

**NEW CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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JULY 29, 2009
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NEW CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Howard L. Berman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. This morning we are quite privileged to be joined by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Susan Rice, as well as a distinguished private panel that will follow her testimony and question period.

I first want to begin on a somewhat different point by thanking Ambassador Rice for her tremendous efforts to rebuild the United Nations human rights mechanism, which has been badly compromised by a pathological focus on Israel, and tarnished by a failure to focus on some of the world's worst human rights violators.

But the purpose of this hearing is to examine the challenges faced by international peacekeeping operations and to explore various options for making such operations more effective, particularly in protecting innocent civilians.

Since 1948, the member states of the United Nations have supported 63 peacekeeping operations on four continents. Today, the U.N. fields more than 90,000 uniformed peacekeepers and thousands of civilian personnel in 15 peacekeeping missions, from Congo to Haiti to Lebanon.

We support U.N. peacekeeping efforts because it is in our national interest to see that states do not fail, that voids are not opened for terrorists to fill, and that economies and lives do not crumble under the weight of war. And for these reasons it is very important that we pay our U.N. peacekeeping dues in full, as we propose in the State Department authorization bill passed by this committee and the House last month.

Around the world, many U.N. peacekeeping operations have yielded positive results on the ground. In the Balkans and East Timor, in Kashmir and Liberia, in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, U.N. blue helmets have worked to create the political space for peace, prevent mass atrocities, and avoid the collapse of states.

As we consider the future of peacekeeping, it is important to recognize that such operations have become increasingly complex. More than ever before they are designed to address the root causes of conflict and to build sustainable peace. This is reflected in the

sheer scale of current operations, which have an average of nine times as many troops, observers and police, and 13 times as many civilians, as the average operation did 10 years ago.

But these expanded peacekeeping mandates have put a severe strain on the system. The demand for resources often exceeds the supply provided by the international community, and as a result, peacekeeping missions frequently lack the troops, helicopters, and other equipment they need. At a time when peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in complex and unstable situations, and sometimes become the targets of combatants, that can be a recipe for disaster.

The United States has taken some important steps to address the lack of capacity and resources. For example, the U.S. military has assisted in the strategic movement of troops, equipment, and supplies to support U.N. peacekeeping missions. In Darfur, we have funded over 25 percent of the cost of the hybrid U.N.-African Union peacekeeping operation and constructed and maintained 34 Darfur base camps for over 7,000 African Union peacekeepers. And through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we will provide training and material assistance to 75,000 troops from a number of African countries, many of whom will be deployed with U.N. peacekeeping missions.

What else can the U.S. and other nations do to increase the capacity of the United Nations and regional organizations to respond to emerging crises? Are expanded peacekeeping mandates the right approach to dealing with the types of conflicts we face today? Or are we asking our peacekeepers to do too much? And what steps can we take to help ensure that U.N. peacekeeping operations have adequate personnel and resources to carry out their missions?

One of the key tests of the international peacekeeping system is its ability to protect civilians consistent with the emerging international norm known as “the responsibility to protect.” This concept, endorsed by the U.N. Security Council in 2006, holds that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Should they fail to do so, the international community has a responsibility to step in and protect threatened populations—with the use of force if absolutely necessary.

But strong words have not always been matched by strong actions. Since 1999, when a U.N. peacekeeping operation was established in the Eastern Congo, over 5 million people have died as a consequence of war, and an additional 45,000 perish every month. And in conflict zones from Congo to Bosnia to Darfur, peacekeepers have been unable to prevent the use of rape as a weapon of war, and even genocide.

How can we equip the United Nations to more effectively protect civilians and prevent mass atrocities? What can the United States do at the Security Council to discourage or overcome political foot-dragging—as we saw in Kosovo and Rwanda—that prevents rapid deployments at times of humanitarian crises? What is our strategy for making sure that women form a critical mass of peacekeepers and peacemakers, both to reduce sexual violence in conflict and to ensure that post-conflict reconstruction prioritizes the well being of women and girls? And finally, the key question: Is the inter-

national peacekeeping system, as it is conceived today, capable of preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities? Or do we need to develop an entirely new model for our increasingly complex world?

We thank Ambassador Rice and our other panelists for being here today to share their insights on this important set of issues, and we do look forward to your testimony.

I now turn to my friend and the ranking member of the committee, the gentlelady from Florida, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening remarks she might wish to make.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, as well. I welcome Ambassador Rice to our committee today, and this is an important and timely hearing. Promoting reform at the United Nations has been among my highest priorities for this committee, and I do this not as an enemy of the U.N. but as someone who is committed to helping the U.N. help itself. I hope that today's session marks the beginning of a series of hearings and a comprehensive review of real U.N. reform, and that we will soon consider H.R. 557, the United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act.

The peacekeeping section of this bill that I introduced requires the adoption of a uniform code of conduct that would apply equally to all U.N. peacekeeping personnel, military and civilian alike. It also requires the U.N. to maintain a database to track violations of that code of conduct which should be shared across all U.N. agencies. This will help ensure that those who have abused the very populations that they have been sent to protect are not simply recycled to other missions.

Ambassador Rice, I would ask your cooperation on this legislation and your commitment to work together on the promotion of comprehensive reforms at the United Nations, particularly in regards to peacekeeping.

U.N. peacekeeping has contributed to the promotion of peace and stability for more than 60 years, and the overwhelming majority of peacekeepers have served with honor and courage. But to allow the operational failures and the unconscionable acts of misconduct that have come to plague U.N. peacekeeping operations to go unchecked undermines the credibility of the U.N.

The United Nations has over 116,000 personnel from 120 countries deployed across 17 peace operations, including two special political missions. Seven new missions requiring more than 54,000 uniformed personnel have been authorized over the past 5 years alone. The budget for July 9 through June 2010 has swelled to \$7.8 billion, with more than \$2 billion coming from us in the United States.

The days of traditional peacekeeping—when peacekeepers were deployed only to places where there was a peace to be kept, monitored lines of disengagement and used force only in self-defense—those days have long since passed. Experts say that we now have entered a second generation of peacekeeping, where missions are increasingly complex and dangerous.

The mission in Haiti, which was preceded by a U.S.-led multinational interim force and was authorized in 2004, is not a traditional monitoring mission. The mission in Haiti has been charged

with securing a stable environment, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police, assisting in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, supporting the political process, and monitoring human rights.

The mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was originally deployed in the year 2000 as a traditional monitoring mission with just over 5,500 uniformed personnel. Today it has an authorized strength of 19,815 uniformed personnel and an aggressive mandate to use force to protect civilians, forcibly disarm combatants, train and mentor the armed forces of the DRC, seize illegal arms shipments; and provide advice to strengthen democratic institution and processes at every level of the government.

The complexity and dangerous nature of the Congo mission is eclipsed only by the hybrid U.N.-African Union mission in Darfur, Sudan, with multiple chains of command and direct interference by the Sudanese regime, the hybrid model presents unique challenges.

And now the U.N. is being pushed to launch a new mission in Somalia, as the U.N. General Assembly has adopted the concept of responsibility to protect. Ambassador Rice, please discuss, if you could, how the U.S. interprets this responsibility, and how the U.S. views the requirements, if any, on individual nations stemming from the responsibility to protect, and when we expect this concept to be applied and how. This discussion is timely following last week's debate at the U.N.

The United States has a strong record of support for peacekeeping. Since 2004, we have supported the provision of training and equipment for 81,000 new peacekeepers worldwide through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Through GPOI, we have also supported the training of 2,000 instructors at the Center of Excellence for stability police units. We have facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to 20 U.N. and regional peace support operations, and we have been at the forefront of efforts to secure critical mission enablers, including utility and tactical helicopters to support missions in Darfur, Chad, Congo, Afghanistan, and beyond.

I look forward to your testimony, Ambassador Rice, on how we can make this assistance even more effective while coordinating efforts with regional combatant commands and other donors to ensure appropriate and equitable burden sharing.

As conflicts rage and new models of peace operations emerge, it would seem that U.N. peacekeeping is currently faced with three fundamental questions: When is United Nations peacekeeping the right instrument? What tasks can United Nations peacekeeping actually accomplish? And how can United Nations peacekeeping become more effective?

Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your testimony, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.

Chairman BERMAN. And thank you. We have a lengthy hearing. We have after the Ambassador finishes and the questions finish, we have a U.N. official, and then an excellent panel, so I am going to recognize the chairman and ranking member, if he shows up, for the appropriate subcommittee, and then hope to get directly to Ambassador Rice's testimony, and so we can finish this sometime during the daylight hours.

The chairman of the International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt, is recognized for up to 3 minutes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and as you are aware there is a markup going on in the Judiciary Committee, and I am going to excuse myself for the first 20 minutes, but Ambassador Rice, welcome.

The gentlelady alluded to Haiti and the peacekeeping mission there. I dare say if the United Nations was not present in Haiti today that there would be a significant United States both civilian and military presence there. Back in 2006, myself and the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher, requested that the GAO compare the cost of the then current and still current U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti with the hypothetical costs of what a U.S. only mission of the same size would entail, and I read your testimony and you have referenced it, but in terms of the American taxpayer, I think it cannot be stated often enough that it certainly has proven to be simply on a financial basis a good investment. It would have cost the United States taxpayer to support a U.S. only mission there eight times of what it cost the United States taxpayer now.

More importantly, as you well know, peacekeeping, and I think your words were it has saved the United States not only treasure but blood. Again, the gentlelady indicated that there is over 100,000 people or personnel in terms of peacekeeping worldwide; 93 of those are American personnel. So given the multiple challenges facing the United States and recognizing that there are problems that have to be addressed and improvements that can be made, it is my belief that one of the most favorable aspects of the United Nations in terms of the United States is the peacekeeping operations, and I know that many of us look forward to your testimony, your leadership, and I am sure there will be consultations over the course of your tenure and our tenure here regarding peacekeeping operations because the gentlelady, the ranking member, as well as the chair, are correct, there are increasing demands on the U.N. and I think it is critical that we have discussions and debate to determine how we can improve those missions, and welcome again, and I yield back.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and now Ambassador Rice.

Ambassador Susan Rice serves as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. She was unanimously confirmed to this Cabinet-rank position by the U.S. Senate on January 22, 2009, with other confirmations coming so quickly. From 2002 to 2009, Ambassador Rice was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution where she focused on U.S. foreign policy, transnational security threats, league states, global poverty and development, and from 1997 to 2001, Ambassador Rice was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and prior to that served as Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton.

Ambassador Rice received a master's degree and a Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford University where she was a Rhodes Scholar, and her B.A. from Stanford University.

We are very pleased to have you here, and your first appearance in this capacity before the committee, and welcome your testimony. Your entire statement will be included in the record.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. RICE, U.S.
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much, Chairman Berman, and thank you, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen. Distinguished members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I am grateful for your convening this hearing on the opportunities and challenges of global peacekeeping, particularly in Africa. I deeply appreciate the committee's broad interest in these questions, and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my testimony and submit it in its entirety for the record.

I am particularly pleased to make my first appearance on the Hill as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nation to discuss an issue that has enjoyed such strong bipartisan support for more than 60 years. From the Truman administration's backing of the first dispatch of the U.N. military observers in the Middle East in 1948, to the Bush administration's support for unprecedented growth in U.N. peacekeeping between 2003 and 2008, the United States has repeatedly turned to the United Nations and its peacekeeping capacity as an essential instrument for advancing our security.

Increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of peacekeeping is one of the Obama administration's highest priorities at the United Nations. The administration recognizes that many of today's peacekeeping operations face significant limitations and challenges, but like our predecessors, we know that U.N. peacekeeping addresses pressing international needs, and serves our national interests. There are five compelling reasons why it is in U.S. national interests to invest in U.N. peacekeeping.

First, U.N. peacekeeping delivers real results in conflict zones. U.N. peacekeepers can provide the political and practical reassurances that warring parties often need to agree to and implement an effective cease fire. Their deployment can help limit or stop the escalation of armed conflict, and stave off wider war.

But today's U.N. operations do much more than just observe cease fires, they provide security and access so that humanitarian aid can reach the sick, the hungry, and the desperate. They help protect vulnerable civilians, and create conditions that will allow refugees to return home, and they help emerging democracies hold elections and strengthen the rule of law.

Many countries are more peaceful and stable today due to U.N. peacekeeping. In recent years, U.N. peacekeepers helped divert an explosion of ethnic violence in Burundi; extend the fledgling government's authority in Sierra Leone; keep order in Liberia; and take back Cite Soleil from the lawless gangs in Haiti. All of these countries, I should note, now enjoy democratically-elected governments.

Second, U.N. peacekeeping allows us to share the burden of creating a more peaceful and secure world. America simply cannot send our fighting forces to every corner of the globe wherever war breaks out. Today U.N. peacekeeping enlists the contributions of

some 118 countries which provide more than 93,000 troops and police to 15 different U.N. operations. We are grateful for our partners' efforts to forge a safer, more decent world. This is burden sharing at its most effective.

The United States, as was mentioned earlier by MR. Delahunt, currently contributes 93 military and police personnel to U.N. operations, approximately 0.1 percent of all uniformed U.N. personnel deployed worldwide. Sixty-five countries contribute more than the United States, including the other four permanent members of the Security Council.

Third, U.N. peacekeeping is cost effective. The total cost of U.N. peacekeeping is expected to exceed \$7.75 billion this year. As large as this figure is, it actually represents less than 1 percent of global military spending. The United States contributes slightly more than a quarter of the annual cost for U.N. peacekeeping. The European Union countries and Japan together pay more than half of the U.N.'s peacekeeping bill. We estimate that the U.S. share of the Fiscal Year 2009 costs will reach, as Ms. Ros-Lehtinen pointed out, about \$2.2 billion. We are grateful to Congress for the appropriations that will enable us to make our payments in full during fiscal 2009, as well as address arrears accrued from 2005 to 2008.

But let us be plain—\$2.2 billion is a lot of money. But the cost of inaction would likely be far greater both in blood and treasure. According to the same GAO report that Mr. Delahunt referenced, in 2006, the United States contribution to the U.N. mission in Haiti was \$116 million for the first 14 months of the operation; roughly an eighth of the cost of unilateral American mission of the same size and duration. That works out to 12 cents on the dollar, money that seems particularly well spent when one recalls that the arrival of U.N. peacekeepers in Haiti let American troops depart without leaving chaos in their wake.

Fourth, the United Nations is uniquely able to mount multifaceted operations. We have learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere how important it is to have an integrated comprehensive approach. The U.N. has particular expertise, it can pull together political, military, police, humanitarian, human rights, electoral and development activities under the leadership of a single individual on the ground.

Fifth, sometimes warring parties will not let other outside actors in except for the U.N. Governments, rebels, warlords, and other antagonists often don't want foreign forces in their country, but the U.N.'s universal character and its unique legitimacy can make it a little easier for some governments and opposition elements to decide to let constructive outside actors in.

All these factors make U.N. peacekeeping an effective and dynamic instrument for advancing U.S. interests. At the same time, we must be clear about the very real challenges facing U.N. peacekeeping, especially its missions to Africa. Let me highlight three of these challenges.

First, the sheer volume and growth of peacekeeping has put the U.N. and its missions under severe strain. Over the past 6 years the U.N. has had to launch or expand eight missions in rapid succession. In 2003, the U.N. had about 36,000 uniformed personnel deployed around the world. Today, as I just said, there are 93,000.

U.N. officials are the first to acknowledge that it has been difficult to generate, recruit and deploy the numbers of personnel required, while keeping quality high and ongoing improvements on track.

A series of initiatives started in 2000 and continued in 2007 greatly enhanced the U.N.'s administrative and logistical support capabilities, but they never envisioned the scale and scope of today's deployments, so there is much still to be done.

Second, the U.N. is being asked to take on harder and riskier operations, often without the support and capabilities it needs from member states. The Security Council has recently given some very ambitious mandates to peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as protecting civilians under the threat of physical violence, including sexual violence, in vast and populous territories with limited infrastructure, faltering peace processes, ongoing hostilities, and uncooperative host governments.

Consider what the world is asking of UNAMID, the hybrid African Union mission in Darfur. Darfur is about the size of California with a pre-war population of 6.5 million. Only 20,000 peacekeepers, and we are not even yet at that strength, are inherently limited in their ability to patrol territories so vast and to protect so many civilians. Imagine how much more difficult their task becomes, as it has, when the host government actively hinders their efforts, the parties balk at cease fire talks, and the peacekeepers are deployed below their full operating capacity.

The Government of Sudan has repeatedly failed to cooperate with international peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, denying them access, expelling international humanitarian groups, refusing entry visas for desperately needed personnel, and blocking the delivery of critical logistical support. While President Obama's special envoy on Sudan, General Scott Gration, helped persuade the Government of Sudan to let four new humanitarian NGOs in, we continue to urge Khartoum to fill the gaps in critical humanitarian aid services and to improve its cooperation with UNAMID.

UNAMID is now only at 69 percent of the 19,500 troops it was authorized to field, and only at 45 percent of its authorized police strength. The United States has provided over \$100 million worth of heavy equipment and training as well as \$17 million worth of airlift assistance for African peacekeepers in Darfur, and we helped secure a pledge of five tactical helicopters for UNAMID from the Government of Ethiopia. But you may recall that UNAMID continues to plead with the international community for over 2 years for 18 medium-sized utility helicopters and about 400 personnel to fly them and maintain them.

The missions in Chad and Congo also lack critical helicopter units to enable them quickly to deploy to areas where vulnerable civilians most need their help.

