short-comings, PRTs are now often cast as a new, primary delivery platform for US humanitarian and development assistance.

¹ ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 3 (3 February 2007).

Finding balance and coherence

It is critically important to develop a coherent strategy that lays out an overarching vision of national security that includes the importance of reducing poverty and conflict. We then need to structure our missions and fund and deploy each actor with a full understanding of the different skills and modalities they bring to the task at hand.

Let me offer what we believe. In exceptional overwhelming humanitarian disasters or crises, military support for civilian-led responses is often welcome and vital. However, in all but the most extreme conflict situations where civilian access is impossible, the military's role in stabilization, complex development and post-conflict operations should be minimized and focused on what the military does best. In most cases, this is first and foremost providing ambient security, followed by specific tasks such as security sector reform and training, and delivering select short-term emergency relief.

Civilian agencies – those possessing the expertise, experience and cultural knowledge necessary to succeed in such environments – should lead whenever and wherever possible. The guiding principle for these efforts should be civilian leadership.

Importantly, we must find structures and approaches that enable communication and coordination without co-mingling necessarily differentiated approaches.

No single actor can do everything alone. The challenge for the USG is to ensure that the roles, resources and capabilities that it invests in and mobilizes are selected based on long-term policy priorities rather than short term capacity considerations. In recent years, the opposite has occurred, leading to the current civilian-military imbalance.

A Way Forward: Five Recommendations

1. Support a robust International Affairs Budget (IAB) Account: The IAB Account should be strongly supported in line with a strategy for increasing our diplomatic and development capacities. President Obama's request for the IAB reflects a 9.5% increase; an important step forward as we seek to rebalance our military and civilian capacities. This request sets us on the pathway of rebuilding our diplomatic and development agencies, with critically needed resources and personnel. I urge this committee to support this request.
2. Move forward with a national strategy for global development: The process of developing a national strategy for global development could be extremely useful both in articulating broad principles for effective development and in laying out how these principles affect the delineation of roles and responsibilities within the government.
3. Rethink the PRTs: As discussed above, PRTs function as primarily militarized entities. Even the ePRTs in Iraq, which are nominally civilian-led, still operate from

military bases and within a context of DOD policy leadership. This type of structure is inconsistent with a smart power approach.

4. Increase USAID's ability to work in transitional environments: The military has benefitted greatly from the flexibility and availability of the CERP funds that enable military commanders to respond more quickly to opportunities and needs. USAID should be supported to develop similarly flexible structures and capacities, which are so necessary to success in transitional environments. Currently USAID assistance is divided into emergency funding through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and longer term development funding through its regional bureaus. It lacks longer-term, more flexible funding and the ability to ensure a strong handshake between short- and long-term programming, so critical in post-conflict and post-disaster environments.
5. Strongly reinforce the principle of civilian leadership in the new Foreign Affairs Act: The development of a new Foreign Assistance Act provides an opportunity to strengthen both the principle and the practice of civilian leadership in the development sphere.
 - a. USAID should be represented in principals and deputies meetings on humanitarian response, post-conflict recovery, and long-term development issues.
 - b. The recent House Appropriations hearing on civil-military issues in foreign assistance indicates that there is a broad and developing interest in these issues across the Congress; HFAC would do well to reach out to the Appropriations and House Armed Services Committees to discuss cross-jurisdictional reforms

There is broad and deep support for undertaking this rebalancing and rethinking of how the US engages in the world. By increasing investment in our civilian capacities and rebalancing the roles of our civilian and military capacities, we have the possibility of tackling with great vigor the substantial global challenges ahead.

Thank you again for your leadership on this important topic.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Lindborg.
Mr. Christenson.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP L. CHRISTENSON
(FORMER ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT)**

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say that many of us who are interested in foreign assistance have very great expectations for your leadership and that for your ranking member. We know you both to be serious legislators who actually like to get legislation done, and have a record of accomplishment. And we also know that you both work in a bipartisan way, and that somehow between now and the end of this Congress, you are probably going to hammer out something that is going to pass the Congress in both Houses.

Chairman BERMAN. Your time will start now. [Laughter.]

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I see Mr. Connolly, who was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff the last time we passed the Foreign Assistance Act.

Chairman BERMAN. And he has overcome it well.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I want to point out that the argument over who controls foreign aid has been going on since 1942. The very first aid agency got started, and 4 days later the warfare broke out between the State Department, the Pentagon, and the independent aid agency. We have done this for 60 years. It is so tiresome. I hope someday we can find some sort of solution that will put an end to the battling, and get people focused on doing the job at hand.

On the issue of the militarization and the 20 percent of development assistance that we report to the Development Assistance Committee that is now channeled through the Pentagon: I think it is important that there is a little terminological confusion here.

DoD can, you know, report as development its money for Iraq and a whole lot of other things that it is doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. I think we really have to accept that these are battlefield activities. They are not development assistance programs. You really cannot measure them by any standard other than how much they contribute to bringing these wars to an end.

Frankly, if they are wasteful and they bring the war to the end, that is not too bad. We have just got to get these wars ended.

The problem that I think the committee might want to look at is what I consider the civilianization of the battlefield. If you talk to State Department and USAID employees, they now are going out to these battle zones, Iraq and Afghanistan, and are expected to be part of a military strategy.

It is not so much that DoD is invading traditional State Department and USAID activities; it is that State and USAID are being asked to participate and manage part of the Pentagon's strategy. I would say to you that these are not agencies that are capable of doing that.

I worked for the Foreign Relations Committee when the Beirut bombing took place. After the Beirut bombing, we adopted—and I have to say we, because it was Congress and the executive branch—a zero-tolerance policy toward employees' safety. Ambas-

sadors were told they are personally liable, and their careers will be affected if anybody at the Embassy is harmed or killed.

So ambassadors have adopted a zero-based approach to personnel safety. One of the ambassadors, and I don't need to name names, in one of the war countries announced to a staff meeting, "No one dies on my watch."

If we have that policy, what we end up with is 1,000 Foreign Service employees holed up in a bunker in Baghdad, living in what one USAID employee calls assisted living. They have a housing office, gym, and cafeteria in the same compound, and they are never allowed to leave.

And when they occasionally do leave, they go out with such massive force of security presence that it is very hard to believe that we are helping our foreign policy. What was described to me was a USAID employee in Kabul went out a few miles out of town to go visit an Afghani contact. He got in the center seat of the armored vehicle; the rest of the vehicle was filled with guards, with personal armor, and carrying loaded automatic weapons. There was a follow-up car that followed them, equally filled with guards.

They got to the Afghani's house. The USAID employee was told to stay in the car while they secured the scene. The guards got out, pointed their weapons at the man and his family and his dog and his mother. This is no way to win hearts and minds. We would have been better off staying at home.

So my question is whether we don't need a different type of USAID activity, where we get young men and women who have served in the military—they are young, they are in shape, they are combat-trained, they know how to protect themselves. There are 1 million Americans who have gone through Iraq or Afghanistan who came back and went to school; they probably got their degrees in agronomy and animal science that we need. Maybe these are the people we ought to turn to, rather than expecting a group of white-collar, middle-aged office workers to go out into these war zones. I mean, what we are doing just doesn't make sense to me.

If you look at what State and USAID are being asked for and at the State Department's recent recruitments for Afghanistan and Iraq: Urban planners, somebody to help redesign the bus routes in some town in Iraq; someone to promote tourism to a city in Iraq; museum curators.

These aren't State Department functions. Why are we asking the State Department to provide that kind of personnel to the PRTs? It doesn't make sense. The tourism promotion job makes you wonder, what is our strategy here? Because none of it makes sense.

On the issue of some of these other DoD "development projects," a lot of them are actually training missions for our troops. They go to resource-scarce areas such as northern Kenya or Uganda and drill wells or build houses. This is training for our troops so that they have experience, you know, when they are called perhaps someday when they go to Darfur and set up a peacekeeping mission, or provide logistic support for peacekeeping.

It is also PR. The military believes very strongly that this is a good PR program, and that they need military-to-military relationships.

But these are activities I don't think we should lump into the development assistance category as this committee and the development community has traditionally understood them. These are military programs; they are PR programs.

However, DoD is aggressively going after some of the areas that were traditionally USAID and State. One of the committee questions is that how do we assure that State and USAID continue to be the leading agency and have control.

I worked for the HELP Commission. One of its recommendations in the commission report, which I strongly urge on the committee, is to start working with countries to develop long-term strategies and specific commitments to these countries about what we are going to do with our foreign aid program.

If we have a long-term, country-owned strategy, that will be more useful in protecting the primacy of the State Department and USAID than anything we can do here in Washington.

I am saying that State and USAID need to form an alliance with the government of each country. And if we have a commitment, I mean it would be a very sound commitment, that we can plan ahead—that in year 5 we are going to do this, in year 7 we are going to do that.

State and USAID need to strengthen themselves with regard to their own capacities. USAID in particular needs help. We have three former administrators of the agency who wrote an article for Foreign Affairs Magazine in which they flatly said the agency is dysfunctional. And I believe you, Mr. Chairman, have said it is broken. Other people have said it is broken. We are all in agreement with that.

And the question is, how do we fix it? Do we fix it now, and then think later about expanding its responsibilities? Or do we try to start by dumping a whole lot of new money and a whole lot of new personnel, and then try to reform it while they are trying to absorb all the new responsibilities and personnel?

My argument is they should fix themselves.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christenson follows:]

Written Testimony of Philip L. Christenson
Former Assistant Administrator, USAID
March 18, 2009
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Thank you, Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen for inviting me to testify today on this important subject. I know there are many Americans with a deep interest in developing countries and in the American foreign aid program who have great expectations for this committee's efforts to address chronic problems in the aid program, and who look to your records as legislators who can work successfully to forge a bipartisan consensus to give up hope that something, finally, can be achieved in the 111th Congress to bring the program better focus, better management, and better results.

I should start off by noting that the fundamental issue we have been asked to address in this hearing has been the subject of bureaucratic infighting and endless conflict since December 1942 when Franklin Roosevelt set up the first independent civilian agency to take charge of relief and reconstruction in the liberated territories. It took exactly four days for the aid agency, the Pentagon and the State Department to begin what Dean Acheson later described as the "civil war within the Roosevelt Administration over the control of the economic policy and operations abroad."

If you can find an enduring solution, you will solve a problem that has so far defeated twelve U.S. Presidents. I should warn you, however, that Acheson in his memoirs said "the struggle is an endless one to which there is no definitive answer."

I believe that in examining the question of a militarization of development assistance we need to be careful with the terminology. "Development" as a term is such a loosely defined word that it becomes very easy to confound the different meanings of the word.

The Defense Department, for good practical reasons, refers to some of its military activities as "development" assistance. That is fine. What happens then is that USAID in reporting US development assistance spending to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, which issues a report on the development aid spending by the OECD or donor countries, then includes the DOD numbers in its claim for the US spending on development aid. One has to recognize, however, that inside the DAC every country does it best to find every single dollar or franc or peso it can find to puff up its numbers compared to the other members. There is nothing wrong with that in the DAC context, but using these numbers in other contexts can lead to analytical confusion.

The DOD programs we claim to other donors in the DAC are development assistance vary greatly. They include the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, military-to-

military HIV/AIDS projects under the PEPFAR program, and an Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program.

While they may fit the DAC definition of development assistance, they are not really development assistance as the term has traditionally been used in this Committee and in the development community generally.

The lion's share of the DOD programs included in the DAC numbers are the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction funding and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program. If you examine those programs, there are clearly military spending on the civil-military, civic action, or pacification programs that are an integral part of a military strategy for winning those wars. These projects cannot and should not be measured by the standards this committee has long used to measure development programs' effectiveness. They are not about development. If they help bring an end to these wars, they are successful. If they do not, they are failures. Nothing else much matters.

These programs lead some to claim there has been a militarization of civilian foreign aid program. If I could re-define the issue somewhat, the underlying issue may be more the "civilian-ization" of the battlefield as civilian foreign affairs agencies and the domestic agencies find themselves incorporated into DOD's plans for the manpower needs of its military strategy of the two on-going wars and its plans for future conflicts.

DOD is not taking over State and USAID's functions. Instead, State and USAID have been tasked with the responsibility to manage what were once traditional DOD functions. In the case of Germany and Japan, it was the United States Army that was the occupying government and it was the armed forces that performed the functions that DOD now designates as State and USAID functions.

The question we should ask ourselves is whether State and USAID are the proper agencies to assume these functions and whether, perhaps, we need a new and different entity is more equipped to provide the services that DOD counter-insurgency strategy needs.

Under what DOD now calls a "whole of government" concept of waging counter-insurgency war, it appears that DOD expects not just State and USAID, but the domestic departments and agencies to be permanently incorporated into a national security strategy of unlimited duration.

At Princeton University on February 5th, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen told an audience about a DOD vision that in ten years when someone is hired at USDA's Extension Service, the career expectation will be that the USDA employee will spend one out of every four or five years working in Afghanistan.

DOD's plans to rely on State and USAID as a practical solution to its needs. We have to recognize that DOD's personnel crisis brought about by two demanding regional wars is not just

in the uniformed services. DOD's civilian employee workforce was slashed by 36%, from 966,000 in 1997 to 623,000 in 2007. They have a serious human resources problem.

What DOD needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in possible future conflicts, is a surge capacity to provide a large number of civilians with specific technical qualifications into the combat zone to design and execute its civil-military, civil action, pacification or "hearts-and-minds" activities. State and USAID do not have the personnel on their payrolls to provide the services that are being demanded. Examining the current and recent State recruitment efforts for personnel for Iraq and Afghanistan, the list includes urban planners, urban mass transit transportation planners, museum curators, tourism promotion experts, city managers, parks and recreation specialists, and commercial bank advisors. It makes no sense to expect the State Department to provide the expertise to re-design the bus routes in Iraqi cities and towns or to provide museum curators. These are not core competencies of the State Department.

What we see is that State has been tasked to function in Iraq in a role not much different from the one DynCorp, MPRI, and hundreds of other contractors perform. State has become a general, all-purpose staff augmentation contractor providing services to DOD. State has no particular expertise in this field and no one has providing a convincing explanation why State should be responsible for hiring these employees on its payroll instead of DOD hiring them on its own.

State and USAID may be a particularly inappropriate source of staff augmentation services. Both agencies adopted, in the aftermath of the Beirut embassy bombing, a zero tolerance policy toward employee safety risks overseas. One of the recent ambassadors in a war zones made his policy perfectly clear to his staff – "no one gets killed on my watch."

As a result, there is an extraordinarily heavy personnel security burden on any State or USAID operation in these war zones. I was in Saigon on TDY at the embassy in 1971 during the Vietnam War. The security problems in Iraq and Afghanistan make the Vietnam War era pale by comparison. Foreign Service officers have served in war zones for many decades. They were in London during the Blitz, in Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s, in Congo during the rebellion in 1960 and 1961. But until now, when Foreign Service employees served in combat zones, the risk was being killed as collateral damage. In Iraq and Afghanistan, our Foreign Service employees are prime targets, and that is a very different situation.

As a result of today's stringent personal security requirements, State and USAID employees do not appear able to perform the functions that the counter-insurgency strategy calls for. The reports are that almost all the State and USAID employees in these war zones are confined to the Embassy or USAID compounds and rarely leave the compound. One USAID employee in Baghdad calls it the Foreign Service version of assisted living with your housing, the cafeteria, the gym and the office all there on the compound, and you are not allowed to leave.

It is hard to believe that having hundreds of State Department and USAID employees trapped in fortified bunkers cut off from the population in these countries contributes in any way to the

success of our efforts there. The security measures when employees do leave the compound are so aggressive that it may well be that we improve our relationships with the local population by staying in the compound.

This cannot be a satisfactory answer to DOD needs. We need to examine not whether we should ask DOD to reduce its role in these activities, but whether State and USAID should give the management and execution of these DOD projects back to DOD.

Ultimately in a war zone where American troops are in combat, US government activities other than the State Department's conduct of diplomacy should be subordinate to the military needs. It follows that the most logical department to lead and execute these programs is DOD. A key principle of successful warfare of unity of command. If DOD is going to take the lead in these war zones, the most efficient and effective way to achieve unity of command is for DOD to have its surge capacity under its own management.