And third, host governments often lack the security and rule of law capacities needed to take over successfully from U.N. peacekeepers when they leave. Let me flag one brief example.

Liberia has made considerable progress during the last 6 years that UNMIL, the U.N. mission, has been on the ground. I saw this in May when I led a Security Council mission to Liberia. But Liberia's army, police, justice system and prison systems are very weak. Poverty, unemployment and violent crime are high. Disputes over

land and ethnicity persist. The country's hard-won progress would unravel if peacekeepers leave too soon.

So it will take concerted action by many actors to meet these difficult challenges facing U.N. peacekeeping. It will also take U.S. leadership in areas where we are uniquely able to provide it. The new administration is moving ahead swiftly on five particularly important fronts.

First, we are working with our fellow Security Council members to provide credible and achievable mandates for U.N. operations, and we are working on a Presidential statement with our partners that would outline a better process for formulating peacekeeping mandates and measuring progress in their implementation.

We have demonstrated our commitment to resist endorsing unachievable or ill-conceived mandates. For example, by opposing in the present circumstances the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Peacekeeping missions are not always the right answer. Some situations require other types of U.N. authorized military deployments such as regional efforts or multinational forces operating under the framework of a lead nation. And effective mediation needs to proceed and accompany all peacekeeping efforts if they are to succeed.

Second, we are breathing new life into faltering peace processes where peacekeeping operations are currently deployed. Our objective is to get the parties in fragile peace talks to abide by their commitments, to cooperate with peacekeepers and build mutual trust. Our most immediate priorities in Africa are Darfur and Sudan's North-South peace process, the Great Lakes region, and the Horn of Africa.

Third, we will do more to help expand the pool of willing and capable troop and police contributors. Our immediate priority is to help secure the capabilities that the missions in Darfur, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo need to better protect civilians under eminent threat, but we are also pursuing more long-term efforts.

Since 2005, the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative, or GPOI, and its African component, ACOTA, have focused on training the peacekeepers needed to meet the spike in global demand. And as of this month the program had trained more than 81,000 peacekeepers and helped deploy nearly 50,000 of them to peacekeeping operations around the world.

We must also prime the pump to generate even more peacekeepers. Other countries willingness to provide troops and police is likely to increase if they see that key Security Council members, including the United States, not only value their sacrifice, but respect their concerns. The United States, for our part, is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police and other civilian personnel, including more women I should note, to U.N. peacekeeping operations. We will also explore ways to provide additional enabling assistance to peacekeeping mission either by ourselves or together with partners.

Fourth, we will help build up host governments' security sectors and rule of law institutions as part of an overall peace-building strategy. Our immediate priorities in this regard are Haiti, Liberia,

and the DRC; three places where such efforts could help let U.N. peacekeeping missions depart sooner.

As a host government capacity grows, the role of a U.N. mission can be reduced, but we will not be rushed out of lasting results. We have made it abundantly clear to our Security Council partners that while we seek to lessen the peacekeeping load as appropriate, we will not support arbitrary or abrupt efforts to downsize or terminate missions.

And finally, the United States will pursue a new generation of peacekeeping reforms from the U.N. Secretariat. We support reforms that help achieve economies of scale and realize cost savings; that strengthen oversight transparency and accountability; that improve field personnel and procurement systems; that strengthen the process of mission planning, reduced deployment, delays and encourage stronger mission leadership; and clarify the roles and responsibilities of all U.N. actors in the field and at headquarters.

The administration is also encouraging reform efforts that elevate performance standards and prevent fraud and abuse, including sexual exploitation. The U.N. has taken several critical steps in recent years to establish and implement a zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel, including establishing a well-publicized code of conduct and creating conduct and discipline units in the field to perform training, carry out initial investigations, and support victims. The administration strongly supports these measures and we will remain vigilant to ensure that they are implemented effectively.

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen and distinguished members, I hope that this provides a helpful starting point for our discussions today. It is pragmatism and a clear sense of America's interests that drives us to support U.N. peacekeeping, and it is also pragmatism and principle that drive us to pursue critical reforms in this important national security tool. We need peacekeeping missions that are planned well, deployed quickly, budgeted realistically, equipped seriously, led ably, and ended responsibly.

I look forward to your questions, your good counsel, and your continued support as we work together to build a more secure America and a more peaceful world. It is a pleasure to be with you. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Rice follows:]

STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR SUSAN E. RICE
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

“CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES FACING
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS”

JULY 29, 2009

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the opportunities and challenges for international peacekeeping operations, particularly in Africa. I deeply appreciate the Committee’s broad interest in these questions.

I am particularly pleased to make my first appearance on the Hill as U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN to discuss an issue that has enjoyed such strong bipartisan support for more than sixty years. From the Truman Administration’s backing of the first dispatch of UN military observers to the Middle East in 1948, to the Bush Administration’s support for unprecedented growth in UN peacekeeping between 2003 and 2008, the United States has repeatedly turned to UN peacekeeping as an essential instrument for advancing our security.

Increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping is one of the Obama Administration’s highest priorities at the United Nations. As you know, seven of the UN’s 15 current peacekeeping operations are in Africa, accounting for some three-quarters of the military, police, and civilian peacekeepers that the UN has deployed world-wide.

The Administration recognizes that many of today’s peacekeeping operations face significant limitations and challenges. But we believe it is important to continue the long and bipartisan tradition of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping because, like our predecessors, we also know that it addresses pressing international needs and serves our national interests.

UN Peacekeeping Is in Our National Interest

There are five compelling reasons why it is in the U.S. national interest to invest in UN peacekeeping.

First, UN peacekeeping delivers real results in conflict zones. UN peacekeepers can provide the political and practical reassurances warring parties need to agree to and implement an effective cease-fire. Their deployment can help limit or stop the escalation of armed conflict and stave off wider war. But today's UN operations do much more than just observe cease-fires. They provide security and access for humanitarian aid to reach the sick, the hungry, the vulnerable, and the desperate. They help protect vulnerable civilians and create the conditions that will let refugees return home. And, they help emerging democracies hold elections and strengthen the rule of law.

Many countries are more peaceful and stable today due to past and current UN peacekeeping efforts. They include Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique. More recently, UN peacekeepers helped avert an explosion of ethnic violence in Burundi, extend a fledgling government's authority in Sierra Leone, keep order in Liberia, and take back Cite Soleil from lawless gangs in Haiti. All of these countries, I should note, now enjoy democratically elected governments.

The U.S. appreciates these efforts—both because they offer millions of people the prospect of a more secure, prosperous, and dignified future and because they advance U.S. national security interests. With the help of UN peacekeeping, war-torn states are able to better provide for their citizens and better meet their international commitments and obligations, including protecting their borders; policing their territory; halting the flow of illicit arms, drugs and trade; and denying sanctuary to transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida.

UN peacekeepers also continue to play their more traditional role as cease fire monitors. This function remains extremely important – often providing the cover and confidence that states and non-state actors need to stop fighting and disengage their forces. We have witnessed this again and again over the decades – in Kashmir in 1949, the Suez crisis in 1956, Cyprus in 1964, the Golan Heights in 1974, Central America in 1989, and the Great Lakes in 1999.

Second, UN peacekeeping allows us to share the burden of creating a more peaceful and secure world. America simply cannot send our armed forces to every corner of the globe whenever war breaks out. Today, UN peacekeeping enlists the contributions of some 118 countries, which provide more than 93,000 troops and police to 15 different UN operations.

Many countries have stepped up impressively. African countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Senegal now provide most of the uniformed personnel in the seven UN peacekeeping operations on their continent. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay supply thousands of troops and police for the UN mission in Haiti. Italy and France together have contributed more than 4,000 troops to the UN force in Lebanon. Countries from Asia and the Pacific have provided the majority of the UN peacekeepers in Timor-Leste for the past decade.

As this suggests, countries come forward with personnel, by and large, because they have a clear stake in international peace and stability, especially in their own regions. But regional actors often cannot supply the numbers and capabilities that a given UN mission demands. Over the past decade, UN peacekeeping operations have often included battle-tested troops from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India—by far the three largest contributors to UN operations, together providing almost 30,000 uniformed personnel and accounting for about a third of the UN troops and police deployed in Africa. Other countries—such as Nepal, Jordan, and, more recently, China and Indonesia—have increasingly demonstrated the ability and will to send large numbers of uniformed personnel to UN missions across the globe. We are grateful for all their efforts to help forge a safer, more decent world.

This is burden sharing at its most effective: The United States currently contributes 93 military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions—approximately 0.1 percent of all uniformed UN personnel deployed worldwide. Sixty-five countries contribute more than the United States, including the other four permanent members of the Security Council: China with 2,153; France with 1,879; Russia with 328; and the United Kingdom with 283. Many of these countries recognize the current factors that constrain our ability to play a more robust, direct role in peacekeeping. At the same time, they appreciate both the professionalism of the personnel that we do contribute and the significant enabling support we provide in such areas as training, equipping, and transportation of UN units.

Third, UN peacekeeping is cost-effective. The total cost of UN peacekeeping is expected to exceed \$7.75 billion this year. Yet, large as this figure is, it represents less than 1 percent of global military spending.

The United States contributes slightly more than a quarter of the annual costs for UN peacekeeping. The European Union countries and Japan together pay more than half the UN's peacekeeping bill. We estimate that the U.S. share of the Fiscal Year 2009 costs will reach \$2.2 billion. We are grateful to Congress for the

appropriations that will enable us to make our payments in full during Fiscal Year 2009, as well as address arrears accrued from 2005 to 2008.

\$2.2 billion is a lot of money, but the costs of inaction would likely be far greater, in both blood and treasure. That is particularly true if the absence of peacekeeping today were to compel us to resort to U.S. military intervention later on. According to a 2006 Government Accountability Office analysis, the U.S. contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti was \$116 million for the first 14 months of the operation—roughly an eighth of the cost of a unilateral American mission of the same size and duration. That works out to 12 cents on the dollar—money that seems particularly well-spent when one recalls that the arrival of UN peacekeepers in Haiti let American troops depart without leaving chaos in their wake. UN blue helmets did the same thing to help us avoid a lengthy U.S. troop deployment in Liberia. Knowing that the Security Council had authorized deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, U.S. troops handed over to Nigerian forces, who came under the UN flag two months later.

Fourth, the United Nations is uniquely able to mount multi-faceted missions.

We have learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere how important it is to have an integrated, comprehensive approach. The UN has particular expertise here: it can pull political, military, police, humanitarian, human rights, electoral, and development activities together under the leadership of a single individual on the ground. And this involvement can be critical even in cases where the UN does not provide the troops; largely civilian UN missions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan have assumed vitally important civilian and police responsibilities, working alongside U.S., NATO, and other forces. The Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General who head these operations often play indispensable roles—mediating disputes, advising fledgling democracies, coordinating international assistance, and leading UN efforts in country.

Fifth, sometimes warring parties won't let other outside actors in—except for the UN. Governments, rebels, warlords, and other antagonists often don't want foreign forces in their country. But the UN's universal character and unique legitimacy can make it a little easier for some governments to decide to let constructive outsiders in. The UN's unmatched ability to draw forces from a range of countries and to choose effective, trusted international mission leaders can provide further reassurance. And the UN's political and development tools reduce the potential that peacekeepers will be seen as occupiers.

All of these factors make UN peacekeeping an effective and dynamic instrument for advancing U.S. interests. It relieves the burden on our brave men and women in uniform. It saves American lives and American dollars over the long run. It brings to bear unique expertise, versatility, and credibility. And it is often the only available option. As a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council, the U.S. exercises full control over where and when a UN operation is established, and what tasks it is authorized to perform. Once we decide to adopt a peacekeeping mandate, it is in our national interest to promote its successful implementation.

The Key Challenges in UN Peacekeeping

At the same time, we must be clear about the very real challenges facing UN peacekeeping, especially its missions in Africa. Let me highlight three of them.

First, the sheer volume and growth of peacekeeping has put the UN and its missions under severe strain. Over the past six years, the UN has had to launch or expand eight missions in rapid succession. In 2003, the UN had about 36,000 uniformed personnel deployed around the world. Today, it has more than 93,000. And maintaining over 90,000 troops in the field requires training, preparing, and deploying a much larger number, in light of troop rotations every six months to one year.

This has meant drawing upon and supporting hundreds of thousands of military personnel. And during the same period, the UN has had to recruit tens of thousands of civilian personnel, including political officers, lawyers, human rights monitors, procurement experts, and logisticians.

UN officials are the first to acknowledge that it has been difficult to generate, recruit, and deploy the numbers of personnel required, while keeping quality high and ongoing improvements on track. A series of initiatives started in 2000 greatly enhanced the UN's administrative and logistical support capabilities, but they never envisaged the scale and scope of today's deployments. To take just one example, the 2000 reforms did not anticipate that, nine years later, UN peacekeeping operations would operate a fleet of 270 aircraft and 17,350 vehicles, consume \$1.75 million of fuel and 11 million liters of water every day, or require more than 17,000 procurement transactions valued at some \$1.43 billion in 2008 alone.

In 2007, UN member states approved UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's proposals for further peacekeeping restructuring: doubling the number of senior peacekeeping managers at UN Headquarters, creating a new Department of Field Support and funding a few hundred additional positions to help manage the dramatic rise in activity. But as anyone who has ever run a large organization knows, managing restructuring, change, and growth simultaneously is a daunting challenge for the most capable and adaptable organizations. The UN has struggled to keep up through this period. Some key posts have only recently been filled, and many core business processes are still under review. The UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support have been beefed up on paper, but it will take time before the full tangible benefits materialize. There is still much more to be done.

Second, the UN is being asked to take on harder, riskier operations—often without the support and capabilities it needs from member states. The Security Council has recently given some very ambitious mandates to peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as protecting civilians under the threat of physical violence—including sexual violence—in vast and populous territories with limited infrastructure, faltering peace processes, ongoing hostilities, and uncooperative host governments.

Consider the difficulty of trying to tamp down the embers of the North-South conflict in Sudan, which has claimed the lives of more than 2 million Sudanese. The UN Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS, was established to help implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which brought an end to decades of fighting. But the implementation of the CPA, in letter and in spirit, remains incomplete, and the parties continue to disagree on such issues as sharing power, distributing wealth and resources, and setting boundaries. So the North-South peace process is precarious. UNMIS depends on key international and regional actors to encourage the parties to abide by their commitments and address outstanding issues that could have grave implications for the future of Sudan.

The world is also asking a great deal of UNAMID, the hybrid African Union-UN mission in Darfur. Darfur is about the size of California, with a pre-war population of 6.5 million. Only twenty thousand peacekeepers are inherently limited in their ability to patrol territory so vast, and to protect so many civilians. Imagine how much more difficult their task becomes when the host government actively hinders their efforts, the parties balk at cease-fire talks, and the peacekeepers are deployed below their full operating capacity.

The Government of Sudan has repeatedly failed to cooperate with international peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, denying them freedom of movement and access, refusing entry visas for desperately needed personnel, blocking the delivery of critical logistics support, and even, on March 4, expelling 13 international non-governmental organizations and revoking the registrations of three Sudanese aid agencies that were doing lifesaving work to feed, shelter, and heal those huddled in Darfur's refugee camps. While President Obama's Special Envoy for Sudan, General Scott Gration, helped persuade the Government of Sudan to let four new humanitarian NGOs in, we continue to urge Khartoum to fill the gaps in critical humanitarian aid services and to improve its cooperation with UNAMID.

At this moment, UNAMID has only 69 percent of the 19,500 troops it was authorized to field and only 45 percent of its authorized police strength of 6,400. Providing logistics support to these troops is an additional challenge. Key supplies are brought through a single port, Port Sudan, on the other side of the country from the UN mission's headquarters in El-Fasher. Bureaucratic delays at customs are frequent. Then, the goods need to be transported over 1,200 miles on barely passable roads—about the same distance from Washington, DC, to Dallas, Texas. And UNAMID is not alone in facing logistics challenges and troop shortfalls: the UN mission across the border in Chad, MINURCAT, functions in equally remote locations and is now deployed at 46 percent, with European Union forces bridging the gap. The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC, is yet to obtain and deploy the additional 3,000 troops that the Security Council authorized in November; they are expected to arrive in the next two to three months.

Beyond deployed strength, a peacekeeping force's capacity to operate effectively depends on several other factors, many of which are in short supply in the missions in Darfur, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These factors include robust command-and-control arrangements; adequate training and equipment for the troops; the capacity to rapidly deploy and move forces in theater; readily available medical, engineering, intelligence, and aviation -- particularly helicopter -- units; and perhaps most importantly, the peacekeepers' capacity and determination to defend themselves and their mission mandate.

The United States has provided over \$100 million worth of heavy equipment and training, as well as \$17 million worth of airlift assistance, for African peacekeepers in Darfur. We helped secure a pledge of five tactical-helicopters for UNAMID from the Government of Ethiopia. But you may recall that UNAMID has been pleading with the international community for two years for 18 medium-sized

utility helicopters and about 400 personnel to fly and maintain them— still to no avail. The missions in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo also lack critical helicopter units to enable them to quickly deploy to areas where vulnerable civilians need their help most.

Third, host governments often lack the security and rule-of-law capacities needed to take over successfully from the UN peacekeepers when they depart.

Let me offer just a few examples. Liberia has made considerable progress during the six years that the UN Mission, UNMIL, has been on the ground—as I saw for myself in May, when I led a UN Security Council mission there. But Liberia still has far to go. The will to pursue peace and development is present at the highest level of government, but the state capacity to sustain it is not. Liberia’s army, police, justice, and prisons systems are very weak; poverty, unemployment, and violent crime are high; disputes over land and ethnicity persist. The country’s hard-won progress could unravel if UN peacekeepers leave too soon.