What DOD may need is to create a new entity within DOD to provide it with the civilian employee surge capacity. It could recruit and hire civilian employees who are better suited for the work than those State and USAID are able to offer. What is needed in these highly insecure combat zones are civilian employees who are young, physically fit, capable of providing their own security, and who have the technical skills that DOD is seeking. This could work very well. If you are in need of agricultural extension advisors to work in a war zone, your ideal recruitment pool may well be the cohort of those extraordinary young man or woman who went into the military, served honorably, and finished their under the GI bill and got degrees in animal science, agronomy or another applicable field.

By being based in DOD, this entity could offer more attractive recruitment incentives. With 623,000 civil service employees, DOD may be to hire several thousand civilian employees to surge its capacities in a war zone and then absorb these employees into its large civil service personnel cohort as vacancies occur by attrition. DOD might be able to offer urban planners or parks and recreation specialists that if they go to Iraq or Afghanistan and serve well, at the end of the tour they would be must-place candidates in a related position within DOD's civilian workforce.

In practice it may be far easier to meet DOD needs with such an offer than the one now on offer at State and USAID – go overseas on a one-year temporary appointment, work in truly harsh conditions, put your life on the line, and get fired when the year is up.

There is a second category of DOD activities we call development in our reports to the DAC.. These are the projects DOD carries out in non-combat zones such as building or repairing clinics and schools, drilling wells, carrying out immunization campaigns or sending doctors, nurses and Special Forces Medical Sergeants to provide hands-on medical diagnosis and treatment in remote areas. While DOD calls these projects development, they have other purposes. Working in resource constrained remote areas provides important training opportunities for military

personnel. Working with the host country's armed services gives DOD important insights into the capabilities of their forces and builds relationships that may be called upon later on in peacekeeping or other operations. To an important extent, these are also public relations exercises that DOD hopes will have a positive return in the future. Not to be overlooked, these are also morale boosters for the troops who participate.

Because they have a multiplicity of purposes and development is not necessarily the prime one, it is no surprise that these programs on a strict cost-benefit analysis would hard to justify on the basis of their development impact alone. Inherently operating in remote regions chosen for their degree of difficulty is expensive, as is using uniformed personnel whose training and long term post-service benefits represent a significant cost factor.

But the projects are good. US ambassadors find them very attractive because they represent a tangible activity that brings good public diplomacy benefits. It is hard to believe that these projects are not well received among host country citizens and officials.

These activities do not compete with State and USAID programs in large part because we largely abandoned school building and water well drilling projects during the 1980s and 1990s when they were deemed to be not sustainable development. Some have criticized these projects for failing to address on-going costs, and on occasion schools have been built before teachers could be found or clinics built with no nurse available. These are not problems unique to the DOD projects.

Until our foreign aid program and that of other donors begin to address the desperate financial circumstances of the poorest countries, it is to be expected that these schools and clinics will not be well-maintained. The Government of Malawi tries to provide health care to its citizens on a budget that is less than two cents per capita per day and tries to educate primary school children on a budget of \$15 per child and that has to pay for teacher salaries, books, paper and pencils and other supplies. When they are as flat broke as they are, deferred maintenance is inevitable. In a country like Malawi where half the nurses graduated each year leave the country for jobs in England, South Africa and other wealthier nations, they are always going to have a shortage of nurses and difficulties filling vacancies. This is part of the reality of their society.

The civic action projects can be easily worked into a civilian-led foreign assistance strategy and do not represent any threat of militarization of our development assistance program.

The Committee posed the question what are the causes of the Defense Department's role in foreign policy and foreign assistance. If the question is what can be done to assure that the civilian foreign agencies retain their lead role in development assistance, I would urge you to look at the HELP Commission's report and the recommendation on page 85 that foreign assistance be based on realistic country-by-country or region-by-region assessments about strategic conditions, that we establish specific achievable goals for US assistance for each country, that we determine the cost of achieving these goals and then make a long-term, specific

commitment with the partner countries.

If we want to defend the role of the civilian agencies, the path to that objective is country ownership of the American assistance activities in that country. State and the foreign aid agencies (not just USAID) need to negotiate with the governments of the countries, especially with the democratically elected governments, and reach a common strategy and a detailed plan for US foreign assistance from all sources. There is no problem with DOD being part of the plan. The agreement could well specify that in a particular year DOD civic action teams will arrive to rehabilitate certain schools, just as it might specify that during a certain fiscal year USAID's education program will provide the funds to replace worn out textbooks, or that the CDC with PEPFAR funding will provide for the costs of adding a certain number of medical or nursing school students to meet desperate human resource shortages. Ideally, there would be coordinated agreements with other donors so that overall there is a comprehensive approach.

Our current system is plagued with ad hoc decision making. I remember former chairman Lee Hamilton saying to a witness who did not have an alternative proposal that you cannot beat something with nothing. That is a fundamental truth. Our civilian development assistance agencies unfortunately engage in very little forward planning and it creates a vacuum. If State and USAID had a specific plan agreed upon with the host government, then attempts by DOD or other agencies to intervene could be successfully deflected. It would tend, as well, to place the DOD interventions into a more rigorous, long-term development framework and that could have very beneficial effects for both the US development efforts as well as for the host country's ability to incorporate those efforts into its own strategies and plans.

Many will argue that the first step should be to increase funding and add thousands of new employees to State and USAID to fend off what they perceive as encroachments onto State and USAID's turf by DOD. Realistically, if this becomes a contest for whom can spend the most money, generate the most paperwork, and send the biggest team to interagency meetings, then State and USAID will lose every time. Just to give you an idea of the balance of forces, current plans call for AFRICOM to have a staff of 1,300 at its headquarters. The Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department has a staff of 100.

A particular challenge in maintaining a strong role for USAID in development assistance is posed by the chronic mismanagement at the agency. Three recent USAID Administrators wrote in the December *Foreign Affairs* magazine that the agency is dysfunctional. Many Members of Congress have stated baldly that the agency is broken.

The agency needs to repair itself and earn the confidence of the rest of government before it should be given significant more program or operating expense funding. It makes no sense to take important new challenges and assign them to an agency whose own administrators call dysfunctional.

USAID has a very expensive and labor-intensive approach to how it conducts its business. CDC

is responsible for half the PEPFAR program and all the contract and grant award processes are done in its headquarters in Atlanta. USAID does almost all its contract and grant award processing using staff send overseas to its field offices at a cost that is three to four times as much as CDC's Atlanta operations. Any well-run international organization conducts periodic management reviews to determine where work can be done at the least expense.

USAID's general approach to project design requires a heavy personnel cost. No federal agency is more addicted to spending money on sponsoring conferences, seminars and workshops for itself and its contractors. A few years ago Congress discovered that 95% of the funds appropriated to combat malaria were used to sponsor conferences, seminars, consultant reports and other advice-giving activities and almost nothing was being spent on proven malaria prevention and treatment techniques. Since such activities have a high USAID labor content, and reducing them could free up substantial personnel resources. USAID needs to do a serious study of how its employees spend their time and manage their time more effectively. When it costs up to \$4,000 per day for each day that an employee is at work in an overseas office, this should be a constant subject of management attention.

USAID also needs to catch up with the 21st Century. Much of its approach was adopted in the 1960s. The developing world has changed radically since USAID was first created. Country ownership where the democratically elected host government sets the priorities and specifies the project design criteria for contractors to bid on could save USAID considerable personnel resources now devoted to the development of new projects and could enhance project sustainability.

Most importantly, USAID needs to re-establish an agency management structure. Over the decades successive USAID Administrators have adopted a geographic notion of delegation of authority that shipped out to the field almost total authority over the agency's operations. It is a very hard agency to manage. We have today seventy or so independent USAID offices who pretty much march to their own drummer. This may be one reason why the White House and State often prefer to look to DOD or agencies other than USAID to carry out new programs or initiatives.

Finally, if I could address the Committee's question about AFRICOM. It is too early to assess AFRICOM's development efforts since the organization is not fully launched, but it is clear there is a problem in meeting DOD's expectations for how AFRICOM will be received in Africa. I think the resolution to this issue will depend on adopting a lower key approach to dealing with Africa. General Zinni as the CENTCOM used to describe himself as the Pro-Consul and traveled in a manner that did not contradict that description. It may work well in other areas, but in Africa is just too much. With a proposed staff for the AFRICOM Commander, there is no place in Africa where it could set up its headquarters because it would be just too large a presence.

The military have tremendous skills in areas that Africa desperately needs technical assistance. Africa is a high cost, low wage economic environment because it lacks that middle tier of skills

and expertise that keeps the infrastructure operating. If we could find an efficient way to tap DOD's skills in training skilled technicians and transfer that knowledge to Africa, it could be a tremendous gift to the continent. This is an area that has been largely abandoned by USAID and one in which DOD could work as part of an integrated strategy for development in one or more countries.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Christenson.
Dr. Brigety.

**STATEMENT OF REUBEN BRIGETY, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF THE
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS ACTION FUND**

Mr. BRIGETY. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, it is my great honor to appear to you this morning. Thank you very much for inviting me.

The Sustainable Security Program, which I direct at the Center for American Progress, is based on the premise that improving the lives of others in the least-developed parts of the world is an important, and at times a vital, national interest of the United States. As such, reforming the mechanisms of our Government to perform this mission is of the utmost urgency.

The Defense Department's expanding role in foreign assistance comes from the recognition of two important developments. The first is that conventional or kinetic military operations are often insufficient to achieve the strategic objectives of a given war. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have retaught the military that you can win the war through decisive military operations, but you cannot necessarily win the peace that way.

The second is that there is great value in preventing conflicts, rather than reacting to them. Investing in a country's development today can prevent it from becoming a battlefield tomorrow.

As such, the military is increasingly using non-kinetic instruments of influence in the form of foreign assistance to promote stability and prevent conflicts around the world.

Now, when considering the developmental impact of foreign assistance activities conducted by the military, it is helpful to think about two types of assistance: Fundamental and instrumental.

Fundamental assistance sees improving the lives of beneficiaries as an end in and of itself. Whether it is helping farmers to improve their irrigation techniques in Mali, or supporting primary education in Jamaica, these programs can have significant development impact, but little strategic value to the United States.

Thus, the success of fundamental assistance can be measured solely by the extent to which it improves the lives of the recipients.

Instrumental assistance tries to improve the lives of beneficiaries as a means to some other tactical or strategic end. Whether they are quick-impact projects to employ disaffected youth in Sadr City, Iraq, or governance initiatives in Mindanao, Philippines to fight the Abu Sayyaf Islamic insurgency, such activities are designed specifi-

cally to advance U.S. security interests. Yet they can only be successful if two things happen.

First, they must actually improve the lives of beneficiaries. And second, those improvements must be causally linked to the achievement of discrete American policy objectives.

It is imperative that we recognize the value in doing both fundamental and instrumental assistance effectively. We should ensure that our civilian institutions are properly resourced and configured to perform both of those missions. To that end, there are tasks which should be undertaken in the near term to strengthen the State Department and USAID in this regard.

First, there should be an easing of the legal restrictions on USAID mission directors in the field that critically limit their ability to respond flexibly to changing conditions on the ground, particularly in support of U.S. Government or U.S. military strategic objectives.

Second, there should be an immediate increase in the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers and development professionals. This growth in the officer corps should provide enough personnel to place one what I call tactical development advisor with every deployable brigade combat team in the U.S. Army, and every Marine Corps expeditionary unit in the U.S. Marine Corps. And it should also be enough to support the needs of every regional combatant command in the numbers required.

Third, USAID and State Department personnel must truly be worldwide-deployable, and be trained to operate in expeditionary, semi-permissive, and non-permissive environments as a matter of course, as a matter of their training.

And finally, the U.S. Government should write and promulgate a national strategy for global development derived from the national security strategy, to guide the use of development assistance in support of American foreign policy, and to coordinate the foreign assistance activities of all U.S. Government agencies abroad.

In conclusion, let me say that development assistance is not just a moral good or a matter of enlightened self-interest. It is in our vital national interest. There is no greater evidence of this than the military's increasing involvement in this sphere. Yet our own political culture and legal processes have not yet caught up to this reality on the ground.

Our Government has a clear stake in the successful performance of fundamental and instrumental assistance, and I hope this hearing will be a meaningful step to empower our agencies to be effective in this regard.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brigety follows:]

Testimony of Dr. Reuben E. Brigety, II
Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
US House of Representatives
March 18, 2009

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

It is my distinct honor to address you today on the matter of “Striking the Appropriate Balance: The Defense Department’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance.” In the invitation to appear before you, there were a series of very specific questions that I was asked to address. I shall do my best to answer each of them in turn. During the course of my presentation, I intend to convey a central message. The successful performance of foreign assistance programs across the spectrum of conflict should be seen as a matter of vital national interest. Accordingly, it is imperative to reform our civilian development institutions to perform the tasks our brave men and women in uniform often find themselves performing due to a lack of civilian partners present in the quantity and quality in which they are needed.

1) *What are the fundamental causes of DoD’s expanding role in foreign assistance?*

The Defense Department’s expanding role in foreign assistance come from the recognition of two important circumstances.

The first is that conventional, or kinetic, military operations are often insufficient to achieve the strategic objectives of a given war. Put another way, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have re-taught the military that you can win the war through decisive military operations, but you cannot necessarily win the peace that way.

The second is that there is great value in preventing conflicts. Investing in a country’s development today could prevent it from becoming a battlefield tomorrow. Certain threats, such as the spread of violent extremist ideologies, can best be countered through proactive measures. These measures, however, are almost all non-kinetic in nature. To the extent that they help counter a present or future threat, the military often avails itself of these non-kinetic instruments to prevent conflict and counter extremism in various locations around the world.

2) *Do you see the expansion of the Defense Department’s role in these activities as a philosophical shift in how the U.S. addresses global challenges?*

It certainly represents a philosophical shift in how the Pentagon views threats to America’s security. Thus, it also colors its approach to its principal mission to fight and win the nation’s wars. Yet it does not necessarily represent a shift in the philosophical approach of the people or government of the United States in how we address global challenges. Such a shift would be marked by a concomitant commitment to strengthen

our civilian development institutions urgently as a national security priority. It remains to be seen if our country is prepared to take this step.

3) *What do you perceive to be the comparative advantages and disadvantages of DoD conducting foreign and security assistance?*

There are a variety of advantages with the military performing foreign and security assistance.

First, the military is much more likely to tailor assistance programs to meet tactical or strategic threats to American interests than are our civilian development agencies. Second, the military has capabilities that can be deployed rapidly and robustly in a crisis, such as the use of US naval assets to respond to the 2004 Asian Tsunami. Finally, the military has surplus humanitarian capacity which can be used to address enduring development challenges, such as the use of the US navy hospital ship *Comfort* to address medical needs in Latin America in partnership with NGOs.

Yet there are a series of disadvantages with the military's involvement in assistance missions.

First, the focus on the performance of programs of tactical or strategic value can mean assistance efforts are directed to places of the greatest potential threat rather than places of the greatest human need. This would be in contravention of essential humanitarian principles of humanitarian action. It can also downplay the importance of indigenously sustainable programs.

Second, the military's growing involvement in this space risks the appearance of "militarization" of America's foreign assistance. This is a perception which makes many of our partners - governments, NGOs, etc. - extremely uncomfortable. It also has real operational consequences in the field when implementing partners refuse to cooperate with the military, or are reticent to work with USAID, for fear of being linked to US foreign policy and losing their operational neutrality.

Finally, and most importantly, DoD does not possess a coherent assessment methodology for evaluating the strategic or tactical success of its assistance programs, especially in permissive environments. In other words, the military does not have a rigorous way of determining if the vaccination of goats in Djibouti by US Army veterinarians - or other similar activities around the world - actually makes America safer in very specific ways. Without an assessment methodology, the military will not be able to justify these sorts of programs to Congress in the long term, nor will they be able to determine their relative strategic effectiveness.

4) *What is the development impact of the Defense Department's foreign assistance activities in the field?*

To my knowledge, no comprehensive, global assessment exists of the development impact of the Defense Department's foreign assistance activities in the field. There are examples to suggest both the positive and negative effects of these programs.

Many NGOs and civilian development professionals may cite examples of military assistance projects which are unsustainable and poorly thought out, such as the construction of schools without mechanisms to employ teachers and supply textbooks. In the view of skeptics, such examples demonstrate why the military should not be involved in foreign assistance focused achieving development outcomes.

Conversely, proponents of the military's involvement in foreign assistance argue that our armed forces are helping to address a vast sea of human need and, as such, their efforts should be welcomed. To the extent that such assistance also promotes America's image abroad or supports discrete security objectives, those are collateral benefits. They will often cite the military's role in disaster response (such as aiding earthquake victims in Pakistan in 2005) or supporting the tasks of civilian development agencies (such as refurbishing schools in Ethiopia in cooperation with USAID).

The lack of a comprehensive analysis of the development impact of these programs suggests both differences in the philosophy and purposes of development assistance between many civilian development advocates and those in the national security community.

It is helpful to think about two types of assistance: fundamental and instrumental.

Fundamental assistance sees improving the lives of beneficiaries as an end in and of itself. It may have the residual benefit of supporting American interests by promoting regional stability and global prosperity, but those geostrategic considerations are at best secondary to the performance of the activities. Thus, the success of fundamental assistance can be measured by the extent to which it improves the lives of the recipients.

Instrumental assistance sees improving the lives of beneficiaries as a means to some other tactical or strategic end. Whether it is a quick impact project to employ disaffected youth - as the military did in Sadr City, Iraq in 2004 - or supporting governance initiatives in Mindanao, Philippines as part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P) to fight the Abu Sayyef Islamist insurgency, such activities are designed specifically to advance US security interests. Yet they can only be successful if two things happen. First, they must actually improve the lives of the beneficiaries, as in fundamental assistance. Second, those improvements must be casually linked to the achievement of discrete American policy objectives.

Both fundamental and instrumental assistance should operate on the principle of "first, do no harm." Only when we differentiate the types of assistance in this manner can we meaningfully assess the relative development impact of the Defense Department's foreign assistance activities.

5) *What is your assessment of the Defense Department's programs, including the 1207 programs, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and programs carried out by the various combatant commands such as SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM?*

Both the 1207 programs and CERP have given Combatant Commanders and tactical commanders on the battlefield much needed flexibility to bring non-kinetic tools to pressing security problems.

Yet the very existence of these programs represents two more fundamental issues.

First, the Pentagon has recognized the strategic relevance of improving the lives through foreign assistance. In this sense, the Pentagon is much further ahead than much of the development assistance community, the conventional US foreign policy community and the American public.

Second, it demonstrates the inability of the US government's development assistance institutions in their present form to perform these missions in every environment when they are needed, with the flexibility they are needed, and within the timeframe they are needed.

With regard to AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, I believe it is still too early to determine the efficacy of their assistance programs. Despite its best intentions, the mission of AFRICOM is still vague with regard to implementation. SOUTHCOM has a long history of doing disaster response missions in the Americas, but it is not yet clear how they will utilize humanitarian assistance as a mechanism to advance prosperity in the Americas, consistent with US interest, in a manner unique to the capabilities of the US armed forces.

6) *What steps need to be taken to ensure that the State Department and USAID are better able to undertake those missions currently executed by the Department of Defense, including 1206 security assistance and development programs?*

There are a series of hard and soft tasks that should be taken to ensure the ability of the State Department and USAID to undertake assistance missions currently being executed by DoD. Hard tasks may be defined as steps which require changes in legislation, policy or programs. Soft tasks are shifts in culture, attitude or approach.

Among the hard tasks to be taken are the following:

- There should be an easing of the legal restrictions on USAID mission directors in the field that critically limit their ability to respond flexibly to changing conditions on the ground, particularly in support of USG or US military strategic objectives.

- The size of the cadre of USAID foreign service officers and development professionals should be increased enough to support every development billet in every USAID mission, to provide one Tactical Development Advisor to every deployable brigade combat team in the US Army and every Marine Expeditionary Unit in the US Marine Corps, to support every regional Combatant Command, and every relevant interagency planning and policy staff.
- USAID and State Department personnel must truly be world wide deployable and be trained to operate in expeditionary, semi- to- non permissive environments as a matter of course.

Some of the soft tasks that should be performed are:

- A cultural shift in USAID in which all of the personnel in the agency recognize their role in support of the national security of the United States through the performance of both fundamental and instrumental development assistance.
- The recognition of the value of developmental and stability operations within the State Department and rewarding people professionally who take such assignments in their careers.

7) What concerns, if any, do you have about the Department of Defense casting its development and humanitarian assistance programs in terms of "military necessity," i.e., for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency purposes?

I have no concerns about the undertaking of development and humanitarian programs as a matter of "military necessity," so long as that is understood within the framework of fundamental vs. instrumental assistance defined earlier (wherein military necessity would roughly equate to instrumental assistance). Indeed, I support it in principle. I believe that our nation must utilize all instruments of its power - defense, diplomacy, and development - to advance its interests abroad.

It is imperative, however, that our government recognizes that we have an interest in doing both fundamental and instrumental assistance effectively. We should ensure that we support both of those missions accordingly with the resources that are required to advance our objectives.

8) If USAID and State were blessed with unlimited resources, what would need to occur internally for those agencies to effectively execute their development and diplomatic missions, respectively?

If there were no constraints on resources, the following measures would, in my view, best enable USAID and the State Department to execute their missions most effectively:

- The creation of a cabinet level Department for Development. The creation of a cabinet-level development agency is the best way to ensure that the development mission (both fundamental and instrumental) is sufficiently protected bureaucratically that it will be an enduring, strong feature of our national security

- Protect the fundamental development mission. The lack of a formidable domestic constituency for foreign assistance often makes it vulnerable to budget cuts. Yet we know that fundamental development requires long term commitment. Furthermore, the United States has a clear interest in helping states continue along the path of sustainable democratic development, regardless of their near-term strategic value. Thus funds dedicated to this mission must be protected against the vicissitudes of the annual appropriations process. There are at least two ways to do this. The first is to mandate by law that some portion of the budget (either tied to the entire budget, or the defense appropriation, or the foreign operations appropriation, or some other budgetary mechanism) will be dedicated to fundamental development assistance to be executed by USAID or another relevant agency. The other is to contract out the fundamental development assistance mission to the UN Development Program or another major international organization, and dedicate a fixed multi-year appropriation to them with whatever caveats might be particular to American foreign assistance priorities.
- Increase the USAID FSO and civil servant corps. There is no question that we are desperately in need of increasing the number of full-time employees of USAID. The only question is by how much. In an environment free of resource constraints, the number of USAID FTEs should be increased back to its Vietnam-era compliment of 15,000 people. This would provide enough staff to give robust support to all essential USAID missions around the world, to deploy development professionals with the military at every level of the chain of command, ensure their participation on all relevant staffs, rebuild in-house technical expertise, and provide ample cushion for training, attrition, and a surge of personnel in response to complex emergencies and national disasters.

Conclusion

Development assistance is not just a moral good or a matter of enlightened self-interest. It is in our vital national interests. There is no greater evidence of this than the military's increasing involvement in this sphere. Yet our own political culture and legal processes have not yet caught up to this reality on the ground. Our government has a clear stake in the successful performance of fundamental and instrumental assistance. I hope this hearing will be a meaningful step to empower our civilian agencies to be effective in this regard.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank all of you very much for your contribution today. And I will start the questioning by yielding myself 5 minutes, which unfortunately limits both my question and your answer to that time period. But I need it.

I want to raise the issue that Mr. Christenson sort of addressed specifically. The issue, put aside for a second the issue of who is leading development assistance in peaceful environments, and let us turn to the non-permissive environment, which I think is a euphemism for “scary.”

And yesterday I met with a group that I think started in Los Angeles. It is called the International Medical Corps. I didn’t know much about them. And this is a group of people using lots of local hires, dedicated particularly to building the healthcare capacity in these transitional and very difficult areas, including the areas in eastern and southern Afghanistan right near the border, and a number of other conflict areas. And these are not what I would call peaceful environments.

But they make the case that because they are focused on doing what the community needs, and finding out the community’s desires in terms of healthcare delivery systems and vaccinations and medical attention, and focused on capacity; and because they do it, that if they were part of the military, if they were uniformed or had uniformed security around, they would become the object of attack much more than they are now. They are quite able to function in these areas in part because they are—even though they are all recognized as an American-based NGO with a specific mission, it is their arm’s length from the military that allows them to function, and function well.

You talked about the problem in these environments. I am curious, I guess my first question is, to the extent—Mr. Christenson, you made a point of discussing this—I am curious about the General’s reaction and the other witnesses’ reaction to that. Maybe I will just leave it to the next 2½ minutes for you to talk about this whole question of the role of the civilian agencies and their contractees working in these kinds of environments.

General HAGEE. I would be happy to start, Mr. Chairman.

First off, I think the role that these agencies play is absolutely critical. I have seen it time and time again. And I will go back to the Somalia example.

The NGOs and most of these individuals were 19, 20, 21, under 25 years old, out there in, as you said, a very scary environment, but doing unbelievably good work. And as they told us, we can’t do it if we are aligned with you. And to be quite honest, we understood that.

But what we were able to work out, just one example, is instead of them using Somalis for their own security, we said well, we are going to be running a convoy from town X to town Y. And I know you can’t go with us. But if you happen to be in the same area as we are traveling, then that would be fine, and we wouldn’t be opposed to that.

And when we kicked off the convoy, not very far behind there were a couple of NGOs tagging along with us. They were not associated with us, which we understood, but we were able to provide that security if anything happened.

I think trying to militarize—my term—these individuals would be the wrong thing to do.

Chairman BERMAN. Ms. Lindborg?

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes, thank you. Mr. Berman, I think you captured exactly the important ways in which NGOs can operate in these non-permissive environments.

And what Mr. Christenson was yearningly describing as a needed function actually already exists with NGOs who do go out with local team members, outside the wire, without arms, able to sit down, know the local customs, drink tea and gain both community acceptance and protection based on the knowledge that the communities have that we are there to advance projects in their interest.

Mercy Corps has worked since 2003 in Iraq unarmed, outside the wire, with support from USAID from the beginning, a wonderful partner in Col. Grabowski in al Kut, who enabled us to operate very separately. He never attempted to make it a joint effort. We found ways to coordinate and to communicate. And we were able to move forward community infrastructure projects in ways in which communities could envision and invest in their own future.

Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. My time has expired. The ranking member, the gentlelady from Florida, recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the excellent testimony to each of our witnesses.

I wanted to ask about micro-managing other countries through our programs. According to one report, after the State Department created its Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development, that office published a list of its aims, and in the course of that, listed 1,179 steps that the agency would take to carry out stabilization and reconstruction efforts in foreign countries.

Those steps included: Maintaining positive relations with the indigenous population; assessing the need for prosthetic limbs in the population; improving drainage during road construction to reduce excessive run-offs; et cetera. It was a long list.

And if that report was accurate, doesn't it seem to demonstrate that the current programs for stabilization and reconstruction actually envision a level of micro-management in foreign societies and governments and economies that could result in further financial bottomless pits for the American taxpayer? I would be interested in knowing your comments.

Mr. BRIGETY. Congresswoman, thank you very much for the question.

Let me say two things quickly. First of all, with regard to stabilization and the foreign assistance that is required for it.

We are still relatively new at trying to understand the best doctrine to do this sort of mission. But what I can say is that the nature of warfare, the nature of our understanding of warfare has changed so dramatically, that the mission will not go away, even as we are trying to figure out how best to do it.

On the specific question you raised with regard to micro-management. Tomorrow the Center for American Progress is going to be releasing, which we are calling "Swords and Plowshares," which essentially looks at the development piece of whatever our Afghanistan strategy is going to be. And the argument, one of the argu-

ments we make in that is that it is actually very quite important to do what we call catalytic development.

So as opposed to bringing in large numbers of outside Western service providers, the question is, how can you think about using development resources very, very strategically? So that you actually engage the local population, engage the local government, to begin to develop their own responses to these sorts of issues.

Now, this is something that happens in other contexts, with much more, much more stable development contexts that our development NGO partners can talk about in detail.

The question is how do you do that in a way, when you are operating in an insecure and non-permissive environment, and do it in a way that actually links to our strategic objectives.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I look forward to seeing that report. I am going to interrupt you just in case anyone else would like to comment.

Ms. LINDBORG. I would make a quick comment, in that I think it is essential that we equip USAID and other civilian parts of the government with the kind of flexibility that the military commanders have right now, to do more contextually appropriate, fast-moving, flexible work in the field.

To have a myriad of chains and directives coming from Washington fundamentally undercuts their ability to be effective. And as we look forward, that should be a cornerstone of the reform process.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Christenson?

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I think we have to start by working on coming up with a definition of where our authority stops in another country's domestic affairs.

We have become enormously intrusive. After World War II there were things that we just expected the Germans to do on their own, but nowadays we go in and every single thing becomes a matter of our interest.

There is a great line by George Ball, who was Under Secretary of State under Kennedy. There was a coup in Zanzibar, and the State Department sent him a memo on the subject. He wrote back, "God watches every sparrow that falls. I do not see why we should compete in His league."

I think on some of these projects that we are doing, we are just way too involved at the micro level. We have got to step back and let them govern themselves.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member. These have been a very important series of hearings.

Col. Hagee, I spent a lot of early time in Afghanistan as the war there began, and interacted in many parts of Afghanistan, watching our military be very effective in school-building. In fact, one CODEL that I was on brought a large amount of schoolbooks from youngsters who collected schoolbooks. And we were interacting with what I think is your provisional reconstruction teams, the

PRTs I think, those kinds of names. So I frankly believe that there is an appropriate balance to the utilization of the military.

However, as you well know in the contrast, you know the outrage of Members of Congress when they heard about stacks of dollars that were stacked up or piled up in blocks, going out into Iraq. And how did \$12 million, or I think it was \$12,000, get lost.

So there is sort of an accountability, not pointing the finger, but I think I am coming down on the idea of balance, with a higher reference to how NGOs and USAID.

And I will pose a question to you, but I am going to go to my, to Ms. Lindborg and Dr. Brigety, please, if you would.

Explore for me again the flexibility that you are asking for USAID, which I frankly very much agree with. They need to be able to produce. And sometimes the regulatory maze that we have for USAID keeps them from actually producing in that village, or with that warlord, if they are enacting.

Tell me what you mean when you say give them greater flexibility, as well. Now, I am talking to you, Dr. Lindborg. Not Dr. Lindborg—yes, Ms. Nancy Lindborg, excuse me.

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you can accept Doctor, that is all right.

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, thank you for the Doctor.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And then I will go to Dr. Brigety. Thank you.

Ms. LINDBORG. You know what we often see in the field is that USAID is constrained by earmarks and by authorities that are, and decisions that are made here in Washington, without affording the mission directors the flexibility to make decisions that are driven by fast-moving, often non-permissive environments.

They are also highly constrained in their ability to leave their compound. And I think there is an interesting discussion enabling civilian government folks to move about more freely, without being confined by shooters and armors.

However—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That means their escorts? You are telling them to be unescorted?

Ms. LINDBORG. It is a delicate balance between security and overburdening our civilian government people with too many escorts.

The NGOs, of course, have the great flexibility of being able to move about without shooters, without armor; and an ability to work with the communities to develop those more fundamental development plans and approaches.

And you often don't know what will be the most effective until you are in it. And so to—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

Ms. LINDBORG [continuing]. Have that pre-wired from Washington constrains your ability to be successful.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would argue that you make a valid point, but I would like to give us flexibility, as well. But I would like to increase the flexible money versus the non-flexible. There are some valuable purposes for some of the designated monies.

Dr. Brigety, let me try to get what you think is the appropriate ratio. How much more should we give? Look at the crisis in Darfur where al-Bashir is sending people out. I can tell you, being in the

camps of Sudan, sitting on the ground in Darfur in those camps, those NGOs were a lifeline.

How do we reinforce them and give them that flexible, NGOs and USAID?

Mr. BRIGETY. Well, ma'am, let me sort of try to address the flexibility question from a slightly different perspective with a story very quickly, if I may.

This past November, a young Marine Corps Captain came to see me. He was assigned to the U.S. Africa Command. And he was given several hundred thousand dollars, and said look, we have to spend this money by the end of the fiscal year. I want you to fly to N'Djamena, to Chad, and go find some projects, humanitarian projects to spend this on. You have 3 weeks to do it.