Even more daunting challenges face the Democratic Republic of the Congo—a vast country the size of the United States east of the Mississippi, with a population nearly twice that of California. The DRC has scant paved roads and few functioning courts, prisons, or municipal governments. Its national army and police have only recently been cobbled together, sometimes by bringing together former foes. Few security personnel are educated; most are barely paid, if at all. The country also suffers from a culture of impunity, where illegal armed groups, as well as members of the armed forces (FARDC) and national police, are responsible for staggering numbers of cases of horrific sexual violence and human rights abuses.

The Administration strongly supports the steps that the UN mission in the DRC has taken to better protect civilians from rape, assault, and murder, including Joint Protection Teams, rapid-response cells, and quick-reaction military units. But Congolese security institutions will have to be significantly strengthened and the rule of law significantly deepened to make a lasting difference.

Our Strategy for the Way Forward

It will take concerted action by many actors to meet the difficult challenges facing UN peacekeeping. It will also take U.S. leadership—in areas where we are uniquely able to provide it. The new Administration is already moving on six particularly important fronts.

First, we are working with our fellow Security Council members to provide credible and achievable mandates for UN peacekeeping operations. We are also currently negotiating a Presidential Statement that would outline a better process for formulating peacekeeping mandates, and measuring progress in their implementation.

We have demonstrated our commitment to resist unachievable or ill-conceived mandates by opposing in present circumstances the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia. Peacekeeping missions are not always the right answer; some situations require other types of military deployments, such as UN authorized regional efforts or regional or multinational forces operating under the framework of a lead nation. UN peacekeepers cannot do everything and go everywhere. There are limits to what they can accomplish, especially in the midst of a full-blown war or in the face of opposition from the host government. And effective mediation must precede and accompany all peacekeeping efforts, if they are to succeed. Thus, we are urging the Council to continue to weigh the full range of responses to a given challenge.

At the same time, poorly armed and disorganized gangs, rebel groups, and others outside a peace process should not be allowed to thwart a peacekeeping mandate or block a UN deployment. That is why the Security Council often must authorize peacekeepers to use appropriate force to defend themselves and fulfill their mandate, including protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence. They must be willing and able to do so.

Second, we are breathing new life into faltering peace processes where peacekeeping operations are currently deployed. Our objective is to get the parties in fragile peace talks to abide by their commitments, cooperate with peacekeepers, and build mutual trust.

Our most immediate priorities in Africa are Darfur and Sudan's North-South peace process, the Great Lakes region, and the Horn of Africa. Sudan Special Envoy Gration is working closely with the UN-AU Joint Chief Mediator, Djibril Bassolé, to reenergize the Darfur peace process. He has traveled extensively to the region and met with representatives from Chad, Qatar, Egypt, Libya, and other parties, such as China, that can influence Khartoum and Darfur's rebels. Special Envoy Gration has also worked tirelessly to reinvigorate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolve the issues that might threaten a sustainable, long-term peace. His efforts include recently hosting a conference on this subject in

Washington that was attended by more than 30 countries and organizations. And last week he helped to smooth all parties' acceptance of the potentially explosive, but thankfully well accepted ruling of the Permanent Court of Justice on the disputed Abyei region.

We also seek to support the work of MINURCAT, the UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. Established in 2007 out of recognition that the Darfur conflict has important regional dimensions, the long-term success of MINURCAT relies heavily on improved relations between the governments of Sudan and Chad. So the United States continues to urge both countries to implement the May 3 Doha accord and honor their previous agreements. U.S. officials have also met at the highest levels with Sudanese and Chadian officials, as well as other international actors, to push the parties to end cross-border support for the warring factions and demonstrate a commitment to normal relations.

Improved relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda played a key role in defusing the crisis in the eastern DRC last year. The United States welcomed this development and encouraged President Kabila of the DRC and President Kagame of Rwanda to broaden and deepen their countries' relationship. Further rapprochement would help create the conditions in the eastern DRC that would allow for MONUC to reduce its size, and ultimately depart.

Where such diplomatic efforts, pursued with many other partners, succeed, they will dramatically improve the safety of civilians menaced by physical violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere. But the U.S. can afford no illusions. Some of the actors involved have long histories of lofty pledges and paltry results. We will not take merely the word of those who have committed genocide and crimes against humanity. We will insist on verifiable, significant and lasting action before we offer meaningful rewards.

Third, we will do more to help expand the pool of willing and capable troop and police contributors. Our immediate priority is to help secure the capabilities that the missions in Darfur, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo need to better protect civilians under imminent threat. But we are also pursuing more long-term efforts.

Since 2005, the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative, or GPOI, and its African component, ACOTA, have focused on training the peacekeepers needed to meet the spike in global demand. As of June 30, the program had trained more than

81,000 peacekeepers and helped deploy nearly 50,000 of them to peacekeeping operations around the world. More than 10,000 of these forces are deployed or will deploy imminently to Darfur, and another six thousand to the DRC. In February, ACOTA started training troops bound for Chad, in addition to non-African missions, such as in Lebanon.

Nonetheless, we recognize that more attention to quality and sustainability are needed. So we have shifted GPOI's focus toward helping develop the ability of troop-contributing countries to be fully self-sufficient. We are training trainers. This approach, over time, will consistently yield higher numbers of capable peacekeepers. We must also do more to ensure that peacekeepers have access to vital equipment, particularly in Africa. This means not only providing equipment packages, such as those provided to UNAMID-bound peacekeepers, but also supporting equipment facilities in Africa and elsewhere.

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement is also training the Formed Police Units, or FPUs, that are so urgently needed in peacekeeping missions today. GPOI also helps meet this need through its support for the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), located in Italy. Productive as these efforts have been, they are not enough. The Administration intends to develop more Formed Police Unit capacities in willing countries and help provide the infrastructure and material for FPUs in countries that are interested in increasing their support for UN peacekeeping.

Still, several UN missions need much more help than that. For this reason, the Administration is exploring the possibility of partnering with nations that share both an interest in seeing UN peacekeeping succeed and who possess some of the key assets needed by UN operations, such as tactical helicopters, engineers, highly mobile infantry units, and Formed Police Units that specialize in crowd control. We expect an exploratory meeting to be held in the fall.

We must also prime the pump to generate more peacekeepers. Other countries' willingness to provide troops and police is likely to increase if they see that key Security Council members, including the United States, not only value their sacrifice but respect their concerns. We will intensify our dialogue with current and potential troop- and police-contributing nations—to better understand their concerns and to spell out our expectations. Our top priorities will be talks with states or regional groupings that could contribute combat-ready, battalion and brigade-size forces—the all-important units that could join, reinforce, or buy time for UN peacekeepers during a crisis.

The United States, for its part, is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women—to UN peacekeeping operations. We will also explore ways to provide enabling assistance to peacekeeping missions, either by ourselves or together with partners.

Fourth, we will consider ways to do more to build up host governments' security sectors and rule-of-law institutions. Our immediate priorities are Haiti, Liberia, and the DRC—three places where such efforts could help let UN peacekeeping missions depart sooner. But in all three countries, the road to success will not be a short one. In Haiti, our bilateral assistance is aligned with the Haitian government's priorities of economic growth and sustainable development, and supports reform of the judiciary and strengthening of the Haitian National Police. The Administration is undertaking a comprehensive review of our assistance to Haiti to identify ways it could have greater and more lasting impact.

Liberia has made some progress establishing its Armed Forces, with the help of the United States. Now, we need to turn greater attention to assisting the Liberian government to strengthen and reform its police and justice sectors, which are lagging behind.

In the DRC, the United States and our European Union partners are expending considerable resources to train and equip local soldiers and police, including to respond more effectively to sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). Important as these train and equip programs are, they are not enough. The DRC needs a comprehensive plan for meeting the oversight, management, and resource requirements of the security sector, especially the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). We need to work with international partners to help the Congolese elaborate and implement it.

As a host government's capacities grow, the role of a UN mission can be reduced. But we will not be rushed out of lasting results. We have made it abundantly clear to our Security Council partners that while we seek to lessen the UN's peacekeeping load, as appropriate, we will not support arbitrary or abrupt efforts to downsize or terminate missions.

Fifth, will continue close collaboration between the UN and regional organizations, especially the African Union (AU). Without sufficient support for regional operations, the road to successful UN operations can be longer and

more treacherous. Regionally-run peacekeeping operations can sometimes be an effective early component of efforts to bring stability to a conflict zone. We will therefore continue to help to strengthen the AU in several areas including mission management, logistics, budgeting, and meeting equipment standards.

We are also willing to share with our African partners best practices, doctrine and lessons learned from the experiences of the Civilian Response Corps in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Civilian Response Corps is preparing a cadre of trained civilian experts, from eight federal agencies and departments, who could deploy when needed to assist in critical reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Africa and elsewhere.

And finally, the United States will pursue a new generation of peacekeeping reforms at the UN Secretariat. We will support reforms that help achieve economies of scale and realize cost savings; that strengthen oversight, transparency, and accountability; that improve field personnel and procurement systems; that strengthen the process of mission planning; that reduce deployment delays; that encourage stronger mission leadership; and that clarify the roles and responsibilities of all UN actors, in the field and at headquarters.

The Administration will also encourage reform efforts that elevate performance standards and prevent fraud and abuse, including sexual exploitation. The United States continues to play a leading role in international efforts to ensure that UN peacekeepers—military, police and civilian—neither exploit nor abuse the vulnerable people they have been sent to protect. The UN has taken several critical steps in recent years to establish and implement a zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel—including establishing a well-publicized code of conduct and creating Conduct and Discipline Units in the field to perform training, carry out initial investigations, and support victims. In recent days, the MONUC force commander sent a mission to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to reinforce preventive measures against sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. The Administration strongly supports these measures, and we will remain vigilant to ensure that they are implemented effectively.

Finally, another key reform area that often gets short shrift is, simply, leadership. The right UN Special Representatives, commanders and managers can make all the difference in the world. They can point to dangers that others may not see; spur action that some wish to shirk; cool the fury of those bent on war; and solve problems that defeat others. Some truly extraordinary individuals have served and

are serving the UN, but there aren't enough of them. We must do more to identify, support, and empower the commanders and leaders that peacekeeping missions need in order to succeed, especially qualified women.

Conclusion

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, Distinguished Members, I hope that this provides a helpful starting place for our discussions today. It is pragmatism and a clear sense of America's interests that drives us to support UN peacekeeping today. But it is also pragmatism and principle that drive us to pursue critical reforms of this important national security tool. We need peacekeeping missions that are planned well, deployed quickly, budgeted realistically, equipped seriously, led ably, and ended responsibly. I look forward to your good counsel and your continued support as we work together to build a more secure America and a more peaceful world.

It's a pleasure to be with you today. Thank you again. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Ambassador, and I yield myself 5 minutes.

You present both a compelling case for why peacekeeping is in so much of our interests as well as a recognition of serious problems and a strategy for addressing those problems. I wanted to ask you just a couple of questions. Three issues I want to raise with you, and then give you a chance to comment.

First, the issue in these conflicts that the soldiers use of rape as a weapon of war in Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, we need a mechanism to hold the individuals accountable for their crimes. Have you any thoughts on the question of whether a U.N. Charter could be amended to hold member states responsible for prosecuting their nationals who commit criminal acts while serving in international peacekeeping operation? Or in the alternative, should there be an international mechanism, a military tribunal established for these kinds of cases?

The other issue I would like you to address, you touched on an interesting point in pointing out some of the priorities, particularly in Africa, for the sustaining and strengthening of peacekeeping operations, and then mentioning that Somalia was a case where that wasn't appropriate, and I am curious. Could you expand on that a little bit, the notion of where it makes sense and where it doesn't, in your mind? So with my remaining 3 minutes.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two very important issues you raise. Let me begin with the first, about accountability for sexual crimes and other abuses. I presume you mean to focus on peacekeeping, is that right?

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I mean—

Ambassador RICE. Or do you mean criminals in war?

Chairman BERMAN. Both. But let us start with the peacekeepers.

Ambassador RICE. Okay.

Chairman BERMAN. You touched on the peace—

Ambassador RICE. The answers would be quite different.

Chairman BERMAN. Okay.

Ambassador RICE. First of all, obviously, the United States, the administration, Congress, we are all deeply concerned about the prevalence of rape as a crime of war. It is not a new phenomenon. Unfortunately, it is as old as time, but it is particularly egregious and strikingly prevalent in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, which I visited recently in May, and spoke with victims of sexual abuse and rape. It is prevalent in Congo, Liberia, Sudan and elsewhere. These situations need to be addressed in a very serious way when they are committed by combatants as well as by peacekeepers.

It is important to note that while there have been some very unacceptable egregious instances of abuse by U.N. personnel, that is a very small fraction of the problem. The vast majority of peacekeepers, as Ms. Ros-Lehtinen pointed out, are responsible, principled, and are contributing to the protection of civilians, rather than the alternative.

But where abuses occur by peacekeepers, there does need to be accountability which is why we have been so supportive of the U.N.'s zero tolerance policy, and its placement in the field of code

of conduct teams that can investigate, train, and enable mission leaders to hold personnel accountable and remove them.

The present circumstance, however, is that every national government, every troop contributing country is responsible ultimately for the prosecution and the disposition of its own troops in cases of crimes. That is, as you know, a privilege we jealously guard ourselves. So while I think it is certainly worth considering and exploring what additional international legal mechanisms might be available to ensure that when perpetrators are identified and convicted that they are in fact held accountable, we need to be realistic about what member states are prepared to allow their own personnel to be subjected to in the form of international justice. It is analogous to the debate that we are all familiar with in this country and elsewhere with respect to the International Criminal Court, which is a vehicle theoretically that might be appropriate in this instance.

And so in talking about an amendment to the U.N. charter, we are talking about adoption by two-thirds of the member states of the General Assembly, and ratification by our own Senate. I think it is a high bar because if we were to sponsor it, we would have to be willing to subject ourselves to it.

Chairman BERMAN. I take your point. My time has expired, and the 5 minutes is both—I would love to hear the answer to the Somalia issue, but I—

Ambassador RICE. I imagine somebody else will raise it and I will certainly address it specifically.

Chairman BERMAN. All right. I am pleased to recognize Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for 5 minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your testimony, Ambassador Rice.

The first question—although it does not relate to peacekeeping—I would like to ask your views on the U.N. Human Rights Council and your plans for reforming this failed body. For example, a few months ago the council praised the Cuban tyranny's human rights record, and it repeatedly condemns Israel. Its membership includes Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China. Over 80 percent of their country-specific condemnations target Israel while Zimbabwe, for example, escapes scrutiny because it has serial human rights abusers on the panel.

On Haiti, I recently traveled to Haiti with some of my south Florida congressional colleagues—Congressman Meeks, Wasserman-Schultz, and Diaz-Balart—and we witnessed the important role played by the U.N. mission in Haiti. I strongly believe that the objectives and the success of the mission there are crucial to Haiti's future as a stable democratic and prosperous nation, and this is what we hoped for Haiti. I also witnessed U.S. programs at work in Haiti.

How is coordination going with the U.N. peacekeeping mission there to help ensure maximum impact and efficiency of our own efforts in Haiti, and how do you see the appointment of former President Clinton as facilitating this coordination and helping to strengthen Haiti's capacity to help its own people, and again move into a new phase marked by growth and stability?

And lastly, on Lebanon, there were repeated reports of UNIFIL engaging in anti-Israel, pro-Hezbollah behavior during Israel's defensive war against Hezbollah in 2006. UNIFIL reportedly displayed Israeli troop movements on its Web site. Last year, UNIFIL soldiers saluted a passing convoy that was bedecked by Hezbollah flags and carried the coffin and picture of a Hezbollah militant. UNIFIL has essentially shrugged off criticism of this outrageous behavior. What will the administration do to enforce accountability regarding these incidents and weed out potential Hezbollah sympathizers from this UNIFIL force?

Thank you, Madam Ambassador.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen. I will do my best in the 2½ minutes that I have to deal with those three questions, but it is going to be a challenge. Let me begin first with the Human Rights Council, and forgive me if I start talking fast to try to be responsive.

We made the decision that the United States would be better off inside the Human Rights Council fighting for what we believe in, playing an active role in trying to call attention to those countries in the world that are the most egregious human rights abusers, and standing up against and actively pushing back on the outrageous and ridiculous focus on Israel that has been the pattern in the Human Rights Council.

We know very well that this is a body that has not lived up to its expectations, and that it is flawed. But we think the United States can best lead on human rights and democracy, which we care so deeply about, from within. We will play a very active and energetic role in focusing effort on those countries that deserve attention, and ensuring that there is balance and a reasonable approach to the issue of Israel. From inside, we will work on the universal periodic review mechanism, which is a good opportunity to deal with a number of countries we have a particular interest in, and we will be actively engaged in the review of the council in 2011 to ensure that it is enhanced and improved.

With respect to Haiti—

Chairman BERMAN. I am going to ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady have 1 additional minute just to finish.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. Does that mean I can talk a little less fast?

Chairman BERMAN. No, fast is good, but you have a lot to cover here.

Ambassador RICE. Okay. I, too, had the privilege of visiting Haiti in recent months. I was with the Security Council delegation there in March, and in my judgment, this is a mission that is performing well and has done a tremendous job of helping to bring stability and security to parts of the country, particularly the slums of Port-au-Prince that were completely lawless, and creating the space for the police to be trained to take over a critical role in Haiti's security. This is a mission that is, in my judgment, on track, and well led with good coordination among its civilian police and military elements. I was pleased to see American police officers serving with distinction and finding their work to be a very worthwhile contribution.