Now, he is a very dedicated young Marine. He is a very smart young man. He was an infantry officer, younger than I by a lot. And the point is we have a legal system which entrusts young military officers with that kind of flexibility; and yet, we have USAID mission directors with masters and Ph.D.s, who have 20 or 25 years or more experience, who cannot deviate more than a few thousand dollars lest they go to jail. And that makes them ineffective partners with regard to the military.

Now, I see that I am running out of time. So with regard to the larger question of ratios, I can't speak to that with any specificity. It really depends on the particular—

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think we should increase the monies to go into USAID and have flexibility?

Mr. BRIGETY. There is no question. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Increase money, get more flexibility.

Mr. BRIGETY. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. My time has expired.

I thank the General for his service. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our distinguished panel for excellent testimony.

General Hagee, you mentioned defense, diplomacy and development, the three smart power pillars. As I said earlier, the fourth power principle I think has to be profound respect for the indigenous, the life-affirming indigenous cultural values, including respect for the sanctity of human life, especially unborn children and their mothers. We need to affirm them both. And as we build out and grow our capabilities, I am concerned that that may not be the case.

When President Obama reversed the Mexico City policy a few weeks ago, he unleashed \$0.5 billion to promote, lobby, and perform abortions on demand in the developing world. That action puts millions of innocent babies, mostly babies of color, at risk of death; and in no way, in no way can be construed as development.

I am concerned that there could be a backlash, especially as more high-profile efforts are underway. The military obviously in their uniform will be out working side by side with NGOs. NGOs have always been an extension of our U.S. foreign policy, but very often

they are integrated in a way that people don't necessarily know who is footing the bill. It will be very clear in this situation.

And I think we run the risk of being the ugly American. I know many people in Africa, many politicians, many people in the health departments who want both mother and baby protected, and not one at the expense of the other.

Secondly, what thought has been given—you might want to answer this—to integrating the Veterans Affairs Committee, Veterans Affairs Administration, who has unbelievable expertise in PTSD, poly-trauma, and issues like prosthetic limbs? I remember when the FMLN, with their foot-taker-offer mines in the early eighties, hurt so many children. And I was there. The VA came in and helped fit many of those young children with prosthetic limbs, especially legs and lower extremities.

Is the VA part of this? Because they do have an expertise that is very valuable.

And finally, the concept of more fully integrating military assets with diplomacy and development, I started out earlier talking about emergency versus sustainable. I think you are too modest when you say the military instrument can create conditions of security to allow the others to do their job.

But when it comes to rapid response, no one does it better than the military. I love the NGOs, but in terms of getting there with the right kind of expertise, for safe water, for helping people who are really on life support, no one does it better than the military. So I hope that is being integrated, as well.

General HAGEE. Mr. Smith, could I ask for a clarification on your question? I want to be sure I use my time appropriately here, exactly what I should address.

Mr. SMITH. How robust is the idea of integrating the VA, including military doctors and the Medical Corps, in the USAID plan and the plan for healthcare, in such a way that if something happens, individuals from the U.S. military can be rapidly deployed?

Like in Sri Lanka. I was there when there were people in the military from my own district that were doing clean water projects, without which people would have gotten contaminated water and gotten very sick. And I just hope that is being fully integrated.

Because again, Provide Comfort. I saw Kurds with American military jackets, camouflage. Without that, the exposure to the elements would have taken many of those individuals. They would have died had it not been for our military. There was about a month lead time, and after that, the baton was very effectively handed over to the NGOs, who did a great job thereafter.

General HAGEE. Well, I would say that, at least it has been my experience, that you are right. The United States military is the best as far as putting expeditionary forces quickly into a crisis site, whether it is a tsunami in Indonesia or the earthquake in Pakistan.

And I have never seen a crowded battlefield. So from a commander's standpoint, I would say you all come. Whether it is the VA, whether it is the Agricultural Department, whether it is the Commerce Department. If you have got the capability and can provide some help here, then there is room for you at this particular situation.

I would like to comment on the NGOs, though. As I said, I have been in East Timor, I have been in Somalia, I have been in some of the real garden spots of the world. And it has always amazed me. We come flying in on a helicopter; we have got significant capability; and there is normally an NGO already there on the ground, trying to do the work.

So I continually tip my hat to these NGOs, primarily young men and women who are out there trying to do the right thing.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I am going to yield myself 15 seconds, just to assure the gentleman from New Jersey, no one is suggesting that for purposes of logistical and lift capacity, that anyone can deliver humanitarian assistance after these disasters, like the U.S. military. Provide comfort, many other situations, we have all seen this. That is not an issue of debate here, I don't think.

And I do want to welcome the presence of someone on the Armed Services Committee who has been very active on this issue of foreign assistance, and how it is being delivered, and in what situations: The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Snyder. It is good to have you here.

And I now recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, for 5 minutes. And welcome back.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I understand before I got here, you said some nice words. Thank you for those words. And I am delighted to be back in this seat.

Thank you, witnesses. What a great panel you are.

I have introduced, and am reintroducing, legislation called Smart Security, with a partnership of women, Action for New Directions, WAND, and Physicians for Social Responsibility, and National Priorities Project, which includes the Friends Committee and Church Women United. So you can imagine what, without me saying any more, what this is all about. It is all about war being the very last option for any country, particularly our own. And instead, investing and focusing on prevention, diplomacy, reconciliation, and reconstruction. And it is much more than that, but I am not going to go into that any further. I just want to give you a sense of it.

But because of that, we know that we need to increase the international affairs budget in order to get our goals at least brought forward. So in the Congressional Progressive Caucus, in our alternative progressive budget, which will come to the floor, actually pluses up it is called Section 150, the International Affairs Budget, by even more than the President is asking.

And I am part of a group that is working with our Chairman Berman in order to get Members of Congress to accept no less than what the President is asking for this section of our budget.

So I am going to ask General Hagee, I have a question for you, then I have a question for Mr. Christenson. I am going to ask both questions, and then you can answer them. We have 2 minutes left.

In plusing up the international affairs budget, do you believe we need to offset it by decreasing the Department of Defense budget? Do you see that as the tradeoff, if we take those functions out of Defense and give them, put them where they need to be?

And Mr. Christenson, what do you think about targeting funds in the international affairs budget so that it goes for humanitarian,

diplomatic, rebuilding, education, and prevents any expenditures in weapons of, military weapons for these countries, nations that we invest in?

Starting with you, Mr. Hagee, General Hagee.

General HAGEE. On the question, I wish I was smart enough to be able to answer that question as to how we should balance, how we should balance that.

One thing I am absolutely convinced of is that our foreign aid and our diplomacy is under-resourced. These are questions of significant national importance. And today, a couple million dollars doesn't sound like very much when we are talking about trillions of dollars. But to me, the amount of money that we are really talking about is insignificant when you look at the issue that we are facing.

So to me, it is really quite simple to provide the appropriate resources for our Diplomatic Corps and for foreign assistance people.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Christenson? You look concerned.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. On the issue of spending, I go to Africa, and I come back just so feeling guilty for having collected a consulting fee that I often don't bill for all the days I worked.

If we can do things where we actually target money for those people in the villages, paying teachers, providing books, buying medicines, paying the nurses, training more nurses and doctors, I think that is just wonderful.

With regard to military, this is just an Africa answer. I have yet to see an African country, other than maybe Botswana or South Africa, that actually benefitted from having an army. When I think of African armies, I think of guys who set up the roadblocks on Friday afternoon to shake down the passersby so they could get drunk on the weekends.

What Africans need is a police force. They need an ability to enforce the law. But they don't need an army.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, one of the things that is most important in foreign policy is to have a good image of the United States. And if you, if you make a severe mistake and the enemy can profit from it, they will.

And back in 2006, General, we had a very difficult situation occur in Haditha, Iraq. And one of my colleagues said that the Marines that were involved were cold-blooded killers. And three of those have been found innocent. One case is still pending, and I think there is some litigation taking place.

You met with our colleague and talked to him about that. And I would like to know how the conversation went, and whether or not you reinforced what he said, or what took place. Because our enemies, Iran and others, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Aljazeera, they played that up big time. And they made it look like the United States was a bunch of killers and murderers and doing horrible things, when in fact this was not the case.

And I would like to know, first of all, did you reinforce what our colleague said? And number two, what do you think we ought to

do in the future to make sure we don't have these sorts of things occur?

I mean, before we judge somebody guilty, we should have all the facts. And so I would like to have your answer on that.

General HAGEE. When I became aware of the incident in Haditha, I came over and briefed the so-called Big Eight, the chairman and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and the Appropriations Committee that looks at defense. And I told them what I knew, which was not very much, and that was essentially that 24 Iraqis had been killed after an IED had gone off; and that it included women and children.

Other than that, we didn't know very much; that we had started an investigation. And I promised each one of them that we would investigate that very carefully, both actually what happened on the ground that night during combat, and also what happened as far as the chain of command is concerned. And if anyone did anything legally wrong or morally wrong, they would be held accountable. And that is what I told each one of those individuals.

And in fact, we did that. We spent, it was much longer than I desired. It took almost 6 months, but we went down every email, every trail, to ensure that we understood, to the best of our ability, what occurred, both up the chain of command and on the ground.

There were some, and the end result, there were some senior Marine officers who in fact were disciplined. And there were, as you indicated, there were other Marines, some senior, who have been charged, and there is still one pending.

I can tell you that Marines were operating, at least a few weeks ago, in Haditha. We were able to explain to them, apologize for what we did. Sometimes things like that happen. You ask how can we prevent that from happening. I don't think—we try hard, but we cannot prevent, on the battlefield, things like that from happening.

The main point I want to make is we held individuals accountable, we went back and we talked with the people, and we are back operating there.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I guess the point I would like to make, General, and I was hoping you would reinforce this; and that is, we believe in this country that you are innocent until proven guilty. And four of the people that are fighting for our country in a war zone, and they are accused of being cold-blooded killers, is just wrong. Especially when you find out later on that three of them were not guilty, and one of them, and the other one may not be guilty, as well.

And so I just was hoping that—

General HAGEE. I can assure you, Mr. Burton, that in the Marine Corps, that is exactly what happened. We never said a thing until after the court martials were over, and the verdict was—

Mr. BURTON. You didn't reinforce anything that was said by our colleague.

General HAGEE. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Well, but you would agree that in the future, we shouldn't condemn somebody in a war zone of a war crime unless it has been proven.

General HAGEE. I think we always need to look at it. Whenever there is a report, we always need to investigate that report.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, General. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would ask unanimous consent to enter my opening statement into the record.

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I want to say hello, especially to my former colleague, Phil Christenson. Good to see you again, Phil, in our respective roles. And I really appreciate what you had to say this morning.

I have got two questions. The first is, I just got back from Afghanistan a couple weeks ago. And CERP funding for the military in Afghanistan, according to the auditors, a few years ago was \$26 million. The amount for the budget this year is \$977 million.

Now, we talked about whether, you know, the appropriate role of the military in development assistance, that would make it one of the largest bilateral aid programs in the world. All being run by the military, all being run sort of on the cusp.

I understand the need to get some flexibility to local commanders on the ground to be able to try to win hearts and minds, but \$977 million is many orders of magnitude greater than that, and raises very serious questions about what could go wrong with that. Let alone, does it fit into any context that makes sense in terms of development profile for Afghanistan?

General Hagee, your comments on that challenge?

General HAGEE. Am I still on? I am still on.

I believe, as my colleagues here have all testified, that we need to have the flexibility. The individuals on the ground need to have that flexibility to help where help is needed. And primarily that comes in the source of money.

How that should be divided, especially when you have a Chief of Mission there, I think is something that should, in fact, be discussed.

When I was operating, and if I had funds, before I would expend those funds, I would always, if there was a Chief of Mission, if there was an ambassador, I would always discuss that with him. How should these funds be expended?

I don't know whether that is being done over there or not. I would assume that it would be. I was unaware of that very, very large figure. It is a large figure.

I don't have a good answer for that, except that I believe that our diplomats and our foreign assistance individuals need the same flexibility that the military has. How that should be divided, someone smarter than I am is going to have to figure that out.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Lindborg.

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you. I think you raise a critically important point. And that is, fundamentally, CERP programs are for different purposes than longer-term development. And the danger is that they, in fact, can undercut the objectives and the processes of

longer-term development. And we have seen that over and over again.

If you build a school through your CERP funds, often it isn't integrated into local community priorities, it isn't resourced through teachers through the longer-term provision of supplies, et cetera, et cetera.

It is important that there is a civilian-led structure that clarifies the development priorities that are not subordinated to the short-term objectives accomplished by CERP.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Real quickly, Phil or Dr. Brigety?

Mr. BRIGETY. Sir, I can't speak to the specific number, but I think the size of that number suggests two things.

The first is that the military clearly understands that reconstruction activities are vital to the achievement of their objectives in Afghanistan.

And the second is that the CERP mechanism is likely the most flexible, certainly amongst the most flexible, if not the most flexible mechanism to get money to do the reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.

And that suggests that are civilian processes for moving money and for strategizing how that money is spent in the context of a crucial foreign policy priority—that is, stabilizing Afghanistan—is flawed, profoundly flawed, and it should be fixed.

Mr. CONNOLLY. It also raises questions about whether the military has the confidence to be running that massive an USAID program, frankly. I mean, that is not your mission.

Real quickly, Secretary Gates has characterized the global war on terror as a global irregular campaign. What is the proper role for the State Department and USAID in that irregular campaign? Phil?

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Well, I don't necessarily agree with Secretary Gates. That is my first problem in answering the question. But I think the State Department needs to be providing the real, solid, in-depth expertise about foreign societies and cultures and to make sure that that expertise is injected into the policy decision making here in Washington.

I personally believe we don't know what we are doing in some of these countries. And we need to.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for joining us today. I appreciate your insights.

There is a photo from the Iraq War, perhaps you have seen it. It is a soldier sitting cross-legged underneath the shadow of a tank, with a variety of military operations going on behind him. And across his lap is a small child. And I think in that photo, we right there most poignantly capture the dynamic of what we are talking about here today.

And in that regard, Mr. Brigety, you had made some comments, if I understood them correctly, about embedding, effectively embedding Foreign Service Officers into military units.

Mr. Christenson, you have the insight as to some of the mechanics of how this is now working, where you have a lot of white-collar workers simply in a bunker, and perhaps not being leveraged as effectively as it could.

With this new model, though, I would like to unpack that further. How do you envision the skill sets and expertise of a Foreign Service Officer being embedded into a military unit? Or should another, could an alternative model be set up, where you have a military officer or a trained military personnel, who in effect is a Foreign Service Officer, or has the same skill set, and would work more seamlessly with the State Department mission, in the midst of combat and difficult situations, knowing full well what the expectation is.

Mr. BRIGETY. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for that question. Let me try to answer it quickly with a quick anecdote.

I talked with a Marine Corps second lieutenant in 2005, January 2005. He fought in the second battle of Fallujah November 2004, and he won a Silver Star in that battle for gallantry.

And someone asked him what else do you wish you had on that battlefield? Expecting him to say better body armor or better air support. And he said, "You know what I really wished I had? I really wished I had a Peace Corps on steroids." Meaning I really wish I had somebody there on the tactical level who could help me with all the vast sort of humanitarian issues I had to deal with.

Here is how I think it could work. We already send senior Foreign Service Officers as senior development advisors to each of the geographic combatant commands. They are not unlike political advisors or POLADs, senior ambassadors.

We can certainly, if we have the right numbers, have much more junior-level development officers who are broadly educated in things like community development, basic healthcare or whatnot, that are attached to a brigade level and a new-level team, for two reasons.

One, so that young second lieutenant or young captain has a ready-made resource at hand that he can ask about how do I go about engaging the community in these sorts of stabilization reconstruction operations.

And two, so you have someone who could help train these military units in garrison back here in the States, before they deploy.

DoD Directive 3000.05 explicitly places stabilization and reconstruction at the core mission of the Defense Department, alongside combat operations. And yet we don't have the infrastructure to help that, the civilian infrastructure embedded in the teams to help them perform that mission. And we should.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. General?

General HAGEE. Could I add a little bit on that?

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Sure.

General HAGEE. First off, I think it is a good model. But meeting on the battlefield is not the place that you should meet.

I was the Commanding General of the first Marine expeditionary force before the war responsible for going up. And I requested a State Department individual to come and help us with the planning. We could not get such an individual. They need to be an integral part of that team.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Which commands, which demands a new model for integration. Either a military officer that is cross-trained in Foreign Service expertise, or vice-versa, where a Foreign Service Officer is going to be in harm's way potentially, not necessarily carrying a rifle on the front lines. Or effectively integrated, if we are going to pursue this direction.

General HAGEE. In a pure system, sir, I would argue that it should be a State Department individual.

And one reason why, if I could, Ambassador Bob Oakley and I worked together in Somalia. He was a Foreign Service Officer, a young Foreign Service Officer in Vietnam, when he was told to write the Vietnamese Constitution. And he wrote the Vietnamese Constitution. It sounded an awful lot like ours.

He brought that to Somalia. And when he was told to write the Somali Constitution, he said no, I am not; they have to write it.

An individual who has served most of his time in the military doesn't bring that breadth of experience.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Ms. Lindborg?

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just add that for non-permissive environment-assistance activities, you need to have models that allow for differentiation. You need to have models that enable your NGOs and some of your civilian aid workers to not be associated with the military on the ground.

And that, especially to jump-start the longer-term development which can and must begin as early as possible, it cannot be connected to a military force.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, it might be common objectives, but separate distinct roles here. So, thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Brigety, thank you for your words, and those of everyone on the panel. I want to start with you, because I represent the City of Minneapolis, State of Minnesota, large Somali population. And as you know, Somali has been referred to several times this morning.

It is a state where, you know, we have had some military presence. And now, you know, it may be the world's longest state without a government.

So I am interested, I am really interested in this topic, as to how we merge military and aid development, State Department-type functions, in order to get a state up on its feet. But you could expand this more generally. It is not just Somalia; there are other places where this is needed.

And so one of our greatest security challenges facing us is how to strengthen weak or failing governments and states. And this is, it is critical to strengthen these kinds of places, and to get them to a point where they can resume responsibility for their own development, and become strong partners for the U.S. and the world community.

Our military is obviously concerned about how to strengthen weak states, and even Secretary Gates has called for a greater capacity at USAID to address this challenge.

But at the same time, all the money—well, not all—but most of the money and resources are with the DoD. And yet we have seen smaller resources other places.

Given the resource imbalance, what mechanisms can ensure our development mission is not overwhelmed by priorities and timelines of our military capacity? Can you speak about the balance, and to make sure what we do—and I am talking about in the short term. Because in the long term, we can just redesign, write a bill, redesign a program. But how do we get from where we are to that place where we have a new model that we are working from?

Mr. BRIGETY. Congressman, thank you very much. It is a terrific question.

The difficulty obviously is that there is no short-term solution. I mean, the imbalance has to be fixed. That is the first step.

You asked an awful lot of things there. I think certainly with regard to what can be done in the reasonably near term, it is vitally important that the American public understands that foreign assistance is a national security priority. It is not simply a matter of good works. Our military leadership has done a very, very good job in articulating that. But once your constituents and the constituents of others understand that, I think that will create the space in order to be able to address the imbalance.

In addition, I think that, certainly with regard to someplace like Somalia, although there are clear development things which can be done to improve the lives of the population, that is ultimately a political issue that has to be resolved.

And I would suggest that that is going to help us to think through other forms of diplomacy. And the State Department I think has been very, very good traditionally at great power representational stuff, representational diplomacy.

But I would think they need to get better at what I like to call tactical diplomacy. And that is being able to understand at the very, very grassroots level who the major political players are, what their various interests are, and how they can be accommodated in ways that support their interests and support ours.

That is a model, for example, that we have also articulated with regard to Afghanistan, with regard to trying to understand the broad breadth of the Taliban insurgency.

Mr. ELLISON. And also, Dr. Brigety, is part of the problem that we really are transitioning from sort of a great power model of national defense, and into this new era, where we have these weak, failing states that can be exploited by hostile elements.

Are we really, are we looking at a paradigm shift here? Do we need to look at the problem in that way?

Mr. BRIGETY. Yes, sir. I think that is the essence of the problem. We have a structure which is still both in our military and our diplomatic corps, but is still geared toward Cold War large-scale, great power threats. And yet the threats that we have, as in the case of the 2002 National Security Strategy, are coming from weak and failing states. And we absolutely have to restructure our Government and our foreign policy in order to do it.

Interestingly, the military is farthest ahead on this. So on the one hand, there is cause for concern for the military's involvement

in this space. On the other hand, they are simply reacting to the world which they see. And now we have to have the rest of our structures catch up to that.

Mr. ELLISON. General Brigety, the last one was—I mean, excuse me. General Hagee, I am sorry. In the last few moments, could you talk about, do you think we know enough about how to get a failing or weak state back up on its feet? Do we have the intellectual capital we need to know how to do this?

General HAGEE. Oh, I think we have the intellectual capital, but I would echo what Mr. Smith said. What we need is a true understanding of that people, that culture, and what they want.

We, the American people have a lot of really good characteristics; unfortunately, understanding a different culture is not one of them.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I seek unanimous consent to place into the record an article mentioned by Mr. Christenson, "Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool," written by three former USAID administrators, Brian Atwood, Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios, a bipartisan group of USAID administrators, placed in the record. Without objection, that will be the order.

And also a letter by a group of former top military commanders all across the armed services, including General Hagee, under the letterhead of the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, regarding the Fiscal Year 2010 international affairs budget. Without objection, that will be the order.

[The information referred to follows:]

Arrested Development

Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool

By J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios

Washington's foreign aid programs have improved in many ways during the Bush presidency. Official development assistance has increased from \$10 billion in 2000 to \$22 billion in 2008, funding two dozen presidential initiatives, many of them innovative and groundbreaking. At the same time, however, the organizational structures and statutes governing these programs have become chaotic and incoherent thanks to 20 years of accumulated neglect by both Republicans and Democrats in the executive and legislative branches. The president has elevated development to a theoretically equal place with defense and diplomacy in what is considered the new paradigm of national power: "the three Ds." But this vision has not been realized because of organizational and programmatic chaos. The Defense Department's massive staff has assumed roles that should be performed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Pentagon's \$600 billion budget has eclipsed those of the civilian agencies.

The Pentagon recognizes this problem. In November 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for a "dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security." Gates pointed to the "asymmetric-warfare challenge" U.S. forces face in the field and insisted that "success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping the behavior of friends, adversaries, and, most importantly, the people in between." In March 2008, retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni and Navy Admiral Leighton Smith, representing a group of more than 50 retired flag and general officers, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of a budget increase for the State Department and USAID. Zinni and Smith said, "We know that the 'enemies' in the world today are actually conditions—poverty, infectious disease, political turmoil and corruption, environmental and energy challenges."

The U.S. foreign assistance program has traditionally sought to support U.S. national security and promote economic growth, poverty reduction, and humanitarian relief abroad. Modern foreign aid efforts began with the Marshall Plan, which was justified as a national security measure, a humanitarian contribution, and an effort to build markets for U.S. exports. In the intervening years, the policy rationale for aid has not changed much, and it remains as compelling now as it was then.

Effective foreign aid programs, therefore, can and should be a crucial component of U.S. foreign policy. To ensure that taxpayer dollars are well spent on a single, coherent foreign aid bureaucracy under one chain of command, the next president will have to push through major institutional reforms. But as many recent studies have demonstrated, U.S. development efforts lack coherent policy guidance and are spread across myriad

agencies with little coordination among them. Such a sad state of affairs did not always exist. We can testify to this from our own experience, having collectively run USAID for 16 years, under both Democratic and Republican administrations. We share the concern that our civilian capacities have eroded at a time when they are most needed. The United States cannot win the hearts and minds of the world's people with only an anemic USAID presence in the developing world. The situation will not improve without sensible presidential leadership to support an independent, vigorous, and restructured USAID or a new federal department devoted to development.

downsizing development

During the Cold War, USAID's presence abroad was far more significant than it is today. Leaders realized that the agency's staff was one of the most powerful instruments of soft power the U.S. government had at its disposal. In many places, USAID is the most visible face of the U.S. government; its influence at the level of civil society is far greater than the State Department's or the Pentagon's, whose representatives tend to remain in capital cities. USAID officers have daily interactions with civil-society leaders, government officials, members of local legislative bodies, businesspeople, and ministries that deal with development issues.

For much of its existence, USAID had substantial resources and autonomy, but in recent decades these have largely been stripped away. For example, the State Department was given responsibility for U.S. foreign assistance programs in central and eastern Europe in 1989 and in the former Soviet Union in 1992, with USAID placed in a subordinate role. Eventually, in 2001, the State Department took over USAID's account and its direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, USAID lost staff, programmatic flexibility, and influence with Congress, other government departments, other aid donors, and recipient nations.

Policymakers began to look for other vehicles to implement their development initiatives. When the Millennium Challenge Corporation was set up in 2004, the Secretary of State—rather than the USAID administrator—was named to chair it. At first, the MCC was discouraged from even working with USAID; when the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was set up in 2003, it was placed in the State Department, with USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services given only supporting roles.

Many new players in the foreign assistance arena—the Centers for Disease Control, the MCC, and now even the Defense Department, through its new Africa Command—have created independent organizational structures to carry out their programs. Not surprisingly, this has led to policy incoherence, a lack of integration across programs and issue areas, inefficient and overlapping bureaucracies, and endless conflicts over roles and responsibilities—not to mention confusion among recipients and among other donors about who represents Washington on development issues. These new development players are now even using the same contractors as USAID. All of this organizational chaos has significantly increased the costs of implementing foreign aid programs, delayed their implementation, and reduced their impact. There is no evidence that this broad array of new development agencies has done any better than the old, more unified USAID, and much evidence that this organizational structure has done worse.

The most recent reorganization of Washington's development apparatus was announced in 2006. USAID was effectively folded into the State Department and given its allocations through a State Department-controlled budget process, and its administrator was asked to wear two bureaucratic hats: director of foreign assistance at the State Department and head of USAID. Many thought this was a mistake. The practical and policy problems that have resulted have only confirmed their views. Dozens of studies on foreign aid show that aid programs rarely succeed when they are not customized to the poor countries they are designed to help and built on local ownership. The centralization of the U.S. government's aid programs in Washington may satisfy the needs of key players in both the executive and the legislative branches for command and control, but it increases the risk of program failure and invites attacks from critics, who insist foreign aid is ineffective.

USAID has also suffered over the years from crippling staff cuts. In 1980, the agency had 4,058 permanent American employees. By 2008, the number had dropped to 2,200. Resources for staff training were also slashed dramatically. These cuts have had several detrimental effects. Most important, they forced the closing of 26 overseas missions in the 1990s. USAID's field presence used to be a real source of strength for the United States. Other countries often looked to the agency for decentralized structure made its programs more responsive to local conditions and needs and allowed the agency to move faster than its foreign counterparts. Downsizing also resulted in a dramatic loss of technical expertise. For example, the agency now has only six engineers and 16 agriculture experts, far fewer than in the 1980s.

The reduced staff and loss of expertise has limited the agency's technical competency and its managerial control over projects, making USAID increasingly dependent on larger and larger grants and contracts to spend its budget. This has transformed USAID from a creative, proactive, and technically skilled organization focused on implementation to a contracting and grant-making agency. This, in turn, has translated into less policy coherence, reduced flexibility, diminished leverage with other donors, and an increasingly risk-averse bureaucracy.

On a policy level, meanwhile, large presidential initiatives and congressional earmarks for health care, HIV/AIDS, K-12 education, microfinance, and the environment have in recent years crowded out other development interventions, such as anticorruption measures, agricultural assistance, democracy-promotion programs, and infrastructure-enhancement measures. The narrower, more focused programs are politically appealing because they appear to have a direct, measurable impact on identifiable individuals. But such a concentration on the short-term delivery of goods and services comes at the expense of building sustainable institutions that promote long-term development. For example, resources devoted to postconflict transitions now exceed development investments in peaceful nations. And the transfer of goods and services, such as in PEPFAR, has not always included the long-term human and institutional infrastructure so important to sustaining an effort. (Thankfully, the congressional reauthorization of PEPFAR recently signed by President George W. Bush requires the training of more than 100,000 local health-care workers in developing countries.)

The impact of this approach to development can best be understood at the country level. Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in the world, has a largely agricultural economy and suffers from periodic famines. Yet in 2007,

about 50 percent of U.S. assistance to Ethiopia went to HIV/AIDS prevention, 38 percent to emergency food relief, and 7 percent to child survival, family planning, and malaria prevention and treatment. Only 1.5 percent went to agriculture, 1.5 percent to economic growth, 1.5 percent to education, and 1 percent to improving governance. Such distorted profiles of development aid are unfortunately quite common. Strategic needs on the ground should dictate the nature of the programs, but currently, allocation decisions are determined by earmarks, presidential initiatives, or diplomatic pressures.

reconstructing aid

The problems with current U.S. development efforts cannot be fixed without major organizational reforms. The time has come to recognize that the semimerger of USAID and the State Department has not worked. The missions and personnel requirements of the two organizations are different. The State Department often has to deal with pressing issues and naturally views development dollars as only one of the possible tools at hand. State Department officers are superb diplomats, negotiators, political observers, and policy analysts. USAID, in contrast, is an operational and program-management agency focused on achieving sustainable economic growth abroad; its staffers are aid professionals with the technical and managerial skills to get their work done. With USAID and the State Department merged, the urgency of the State Department's mission and the collective mindset of its personnel end up dominating, to the detriment of the development agenda. The problem lies not in individuals but in clashing organizational cultures, management systems, and time horizons.

There are two proposed approaches to fixing the problem: integrating USAID even more completely into the State Department and granting it significantly more independence, either as its own cabinet-level department or as a strong autonomous agency whose head reports directly to the secretary of state. The first option would make things even worse than they are now. In a full merger with the State Department, USAID would lose its development mission altogether, as that mission would continually lose out to the State Department's more traditional diplomatic priorities. The right approach is to find some way of restoring USAID's autonomy and vitality. The real question is whether USAID should be an independent agency reporting to the secretary of state or a new cabinet department. Both routes have advantages and disadvantages, but either would be preferable to the current setup.

A cabinet-level department would give USAID much greater stature and allow it to influence policy on trade, investment, and the environment while improving existing assistance programs. This approach is the predominant model used in wealthy donor countries. The United Kingdom moved in this direction in the mid-1990s. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development has used its perch to achieve greater influence on development matters throughout the British government by helping to shape trade, finance, and environmental policy at the cabinet level. As a result, the Department for International Development has become the most prominent government aid agency in the world, even though London spends far less on aid than Washington does.

The chief argument against a cabinet-level development department in the United States is that the secretary of state needs to have some policy involvement and oversight when it comes to foreign aid. Moreover, the secretary of state is always going to be a more powerful member of the cabinet than a development czar. USAID often relies on the active support of the secretary of state in order to get the funding and legislation it needs to carry out its mission. For these reasons, many observers believe that a strong agency reporting to the secretary of state would be preferable.

Regardless of which option the next administration chooses, there are several policies that must be implemented in order to strengthen the United States' development capabilities. First, the new USAID must have budgetary independence, and its operating account—which pays for buildings, salaries, and technology—should be dramatically increased in order to boost the size of the permanent staff, invest in training, and increase the agency's technical expertise. This will enable the new USAID to reopen missions that were permanently closed and to staff them adequately.

Second, the head of the new USAID should be a statutory member of the National Security Council and serve as part of the president's international economic advisory team on the National Economic Council. There are compelling security and macroeconomic arguments for foreign aid. As Paul Collier's acclaimed book *The Bottom Billion* demonstrates, countries with high poverty rates descend into civil war far more often than more prosperous nations. These conflicts kill thousands and destroy the political and economic institutions of the states in which they occur, leaving the international community to pick up the enormous tab for rescue, relief, and reconstruction. Likewise, development success is closely related to investment, trade, and finance policies; U.S. policy and developing-country policies on these matters are as important as the volume of foreign assistance. U.S. agricultural subsidies, trade protectionism, and subsidies for ethanol all hurt poor countries by distorting food markets. Yet within the U.S. government, decisions concerning international trade and finance are all too often made without any regard for reducing poverty or stimulating economic growth in poor countries. Making the new USAID an integral part of the interagency process would allow it to influence policymaking and take direction from the State Department, the Pentagon, and other agencies on matters involving foreign policy and national security. It would be a two-way street.