With respect to President Clinton, I think that Haiti and indeed the United Nations and the United States are blessed to have somebody of his commitment and stature actively engaged in supporting Haiti. He will, among other things, help with Haiti's economic development and bring attention, and I hope investors and resources, to Haiti at this critical point. Getting Haiti on its feet economically and reducing poverty is a critical element of success, as you well know.

With respect to Lebanon, I share your concerns about the incidents that you have raised. We clearly have cause for even greater concern in recent days with the explosion of the arms cache which we believe to have been in violation of 1701, likely sponsored by Hezbollah. We think that there is reason for continued vigilance and scrutiny not only with respect to violations of 1701 and the arms embargo, and we will do that and continue to do that, but we will also ensure that UNIFIL and its troop contributors act in a fashion consistent with their mandate and their purpose.

Many of these troop contributors, as you know, are some of our closest allies and partners.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The chairman of the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee, Mr. Payne, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, and let me welcome you, Dr. Rice, and I am so pleased that you have been appointed to your position. Your background as assistant secretary and national security at Brookings Institute really prepared you well for the position, and from what I have gotten from other member states your presence there has changed the image of the U.S., and I really appreciate that. Let me also commend you for the work you did on Human Rights Commission to insert the United States again in. We know that there is still a lot of work to be done, but it is far from where it used to be, and the fact that you had the courage to present United States in the election, which is won maybe 97 percent of available votes show that your judgment was right.

I certainly also appreciate the work you did on making the Durban Conference, you know, less stringent. I certainly believe we should have participated, but I think that your work there made the conference better. My position is, we know what Ahmadinejad is going to say. He says it every year. I think if someone is there to refute what he says makes more sense than no one there to answer it; or if you dare, you walk out. We confront in my city in my town where I grew up, we sit eye to eye with our enemy, and we do battle. We do not become invisible.

Let me just ask a quick question, two quick ones. One, some countries say that they are unable to have troops because of the wet lease issue where in many instances the troops are not fully prepared with equipment and so forth. Is the U.N. looking at how you can assist countries that are willing to provide troops but do not have the equipment and uniforms or other things to provide?

Secondly, as relates to Somalia, as you know that is probably one of the most important countries right now. If Somalia is lost to extremists, it will be a disaster for the Horn, and therefore what can, number one, AU has the current mandate and their mandate is not

Chapter 7, so their troops cannot even fight back under the AU, is there any consideration to attempt to change the mandate for AU to U.N., and that there could be ample forces put in place because it is so key, and I think that with help from the U.N. that Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's troops if given the proper training will be able to defend themselves and defend Mogadishu and the general Somalia area, but they need help as Sheikh Sharif told me in my recent trip to Mogadishu.

The hijackers have money because they get it from the shipping industry, and that whole group. The al-Shabob and Hezbollah, Islam—yes, Islam Balad—have funds from al-Qaeda, the government lacks the funds that they need, and so the enemies have the funds, but the government lacks it.

So, is there any way that we can move that forward, and finally, will the mission in Haiti remain, and do you see development going with the new emphasis that the U.N. has with President Clinton being there so that development in some way can expand in Haiti?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Payne, and thank you for your kind comments about my service and for your long friendship and support on these very critical issues. I will try my best.

Troop contributors lack of equipment is, as you know, a perennial challenge, particularly as we are searching for more and more troops and needing to look in different locations to find them. The U.N. has turned often to countries that have the will to contribute but may not have the resources, and they have sourced equipment externally to provide to such troop contingents. The United States has supported in certain instances, including in Darfur, the equipping of contingents so that they could deploy with what they need. It remains a challenge. It is far from perfect, but there are efforts to match troops with equipment packages so that they can be functional.

I would like to come back to Somalia. Let me address Haiti quickly and say yes, I think the mission should stay there for some time, through at least the upcoming elections. I am hopeful that President Clinton's leadership will be very constructive with respect to accelerating Haiti's development.

Chairman BERMAN. Just to balance it out, 1 additional minute, and then from now on remember questions/answers all in 5 minutes so we might have to limit our questions in order to hear answers.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask about Cote d'Ivoire if you have a second too.

Ambassador RICE. Whoa. Okay. [Laughter.]

Let me treat Somalia if I might because the chairman also asked about it, and I wasn't able to touch on it.

We are very concerned, obviously, about the situation in Somalia. We have an enormous stake in the survival of the transitional Federal Government, and in the defeat of al-Shabaab, and other extremist groups that are affiliated with al-Qaeda and are gravely imperiling the transitional Federal Government. That is why the United States has provided 80 tons of military equipment, including ammunition, to support the TFG; that is why we have been the principal supporter of AMISOM in funding its logistic support package.

AMISOM is playing a very important role even within the bounds of its mandate. It is helping to defend the TFG and we think that is vitally important.

With respect to whether it is a circumstance ripe for U.N. peacekeeping, we think it is a circumstance where we need a credible security support for the government. AMISOM has committed to play that role. We think it is the best approach at present because there is a history in Somalia, as you will recall, with the United Nations which isn't entirely a happy one, to put it mildly.

There is a tradition of really violent opposition to outsiders of all sorts. AMISOM has succeeded to a substantial extent in being accepted by the population, particularly in Mogadishu. It has engaged in medical outreach and support, provision of services to the population. It is not viewed with the same skepticism and hostility that the U.N. might be. Additionally, we have just discussed the problem of giving the U.N. mandates that it cannot fulfill. This is a case where even AMISOM is not staffed at its full complement. So, to hand AMISOM over to the U.N. with the current deficit, as well as the gaps between the authorized strength and the actual troops available in Darfur and Congo would only be to exacerbate the problem.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Now back to the 5-minute rule, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Just in time for me.

Ambassador Rice, thank you for your testimony and for your leadership. Let me just say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, for the entirety of my 29 years in the House my support for U.N. peacekeeping has been strong and consistent, but not unqualified. Peacekeepers must always be on the side of protection, not some of the time but all of the time. So in my very limited time let me ask you to address two of my ongoing concerns, first on the issue of mandates.

Ambassador Williamson makes some 14 incisive observations that I agree with him on each and every one of them, including especially the issue of mandates or rules of engagement. I will never forget, because I was very active in the Balkans, went over there many times during the Balkans War, was in Vukovar just before it fell, and the shame of Srebrenica where some 8,000 Bosniacs were slaughtered, and I have been back to Srebrenica several times since, in the so-called safe haven. Hopefully there were lessons learned with regards to UNPROFOR's mandate which was very, very ineffective.

I will never forget on a trip to Darfur meeting with a Major Ajumbo who was with the AU, he was also in the Balkans, and he said our rules of engagements here are very similar in terms of protection as they were in the Balkans.

Now, we know the mandate or the rule of engagement has been changed. My hope is, and I would ask you to comment on this, whether or not in real terms it will really be all about protection.

Secondly, on the issue of the Congo, the DR Congo, and the abuse of children especially by peacekeepers, held three hearings on this outrageous behavior. Jane Holl Lute, who is now back in the administration, was the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for mission support, she was outraged as were others in the U.N. She

said the blue helmets have become black and blue through self-inflicted wounds in some of our number, and we will not sit idly by until the blue helmet is restored.

Many good things were put into effect. Prince Zeid's recommendations have been followed, but only to some extent. The database, to the best of my knowledge, is not U.N.-wide, and maybe you want to comment on that. But my concern that I had, I visited Goma in 2008, and was shocked to learn that the UNOIOS, the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Service had been redeployed out of Goma. Just today the general who operates the MONUC said that he is concerned that there are several cases of exploitation that have gone undetected, particularly in the remote areas, and I was told by the OIOS leadership in Goma right before they were redeployed out of the area, how can you investigate when you are not there, you know, in proximity to where the abuses are taking place.

So my question would be is there an effort to get OIOS back to Goma? Are they back? I have been unable to discover whether or not they are back. And what can we do to really make zero tolerance stick?

At our hearings we kept hearing from—particularly the private witnesses—zero tolerance has really meant zero compliance, which I think is a bit of a hyperbole, but it does raise some serious questions about the seriousness that this is being combatted.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Smith, and let me also thank you for your deep and longstanding concern about this whole panoply of issues. It is a concern that we share, and indeed the theme of your questions comes back to civilian protection, including that which is being perpetrated in the worst instances, rare but severe, by United Nations personnel, and you referenced both Darfur and Congo. Whether children or women, I think it is all, in effect, the same question.

So, let me say this. In both Darfur and Congo mandates have been strengthened to focus very directly and specifically on the challenge of civilian protection, and this is—particularly in the case of Congo—the principal focus of MONUC now. I was there in May, and I saw some of the specific steps that the U.N. is taking to deal with this problem. In the Congo, as you know, the bulk of the violence is being perpetrated by the FDLR, the LRA, some renegade elements of the FARDC, the Congolese forces. What MONUC is doing is creating joint civilian/military protection teams which are rapid response capable, so that in many areas of the Kivus they can reach civilians at risk within 7 minutes, which is a huge improvement over the past. So there is an improved civilian protection response capability that I was, frankly, surprised by and impressed by in parts of north Kivus. That is progress.

With respect to zero tolerance and making that real on the ground, the U.N. has put investigative teams in place. I will check into your specific question of OIOS and get back to you, but the broad story is that there are real efforts underway to have the U.N. investigate itself and hold itself accountable. I am confident that this will yield improved results.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE SUSAN E. RICE, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

The Administration believes that UN peacekeepers must be held to the highest standard of conduct, and that they should be held accountable if they abuse the people they are there to protect. In order to promote the UN's zero-tolerance policy, the UN has deployed Conduct and Discipline Units (CDU) in each mission to provide training for new arrivals on the UN's code of conduct and disciplinary procedures. The CDUs publicize the code and reporting procedures, so that members of the public can report allegations of abuse. They review allegations and evidence, refer cases of minor misconduct to supervisors, and refer serious allegations to OIOS for criminal investigation. CDU-handled cases include consensual relationships (if there is a "no fraternization" policy), violations of "out of bounds" regulations, and consorting with prostitutes.

The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigates allegations of serious offenses of all kinds, including sexual exploitation and abuse, fraud, serious misconduct, and other potentially criminal acts, and responds to requests for support from UN agencies as well as from UN peacekeeping operations. OIOS currently has three permanent positions in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC): two investigators—one in Goma and one in Kinshasa—and one support staff member. In addition, there are 15 OIOS investigators assigned to the regional hub in Nairobi currently operating on a pilot basis. Investigators are able to deploy to Goma from Nairobi more quickly than they can from Kinshasa.

OIOS has proposed moving its investigators to regional hubs, both to reduce costs and to speed deployment of investigators as needed to field missions. This approach is also designed to give OIOS greater flexibility in positioning investigators in relation to the volume and complexity of their caseload. In addition, OIOS believes that having a more centralized system improves recruitment of more qualified investigators, allows expertise and best practices to be developed and shared, and increases efficiencies by shared services and availability. OIOS also believes that posting investigators regionally rather than in missions helps to preserve objectivity.

Rather than approving the proposal outright, the United States chose to support the pilot project in order to see how the regional hub system works in practice. We considered this approach prudent and will review results during the next round of budget discussions. Meanwhile, we are monitoring the situation closely.

OIOS is currently investigating 31 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving MONUC peacekeepers, including civilian, military and police personnel. Since these investigations are ongoing, OIOS cannot provide information on the severity or nature of the allegations.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much, and what an honor to be with you, Ambassador Rice.

I am going to change the subject just a little bit it is about the U.N. For a long time I have been a supporter of moving from military peacekeeping to what I call "Smart Power," and I believe that fits right in with President Obama and Secretary Clinton's missions as well; a smart security platform where we move from the military into diplomacy and economic support, and health care, and alternatives to a military mission.

So, I am going to segue that into something that I think is smart power, and I question why the United States doesn't ratify the conventions, the U.N. conventions that we are becoming a very—a part of a very small group of holdouts in not ratifying the rights of the child, the discrimination against women, CEDAW and the Kyoto Convention on climate change, and I am not sure, did they sign the U.N. CRPD, the disabilities this week? The President signed it on Friday night in the White House.

Ambassador RICE. He instructed me to sign it later this week.

Ms. WOOLSEY. All right.

Ambassador RICE. Yes, we will be signing.

Ms. WOOLSEY. All right. Well, you are setting a precedent, but could you tell me what is going on with—I mean, I can tell you that I have introduced CEDAW in the House because it is not ours, it is a Senate, but asking the Senate to do their part so that it could be ratified, and I have done this every Congress since 1993, and we have 123 co-sponsors on it this year alone. I mean, we want it ratified along with these other conventions. So my question is do you know what is happening with all of them?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much. We share your commitment to effective employment of smart power, and also your belief that in a number of instances these treaties, particularly those which are critical to the respective human rights, advance our ability not only to protect and promote human rights internationally, but enhance our smart power. Let me treat the three treaties that you raised with specificity.

As I just mentioned, and as you can imagine, the administration is going through a process, as we get our personnel in place, of reviewing a number of treaties that have not been ratified, some not signed, and some signed but not submitted for ratification. This is a lengthy legal process but we are pursuing it expeditiously. The first one to emerge from that review process has been the disabilities convention. As you mentioned, on Friday the President announced our commitment to sign it. I will sign it tomorrow in New York, and we will look forward to Senate action on it.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Congratulations.

Ambassador RICE. With respect to the CEDAW, as Secretary Clinton has said, as I have said, and others, this is an important treaty that the administration wants to see ratified, and ratified swiftly. I think we have strong champions of that in the Senate. I do not know when exactly it might be able to be considered, but we have certainly indicated informally, and we will ultimately do so formally, that this is an important priority for the administration.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child as you know was signed by the Clinton administration in 1995; 193 countries have ratified it. The United States and Somalia are the two countries that have not ratified it. It is a complicated treaty and we will have to consider whether we can adapt it to our very complex state and local laws. We are in the process, or we will soon launch a process I should say, of reviewing that treaty and considering whether or not we can craft a complex set of reservations that meet our concerns, and then make a decision on how to pursue that particular convention. Thank you.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, and Mr. Smith tells me he thinks it was President Bush who signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Ambassador RICE. Well, I will certainly check.

Mr. SMITH. Will the gentleman yield?

Ambassador RICE. It was 1995.

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Rice, good to see you again. It was nice to see you in New York, and I appreciate very much the working relationship we have had on issues regarding Africa in your previous positions.

I was going to ask you about Eritrea, the concern there, expressed to me by different ambassadors from sub-Saharan Africa now that the AU has gone on record with kind of an unprecedented step of asking for sanctions on Eritrea because they are training these jihadists that end up killing African Union troops in Somalia. They would like to know what we could do—maybe up in New York—regarding this new problem, or old probably actually, but one which has taken on an increasing toll.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Royce, and thank you for your kind words. I certainly have been grateful for our cooperation over the years, and I, too, enjoyed our time together in New York.

I am glad you raise the issue of Eritrea because it is a timely and topical issue in our deliberations in New York. We have considered Eritrea twice in the last month in the Security Council, both in the context of Somalia and Djibouti, and I will share here and repeat essentially what I said in New York. The United States is deeply concerned and very frustrated with Eritrea's behavior in Somalia where it is arming, supporting, funding al-Shabaab and other extremist elements, and undermining the security of the transitional Federal Government which, as I mentioned earlier, is important to our national security. Eritrea is taking steps at destabilizing Somalia and the region, which has a direct impact on our security and that of others. It is unacceptable, and we will not tolerate it, nor will other members of the Security Council. We take note that the EGAD and African Union called for sanctions. This is indeed, as you point out, highly unusual. We will continue to discuss with colleagues in the Security Council appropriate measures, including potentially sanctions, against Eritrea for its actions in Somalia.

There is another issue, however: Djibouti. The Security Council passed a resolution following Eritrea's incursion into Djibouti and the killing of 40 Djiboutian soldiers in a border incident last year. The council demanded that Eritrea acknowledge this dispute and act to resolve it. Djibouti has upheld its obligations. Eritrea has not. It has essentially stiffed and stonewalled the U.N. and others on this.

The United States and the new administration had hoped, and continues to hope, that there may be a window for improved relations with Eritrea; that Eritrea will step back from its destabilizing activities in Somalia and the broader region, and return to a more constructive role.

We have tried to convey that message very directly to the Government of Eritrea and they seem not to be particularly receptive to hearing it from us or others. As I said in New York, there is a very short window for Eritrea to signal through its actions that it wishes a better relationship with the United States, and indeed the wider international community. If we do not see signs of that signal in short order, I can assure you that we will be taking appropriate steps with partners in Africa and the Security Council to take cognizance of Eritrea's actions both in Somalia and in the wider region.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Rice.

One step we could take would be to put Eritrea back—put them on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but let me go to another issue.

The issue in Cyprus, it seems that the Greek Cypriots, Turkey Cypriots probably would work out a resolution of some type, but there are 40,000 Turkish soldiers on the island, and it would seem to me that if the United States could persuade Turkey that this standing army is not needed for any legitimate security purpose, and to draw that force down, it could go a long way in terms of reconciling and creating an atmosphere on the Island of Cyprus that would be conducive to harmony. I wanted to get in on that.

Chairman BERMAN. I stand totally behind the gentleman's question. I think it is very important, and there is no time to answer it now.

Ambassador RICE. I would be happy to talk off-line about that.