Third, the new USAID will need a new congressional mandate. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—which has not been amended in any meaningful way since 1985—is a Cold War artifact that has become obsolete. The eligibility criteria for the MCC could serve as the basis for new legislation. The MCC uses 17 indicators in three broad development categories—"ruling justly, economic freedom, and investing in people"—to determine a nation's eligibility to receive development aid. A new congressional mandate would make the executive branch accountable for results and provide a new framework for legislators who wish to earmark funds for specific purposes.

civilian casualties

As the division of labor among the Pentagon, the State Department, and USAID has become blurred, military bureaucracies have eclipsed their civilian counterparts, thanks largely to their vastly greater resources and greater organizational capacity. Few in Washington, including Secretary Gates, like this situation or think it serves U.S. interests. But nothing will change unless the next president works with Congress to oversee significant institutional reform. Revitalizing the U.S. approach to development assistance should be viewed as a crucial part of the broader effort to revitalize the government's civilian institutional capacities.

To streamline and strengthen the State Department bureaucracy and restore USAID's authority over aid programs, all humanitarian and development programs now assigned to the State Department—such as refugee programs, *pepfar*, and the programs implemented by the new bureau for post-conflict reconstruction—should be placed under the aegis of the new *usaid*. Likewise, democracy-promotion programs and the Defense Department's aid programs around the world should largely return to civilian control, with the relevant authority and resources assigned to the new USAID. Many cabinet departments understandably have policy interests abroad, but those interests should not include managing their own, independent foreign aid programs. From the early 1960s to 1992, the Office of Management and Budget aggressively enforced a rule mandating that all foreign aid programs and spending must go through *usaid* (except when USAID chose to contract with other federal agencies in cases for which it lacked specific technical expertise). It is time to return to that model.

Furthermore, the head of the new USAID must have the authority to devise an overall U.S. government strategy on humanitarian and development programs and to coordinate the activities of other departments at the global, country, and regional levels. In addition to presiding over a White House interagency committee on foreign assistance, the new USAID head (instead of the secretary of state) should chair the *MCC* board. The *MCC* is one of the United States' most innovative foreign aid programs; it is free of earmarks and promotes genuine partnership with recipient countries. The *MCC* should be protected from political pressures in Washington that might compromise its eligibility criteria. At the same time, a new, strengthened USAID should be given the authority to help recipient nations design proposals, facilitate the implementation of programs, and evaluate their effectiveness.

Finally, the next president should establish a civilian equivalent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would include the most senior career officers of the State Department, the new *usaid*, the Treasury Department, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Chaired by a senior Foreign Service officer, this statutory institution would offer advice to the political leadership on diplomacy, development, and crisis prevention. This group would also provide a source of independent judgment on development issues to agency heads and to the National Security Council, just as the Joint Chiefs do on military matters.

Of course, there will be areas of overlapping jurisdiction between the defense, diplomatic, and development institutions. One example is the provision of security assistance in countries recovering from conflict; in these

difficult environments, the State Department's diplomatic mission is crucial, and the Defense Department is needed for training and logistics. The key is who controls the money for noncombat activities. This authority belongs with the diplomatic mission. But when foreign aid payments are involved, the authority should rest squarely with the new, revamped USAID, whether it attains the status of a cabinet-level department or simply greater autonomy as an agency reporting to the secretary of state.

It is official U.S. policy to build strong and effective defense, diplomatic, and development institutions working together to advance U.S. national security and foreign policy. This goal has not yet been achieved. The civilian agencies today are simply not capable of pulling their weight. The next president will have to dramatically overhaul the foreign aid establishment during his first year. The United States' national security and its global leadership position will depend on it.

J. Brian Atwood is Dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota and was Administrator of USAID from 1993 to 1999.

M. Peter McPherson is President of NASULGC; he was President of Michigan State University from 1993 to 2004 and Administrator of USAID from 1981 to 1986.

Andrew Natsios is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute; he was Administrator of USAID from 2001 to 2005.



U.S. GLOBAL
LEADERSHIP
CAMPAIGN

February 12, 2009

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As a group of former top military commanders across all of the armed services, we urge your support for a robust FY10 International Affairs Budget that sufficiently invests in "smart power" – elevating our non-military tools of global development and diplomacy alongside a strong defense. Investing in our non-military tools is essential to ensuring our national security, building global economic prosperity and demonstrating American moral values.

As you said, "the security and well-being of each and every American is tied to the security and well-being of those who live beyond our borders." America cannot rely solely on our military power to secure our national interests. The global realities of the 21st century require the United States to utilize the full range of non-military tools as a fundamental pillar of our national security. Strong U.S. leadership is essential to strengthen democratic governance, alleviate global poverty, improve human conditions, and harness economic potential.

In times of humanitarian crisis, our military power can provide the logistics and organization to get help fast to those in need, but the military cannot build sustainable societies. Investments in our civilian international affairs programs are critical to bolstering our national security by addressing transnational threats such as terrorism, infectious diseases and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and stabilizing weak and fragile states. The military can only help create the conditions necessary for our diplomatic, development and humanitarian programs to effectively address these issues.

This view is shared by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who has said, "America will be grappling with a range of challenges to the international system and to our own security – from global terrorism to ethnic conflicts, to rogue nations and rising powers. And as I have said before, they will require devoting considerably more resources to non-military instruments of national power."

Despite modest increases over the last eight years, the International Affairs Budget remains under-funded, representing only 1.2 percent of all federal spending and remaining 11 percent below Cold War levels. This hinders the ability of our civilian foreign affairs agencies to meet our foreign policy and national security goals, and places greater burdens on the military. Robust investments in our civilian international capabilities will keep us safer by reducing our vulnerability to threats from destabilizing forces, reaffirming America's tradition of moral leadership and improving America's image abroad.

We must ensure that our nation is fully equipped to face the global challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century. As you prepare the FY 2010 federal budget, we urge you to request a robust International Affairs Budget and we look forward to working with you.

List of Signatories Attached

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U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP CAMPAIGN
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL
LETTER TO PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

FULL LIST OF SIGNATORIES

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**U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP CAMPAIGN
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL
LETTER TO PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA**

FULL LIST OF SIGNATORIES

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Chairman BERMAN. And the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Boozman, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hagee, I have had the opportunity to be in Iraq several times, and Afghanistan, and on some occasions being in the forward operating bases, looking at VA—not VA, but healthcare issues and things. But being out there.

I guess it seemed like the frustration that the commanders were facing was they figured out pretty quickly, as the war in Iraq went on, and now in Afghanistan, that they were fighting a war militarily that needed a great deal to be solved with humanitarian aid, just the infrastructure aid, all of those kind of things. You know, high unemployment, just basic things.

And yet there was nobody there to help. The State Department wasn't there, because they were very dangerous situations. None of the branches of government, except for the military, Commerce, all of these things that they desperately needed.

So as a result, they had to become the aid providers. And I guess, I just, unless you did a situation—we talked about embedding USAID people, State Department in there. And again, I would argue that not only that, but there are other areas of government that should provide a role, also. But you would almost have to train them in a different way. I mean, that would be a different breed of guy or girl than the normal person in those conditions. I mean, those are very, very difficult conditions.

But again, now we are coming back and kind of saying well, there is this imbalance and this and that. But in that situation, I just don't see how you get around from doing that.

General HAGEE. I think what you have pointed out is absolutely correct; and that is that we should have individuals, depending on the situation and where we are, from Agriculture, from Commerce, from Water and Power. In my opinion, the armed forces should not be training police; that is not what we do real well. But there are policemen here in this country who do that actually really quite well.

How do you train for that? I would argue that one, if not the most important, reason that we have the best military that the world has ever seen, is that at each grade, we allow an officer or an enlisted to go to school for about a year. They learn how to plan. They argue with one another. They argue about doctrine, they argue about how we should be organized. And we have done that since just after Vietnam.

Unfortunately, no other agency in the United States Government, as far as I know, has that capability, because they don't have the capacity to do that. That is one way that you could address that, sir.

Mr. BOOZMAN. And I agree. The other problem in these failed states, these situations, it is unlike fighting any other war, I think, that we have fought, in the sense that there are no safe havens. I mean, you are in danger almost wherever you are at. There is no pulling back to the back of the line. Again, it is just very difficult.

Yes, ma'am.

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you for your question, Mr. Boozman. I would just offer that there is a model out there in Iraq, with

USAID funding for NGOs that have worked throughout all 18 governments of Iraq throughout 2003, on the Community Action Program. Which is, even in non-permissive environments, through local staff, through an ability to gain community acceptance and security, working on community infrastructure and on mobilizing citizens for action, and to become constituents for security.

It was a minuscule amount of funding compared to what goes in on a daily basis to Iraq. And there are opportunities to expand what we already know can work.

Mr. BOOZMAN. No, I understand. And yet, like I say, there are plenty of situations where, to those guys on the Ford Operating Base, that wasn't available.

And it might be valuable at some time to get some of those guys in here, and sit them down and say, What were your challenges out there?

Mr. Christenson, real quickly while I have got you here, the Millennium Challenge Account. You know, to me that seems to have worked well. Can you just very quickly, in 33 seconds, share your, share what you think is going on with that?

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Yes, sir. I think the Millennium Challenge Account is the wave of the future. It takes a little longer to get the projects proposed by the host government, but that is because we are relying on the host government to set forth its priorities. When you are dealing with democratic governments, that is who you should listen to.

I think what is important is to look at the difference between what they propose to MCC versus what we have on offer through our other programs. It is very instructive.

Mr. BOOZMAN. In 2 seconds, again, in being there, the leaders of those countries were so proud of meeting their objectives and stuff. So I yield back.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for a unanimous consent request.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to put an article that I think is relevant to the discussion in the record. Is it okay?

Chairman BERMAN. Yes. Under the subjective relevance test, it is okay. [Laughter.]

So ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

When Help Does Harm

By MATTHEW REES

March 17, 2009

It is one of the great conundrums of the modern age: More than 300 million people living across the continent of Africa are still mired in poverty after decades of effort -- by the World Bank, foreign governments and charitable organizations -- to lift them out of it. While a few African countries have achieved notable rates of economic growth in recent years, per-capita income in Africa as a whole has inched up only slightly since 1960. In that year, the region's gross domestic product was about equal to that of East Asia. By 2005, East Asia's GDP was five times higher. The total aid package to Africa, over the past 50 years, exceeds \$1 trillion. There is far too little to show for it.

Dead Aid

By Dambisa Moyo

(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 188 pages, \$24)

Dambisa Moyo, a native of Zambia and a former World Bank consultant, believes that it is time to end the charade -- to stop proceeding as if foreign aid does the good that it is supposed to do. The problem, she says in "Dead Aid," is not that foreign money is poorly spent (though much of it is) or that development programs are badly managed (though many of them are). No, the problem is more fundamental: Aid, she writes, is "no longer part of the potential solution, it's part of the problem -- in fact, aid *is* the problem."

In a tightly argued brief, Ms. Moyo spells out how attempts to help Africa actually hurt it. The aid money pouring into Africa, she says, underwrites brutal and corrupt regimes; it stifles investment; and it leads to higher rates of poverty -- all of which, in turn, creates a demand for yet more aid. Africa, Ms. Moyo notes, seems hopelessly trapped in this spiral, and she wants to see it break free. Over the past 30 years, she says, the most aid-dependent countries in Africa have experienced economic contraction averaging 0.2% a year.

America's policy toward postwar Europe is often cited as the model for African assistance, but Ms. Moyo reminds us that the vaunted Marshall Plan was limited to five years and was focused on reconstructing societies ravaged by war. In Africa, she says, the aid spigot never stops flowing. "There is no incentive for long-term financial planning," she observes, "no reason to seek alternatives to fund development, when all you have to do is sit back and bank the cheques."

Inevitably, "Dead Aid" will offend the pieties of the World Bank and the foreign-aid sectors of the U.S. government. But Ms. Moyo is not alone in asking tough questions about good intentions gone awry. Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, has said of the \$300 billion in aid given to Africa since the 1970s that "there is little to show for it in terms of economic growth and human development." Senegal's president, Abdoulaye Wade, has expressed similar sentiments.

Given that aid has been, in Ms. Moyo's words, "an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster," why has it continued? One reason, she says, is that there about 500,000 people "in the business of aid," and their livelihoods are dictated more by the

size of their lending portfolios than the effectiveness of their programs. There is also the Bono effect. Along with other celebrities, the U2 frontman has become a powerful voice calling for still more aid to Africa, not less. The result is a kind of moral bullying. "Honest, critical, and serious dialogue and debate on the merits and demerits of aid," Ms. Moyo writes, "have atrophied."

Much of "Dead Aid" outlines an agenda for Africa's economic development, such as expanding its trade and developing its banking sector -- that is, creating a reliable system of credit that will allow individuals to earn interest on their savings and businesses to receive the loans they need to grow. Ms. Moyo argues for African countries to create bond markets -- a reminder that her instincts are closer to Goldman Sachs (where she worked for eight years) than to Jeffrey Sachs (the Columbia professor who wants Western governments to pour more money into Africa). She notes that, in the past 10 years, 43 developing nations have issued international bonds but that only three -- South Africa, Ghana and Gabon -- were from Africa.

While criticizing outsiders for their misguided ideas, Ms. Moyo does not ignore Africa's self-inflicted wounds. There are, she notes, steep obstacles to doing business there. According to the World Bank, nine of the world's 10 most hostile business environments are in Africa.

Unlike many experts in international affairs, Ms. Moyo does not believe that democracy is a key to solving Africa's problems. What poor countries need, she writes, is a "decisive benevolent dictator to push through the reforms required to get the economy moving." Economic growth, she says, is a prerequisite for democracy. She cites a study showing that democratic governments survive longer as per-capita income increases.

It is too bad that Ms. Moyo did not stop now and then to draw directly on her personal experience -- not only on her work as an investment banker but on her early life in Zambia. (Her mother is chairman of a Zambian bank; her father runs an anticorruption organization.) First-person accounts might have made her argument even more vivid.

Even so, it is vivid enough. She closes her book with a fascinating question: What would happen if African countries were told that in five years all financial aid would end? She doesn't try to answer the question in any detail, other than to dismiss the notion that living conditions in Africa would grow worse. She points to Botswana and South Africa as examples of countries that have prospered precisely because they haven't allowed themselves to become heavily dependent on aid.

Some of us remember Live Aid, the music festival held in 1985 to provide relief to Ethiopia. It was a noble effort and perhaps did some good, but "Dead Aid" reminds us that noble efforts are not enough -- that "help" can often do harm.

Chairman BERMAN. And the gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. WATSON. Yes, and very quickly. If we run out of time, I will take the complete response in writing. I want to address this to Mr. Christenson.

I have heard remarks among the panel—and I really appreciate this panel being here, and I am quite concerned, because I have been there. We had a problem at my post in Micronesia; it had to do with cholera.

I called down the emergency medical team from Guam, and they came in their fatigues. And they were going to go into the village to tell the people to heat the water for 10 minutes, boil the water for 10 minutes before they drank it.

Well, they came in their fatigues. They thought there was an invasion of that community.

Now, I am getting to this point. USAID has traditionally been seen as an organization that really comes in after the war, and really helps the people with their development. That is ideal. And I think we ought to have a strict demarcation between what the military does and USAID's traditional role, and probably a better merging with the NGOs that are already on the ground.

Would you comment, please? What you see as ideal.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I think what would be ideal is if we had an agency for international development that was capable of sending that type of team.

Ms. WATSON. And who is that?

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Well, they don't have it. USAID is a contracting agency. They don't have people who are prepared to show up that quickly. They can put out a task order, and have people bid on it, by which time they have all died of cholera.

Perhaps the military needs to be asked to, to show up, you know, without their fatigues. Maybe just if they are doing a medical program, they can show up in their white uniform instead of the other.

But I think that we should not accept the notion that the military are somehow off limits. I have a real problem with some of the comments as sort of—comments I have heard in the past about people wanting not to be seen with the military. I am proud of being seen with the U.S. military, and I think other people should be, too.

Ms. WATSON. Let me ask Dr.—yes, I just dropped your name for a moment. Doctor, yes. And how do we fashion so that we can improve our image, the USAID function? And how do we work, how should we work with the NGOs?

And there was a statement made that when we got there, they were already there. And my experience has been that they can customize and sensitize the aid to the area that they are in. And I find it works very, very well. I would like to get your reaction.

Ms. LINDBORG. Well, the great value that the NGOs bring globally is that we are often there in advance during and after a conflict, that we leverage the assistance we receive from the U.S. Government with extraordinary amounts of public support from across this country. And that we are able to work in a way that understands, through relationships and cultural knowledge, what the

needs are, and what the visions for the future are in the communities in which we work.

That value I believe is greatly compromised if we are brought too closely into the team, and we would be wise to develop structures that allow that kind of differentiation, while also enabling the kind of communication and coordination that allows a larger set of objectives to be developed.

There is a separate question about enabling USAID to be more expeditionary and more effective. It has lost extraordinary amounts of capacity over the past two decades. As Mr. Berman cited, it has very little of the expertise that it used to have.

So I think there are two related, but slightly different, challenges that we face as we move forward.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. And in my remaining time, I would like to go back to Mr. Christenson. Are you suggesting the need to develop a new organization? I think that is what I heard.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Yes, ma'am, I do believe we need a new organization.

Ms. WATSON. And you mentioned it, and you said an international—

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Well, it could be an organization made up of people who are actually prepared and have technical skills that can be deployed to countries. USAID doesn't have the technical skills because they stopped recruiting them in the 1980s.

Ms. WATSON. Out of the State Department, this organization?

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis, recognized for no more than 5 minutes.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder what you might think about a public-private investment fund for Iraq. Is this the time to be talking about something like that, like we have done in other countries, where we presumably would make these as loans maybe that had been repaid? We have done that in other places.

Is this something we should be talking about at this point for economic development in Iraq? Trying to stabilize the gains we have made there?

General HAGEE. In my personal opinion, sir, absolutely. I know that there have been several senior officers, the current chairman, who has actually gone to some of the private equity firms trying to get them interested in doing just that.

To me, the idea that we are going to separate the battlefield, and pot A is going to do this, and capability B is going to do that, does not work on today's battlefield. One can even argue that it may not have worked during World War II, but it surely doesn't work today.

And winning the war and winning the peace, that, to me, doesn't compute. We have a situation. We need to bring all elements of national power, and that includes the private sector, I would argue, to this situation, if it is, in fact, in our national interest.

Now, I think the, what the entire panel would agree on is you need someone to coordinate that. You can't just be haphazard. But the idea that we can fence off this current battlefield, and that we can divide war and peace, I think is—if we think that way, we are not thinking about the real situation.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you.

Ms. LINDBORG. I think you are asking exactly the right question. And as we look to creating a more nimble and innovative USAID, you would have to put a lot of work into developing mechanisms that support public-private partnerships.

And of course, we have tools that are also funded by the international affairs budget, like OPIC (the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) that enables greater risk-taking by our public and our private sector.

I would add that in Afghanistan, with support from USAID, Mercy Corps already has partnerships with the private sector, where we are seeking to stimulate economic development.

I would firmly support your thinking on bringing that more vigorously into Iraq. Without economic opportunity, it is that much harder to get stability in these conflict environments.

Mr. INGLIS. Anyone else?

Mr. BRIGETY. Sir, I would simply add, in addition to the comments of my colleagues, that it is important to develop public-private partnerships not simply in response to wars like Iraq, but it is also important to think proactively, and to think about ways in which we could bring public-private partnerships to bear in places that are unstable, but have not yet collapsed into war.

Again, as I said in my statement, because if we are able to leverage those toward capabilities, then we prevent, in many cases, states from collapsing entirely, and preventing them from becoming failed states, and therefore places where we may have to respond militarily.

So this is a continuum. And we need to be thinking about it in the context of full-on combat operations, but also in the context of preventative action, as well.

Mr. INGLIS. The reason I am asking is, the first time I was in Iraq I met the helpful captain who had left Wall Street, and sort of gotten back into the National Guard in order to go to Iraq, wanted to go to Iraq. And he is now back on Wall Street, and has already a successful project that has been, I think it says, I understand it was profitable in the first year. A tomato processing plant that is employing people that has already become profitable.

And what I hear from him is there are tremendous opportunities if people are willing to take a little bit of risk. Of course, they need perhaps the support of the U.S. Government to make them feel comfortable in taking some of that risk. But if they do, there are tremendous opportunities to get people to work in productive enterprises, and to make some money. Because people need to eat, they need clothes, they need supplies, they need equipment. So it is helpful to hear your thoughts about this possibility.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. We have 2½ minutes remaining before a vote that is now going on. I, myself, intend—if maybe only I can get to ask some more questions—to miss the vote. And any of you are welcome to join me, if you want to. As long as we keep—as long as we are winning.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Thank you very much. I just have a concern.

One, I think we are talking about two different things as it relates to foreign assistance. And I think we are mixing them up.

I think that in an area like Iraq or Afghanistan, this has to be this, you know, USAID may be embedded and all that. The thing that disturbs me, though, is something like AFRICOM, where you don't have a war going on, where you send a four-star general to four or five countries in a day or two, tell them we have got a new thing going that is called AFRICOM, and we are going to tell you more about it. But you have got a four-star general. We are going to be assisting in your USAID, and feeding the children, and all the other things.

And so when they leave, these countries, 52 out of 53 countries, said thanks, but no thanks. Liberia said okay. They just, anything, you know. Give me a hand. If it means jobs, it is okay.

But overwhelmingly, African nations said no. Number one, they said that this is here to protect the bay, the Gulf of Guinea's oil, that is very good for the United States. And number two is to hunt out any suspected militant that may harm U.S. interests, or whatever. And they, you know, ended up saying well, what is in it for us? Why do you want to militarize U.S. assistance? And that is what it really looked like.

And there was to the country a question of wait a minute, what is this all about. Which I also have questions about, and certainly oppose in the manner in which it was initially—now it is in effect. You know, the military, when they are going to do something, they just do it, and so it is done.

But I think that it is wrong. I think that developing countries that are trying democracy and so forth, the way it used to be was that the military people dispensed everything in their own countries. And now we are going to have duplicating that with U.S. assistance through military.

There is no question the military can bore holes for water, and build bridges, no question about that. Mercy ship comes in, they could help people. No doubt about it.

However, I think it is a wrong move for us to make it appear as though—and they say well, that is not the intent—but that is the way it looks to me. So I just wanted to—yes?

Mr. BRIGETY. Congressman, thank you very much for your comments. There is no question that the role of AFRICOM could have been done better. I think that everyone involved in that and that observed it recognizes that.

I do think, however, that the essential premise of AFRICOM, which is that there are security challenges on the continent of Africa which are not amenable to be solved through military means. And therefore, we need to think differently about them. I think that premise basically is correct.

Let me give you sort of an example of that. I was in the Dob refugee camp on the Kenyan-Somali border inside Kenya in 2007. And if you have been there, you know that the Dob has a refugee population about 150,000, many of whom have been there since 1992.

Mr. PAYNE. And growing now.

Mr. BRIGETY. Yes, sir, and growing. And of that, when I was there in 2007, of that 150,000 there were just over 50,000 men be-

tween the ages of 18 and 59 with nothing to do. Many of whom, it has been argued, could have been linked to fighting in Somalia.

Now, that is not necessarily a development priority, because the malnutrition rate of the Dob camp is actually very, very low. The population is well fed, et cetera. And yet this is a place where development mechanisms, things like job training for men, clearly meet with our security objectives, which are trying to figure out how we can engage that very large population of men that otherwise have no other skills, and will be, one way or another either be involved in Somalia fighting today, or will have to be repatriated.

So those sorts of challenges across the continent are things that USAID would not necessarily look at, because they are not straight in sole, what I will call fundamental development challenges. And yet, there are things that I think as a country, we are going to have to be thinking about.

Ms. LINDBORG. If I could say a quick comment. Mr. Payne, I very much appreciate your observations. And I think that in fact, the standing up of AFRICOM stands as one of the most singular arguments for the need to increase our civilian capacities. That the military saw it didn't want to keep putting boots on the ground in the combat situations, and saw that there was, because of chronic under-investment in development and diplomacy functions, great potential for conflict on the African continent.

With their can-do attitude, they rolled in with a set of solutions. I think it is incumbent upon us as a country to rebalance our civilian capacities in order to meet those challenges, rather than using the military solutions that AFRICOM puts on the table.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Chairman BERMAN. Gentlemen, my strategy worked. I get to recognize myself and I don't have to put myself on the clock. Because, unless you are going to hang around too, in which case I am willing to go back and forth with you.

I wanted to—and I know several of you have to leave pretty soon, and I won't be that long. But a couple of points I wanted to make and get your reaction to.

The ranking member raised, in her opening statement, this sort of discussion of building up capacity versus reform. And Mr. Christenson spoke about that. And the chicken and the egg, and which comes first.

But if USAID has become simply a contracting agency, you can't really reform without building capacity. And so I don't think it is as easy to say, Well, let us reform first and then we will rebuild the capacity. You want to rebuild the capacity the right way; we want to take a lot of the things you suggested in both training and mission, and in getting out of post-World War II models. We have done a lot of that already. And I have seen a lot of different programs in different areas that have made real differences on the ground.

But I don't think—and I guess I wish the ranking member were here so we could continue this discussion, but the message can get back to her. I think there is a problem with just saying, Let us reform it all first then we will get to the capacity building. Because if USAID is now a contracting agency, what are you going to do,

close the contracting down? We are not going to do that. So I think the two go hand-in-hand.

The second point is, the question about the Millennium Challenge Program. And I am torn, because part of me thinks that is the right way to go. That is the model for the future. It is a merit-based test; it ensures the capacity of the society that is well-governed to most absorb the aid. It is driven by the elected leadership, because democracy is one of the tests. And a number of other tests of good governance are the tests for where it goes.

And at the same time, for all the reasons the General mentioned and others have talked about, if you turn your back on the states that still might be dictatorships, and where corruption is still rampant, and don't work with both the USAID people on the ground and the NGOs—as opposed to the government in many cases—to do something, you are going to go from corrupt and dictatorial states to failed states.

And so this is a—it is not so easy to sort through all of that, in terms of how to apportion it. But there is something about that program I agree is very appealing, and in the long run makes a lot of sense.

I would mention, Mr. Christenson, that, as you discussed this, I noticed you signed the majority report of the Health Commission. Am I wrong?

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I wrote parts of it.

Chairman BERMAN. Oh, you wrote it.

How about the part that called for up to 10 percent of the combined national security budget to go into the international affairs budget programs? A significant increase from the current level, which is about 6 percent, and would result in a huge increase, far more than even this administration is proposing in foreign assistance.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. No, I did not write that, I could guarantee you. I mean, that is overkill.

Chairman BERMAN. All right. Well, I wouldn't have asked the question if I hadn't thought you had signed it.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. You know, if I could suggest something that members of the panel have to leave, if they have, you said they have to leave at 12 o'clock. Perhaps we could ask them their views. Maybe after they have had the chance to leave, we could talk about that.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I do want to make the second vote. But I take your point, that you did not write that part of the report.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. But can I just say something?

Chairman BERMAN. Yes.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. USAID does not have a competent personnel office. It uses its director of personnel as a rotating slot for mission directors they can't figure out what else to do with for a while. They are constantly changing. The number-one reform of foreign aid would be to have a professional human resources office with continuity of leadership.

Chairman BERMAN. That is an indictment of the management.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Yes. I said USAID needs a management structure. It needs people to go in there and put back in place a competent management.

This committee in the late nineties had a bill that required that the State Department Director General, who is the director of personnel, be somebody with 10 years human resources management experience instead of using it as an honorific place for ambassadors to park.

The State Department had a fit, and they insisted that it come out of the bill.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, we ought to think about that.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I think that is a number-one reform for both agencies.

Chairman BERMAN. Although I do have to say, I have always been quite impressed with the present Under Secretary of Management in the State Department.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Extremely impressed in my opinion. I mean, Pat Kennedy is fabulous.

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, okay. It is possible.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I once went up to CIA and spent the entire day talking to them about how do they deal with the problems they have that are the same as the State Department and USAID face. It was a very valuable day.

One of the things I discovered was that the CIA has a personnel director who has been there for a very long time. They plan 10 or 15 years from now. They bring in people and they have very long-term plans that they implement to train, develop and assign them.

State and USAID have people who make plans, and then they leave. The next guy has always wanted to do it differently, and he starts another plan. And it turns into absolute chaos.

If you look at the cohort of people that USAID has brought in once they were given the authority to hire more people, it is the same template they have been recruiting against for eternity. They are Peace Corps volunteers who went overseas, perhaps with an English major. They came back from the Peace Corps, and they go to SAIS or Georgetown School of Foreign Service and got a quick master's degree in international development. Then USAID says they don't have any engineers. Well, yes, you didn't—

Chairman BERMAN. We should get them to run for Congress.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Go out and hire them. If you are looking for agronomists, go hire agronomists.

But if they are constantly recruiting against a template that nobody has ever really thought about—asking, Do we really need to hire this type of person to work in this agency and to be the future leaders of the agency? They don't do it.

Chairman BERMAN. I think you raise a very, very good point that we should look at.

Well, any other reactions on this? Ms. Lindborg.

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just quickly add, on your thinking about the MCC, I don't see it as an either/or; but rather, those I think are exactly the kinds of issues that can be effectively addressed in the national security strategy. And to ensure that we have capacities to deal both with the failing states, those more or less permissive environments, as well as those countries that are further along on their development continuum, and create a cohesive whole. So there can be a handshake and coordination on platforms that are shared in each of the countries.

So I think that you are raising the right questions, and the answers lay in creating this more comprehensive view.

Chairman BERMAN. And then my—

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Can I answer the question on the MCC?

Chairman BERMAN. Yes.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. One of the problems the MCC has an upward limit for is program. Countries like South Africa and other well-managed democracies are not allowed to participate in the MCC.

One of the reforms we might look at is when you have countries that are above the MCC threshold for eligibility. Maybe we ought to turn to an MCC model for them; and take those human resources that we are wasting on trying to manage projects in these countries, and use them where we need them.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I will take South Africa in particular.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. You what?

Chairman BERMAN. You raised South Africa. In South Africa in particular, we went there last July, and we looked at a lot of PEPFAR projects. And one of the results of our heavy investment in PEPFAR was helping to build, in South Africa, both an openness and a capacity to take these things over. And you saw it morphing from simply providing prescription drugs and having just American agencies involved in education programs and prevention programs, to the start of a development of a South African infrastructure to do those things.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. I spent 33 years working on South Africa, and I don't agree that that is what happened. And I apologize for saying that.

South Africans were planning a massive HIV/AIDS program prior to the launching of the PEPFAR program. They were planning to—

Chairman BERMAN. I heard some of the things they were talking about. And—

Mr. CHRISTENSON. If you look at what they actually did. Forget the rumors in the newspapers of who said this, supposedly said what, they were working on a massive program that they were going to announce in late 2003.

If you look at what they announced in 2003, and you look at what they have accomplished, they kept their word, and they accomplished what they promised.

South Africans have a very different way of dealing with the world. They work out the difficulties in advance of making the announcement. Bush took all the wind out of their sails by making the PEPFAR announcement, which he did in a very abusive way.

Chairman BERMAN. Okay.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. Let me just finish. The U.S. Government announced to the South Africans that they were going to have a program with 500,000 South Africans in it, by calling them at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on the day of the State of the Union Address.

The South Africans were livid.

Chairman BERMAN. You are not going to get me to defend the way the Bush administration handled some of these issues.

Mr. CHRISTENSON. No. Then what you had was this permanent conflict between PEPFAR and the South African Government. The Ministry of Health's attitude was you are either with PEPFAR or

you are with us, you can't be with both. How did we do that so poorly?