Chairman BERMAN. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Ambassador, thank you so very much for your presence here today and for the longstanding friendship, and the mileage that you bring to the ambassadorship and the mission in the United Nations. Might I take a moment of personal privilege to acknowledge the very distinguished brother that you have as well, that we are excited about the efforts that he is making for our country.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you. I am very proud of my brother. Thank you so much.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And your whole family. I don't want to leave anyone out, but I very much appreciate his leadership.

You mentioned some important issues. First of all, I want to thank my colleague and friend, the chairman, Chairman Berman and the ranking member, and also my friend Congressman Delahunt and his subcommittee, which I am on, that really laid the groundwork for saying what is the cost of not doing peacekeeping, and that is where I would like to focus my line of questioning, and just take, for example, your words about U.N. peacekeeping allows us to share the burden of creating a more peaceful and secure world. I think America needs to focus on that a little bit more as we relate to what the United Nations actually does.

And then there is a point that you made, maybe you were not able to elaborate on, that the issue—I will keep looking at it as I try to ask—the difficulty of doing peacekeeping. So let me try to focus my questions on the cost and give you these three issues.

Haiti, what progress have we made, and how is the envoy, President Clinton doing as it relates to Haiti?

With respect to Sudan, I met with the African Union before the peacekeeping status was set up, and I know that it was slow in moving, and I am interested in how the peacekeeping processes in Sudan as we talk about the comprehensive peace agreement and certain that we have an envoy there.

I also believe it is important that we look at questions dealing with peacekeepers, and I would be interested in the work that the United Nations is taking to establish and implement a zero toler-

ance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel.

I would appreciate a brief on that issue, particularly as sometimes they are noted as transmitting STDs and how we are handling that. If I might yield to you for those questions.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee, for those questions. Let me try as best I can in the time we have to cover as much ground as I might.

You asked about the cost of not supporting U.N. peacekeeping, and I think that is a very important issue. It is one I touched upon in my testimony.

The U.N. currently is in 15 different conflict areas around the world and I think it is fair to say that if the U.N. were not present in many of those zones, the conflicts would continue to rage on; fragile peace processes would collapse; elections would not be held in places as critical as the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Liberia, or Haiti; and we would, as would other members of the international community, face the consequences of conflict because as we know, conflict zones not only cost the lives, the precious lives of innocents, it impedes development, it spills over and can infect an entire region, and we saw that in Liberia, we saw that in the Great Lakes region.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So it is not just a cheap way of doing it, it is actually impacting saving lives and the United States involvement in conflicts around the world overspilling.

Ambassador RICE. It is saving lives and it is preventing conflict zones from being exploited as they often are by extremists and criminals, where they can also often become breeding zones for disease and other transnational security threats that can affect America's security. We cannot as the United States be involved in every one of those conflict zones and be the peacekeepers ourselves. But through the United Nations where we have a 93,000 military and police personnel from 118 other countries doing that work, we contribute 93 military and police personnel to U.N. operations. The rest of the world is doing the bulk of this important work without which our security would be negatively impacted.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How are we doing in Sudan in the sexual exploitation? My time, I just don't want to miss getting your great answers on that, Sudan and the sexual exploitation?

Ambassador RICE. I spoke earlier about sexual exploitation and zero tolerance. I also spoke about Haiti. With respect to zero tolerance, the U.N. has taken important steps to implement this policy on the ground in critical places like Congo and Sudan. We continue to be dismayed by the fact that cases of abuse occasionally still do arise, but the steps that the U.N. has taken to investigate, prevent, and hold accountable those who have committed crimes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

Ambassador RICE. On Sudan, that is a bigger and longer question, but let me say this: The United States is deeply committed to two critical things in Sudan. One is effective implementation of the North-South Peace Agreement, the CPA, and the other is saving lives and ending the suffering in Darfur. The President has placed top priority on this issue. He has appointed General Scott Graton as his special envoy to work actively on both of those

issues. We are committed to doing our utmost to achieve success in both regards. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much for your leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. And I might remind the committee that at 2:30 the committee will be having a private briefing with General Gratton regarding Sudan, and I invite all members to come.

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Klein is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Ambassador. I am all the way over here to the far left. [Laughter.]

Chairman BERMAN. So to speak.

Mr. KLEIN. Figuratively and physically.

Thank you for being here. Congratulations on your appointment.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you.

Mr. KLEIN. The ranking member discussed this briefly, talking about UNIFIL and the mandate, and obviously the fact that it is coming up and there is concerns over the last number of weeks based on the munitions depot in south Lebanon, and the fact that UNIFIL soldiers attempted to investigate this incident. A mob of civilians attacked the soldiers who, at least from the observations we have, instead of confronting the mob abandoned the investigation and the responsibilities, it is our understanding, and additionally reported that Lebanese civilians crossed the blue line to plant Hezbollah flags at a makeshift observation point several years into Israel.

The concerns we have had for the last number of months and for a period now is that UNIFIL is not fulfilling what we believe is necessary to keep things in check there, and although the rockets haven't been coming, there has been a massive re-arming of that area, and I had the chance to travel to Lebanon a number of months ago in a bipartisan group. We spoke to the Lebanese Government about it and expressed our significant concern, and for all practical purposes we did not get a response that we believe was forthcoming.

We want to work with Lebanon, and we appreciate the fact that the Lebanese people had a very—expressed themselves politically in a way that I think would be consistent with our beliefs, but the specific question I have for you is what can we do to strengthen this mandate that UNIFIL has to really take on and fulfill the U.N. resolutions?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Klein. I think you posed the question precisely and correctly because, as you know, UNIFIL is currently limited to a Chapter 6 mandate. Others can provide the history better than I, as this mandate was passed and updated prior to my tenure. But it was a contentious discussion and debate, and there were those who didn't want to give UNIFIL the enhanced capacity that it has today. The strengthening of the mandate is an interest that I understand many good people on the Hill share. We certainly are sympathetic to it, but I don't think as a practical matter that we will be able to muster the support in the Security Council that would be necessary to substantially strengthen the mandate.

So, we are dealing with a Chapter 6 operation that has about 12,000 personnel. Many are contributed by some of our most important allies in Europe. We, frankly, think that all of the problems you have described and that others have described notwithstanding, on balance the role that UNIFIL is playing adds value rather than the opposite, even as we wish it would be able to do more.

UNIFIL is, in fact, taking active steps to visibly mark the blue line; 40 points along the blue line have been agreed by the parties; 17 markers have been installed; eight are under construction. It is investigating where it can, consistent with its mandate, violations of 1701, including arms flows. It did not succeed in investigating the arms cache that exploded on the 14th of July, not because it lacked the will but because it lacked the mandate to repel with force the—

Mr. KLEIN. I guess what I would ask you though, and I appreciate your explanation, you know, sometimes there is a role that—it has “a legitimate role” there, that has been established. But I think many of us think that the role of legitimacy, if in fact it is limited in its capacity, sometimes provide cover for what is actually going on there. Again, we are happy that nothing is—there are no attacks on Israel right now, but I mean, I think it is a ticking time bomb just waiting to happen, and you know, whether UNIFIL is playing a role, I hear you. We may not be able to go any farther with it, but you know, are you satisfied with just continuing this on indefinitely and saying that—

Ambassador RICE. I don't think anybody could say they are satisfied with UNIFIL in its current capacity, but I think we support it because its presence contributes, on balance. It is better than the alternative. Were there no UNIFIL there would be no ability to demarcate the blue line to investigate these abuses, nor to provide some eyes and ears on what is transpiring in this very, very sensitive zone.

Mr. KLEIN. The only other thing I would like to add on a separate note is Durban, and I do want to express my appreciation. I know this country did try to work through and change what was prepared for the Durban conference. I appreciate the approach we did take, and I appreciate the fact that we did not participate, and I do appreciate the fact that we are trying in a constructive way through the Human Rights Council to change the dynamic there as well.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Rice, as I look at the challenges that are facing the United Nations in terms of peacekeeping, the one that I think that is most striking is the issue of timeliness of response, and I know that you are familiar with the statistics. You know, it is 15 percent of a force is on the average deployed within 90 days, and again looking at the averages, it is 14 months or 13 months, I guess, before a force is fully deployed, and it is like just about everything in life. Early intervention is the key to success, and the idea of

rapid deployment I know is a concern to you, and a concern to the administration.

What ideas are out there at this point in time in terms of accelerating the response, the crises which if allowed to fester over time really change the facts on the ground, and most often in a negative fashion, making the challenge even more serious and that much more difficult to address?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. You absolutely put your finger on what is a critical and frankly growing challenge over the course of the last decade for the United Nations.

There was a time in the 1990s, even as there was a fair demand on peacekeepers, that the rate of full deployment was substantially swifter than it is today. In large part this is a function of the fact that we are at a level and complexity of deployment of U.N. missions that has never been seen before. There are 93,000 uniformed personnel, as you know, across 15 missions, and even within some of those missions, notably Darfur and Congo, are not yet at authorized strength.

The reality is there is a gap between supply and demand. We are doing what we can to help increase supply and be more rational on the demand side. But we believe we need those additional troops in Darfur and in Congo. They are roughly 6,000 troops short when you add those two together. There is about 4,000 short even though it is not a U.N. mission for AMISOM in Somalia.

We, the international community, including the peacekeeping, need to increase the supply of available well-trained, well-equipped forces, and we need to be more rational as we put increased demands on the United Nations.

Secondly, the United Nations' Secretariat is looking at means to speed the dispatch of those who are available to go. We often have trouble with airlift, and with contracting procedures that we, the United States, have insisted be very, very rigorous for good reason with respect to accountability and transparency. Yet the current procurement process and the contracting procedures impede rapid deployment.

So we are looking at ways that we can help the United Nations speed deployment as was done under the previous administration in Darfur, and as we assisted in Somalia and other places getting the AU in there. We are also working with the U.N. as it is working on its own new horizons initiative for ways it can streamline and expedite the procurement process.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Might there be a role for a small increase in the number of U.S. military given the expertise and the professionalism of the U.S. military forces to accelerate a quick response, particularly in a crisis that does not require substantial amounts of military personnel?

Ambassador RICE. I want to be sure I am understanding your question. We have contributed, as you know, through airlift.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.

Ambassador RICE. Through training to enable—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess what I am talking about is a leadership cadre of American military officers to coordinate and to assist in the effort to accelerate that response.

Ambassador RICE. I think it is an interesting idea and I would certainly be interested in exploring it further with you. As I said in my testimony, we are willing to consider the contribution of additional military observers, staff officers and the like that could support strengthening these missions.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Barbara Lee. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador Rice. Let me just also congratulate you, and just say how excited we are that you are at the United Nations. We are confident of your abilities to represent the United States. I mean, you have demonstrated already your brilliance, and also your commitment to the fundamental principles of cooperation and human rights.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you.

Ms. LEE. And so it is really wonderful to see you.

Let me just take a moment and associate myself with the remarks of Chairman Don Payne as it relates to the conference on racism, and I do appreciate your hanging in there and working to try to make sure that the document was one that the United States could support. Unfortunately, that did not happen.

Let me also just for the record say that I know, and Chairman Berman was very helpful in this, that we wanted that conference on racism to be just exactly what it was about, racism, and in fact we worked to make sure that the document was 99.9 percent what the United States wanted, and that 0.1 percent, unfortunately, was not, and that determined our lack of participation, and I am, unlike Mr. Klein, as a minority and many members of the Congressional Black Caucus feel this way, we were very disappointed that we did not have a voice, a United States voice at that conference.

So I hope as we move forward we will figure out ways to be able to participate formally in that conference because who better, what country has had the experience of dealing with racial discrimination and racism, and have come so far and can lead on this, but yet have many issues that we need to address in an international forum. So I am very sorry that we did not participate, and hopefully we will be able to figure this out next time.

Let me ask you about the appropriations for the United Nations and how it impacts the arrears issue, how it impacts peacekeeping operations. Now, it is my understanding that in the Foreign Ops bill which recently passed we provided \$2.1 billion, which is about \$135 million below the President's request, and \$263 million below 2009 for our contributions to international peacekeeping activities. And given the increasing demands, I want to make sure that we have adequate resources to meet the growing peacekeeping needs around the globe.

Also I want to find out how you are attempting to reverse the trend of United States arrears to the United Nations. I mean, what do we need to do here in Congress? Are we addressing benchmarks? What do we need to do? What do we need to know? And also, what impact has the United States arrears had on the growing peacekeeping missions and their ability to address the severe strain of the missions around the globe? And finally, if you could just quickly just make a distinction between peacekeeping and

peacemaking, and what mandates of the United Nations authorize peacekeeping versus peacemaking?

Thank you very much, and again good to see you.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you so much, and thank you for your kind words and for your leadership on so many of these issues. Let me turn swiftly to the arrears question since we have very little time left.

It is complicated and I can give you more specifics and backup, but the short version is that given what Congress appropriated for fiscal 2009 as well as in the Iraq and other war supplemental, and assuming, as we hope, that Congress will fully fund the President's 2010 request, we will be in good shape to meet our obligations with respect to our peacekeeping commitments and our regular budget obligations. We will also have eliminated significant arrears on the peacekeeping side accrued between 2005 and 2008, where there was a gap between what Congress appropriated and what we were assessed called cap-related arrears, and the funding in the 2009 supplemental bill will enable us to pay back those arrears, and that accounts for the vast bulk of our outstanding peacekeeping arrears that the United States is committed to pay, and that we feel we are rightly being asked to pay.

There is a long history of contested arrears that precede the year 2000 that I won't bore you with. We are focused on the recent arrears and getting current on both the peacekeeping and the regular budget, and we are doing that. So I am able to now say to my colleagues in New York that the United States is soon to be up to date, and lead from a position of responsibility and strength, and I am very grateful to Congress for that.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ELLISON. Good morning, Ambassador. My name is Keith Ellison, and I want to join everyone who has said such nice things about you, and this is my first time meeting you, but I have read a lot about you, and I am really pleased you are doing the job you are doing.

In your prepared remarks, I think you did an excellent job at making a good case for the U.S. to support peacekeeping, and I know it was not your point to sort of raise questions about whether we could do more, your point was to say we are doing a lot, and it is a good thing to do. But I couldn't help wondering what your thoughts were regarding whether we could do more given that other countries have more people in uniform than our country does, and we are a pretty big country, and that when I look at a figure like \$2.2 billion, I say, yeah, you are right, it is a lot of money, but is it 1 week in Iraq? I don't know. Can you offer your thoughts, can we, should we be doing more to support peacekeeping around the globe?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much for your kind words. I look forward to getting to know you better. I have followed your career as well. You ask a very important question about how the U.S. can contribute.

First of all, I think it is important to acknowledge how we are contributing. We are paying slightly more than 25 percent of the cost of these operations. We are contributing over and above that

on a voluntary basis to lift, equip, support, train and deploy many of the peacekeepers that are active in the most complex and important operations. Through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, as I mentioned in my testimony, we have trained 81,000 peacekeepers. This is actually an initiative that had its antecedents back in the middle of the Clinton administration, in my previous incarnation. It grew through the Bush administration, and it continues to be an important element of the U.S. contribution to building global peacekeeping capacity. It is costly and it is important.

I did say in my testimony, to answer what I think is the real thrust of your question, that the new administration is prepared to consider where we can make contributions with respect to military officers, observers, and civilian police are a very important component of what is necessary for strong leadership of these missions, even as we obviously are making enormous contributions outside of the U.N. context in places like Afghanistan and indeed Iraq. Our ability to contribute more than that at this stage is obviously constrained and I think we would also have some questions about the wisdom of a different form of U.S. contribution, but it is something that we are open to and will consider, as appropriate, down the road.

When it comes to the specific capabilities that we can provide through military observers, through staff officers, and through police, we have really made real contributions, as I personally witnessed in both Haiti and Liberia. U.S. police personnel are really adding value. These are areas that we are open to when we receive a specific request from the United Nations for such contributions. We will weigh requests carefully and make judgments on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. ELLISON. Somalia. I appreciate you mentioning the 80 tons of weapons and ammunition, those sort of materials are important. But there is about, I think, at least 2.3, maybe more than that, millions of people who are food insecure in Somalia. Can you talk about other things in the nature of socioeconomic aid that we might be doing in Somalia in order to help stabilize that country?

Ambassador RICE. Yes. The prior question where I mentioned this didn't really give me an opportunity to elaborate on the extent of our contributions, and I think it is important to explain.

First of all, our assistance to Somalia goes well beyond. The bulk of our assistance is in the humanitarian realm where we are by and large the most generous contributor of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. We have provided almost half of the WFP's food aid just this year, in 2009, for Somalia. We have also, in just Fiscal Year 2009, provided more than \$149 million for humanitarian assistance programs in Somalia. This is crucial, obviously, to respond to the enormous suffering that is facing the people of Somalia in the current insecure environment, and in particular as the transitional Federal Government faces the threat that it does from al-Shabaab and others.

That said, the long-term stability and security of Somalia won't be accomplished by the delivery of ammunition or of life-saving humanitarian assistance. It requires an effective stable government that is broad-based, that is representative and that has the capacity to deliver for its people. This is why we are investing and trying

to support the TFG, which is the best prospect for that in a long time. But it is fragile and it needs our support and the support of others.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahan.

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador, I want to associate myself with the remarks of Congressman Ellison in regard to the work that you are doing, and certainly for someone who believes in the overall mission of the United Nations it is great to have an ambassador there from the United States who believes in that as well, and puts such a good face, if you will, on American interests and American involvement there.