Chairman BERMAN. Well, that is a fair question. My own sense that the danger of sending any of us anywhere for a quick trip is, we can jump to a conclusion perhaps based on inadequate evidence. My own sense is there were changes in that tension that had, by the summer of 2008.

Let me just ask my last question. And General, I would be curious about your response, but all the panelists.

We have been talking about development assistance and permissive environments and non-permissive environments, all that. I would like to go to security assistance for a second. Because this whole issue—another phenomenon I mentioned in my opening remarks, besides the PRTs and other sort of, the creeping role of DoD into a lot of traditionally civilian assistance programs, is the DoD finding different ways to take over the decisions regarding, and the providing of, security assistance.

Now, the military may not be right for training police, but they are right for training troops. And the security assistance and IMET are always going to be implemented in great part by military people.

But I am curious, is there a reason why the actual providing of military assistance, money for systems and all that stuff, should be carried out by DoD rather than the State Department?

One of the reasons, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said, talk about not handling an issue well. The State Department, the length of time, and the difficulty in actually getting that out to the intended recipients needs a huge amount of reform and improvement.

But at the end of the day, isn't security assistance an aspect of our foreign policy priorities in—with the national security context, I guess what I want you to say is yes, State should still do this. But disabuse me if I am wrong.

General HAGEE. I would, sir, but you are not. I would support. But I would also echo what the chairman has said, and what others have said, the bureaucratic process of getting that in a timely manner so that in fact you can have a diplomatic effect, it is just really quite burdensome.

The commander on the ground, when all is said and done, doesn't care where it comes from, as long as it comes in a timely manner. And I think State handling it is just—personal opinion, Mike Hagee's opinion—is just fine.

Chairman BERMAN. But we have got to make it, we have got to clean up the way it is done, I take it.

Anybody else have reactions on this issue?

Mr. BRIGETY. Sir, the only thing I would add is, you mentioned briefly police training. And it is the perpetual problem with every stabilization reinstruction.

As General Hagee has said, as other military officers have said, that the military should not have a role in police training, I agree with that. But I also think that we need to seriously relook at Section 660, the Foreign Assistance Act, that prohibits USAID from engaging in that.

Somebody has to own that mission operationally for the U.S. Government.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you all very much. I am sorry for keeping you a little longer than you intended, and I think it has been a very excellent hearing. I think a lot of different issues have been raised that we can think about. And I appreciate your being here.

General HAGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Chairman

March 17, 2009

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building:**

DATE: Wednesday, March 18, 2009

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Striking the Appropriate Balance: The Defense Department's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance

WITNESSES: General Michael W. Hagee, USMC, Retired
(Former Commandant of the Marine Corps)

Ms. Nancy Lindborg
President
Mercy Corps

Reuben Brigety, Ph.D.
Director of the Sustainable Security Program
Center for American Progress Action Fund

The Honorable Philip L. Christenson
(Former Assistant Administrator, United States Agency for International Development)

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Wednesday Date 3/18/09 Room 2172 RHOB

Starting Time 10:02 A.M. Ending Time 12:15 P.M.

Recesses (to)

Presiding Member(s) Howard L. Berman, CA - Chairman

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:

Open Session Electronically Recorded (taped)
Executive (closed) Session Stenographic Record
Televised

TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)
Striking the Appropriate Balance: The Defense Department's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
See attached

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
Mr. Vic Snyder, AR

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)
• Letter dated 2/12/09 to President Barack Obama from the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign; Report entitled Arrested Development "Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool" dated Nov/Dec 2008; see attached

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED 12:15 pm


Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director

Attendance - HCFA Full Committee
Striking the Appropriate Balance: The Defense Department's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance
March 18, 2009 @ 10:00 a.m. , 2172 RHOB

Howard L. Berman (CA)	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (FL)
Donald Payne (NJ)	Christopher H. Smith (NJ)
Diane E. Watson (CA)	Dan Burton (IN)
Russ Carnahan (MO)	Jeff Flake (AZ)
Gerald E. Connolly (VA)	John Boozman (AR)
Michael E. McMahon (NY)	Jeff Fortenberry (NE)
Gene Green (TX)	Ted Poe (TX)
Lynn C. Woolsey (CA)	Bob Inglis (SC)
Sheila Jackson-Lee (TX)	
Barbara Lee (CA)	
David Scott (GA)	
Keith Ellison (MN)	
Ron Klein (FL)	

* Vic Snyder (AR)

* - Non Committee Member

Articles submitted to the record:

1. Letter to President Barack Obama from the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, dated February 12, 2009, submitted by General Michael W. Hagee
 2. Report entitled Arrested Development "Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool" dated November/December 2008, submitted by Philip L. Christenson.
 3. Article "When Help Does Harm" Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2009. Submitted by Mr. Dan Burton, IN
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Verbatim, as delivered

March 18, 2009

Chairman Berman's opening statement at hearing, "Striking the Appropriate Balance: the Defense Department's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance"

I'd like to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses today for the third in a series of hearings that the Committee will convene on foreign assistance reform. In the last Congress, the Full Committee held two hearings addressing this issue, and our subcommittees held several others.

One observation that repeatedly came up during those hearings was the Defense Department's increasing role in foreign assistance.

We have heard the same explanation for this over and over again: DoD is filling a vacuum left by the State Department and USAID, which lack the capacity to carry out their diplomatic and development functions.

There is no doubt that these agencies have been weakened by a severe shortage of resources.

For example, USAID has only about 2,500 permanent staff today, compared to 4,300 in 1975. The agency is responsible for overseeing hundreds of infrastructure projects around the world, yet employs only five engineers. They have only 29 education specialists to monitor programs in 87 countries.

Likewise, the State Department lacks resources to fill critical diplomatic posts. Today, the agency has a 12% vacancy rate in overseas Foreign Service positions, and an even higher vacancy rate here in the United States. This hollowing out of the State Department cripples its ability to aggressively pursue and protect American interests abroad.

President Obama's fiscal year 2010 international affairs budget request – which I strongly support, and I hope my colleagues will, too – represents an important step forward in addressing these weaknesses.

And for our part, the Committee plans to tackle these troubling capacity issues when we take up the State Department authorization bill and foreign assistance reform legislation later this year.

But beyond capacity and resources, there are some deeper issues I'd like to examine today.

Is providing military assistance to a foreign country a foreign policy decision that should be the primary responsibility of civilian agencies, with appropriate Defense Department involvement in implementation? Or is it a national security mission that should be planned and carried out by the Pentagon?

Does DoD have such a comparative advantage in performing certain non-traditional defense missions that it should be carrying out activities previously reserved for civilian agencies?

And what are the implications of putting a military face on development and humanitarian activities? How does this affect the way we are viewed in the world, and what is the practical impact on USAID's ability to carry out development projects?

The Department of Defense has always played an important role in carrying out certain security assistance activities, particularly implementing military training and military sales directed by the Department of State.

However, DoD's role significantly expanded in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, where they took on a direct role in planning, funding and implementing military and police training and other non-military activities.

And beyond those two conflicts, the Pentagon began requesting – and receiving -- authority to conduct similar activities in other parts of the world. DoD's goal was to address irregular security threats on a global scale -- threats they argued did not fit neatly into traditional State or Defense Department missions, and thus required new tools of engagement.

These include global train and equip authority, also known as the Section 1206 program; a world-wide stabilization and reconstruction fund, also known as the Section 1207 program; and numerous new training programs directly managed by the Defense Department.

In addition, some existing authorities were expanded, including the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance.

DoD's argument that these programs are justified by "military necessity" should be given significant deference. Indeed, I can think of many situations in which it might make sense for military commanders to get involved in activities that – in peacetime – would be considered foreign assistance.

However, many questions remain regarding the utility and implications of such programs. For example, on several occasions this Committee has raised concerns about the use of Section 1206 funds.

In some cases, it appears they've been used for programs with only a tenuous link to counterterrorism. In others, it looks more like a traditional diplomatic tool designed to curry influence with potential friends.

In the development context, critics have argued that DoD's role erases the distinction between military personnel and civilians carrying out similar development activities, ignores development best practices such as sustainability and effectiveness, and puts a military face on inherently civilian programs.

It can also result in waste, fraud, and abuse, which has been well documented by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Interestingly, in a letter attached to a report submitted last week on one of DoD's international programs, the Pentagon stated, "Humanitarian assistance activities continue to provide significant peacetime engagement opportunities for Combatant Commanders and U.S. military personnel while also serving the basic economic and social needs of people in the countries supported."

The question remains: Shouldn't our "peacetime engagement" efforts be carried out by USAID, our nation's premier development agency? And should our military be responsible for performing the mission of civilian agencies? Do we really want to ask the men and women who go to war to do the mission of both Defense and State?

Some have suggested that a National Development Strategy would serve as a useful mechanism to help coordinate and establish appropriate roles for various agencies that provide foreign assistance. One of our witnesses supports such a strategy in her written statement.

I welcome this hearing today as an opportunity to shed light on the many important questions surrounding the military's growing role in foreign assistance.

Opening Statement
Congressman Gerald E. Connolly
House Foreign Affairs Committee – Full Committee Hearing
Striking the Appropriate Balance:
The Defense Department’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance

Mr. Chairman,
Addressing the growing imbalance between defense-driven versus diplomatic-driven foreign assistance is long overdue. I thank you for your leadership to reassert the Committee’s role in the debate at such a critical time.

For eight long years, the United States has watched as its international stature was eroded by the previous Administration’s “Cowboy Diplomacy,” under which foreign leaders were tagged as either with us or against us. President Obama has pledged to reach out to his counterparts across the globe to re-engage diplomatically the U.S. and to rebuild America’s reputation as a leader on the world stage. He has pledged renewed collaboration for addressing our shared challenges such as terrorism, poverty, climate change and disease to name just a few.

As a sign of this commitment, President Obama has proposed a \$4.5 billion increase in next year’s international affairs budget, which includes the Department of State and other activities. Of course, just increasing our foreign aid alone will not solve the problem. We must rebalance our defense and diplomatic capabilities. As Ms. Lindborg notes in her testimony, the DoD’s foreign assistance programming has increased three-fold in recent years while USAID development funding has shrunk by nearly one-fourth. This “militarization of America’s foreign assistance,” as Gen. Hagee refers to it, has eroded support for our efforts overseas and in some cases may have even put our NGO partners at risk by fostering distrust in the communities with which they are working.

While I may not go as far as Dr. Bridgety in supporting the creation of a free standing cabinet position to round out the three D’s of our international agenda -- Defense, Diplomacy and Development -- I do agree with his assertion that we need to protect and sustain our international development investments for our long-term benefit and that of our global neighbors. Further supporting that mission, I am glad to see members of the panel recognize the need for and advocate on behalf of an increased civilian workforce, or as Gen. Hagee phrased it, “building a civilian surge capacity” to compliment the defense capabilities we already have in place. I think that description strikes the right image for how we need to reposition ourselves in this ongoing effort.

I look forward to hearing more from the panel. Thank you.

CONGRESSWOMAN SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS
STATEMENT BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
“STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S EXPANDING ROLE IN
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE”

MARCH 18, 2009

Let me first thank Chairman Berman his leadership in bringing this important issue before the committee. I want to also thank our renowned witnesses General Michael W. Hagee, United States Marine Corps (Retired), Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps, Reuben Brigety, Director of the Sustainable Security Program at American Progress, and the Honorable Philip L. Christenson, Former Assistant Administrator, United States Agency for International Development.

Expanding Department of Defense Foreign Assistance Programs is a necessary step toward enhanced national security, international economic stability, combating poverty, and reducing the spread of devastating diseases. Humanitarianism and foreign assistance programs create a diplomatic framework for improving relationships with other countries and will revitalize America’s Global Leadership.

Foreign assistance allows the United States to export democracy globally. It provides a peaceful framework for stabilizing fragile states and ensuring sustainable development. Humanitarian assistance is critical to prevent instability, violence, and genocide by integrating civilian and military tools to create sustainable and peaceful democracies worldwide. Terrorism and violence cannot simply be deterred and contained through purely military means. Rather, by fostering international cooperation and partnerships with developing nations, we can not only ensure security of millions of people overseas, but we can ensure stability within our own borders. Medical missions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South Asia are starting points for military relations that prevent the rise of conflicts due to diplomatic tensions. Our foreign assistance to Pakistan, South Africa, The Horn of Africa, among other places has stabilized tenuous regions and bridged cultural gaps.

Humanitarian foreign assistance is the crucial lynchpin to fight global poverty and the spread of infectious diseases. More people die from poverty and diseases in developing nations every year than in every war of the 20th century. Providing access to life-saving anti-retroviral drugs and medication to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and a litany of other public-health threats will save millions of lives and prevent young children from becoming orphans, a crisis that is occurring at an alarming rate.

Disease surveillance networks can monitor the further spread of diseases and prevent catastrophic outbreaks of epidemics such as avian flu and SARS. Foreign assistance can create sustainable hospitals and health-facilities that create jobs and save the lives of millions. Critical education programs train doctors and medical professionals to create self-sustaining health systems in developing nations. Through this, we can combat the economic crisis worldwide. Foreign assistance is a fundamental tool for globalization that creates economic opportunities and foster growth that not only pull people out of poverty, but open new markets for trade and economic relations.

Foreign humanitarian assistance is also a path to further environmental protection. Aid programs in Central and South America, as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa allows the transfer of farming technology and methods that prevent deforestation and loss of biodiversity in environmental rich regions. It serves as a model for American environmental leadership that can prevent the destruction and exploitation of natural resources worldwide.

Finally, it is necessary to ensure that foreign assistance is organized, transparent, and effective. Too many times our assistance programs consist of nothing more than sending money overseas with neither oversight nor a framework for effective aid-implementation. Simply funding foreign nations is neither sustainable nor effective. Working with Non-governmental organizations and grass-roots programs can ensure that the assistance we provide gets used efficiently and effectively.

It results in not just monetary assistance, but also education and training assistance that ensures effective and efficient programs. Working not simply through USAID, and rather broadening our initiatives internationally can ensure a cooperative and diverse aid system that can save lives and foster international stability and cooperation. Expanding U.S. humanitarian assistance programs through this framework is the best solution to global crises that threaten all human beings.

CONCLUSION

I would like to once again thank our witnesses for coming here today. I am looking forward to the testimonies of Ms. Lindborg, Mr. Hagee, and Dr. Brigety to see how we can move forward on these pressing issues. I yield back the balance of my time.

Opening Statement
Congresswoman Diane E. Watson
Full Committee
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
2172 Rayburn House Office Building
10:00 a.m.

*“Striking the Appropriate Balance:
The Defense Department’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance”*

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today’s hearing. I am especially interested in listening to our experienced panelist’s perspective on striking a balance between civilian roles in foreign assistance and an appropriate role for the Department of Defense.

Prior to the global war on terrorism, foreign assistance was largely a function of the Department of State, but in the last several years the DoD has been authorized to provide assistance to foreign populations, security forces and other foreign governmental institutions. I believe this change has shifted the balance of power significantly since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

It is my hope that we can take the information from today’s discussion and apply it to balancing and refocusing the role and responsibilities of our armed forces and diplomatic corps.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Rep. Michael E. McMahon

Striking the Appropriate Balance: The Defense Department's
Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance

March 18, 2009

OPENING STATEMENT for March 18, 2009

Thank you, Chairman Berman.

The brutality of September 11th 2001 demanded an immediate response from the United States. I believe that as a country we successfully united together and pursued a policy of militarization that unfortunately, we could not avoid at the time.

March 18th 2009 brings a new vision to our foreign policy objectives.

Unfortunately, the increased militarization of foreign aid simply does not allow the United States to focus on the “instrumental” or long-term development goals for conflict or post-conflict zones.

There are countless examples of the US military directly providing assistance to these regions instead of teaching governments to take responsibility for their own people.

For example, in Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams build schools while the National Solidarity Program, run by the Afghan government—and which builds schools at a fraction of the cost of PRTs or international contractors—is crumbling due to lack of funding from the United States.

Of course, this example in itself is a demonstration of the devotion of our troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and South America, but it is time for the State Department to take a leading role in such projects.

I look forward to working through this committee and with Secretary Clinton to rebuild the mechanisms in which to do this and restore the United States’ image of leader in not only defense matters but in diplomacy, as well.