I represent Brooklyn and Staten Island, New York, the great city from which I know you come as well, and my district is incredibly diverse. In fact, as you talk about all the regions that the peace-keeping efforts are involved in, it sounds like you are describing my district. We have the largest Liberian TPS population, actually the largest Liberian population outside of Monrovia; a large Sri Lankan population; the largest mosque in New York City; the largest Muslim voting population outside of Michigan is located in the district; the fastest growing Jewish population in the City of New York as well.

I tell you all of that as a segue to my invitation to you to please come to my district and I would love to have you at an event, maybe at the college, to talk about some of the work that you are doing because the issues are very relevant to the folks in my district. I have sent a letter to your office, and would like to just call it to your attention, so that is my first request.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you.

Mr. MCMAHON. And if you would take that under advisement.

Secondly, I would like to go over the issues that the ranking member talked about, the situation in Lebanon with the recent bombing as you mentioned, or the explosion at Kir bet Salem, obviously a munitions depot that was in violation of U.N. Resolution 1701, and you spoke about your concerns about that issue. I would like to just maybe ask a little bit further. What specific actions do you see? For instance, should the resolution itself be tightened, be more specific language? Is more enforcement, vigilance needed, and what can we do to make sure that the forces of Hezbollah, which are bent on bringing down Israel, are not allowed to get anymore arms in that area?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much. I am fascinated to hear about the diverse composition of your district. It sounds like a tremendous place, and I would be honored to have the opportunity to spend time there with you. Let us definitely follow up on that.

Turning to Lebanon, we have touched on this a couple of times already. There are challenges, as I pointed out in response to Mr. Klein's question, about changing the mandate of UNIFIL pursuant to 1701. It is a Chapter 6 mandate with built-in limitations and there are a number of relevant countries that have a say in this and that take a different view than we do.

That said, as I mentioned earlier, we take the view that on balance UNIFIL's contributions are beneficial even if they fall short of what we would like to see.

In terms of next steps, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces are conducting a joint investigation of this arms cache. We think that is important. The preliminary indications as reported to the Security Council by the U.N. Secretariat are in fact that it was a Hezbollah-related arms cache. This underscores the fact that arms continue to flow into Lebanon, and it makes the principal foundation of 1701, that the only forces that should have access to arms in Lebanon are the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL, all that much more urgent.

So, we are going to be pushing on effective investigation and enforcement of 1701 within the confines of its mandate. We are pushing very hard on all concerned players, and urging the Government of Lebanon to assert its responsibilities in this regard to the maximum extent possible.

As I also said earlier, we can by no means say we are satisfied. We will continue to push for better performance. Yet, I do insist that on balance having UNIFIL there, even with its limitations, is far better than the alternative of no international presence in that very sensitive area.

Mr. MCMAHON. Is the UNIFIL force large enough, in your opinion?

Ambassador RICE. I think at 12,000, roughly, it is substantial. I have not been persuaded, based on what I have heard thus far, that the issue is the need for more troops. I think we certainly would be open to considering that as we talk about how to strengthen UNIFIL, but I think at this stage the real issue is to ensure that it is doing its utmost with the troops it has, within the mandate it has.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Ambassador needed to leave here at noon. We have four people who have not yet questioned. For our good behavior, can we get 10 more minutes out of you?

Ambassador RICE. I have—

Chairman BERMAN. 10 minutes past noon.

Ambassador RICE. I meant to join Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Miliband for a luncheon as soon as I am due to leave here.

Chairman BERMAN. All right.

Ambassador RICE. I will be as generous as I can without getting fired, if you don't mind.

Chairman BERMAN. Right, no. [Laughter.] Or missing lunch.

Mr. Scott, the gentleman from Georgia is recognized for some number of minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. No more than 5.

Mr. SCOTT. I will be as quick as I can.

Madam Secretary, may I ask you about the virulent use of rape as a weapon, and particularly in the war in the Congo, Darfur, Bosnia, Rwanda? Having visited over there a few months ago visiting the hospitals and seeing that particularly, and I brought this up with Secretary Clinton as well, that the most prominent injury to women have been sexual violence; not just rape but the violence that happens to women.

Without mechanisms to hold individual soldiers accountable for their crimes, this tragedy will continue. Should the U.N. charter be

amended to hold member states responsible for prosecuting these individuals who commit criminal acts while serving in an international peacekeeping operation?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Scott. I think I was asked a very similar question by Chairman Berman. I did respond on the question of the amendment to the charter, but let me address, in addition, the broader question you raise, which is the use of rape as a weapon of war.

This is a horrific phenomenon in many hot conflict zones, including those where the United Nations is present. As I mentioned earlier, I was recently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Goma. I, too, visited these hospitals where rape victims are being cared for. I met with them, I spoke with them, and as a human being and as a woman I can tell you that I take this issue very personally, and I feel it deeply, and so did my colleagues on the Security Council with whom I traveled.

A lot of the focus when we talk about rape somehow falls on peacekeepers. That is not because there have not been outrages and abuses by peacekeepers. There have been and they must be held accountable. I have described earlier the mechanisms that are in place, and where the gaps remain.

But the bulk, the vast bulk of the abuse that is being committed against women in the Congo is being committed by the FDLR, and by the LRA, and to a lesser but terrible extent, by elements of the Congolese Armed Forces themselves.

Mr. SCOTT. Right.

Ambassador RICE. And the effort that MONUC and indeed the Congolese Armed Forces are making to try to deal with the remnants of the FDLR and the LRA are an essential part, albeit a very costly in terms of humanitarian consequences, part of dealing with this problem of violence against civilians. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot say that we don't support MONUC and others trying to deal with these negative forces, the FDLR and the LRA, and then say we are deeply concerned about abuse of civilians.

I want to add one other point if I might. The Security Council delegation gave to President Kabila a list provided by the U.N. of five names of senior FARDC Congolese commanders that we believe to be responsible for crimes against women and children. We have demanded that they be removed. President Kabila has agreed that they be removed. We are going to follow up to be very sure that the Congolese leadership hold accountable their own people who are committing these atrocities.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you so much, and I want to ask just one other thing. I think I have got 1 minute left. But the other point about this is beyond the soldiers what happens is it becomes a way of life. After these soldiers leave, they get back into society, and they continue this, and it is so despicable and shameful.

In my minute left I want to touch on Somalia and it is so complex there. I visited over there as well at the height of this thing going over there. What is our attitude toward the existing Somali Government, and do you side with the position of—regardless of the difficulties there but because of al-Shabaab and all of that going in there that we should get behind that existing government and help them stand against this al-Qaeda front?

Ambassador RICE. Yes is the short answer. The United States supports the transitional Federal Government in word and deed.

Mr. SCOTT. Would that mean putting money to them to help them fight?

Ambassador RICE. Yes. We have given money and we have given 80 tons of ammunition. We have given humanitarian assistance. We have given political support. We support the Djibouti process, the political peace process to shore up the TFG.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and Ambassador Rice, great privilege being with you, and hope some day you will come to our district as well just across the river and maybe speak at George Mason University.

Chairman BERMAN. You better watch out for this.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't want you just going to Staten Island. My district, by the way, is 27 percent foreign born from well over 100 countries, so lots of diversity.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask without objection my opening statement be entered into the record.

Chairman BERMAN. It will be, so ordered.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have got two sets of questions. The first is, peacekeeping operations, because we hear so much criticism of the United Nations. Have they served U.S. foreign policy over those 61 years since the first one?

Ambassador RICE. Absolutely.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can you think of a peacekeeping operation undertaken by the United Nations that went against the desires and wishes and even the vote of the United States?

Ambassador RICE. I am sorry. The vote?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can you think of one peacekeeping—

Ambassador RICE. There is not a peacekeeping mission that can be established without the United States support.

Now have there been instances where peacekeeping operations have fallen short of our desires and expectations?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Different question. I am going to get to that.

Ambassador RICE. Okay.

Mr. CONNOLLY. But in terms of serving U.S. diplomatic interests there is not a single example you can think of, is there, in 61 years where the U.N. tried to undertake a peacekeeping operation against the interest or desires of the United States?

Ambassador RICE. No. By definition, because we have the veto, unless we believe it—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right.

Ambassador RICE [continuing]. Serves our interest, we would not support it.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right, because sometimes there is some rhetoric, Ambassador Rice, you would think that some peacekeeping operations are against U.S. interests. As a matter of fact, as you say, they have never been against U.S. interests. For 61 years, they have served our interest, and you have laid it out pretty well in your testimony all the various aspects of that.

The second question has to do with efficacy, and I guess the example I would give is the tragic example of Srebrenica. Peacekeeping operations are not always what we would like them to be, as you were just about to say. What discussions have been going on at U.N. headquarters in New York, and what discussions have we, the United States, undertaken to try to strengthen the role of peacekeeping operations and to clarify their instructions when something as tragic as what happened at Srebrenica, for example, occurred?

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. I have been to your district. I am sure I will go back many times.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You would be welcome.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you very much.

There is much to be done to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping, and that has been, as you know, the theme we have been discussing and its various aspects most of the morning. There are things that we can do as members of the Security Council, for example, to ensure the mandates that we give U.N. missions are well tailored, achievable, and rational. That has not always been the case to the extent necessary.

We need to match supply with demand, and we have talked about that as well today. There are 93,000 peacekeepers in the field. The U.N. is overstretched. There are several critical operations where the authorized strength is not met by the number of troops on the ground, and there is a gap, a major capacity gap that needs to be filled. We are doing our best in terms of training, recruiting, supporting, equipping and lifting peacekeepers, but it is a gap that needs to be closed lest this tool that serves our interests risks falling into irreparable disrepair.

We also can strengthen the U.N.'s own internal management, and there have been a series of reforms, first in 2000, and more recently in 2007. Today the U.N. is again looking at, in the current context, which is unprecedented and was in fact unanticipated in the last waves of reform, as to what can be done to close the gap between demand and supply, to enable the U.N. to deploy more rapidly, to ensure that its operations are performed with greater transparency and efficiency and cost effectiveness, and all of these are areas that we are very much focused on and committed to pursuing.

I spoke earlier about procurement and economies of scale. All of these are important things that we think need to be pursued in the interest of reforming U.N. peacekeeping.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. My time is up, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. Thank you.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has been given up. Ambassador Rice, meet Ambassador Watson, 5 minutes.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. I want to see that you get to your lunch pretty much on time, and yield back most of my time, but I just want to say to you we are so proud that you are there representing us in the U.N. I have been sitting here listening to your enthusiasm. You mentioned a word that we very seldom hear. You said "wisdom," and I would hope that we would act with more wisdom. It is not used a lot in this place, and I just want you to know that

your broad base of knowledge on all the issues that have been raised at this table today indicates to us that our presence at the U.N. was most needed, and there has been moves in the past to withdraw our membership and not pay our dues. So thank you so much for serving us well.

I yield back my time. Give my greetings to those you are having lunch with, and get on your way.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you so much, Ambassador Watson, for those very kind words. I am very grateful.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Watson, and we are done with the questions. I am going to give 15 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey first just to correct the record.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say, Ambassador Rice, that you were right. The Clinton administration did sign it. George Bush I, and Ronald Reagan, as we all know, negotiated the treaty. I actually gave the speech on November 10, 1989, on behalf of the administration at the United Nations in favor of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, and I remember my conversations—

Chairman BERMAN. You forgot to get a signature. [Laughter.]

Mr. SMITH. Exactly. So I will give you a copy of my speech if you would like to see it.

Ambassador RICE. I would like to see that speech.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Ambassador RICE. Do you still favor—

Mr. SMITH. I believe in accuracy even when it is inconvenient.

Chairman BERMAN. It was virtually signed 1989.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Rice, thank you very, very much. I am just going to make one last point. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, and my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, and I could disagree on the final decision, but I have to say because I know how hard you worked to get that Durban document in the right shape. We can quibble about it was $\frac{1}{10}$ of 1 percent, or a substantial issue, but the fact is no one worked harder than you did to try and make it happen, and we all appreciate that, however we view the final decision. Thank you very much for being here.

Ambassador RICE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and all of the members for your support, and your great commitment to this issue. I very much appreciated this opportunity.

Chairman BERMAN. Great. And with that you go to lunch and we don't.

I am going to ask the committee—just 1 second here. Dr. Luck, you are next on board, and I am going to ask the committee to indulge a process where we have first Dr. Luck who is Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary General give his briefing to the committee, and then the rest of the panel give their statements, and then if there are any questions afterwards we either submit them for the record because my fear—I don't want the people who came for the hearing not to be able to share their testimony, and we will see what time remains because there will be votes in less than 1 hour, and we will never get people back after those votes, and

hopefully we will be able to complete the testimony, and if we don't have the votes, to maybe even ask some questions.

[Discussion off the record.]

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Williamson is a familiar face to many of us on the committee. He is a partner in the law firm of Winston & Strawn. He recently completed an assignment as the President's Special Envoy to Sudan. Earlier he served in the Reagan White House as Special Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff, and then onto the White House senior staff as Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs.

His many diplomatic posts have included serving as Ambassador to the United Nations offices in Vienna, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs; Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, and Ambassador to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. It is great to have you here again.

Erin Weir is the peacekeeping advocate at Refugees International. She has participated in field missions to Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Before joining Refugees International, she spent 1 year as a research associate with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana. Ms. Weir coordinates the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping, a forum that promotes peace operations policy.

Brett Schaefer is the Jay Kingham fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He analyzes a broad range of foreign policy issues, focusing primarily on international organizations, and sub-Saharan Africa. A frequent visitor to the region, he has written extensively on economic development and peace and security issues there, and how they affect U.S. national interests. From March 2003 to March 2004, Schaefer worked at the Pentagon as an assistant for International Criminal Court Policy.

William Flavin is the directing professor of Doctrine, Concepts, Training, and Education Division at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute located in the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Before this assignment he was a senior foreign affairs analyst at Booz Allen and Hamilton on contract to assist the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute for Doctrine Development. From 1995 to 1999, he was a colonel in the U.S. Army serving as the deputy director of special operations for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, at Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers, Europe.

We are very pleased to have all of you here and, Ambassador Williamson, why don't you begin the testimony.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON,
PARTNER, WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP (FORMER SPECIAL
ENVOY TO SUDAN AND AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS)**

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and the committee members and my friend Don Payne who I look forward to seeing later today at your subcommittee's hearing on Sudan, and request that my full statement be put in the record.

Chairman BERMAN. It will be. All the witnesses' statements will be included in their entirety.

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The U.N. is useful. It deserves engagement and support, but there is plenty of room for reform. Similarly, U.N. peacekeeping operations are helpful for burden-sharing, they have an acceptance and legitimacy, and capacity that has served us well in many instances. Some have been very successful, such as Sierra Leone, Kemerlest, Liberia and others and some have a decidedly mixed result, including in Sudan with both UNMIS, which failed to act appropriately to stop the destruction of Abyei in May 2008, and UNAMID, which still faces many difficulties.

Leadership is very important, and let me note that under Secretary Generals Alain Le Roy and Suzanna Malcorra, the Under Secretaries for Peacekeeping and Field Support have brought a vigor enthusiasm and creativity to their new positions, and let me note that there needs to be a recognition that some risk-taking is desirable, especially in field support. Failure to take some risk to make sure the equipment and other support is provided results in greater risk for the peacekeepers and the political process.

United Nations peacekeeping operations, like all mechanisms of foreign and security policy, are imperfect. There are times peacekeeping is very useful. There are times they deserve the support and there are times they need reform, and let me just quickly go through a list of reforms I would urge the committee to consider as it deals with ongoing peacekeeping operations.

One, the United States must be realistic about what a peacekeeping mission can do, the limits of its capacity. There are limits of available peacekeepers from contributing countries. There are limits to available equipment such as helicopters with night vision. There are limits to political leverage and influence of the United Nations, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched sovereign governments. These limits and others must be understood, acknowledged, and be part of the analysis of whether or not to support authorization of any new peacekeeping mission.

Two, the United States must be steely eyed and crystal clear in assessing the real support within the Security Council for any new mission. Both political will and material support is required not only at the launch of a peacekeeping operation but it must be sustained throughout, especially if one or more of the Security Council permanent members have direct interest in the conflict or if one part of a conflict, the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation can be compromised on various fronts. In such situations the likelihood of success is substantially limited.

Three, the United States should not be so anxious to launch a peacekeeping mission that it accepts inadequate mandates with too small a force size to get the job done.

Four, peacekeeping ought not to be immortal. Some peacekeeping in positional forces such as in Cyprus and Western Sahara were deployed in acute situations that over time have calmed down. The dispute is resolvable but the pain on either side is not acute enough to compel compromise. The status quo may not be preferable but it is acceptable. The peacekeepers allow comfort to set in, unresolved issues remain unresolved due in part to the peace-

keepers themselves. We should move forward and look at which peacekeeping missions should be withdrawn to force the parties to resolve it.

Five, peacekeeping must be more flexible.

Six, there has to be a recognition that in difficult environments a lead country can be very useful, such as the United Kingdom, with the peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and France and Cote d'Ivoire.

Seven, there needs to be reform of the work program on the U.N. Fifth Committee. That body spends an entire year on the U.S. regular budget of approximately \$3 billion. However, it devotes only 1 month, the month of May, for the U.N. peacekeeping budget of almost \$3 billion.

Eight, U.N. peacekeeping operations, like other U.N. bodies and mechanisms, should conform to the highest standards of procurement and management. Unfortunately, since such standards are not always met to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability, the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services should be supported politically and financially.

Nine, progress must be made to standardize peacekeeping equipment, especially common communication systems, throughout the system.

Ten, often the most important determinant of a successful peacekeeping operation is the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Deputy SRSG. The personality, energy drive, political skill, innovation, and overall talent of the SRSG and Deputy RSG can be critical. There should be a more rigorous selection process imposed on both the Secretary General and the Security Council.

Eleven, similarly peacekeeping force commanders often are picked because of nationality and politics, not competence. This must end.

Twelve, there should be common training for peacekeepers whatever their country of origin, a common procedure manual and practice.

Thirteen, progress has been made but more is required for peacekeeping activities to be integrated with the World Food Program and other important U.N. humanitarian agencies.

And fourteen, there needs to be better training and monitoring of peacekeepers on human rights, especially exploitation of women and children and HIV/AIDS.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Williamson follows:]

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Possibilities and Limitations

Ambassador Richard S. Williamson
before
House Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Congress
Washington, DC
July 29, 2009

I want to thank Chairman Howard Berman, Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and the other members of the House Committee on Foreign Relations for inviting me to share some of my views on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. In making my observations I will draw upon, among other things, my experiences dealing with UN Peacekeeping Operations while I served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs and, most recently, as the President's Special Envoy to Sudan.

I have seen the value of the United Nations on the ground. In countless situations it has helped make the world a better place. In Central America and Africa I've seen small children inoculated against disease in UN health clinics. In Mitrovica, Kosovo, I met with a doctor who talked about the importance of the United Nations presence in helping her family and others rebuild after brutal ethnic cleansing. In Ethiopia, I've visited a UN clinic helping equip children with prosthetics for lost limbs due to exploded ordnances. In Freetown, I heard many stories of hope for restorative justice and reconciliation due to the United Nation's sponsored Sierre Leone Special Court. In Kabal I listened to President Hamid Karzai talk about the successful Loya Jirga and the pride he felt that this UN-supported process included women for the first time in Afghanistan's history. I've visited refugee camps and internally displaced person camps in Africa, the Middle East and Asia where UN relief agencies were keeping people alive. In these

and so many other cases, the United Nations is working effectively to realize the dreams for it of the United States and other founding countries.

But, the United Nations, like all organizations, is imperfect. It suffers due to structural and procedural problems. While some progress has been made, the UN continues to suffer from waste, fraud and abuse. In some areas the bureaucracy is bloated and inefficient. And it suffers because it too often is given assignments that exceed its resources or capacity to achieve acceptable results.

Let me be clear, some critical problems are a direct result of mischief, bad behavior and carelessness of member states intent on scoring short-term political gain, indulging in rhetorical excess with wanton disregard for the integrity of the institution and the values for which it stands, and, on occasion, seeking to off load political problems onto the UN without providing the resources and political support to effectively deal with those problems. Unfortunately, this later dynamic is sometimes at play in the creation of and uneven support for some United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

UN Peacekeeping Organizations are Useful

The United States has unequalled global reach in military might, economic strength and cultural reach. It has the capacity to project its power and influence to every corner of the globe. But our might, strength and reach are not boundless, America also has vast interests, desires, preferences and strategic requirements that girdle the globe. There are limits to America's blood, treasury and political support to protect those interests. Competing considerations must be weighed. Priorities must be set. Decisions must be made. And, in such circumstances, burden sharing can be very useful, indeed.

Furthermore, there are situations around the world in which the United States has legitimate interests and concerns but where American intervention diplomatically or otherwise is unwelcome and may prove counter-productive. In some such circumstances America working in concert with other nations may be more effective. And, in some, other countries acting with quieter American support politically, financially or otherwise may be the preferred prescription. Furthermore, in many places around the world the United Nations has a special legitimacy, an acceptability, that any country alone does not.

Therefore, it is useful to American interests that one means of burden sharing, one useful implement in America's vast foreign policy tool box is United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. And UNPKOs also, in certain circumstances, can be more effective mechanisms to advance U.S. interests.

Clearly, America has the ability to act alone, arguable on a wider range of issues than any other nation. Just as clearly, America should reserve its right to act alone if it must to protect vital interests, especially vital security interests. But history, logic and common sense suggest just as clearly that it is often in America's interest to work with others to protect our security, advance our interests and project our values.

UNPKOs: Background

There have been 63 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. During the UN's first 45 years, armed conflicts, even in remote corners of the world, were viewed through the prism of the Cold War confrontation. Most often the two superpowers did not want UN meddling. UN peacekeeping missions were few and, generally, served only as interpositional forces to police ceasefires agreed to by the warring parties in order to give the combatants time and space to find and implement a political solution. Sometimes it worked, as in helping with the Nambia

settlement. Sometimes it failed, as in the Congo in the early 1960s. And some UN Peacekeeping Operations go on and on, helping to prevent renewed hostilities in areas where a final settlement remains elusive such as Cyprus and the Western Sahara.

A review of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War suggests a number of factors which helped determine the effectiveness of any operation in relation to the cost and effort put into it. UN peacekeeping involvement should: (1) be accepted by all the parties to the conflict; (2) receive the acceptance and cooperation of the Security Council members; (3) have a clear and realistic mandate; and (4) be established in a way that clearly defines the authority of the Security Council, but allows the Secretary-General to have broad latitude for the initiative's operational direction and administration.

Whether by bridging a gulf of remaining differences, or by merely providing a graceful exit or political justification that the respective governments could use with their situations at home, the UN had a role. It did not impose peace. It acted as a midwife, a facilitator, a promoter of peace. This was a limited role, but often an enormously important one.

An official UN publication around the time of the end of the Cold War, *The Blue Helmets*, states among the characteristics of a successful peacekeeping operation, "The military observers are not armed and while the soldiers of United Nations peacekeeping forces are provided with light defensive weapons, they are not authorized to use force except in self-defense. A further key principle is that operations must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and must not be used in any way to favor one party against another in internal conflicts affecting Member States. ...The United Nations operations cannot take sides or use force without becoming part of the problems at the root of the dispute." All this changed with the end of the Cold War.

In 1988-89, while I was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, we launched a UN Peace Operation not to observe a ceasefire but to facilitate the political transition in Namibia. The UN helped organize and monitor Namibia's first free and fair election and the withdrawal of foreign forces. There would be other such UN operations, most notably the massive UN effort in Cambodia.

In a sense, with the end of the Cold War, the UN was liberated. The bipolar standoff between Washington and Moscow that often created gridlock within the Security Council was lifted. The new dynamic created new opportunities for cooperation to replace confrontation within the UN Security Council. However, the lifting of Cold War constraints also created new and different disorders.

The Cold War had provided an organizing principle and structure to global affairs. As Richard Haas wrote in his book *Intervention: The Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War*, "In the U.S.-Soviet relationship competition was structured and circumscribed." With the end of the Cold War that system of political control was lost. Ancient ethnic hatreds flashed. Irrational people with evil intent "revived their tradition of slaughtering their neighbors." Some nation states disintegrated. At the same time, advances in information technology made it impossible for governments to regulate and manipulate information. And new actors have emerged who operate across national borders and threaten peace and international security: organized crime, narcotics syndicates, regional warlords and terrorist organizations. In a number of regions pandemonium broke out. In the early 1990s Leslie Gelb pointed out the difficulty of a growing number of "teacup wars"; "wars of debilitation, a steady run of uncivil civil wars sundering fragile, but functioning nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations."

Without the bipolar ballast of the Cold War and the discipline imposed by the Washington-Moscow standoff, the types of conflicts around the world changed. Traditional warfare took place between two nations with organized armies clashing across defined boundaries. In the post-Cold War era, increasingly armed conflicts are internal struggles fought by irregular forces. Often guerrilla tactics are the means and light weapons the tools of destruction. Wars take place within failed states. Since political power and legitimacy within a country are difficult to determine, these new wars are much harder to resolve.

These conflicts seldom pose a threat to the strategic interests of Security Council members, but they often involve great human suffering. The outbreak of ethnic conflict, civil unrest and humanitarian suffering have often made international intervention more necessary. And the witnessing of that suffering by the world through the mass media, makes action more desired.

Since these wars usually did not take place within countries where the major powers had vital interests, often the preferred response was UN intervention. As Professor David Hendrickson observed in an essay entitled, "The Ethics of Collective Security", the end of Cold War tensions "persuaded many observers that we stand today at a critical juncture, one at which the promise of collective security, working through the mechanism of the United Nations might at last be realized."

Quickly, UN Peacekeeping became a growth industry. In 1987, there were five active UN Peacekeeping Operations with a combined annual budget of \$233 million and approximately 10,000 troops. By 1995, the UN had 17 active peacekeeping operations with an annual budget of \$3.6 billion and over 75,000 troops. By the time I arrived in New York to assume my duties as Ambassador to the UN for Special Political Affairs, there had been 54 UN Peacekeeping

Operations launched since the UN's founding in 1945, 41 of these begun since 1989. Today there are 15 active UN Peacekeeping Operations with 116,413 peacekeepers deployed from 118 countries at a cost of nearly \$7.8 billion a year. Unfortunately, these new UN Peacekeeping Operations have not always been successful. UN member states, sometimes including the United States, have pushed the United Nations beyond its capacity and operational reach.

In recent years UN peacekeepers were sent out with varied mandates ranging from preventive diplomacy, the ending of civil wars, confidence-building measures, verification of arms limitation agreements, law and order assistance, humanitarian relief and drug interdiction to combating terrorism. Old guidelines for successful UN peacekeeping operations were left behind. The past principles of "consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense" failed.

The early fast pace of growth in UN Peacekeeping Operations led UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to say that "Peacekeeping has to be reinvented every day. There are as many types of peacekeeping as there are confrontations. Every major operation provokes a new question."

As UN Peacekeeping Operations grew, missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda were given Chapter VII authority to use military force to carry out UN Security Council decisions. Some UN experts, such as former UN Under Secretary-General Brian Urquhart, felt early on as UN Peacekeeping Missions exploded in number and varied mandates that there needed to be a reconsideration of the UN peacekeeping principles and that changes needed to be systematically considered and agreed upon. This was not done as UN Peacekeeping missions continued to grow in number, variety, robustness and old rules of impartiality and state sovereignty faded.

As a former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote in her memoir, *Madam Secretary*, “‘Let the UN do it’ had become the operative phrase in Washington and other capitals. This shift was partly due to the hope that the UN would finally fulfill the dreams of its founders. But it was due as well to the desire of many national governments, including the United States, not to take on the hard tasks themselves.”

Some new peacekeeping missions were successful such as those in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. However, not all were. Some had tragic results. Many member states failed to understand the inherent problems in the expanding mandates assigned to UN peacekeepers. And few were willing to accept the inherent limitations of the United Nations capabilities. The setbacks in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo shook confidence in UN peacekeeping.

As Sarah Sewall, a Clinton administration official “who initially argued that the UN should be able to assume a peace enforcement role,” wrote in the volume *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Ambivalent Engagement*, “Washington fundamentally underestimated the difficulty of the new peace enforcement operations. ... Today it is obvious that operations in which significant combat can be anticipated are beyond the UN’s reach and likely to remain so.”

Sudan

While serving as the President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, I witnessed two large, complex United Nations Peacekeeping Operations up close: UNMIS and UNAMID. The challenges each faced were significant and numerous. Their success has been uneven. In their mandate and execution; successes and failures; achievements and disappointments there are lessons to be learned.

UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, was authorized by the United Nations Security Council in 2005 right after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed ending Africa's longest civil war. Like many peace deals to end long, savage, brutal, bloody wars, the agreement ended the worst killing but it is imperfect. In the case of the CPA there is a 6 year implementation phase leading up to a 2011 scheduled referendum in which the people of the South will decide whether to remain as part of Sudan or to become independent. That was a six year window during which each side has sought to "renegotiate" the terms by changing facts on the ground. This provided ample time for mischief and malice to play out, which it has.

The most difficult flashpoint between the North and the South has been and remains the Abyei area. Home of the Ngok Dinka, it lies in a contested border area rich with oil reserves. The CPA was unable to delineate an acceptable border in Abyei and created an independent mechanism, the Abyei Border Commission (ABC), to demarcate the border. Both sides agreed to accept the ABC decision. However, when the ABC announced its demarcation, Khartoum refused to accept it. Tensions rose. Strains were heightened further because the Arab Messeryia nomadic tribe has traditionally migrated across this area annually to water their herds. That this was the most explosive place along the entire Sudan North/South border was well known and well understood. Nonetheless, UNMIS with a force size of 10,000 had only a small garrison in Abyei, a town of nearly 50,000 people. And in May, 2005, during the tragic flare up in Abyei during which the entire town was burnt to the ground in a few days of horrific violence, UNMIS was missing in action despite a mandate to protect innocent civilians. In fact, on the day the violence spun out of control UNMIS had only 95 armed peacekeepers in Abyei including two cooks. And the order was given to keep all UNMIS personnel inside the garrison, as civilians were terrorized and their homes destroyed.

A few days later I traveled to Abyei to survey the carnaged remains. It was awful, a ghost town. 50,000 innocent people had fled and migrated one day's walk to Agok where they would desperately cling to life under temporary shelters of plastic sheets to weather Southern Sudan's rainy season during which up to 47 inches of rain falls. Moving down Abyei's dirt roads there were smoldering ruins as far as I could see in every direction. The remnants of hut homes with smoke still rising, scraps of clothing, melted plastic water bottles, contorted black bed frames. I even saw what looked like a child's bicycle blackened and bent by heat almost unrecognizable, a symbol of hope lost. 50,000 innocent lives ruined, some killed, and UNMIS, a UN Peacekeeping Operation of 10,000 with an annual budget of \$1 billion, had done nothing to help. It was shameful.

At UNMIS headquarters up north in Khartoum, the 19 UN press people went into overdrive to try to exculpate UNMIS of any responsibility for the Abyei decimation. Fortunately, the new leadership of UNPKO, Under Secretary-General Alain Le Roy refused to be complicit in this shameful reinvention of history. An investigation was conducted, UNMIS mistakes uncovered, a report made, and some changes took place. Yet the same Special Representative of Secretary-General, who was in charge of UNMIS at the time of the Abyei tragedy and the UNPKO failure, remains at post today. So accountability has been limited for UNMIS' failures that contributed to Abyei's devastation.

Also, for a variety of reasons, CPA stipulations for disarmament of the Arab militia sponsored by Khartoum has not occurred. Nor have the militias disbanded, been reintegrated, or adequate reconstruction taken place. Clearly these failures are not solely due to UNMIS. However, UNMIS is not blameless.

Hopefully with the recent Abyei border decision of the Permanent Arbitrator Tribunal in The Hague, which has been accepted rhetorically by Khartoum and Juba, the CPA implementation can proceed. Yet many questions regarding cooperation, capacity and competence remain with respect to the 2010 election, viability of the Government of Southern Sudan, economic development and the 2011 referendum. The challenges are substantial and the role of UNAMIS is consequential if CPA full implementation is to be achieved.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Darfur has been even more problematic. The conflict in Darfur flashed in 2003. A small rebel attack on a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) airfield in Darfur destroyed some aircraft and killed a few SAF soldiers. Rather than a targeted proportional response, Khartoum “opened the gates of Hell.” The Sudan government armed Arab militia known as the Janjaweed, the Devils on Horseback and Camel. Then in coordinated attacks against innocent African Darfuris they brought destruction, devastation, death and deep despair. The United Nation estimates that over 300,000 innocents have died and 2.7 million have been displaced in Darfur. The UN has labeled Darfur as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

In 2004, the African Union agreed to send a regional peacekeeping mission to Darfur. The United States and many others encouraged and supported this regional response. However, the mandate for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was limited. The AU peacekeepers were to monitor and report on violence, not try to stop it. And the African Union’s resources in men, equipment and logistics were sorely challenged.

The United States was the most generous country supporting AMIS. In the end, the U.S. government spent approximately \$400 million on a private contractor to build the camps around Darfur required for deployment of the African peacekeepers. However, as vicious violence

continued in Darfur, it soon became apparent that in Darfur, a vast area the size of France, that 3,200 African Union peacekeepers were too few, and their mandate too weak to stabilize the situation.

An intense period followed of growing diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to accept United Nations Peacekeepers. For many months, the Government of Sudan rebuffed the UN charging that UN Peacekeepers were really an effort by Europeans to recolonize their country. Phony government orchestrated demonstrations in the streets of Khartoum protested against UN infringement of Sudan's sovereignty. Finally, in the summer of 2007, the impasse was broken when the United States and others agreed to compromise language for the UNPKO that the force would be "predominantly African." There is disagreement on what precisely that language means. Khartoum has claimed that it gave the Sudan government power to approve proposed troop contributing countries to UNAMID. This asserted veto power by Khartoum has contributed to the excruciatingly slow deployment of UNAMID to full strength as proposed peacekeepers from Nepal and Thailand were repeatedly disallowed.

During my tenure as the President's Special Envoy to Sudan, a great deal of my time and attention was focused on UNAMID. I recognized that even at UNAMID's full strength of 27,000 peacekeepers, this UN mission will be inadequate to impose peace on an area of arid desert the size of Darfur. However, it was my belief that full deployment of UNAMID could create a larger security footprint. Thereby critical international humanitarian assistance could flow to more Darfuris. Some of the predatory violence of militias, rebels and bandits could be crowded out. It would contribute to a more stable situation that might contribute to meaningful peace talks and a return of displaced Darfuris. But accelerating UNAMID deployment proved

enormously difficult. As we meet today it is 18 months since UNAMID was launched and it still is not at full strength. There is plenty of culpability to spread around.

Khartoum has been the major impediment to UNAMID's full deployment. Unlike most UNPKOs in places like Timor Lieste, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan does not have a weak government unable to project power throughout its territory. Indeed, the Khartoum government is strong, discipline, and, history has demonstrated, willing to engage in extreme and quite ruthless acts to stay in power. Khartoum has freely wielded its sovereign prerogatives, strength, and ample capacities to impede UNAMID: slowing UNAMID cargo at the Port of Sudan, limiting access to land with water for UNAMID camps, delaying issuing visas, and so on and so forth. The UN Secretariat, especially in the earlier months, proved inept at consultations with the sovereign government of Sudan, anemic in pressing its case, inflexible and very risk adverse. The result was a real botch of it.

The United States was not the only UN member state greatly disappointed and highly frustrated by the glacial pace of UNAMID deployment. We sought out Canada to join us as co-leaders of an ad hoc group we called "Friends of UNAMID." Its mission was to prioritize and coordinate the efforts of donor countries in concert with the UNPKO Secretariat and the African Union to accelerate UNAMID deployment and to support UNAMID politically and materially. It was the first such group in the history of the United Nations. After consulting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon and gaining his public support, our new mechanism was launched with over a dozen donor countries participating in the weekly meetings and in providing various extraordinary material support for UNAMID. After a slow start, once Alain Le Roy became the new Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations and Susana Malcorra the new Under Secretary General for Field Support, the Friends of UNAMID really

took off and gradually the pace of deployment accelerated. I cannot say enough good things about the leadership and innovation brought to their tasks by Under Secretaries General Le Roy and Malcorra. They have demonstrated repeatedly how personalities, energy and innovation can empower leaders and improve performance.

Meanwhile, in addition to launching the Friends of UNAMID, the United States has been very active on other fronts to accelerate deployment. The United States' built African peacekeeper camps in Darfur have become UNAMID camps. The United States spent \$100 million to train and equip peacekeepers for UNAMID from Rwanda, Senegal and other African countries. The United States has supplied transportation lift to get some of the peacekeepers to Darfur. And the United States, in coordination with the UN Secretariat, has been relentless in pressuring Khartoum to lift their many impediments to UNAMID deployment and operations.

Is UNMIS *the* answer to Sudan North/South peace and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? Is UNAMID *the* answer to the tragic genocide in slow motion in Darfur? Absolutely NOT! But UNMIS and UNAMID are each *an* answer. Each of these UNPKOs are making the situations better. Each is contributing to an improved situation on the ground and contributing to some improved stability for peace to have a chance. Are they worth the cost, the personnel, the risks they assume? That's a difficult decision which with UNMIS and UNAMID, as in all UNPKOs, is a case by case decision that warrants reconsideration as events unfold.

General Observations

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, like all mechanisms of foreign and security policy, are imperfect. There are times UNPKOs are very useful in advancing United States interests. In general UNPKOs deserve our support. However, there is ample room for

improvement and the United States as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and as the largest financial contributor to UN Peacekeeping budgets must be a leader and forward leaning in working to reform and improve UN Peacekeeping Operations.

One, the United States must be realistic about what a UNPKO can do, the limits of its capacity. There are limits of available peacekeepers from Troop Contributing Countries. There are limits of available equipment such as helicopters with night vision. There are limits to the political leverage and influence of the United Nations, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched sovereign governments. These limits and others must be understood, acknowledged, and be part of the analysis of whether or not to support authorization of any new UNPKO.

Two, the United States must be steely-eyed and crystal clear in assessing the real support within the UN Security Council for any new UNPKO. Both political will and material support is required not only at the launch of a new UNPKO but it must be sustained throughout. Especially if one or more of the Security Council Permanent Members have direct interests in a conflict or with one party of a conflict, the effectiveness of the UNPKO will be compromised on various fronts. In such situations the likelihood of success is substantially compromised.

Three, the United States should not be so anxious to launch a UNPKO that it accepts inadequate mandates or too small a force size to get the job done. Nor can it accept infringement on UNPKO's composition, freedom of movement and so on. Better not to approve a UNPKO than to launch one inadequate to the assignment.

Four, UNPKOs ought not be immortal. Some UNPKO interpositional forces such as in Cypress and Western Sahara were deployed in acute situations that, over time, have calmed down. The dispute is resolvable but the pain on either side is not acute enough to compel compromise. The status quo may not be preferable, but it is acceptable. The UNPKO allows a

comfort to set in. Unresolved issues remain unresolved because, due to the UNPKO, they don't need to be resolved. That's rubbish. The parties should be forced to resolve their problems and move on. UNPKOs ought not become nannies allowing complacency to set in and issues to remain indefinitely unresolved.

Five, UNPKOs must be more flexible. They must be better at adapting to the situation and adjusting. For example, helicopters with night vision might be preferable to transport UNPKO equipment and personnel and to aid peacekeepers under attack. However, if unavailable, helicopter without night vision are better than no helicopters. For example, tragically last year some UNAMID peacekeepers were attacked and some killed. Attack helicopters without night vision had been available for months, but UNAMID's position was they did not meet specifications, so they refused the offer. For the UNAMID peacekeepers under attack during daylight, the available helicopters certainly would have been welcome.

Six, recognize that in difficult environments a lead dog can be very helpful. The United Kingdom played that lead role with peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and France in Cote D'Ivoire.

Seven, there needs to be reform of the work program of the UN's Fifth Committee. That body spends the entire year on the UN Regular Budget of approximately \$3 billion. However, it devotes only the month of May to the UN Peacekeeping budget of almost \$8 billion.

Eight, UN Peacekeeping Operations, like other UN bodies and mechanisms, should conform to the highest standards of procurement and management. Unfortunately, such standards have not always been met. To insure appropriate oversight and accountability, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service (OIOS) should be supported politically and financially. It should be urged to deal appropriately and expeditiously with the cases referred by the

Procurement Task Force and a permanent appointment should be made for the person in charge of investigations.

Nine, progress must be made to “standardize” UNPKO equipment, especially common communications equipment system wide.

Ten, often the most important determinant of a successful UNPKO is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Deputy SRSG. The personality, energy, drive, political skill, commitment, innovation and overall talent of the SRSG and Deputy SRSG are absolutely critical. Nonetheless, the capabilities of SRSG range from outstanding personalities like Laktar Brahimi and Sergio Vieira de Mello to the merely adequate to the buffoonish. Geographic consideration, cronyism, and a general lack of rigor in the selection of SRSGs and Deputy SRSGs must end. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council must change past sloppy, haphazard selection practices and slack accountability and reform to provide the sort of selection process and oversight of these posts warranted by their importance and the seriousness of their mission.

Eleven, similarly UNPKO Force Commanders often are picked because of nationality and politics, not competence. This too must end. It’s a deadly serious business and should be treated as such.

Twelve, there should be common training for UNPKOs whatever their country of origin: a common procedure, manual and practice.

Thirteen, progress has been made but more is required for UNPKO activity to be integrated with the World Food Program and other important UN humanitarian agencies active in conflict and post-conflict arenas.

Fourteen, there needs to be better training and monitoring of UNPKOs on human rights – especially exploitation of women and children, and HIV-AIDS.

Let me note that under the supervision of United Nations Under Secretaries General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support this month published an excellent 46 page Non-Paper titled *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. It contains some of the recommendations I have mentioned and others to improve UN Peacekeeping Operations. Many critical issues are raised. I commend it to the members of this Committee and your staff.

Conclusion

I close where I began my testimony. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations can be very useful in advancing United States interests and in helping make the world safer and more secure. UNPKOs deserve support. But, at the same time, reform is needed to improve their operations. And, most important, hard eyed realism is required of the United States in the Security Council and discrimination is necessary on whether or not to approve UNPKOs. It is not the place to off load problems. It is not the place to overload the mechanism's capacity. It is not the place to approve missions for which our or other's political will equivocates or toward which inadequate resources will be deployed. The most critical UNPKO mistakes are often in their inception and launch. Passing a problem to a UNPKO is *not* solving a problem. It is only a beginning of a solution that requires political and material support and efficient, effective, and persistent leadership and very hard work on the ground.

Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ms. Weir.

**STATEMENT OF MS. ERIN A. WEIR, PEACEKEEPING
ADVOCATE, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL**

Ms. WEIR. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and thank you for sticking with us for so long. I will keep my testimony brief.

I am here representing Refugees International. We are an independent Washington, DC-based organization that advocates for solutions to refugee crises.

In the past 2 years I have assessed peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian activities in Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. I know firsthand what a crucial role peacekeeping can play in the area of aid, the maintenance of stability and the protection of civilians in some of the most dangerous places in the world. I have also seen the limitations of peacekeeping and the consequences of confusing mandates and under resourced missions.

The U.S. needs to learn from those examples and work to ensure that mandates are clear and achievable; that peacekeepers are well trained and equipped; and that the norms that underpin the international effort to protect civilians from harm are strengthened.

The demands on peacekeepers have changed and expanded exponentially over the past 20 years. Today, peacekeeping mandates include everything from providing support to cease fire agreements and peace processes to the role of reform of security sector institutions, and the physical protection of civilians. In just one example, the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo includes 45 different tasks.

Civilian protection has become a priority, but protection is a tricky thing to do in practice, and there is no one-size-fits-all protection strategy. In the field I have seen civilians coping with many different threats to their safety, but broadly speaking there are three types of danger that they face. In Darfur and in eastern DRC, there is often classic military style violence, coordinated attacks on villages and displacement camps by armed groups. In eastern Chad, the day-to-day threat facing civilians and humanitarian workers is banditry. It is looting and violence perpetrated by criminals who capitalize on chaos and impunity that prevails in conflict zones. And a third type of threat falls somewhere in between. Looting and violence perpetrated against civilians by individual members of armed groups or even national militaries for individual gain; again, something we see in DR Congo.

Unfortunately, these are not mutually exclusive. A colleague and I were in Goma in Eastern Congo this past October when a rebel attack brought all three types of violence to bear at once, and the peacekeepers there were so overstretched, their mandate so convoluted that they weren't able to handle anyone of the threats effectively. The failure precipitated a humanitarian crisis, and I think we all saw the images on the news when several hundred thousand Congolese civilians were displaced.

The point here is that in order to address each of these threats peacekeeping missions need to be equipped with different combinations of diplomatic, military, and policing tools every time that they are sent out to the field, and so it is crucial that peacekeeping mandates are reflective of the types of threats that civilians are facing on the ground.

As one of the most powerful members of the Security Council, it is essential that the U.S. take a leadership role and ensure that peacekeeping mandates are clear and achievable. It is also important that the U.S. use its influence within the wider U.N. system to ensure that peacekeeping missions get the resources and support that they need to fulfill expectations.

At present the U.N. is having difficulty generating enough troops, and even more difficulty finding troop contributing countries willing or able to staff and equip the missions with specialized skills and resources that are needed to fulfill these difficult mandates.

The U.S. has these capabilities and should be committing more of them to U.N. peacekeeping operations. The commitment of specialized U.S. forces and enabling units such as engineers, medics, and transport units, would have a huge impact on the ground and allow new missions to deploy quickly and operate effectively.

All that said, sometimes U.N. peacekeeping isn't the answer. History has taught us that U.N. peacekeeping operations are only effective in situations where the mission is deployed with the consent of the host government. Missions without host country consent require peace enforcement operations, or coalitions of the willing.

Dr. Luck spoke today already about the responsibility to protect or R2P, but in order to make R2P operational the United States needs to support regional bodies and work with allies like the African Union, the European Union and NATO to develop the capabilities necessary to deploy robust peace enforcement missions when civilians are at risk of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Lack of political will is another hurdle to realizing the responsibility to protect. Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, including the United States, have been extremely reluctant to authorize the deployment of international forces without the consent of the host government. In one example, the recent concessions made to the Government of Sudan in order to secure its consent for a peacekeeping deployment in spite of the fact that the government itself was implicated in the violence against its people made a complete farce of the commitment to protect.

The U.S. needs to work with allies and engage with skeptics to improve the acceptance and acceptability of all three pillars of the responsibility to protect.

In conclusion, the U.S. needs to use its clout within the Security Council to ensure that peacekeeping mandates are clear and achievable, that missions are well resourced, and that new deployments are only made where U.N. peacekeeping is the most effective tool for the job. Where it isn't, the U.S. needs to work to make R2P a political and operational reality by working to strengthen the norm and helping to build the robust peace enforcement capabilities that are needed to keep people safe.

Congress can help to do this by continuing to raise important questions about protection, and the need for the international community as a whole to perform better. Congress can also support U.N. peacekeeping and the ongoing reforms within the U.N. system by continuing to pay its share of U.N. peacekeeping costs in full, and on time.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Weir follows:]



**Testimony of Ms. Erin A. Weir
Peacekeeping Advocate for Refugees International
on the
“New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations”
House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 29, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., 2172 RHOB**

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen and Members of the Committee: Thank you for this opportunity to testify today before the House Foreign Affairs Committee about UN Peacekeeping, and the challenge of keeping people safe in times of conflict and crisis.

I am here representing Refugees International. We are an independent, Washington DC based organization that advocates to end refugee crises.

In the past two years I have assessed peacekeeping efforts in Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia. I have talked to people who have been displaced from their homes, to humanitarian actors, to host-governments and to peacekeepers themselves. I know first hand what a crucial role peacekeeping can play in the delivery of aid, the maintenance of stability, and the protection of civilians in some of the most dangerous places in the world. I have also seen with my own eyes the limitations of peacekeeping, and the consequences of a confusing mandate or an under resourced-mission.

UN peacekeeping has become more important, and more controversial than ever. After the massive failures of international governments to protect civilians from systematic violence throughout the 1990's, and with the brutal conditions created by modern conflict, the international community has begun to recognize its responsibility to better protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and other crimes against humanity.

In order to meet this responsibility, governments increasingly look to UN peacekeepers. Peacekeeping mandates have steadily become more complex and difficult to achieve, but the ability of the UN system, and the political will of member states to adequately staff and equip those missions, have not evolved with expectations.

The mandate of the UN Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by the acronym MONUC, includes 45 discreet tasks and responsibilities, not the least of which is the protection of civilians in the hilly, densely forested, nearly inaccessible provinces of North and South Kivu in the east of the country. Meanwhile, the 3,000 troops and additional equipment that were promised to the mission in December of 2008 have still not been deployed.

At this moment there are roughly 116,000 military, police and civilian peacekeepers deployed around the world. It sounds like a large number, until you consider the fact that they are tasked with everything from support of ceasefires and peace processes, to the reform of security institutions and the physical protection of civilians made vulnerable by conflict. The US currently has roughly 60,000 troops and civilian staff, and an additional 23,500 non-U.S. coalition forces in Afghanistan alone to perform a very similar role.

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Nevertheless, some progress has been made. The UN is taking steps to improve the efficiency and accountability of its procurement and deployment systems, as well as the quality of guidance and training that it delivers to peacekeepers to make missions more effective. Outside of the UN system, regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union are developing new tools to complement UN peacekeeping, particularly where peace enforcement is necessary. The U.S. has a key role to play to support these developments and reforms, and can do more to support concrete action that protects people from harm.

Background

UN peacekeeping is not what it used to be. Early peacekeeping missions were deployed with the consent of both parties to the conflict in order to monitor and enforce existing peace agreements. These peacekeepers represented a “thin blue line” between two groups who had agreed to their presence. The mandates were simple and the danger and political controversy surrounding the missions were very low.

Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s UN peacekeepers began to be deployed in new and more challenging places, such as Somalia in 1992 and Liberia in 1993. The nature of conflict was changing, and intra-state conflicts, often with multiple internal armed groups, usually meant that one or more of the armed actors did not consent to the involvement of peacekeepers. The potential for peacekeepers to become targets of violence dramatically increased. Their neutrality was also increasingly compromised by calls from concerned governments and humanitarian actors for them to engage in the protection of civilians, which often demands that peacekeepers take action that will put them at odds with armed groups involved in the conflict.

Over time it became clear that UN forces designed to fulfill traditional peacekeeping roles were drastically under-equipped, and politically and operationally unprepared to take on the more robust peacekeeping demanded by complex protection mandates and the more aggressive military action that is often necessary to fulfill protection demands.

Protection of Civilians

The many traumatic experiences of the 1990s – the genocide in Rwanda, crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo – resulted in the push for UN peacekeepers to take on a much more active role in the protection of civilians.

As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice recently said, “We have just drawn down the curtain on the bloodiest century in human history. That is why the United States is determined to work ... to ensure that the 21st century takes a far lesser toll on civilians—on innocents who should be sheltered by the rule of law and the rules of war. I believe deeply that atrocities are not inevitable.”⁴⁴

Today mission mandates routinely include authorization for peacekeepers to take measures to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Some mandates even prioritize protection of civilians above all other objectives, such as the current mandate for the UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) and in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Yet in spite of the overarching international focus on civilian protection, there is no clear definition or doctrine to tell military peacekeepers what protection is or how to make a protection mandate work.

This sort of guidance is crucial if we ever hope to make peacekeeping missions as effective as they have the potential to be. This is particularly true of physical protection, as the necessary response depends very much on the nature of the threat that civilians are facing. While military peacekeepers may be relatively well prepared to protect civilians against organized rebel or military attacks, civilians are also the victim of random, un-coordinated attacks by individual members of armed groups, and by other bandits and criminals who capitalize on the overall lack of rule of law that is often a defining feature of countries affected by armed conflict.

In eastern DRC in October of last year a colleague and I were present when civilians fell victim to all three of these threats at once. Rebels advanced, attacking villages and towns in coordinated military style offensives.

Simultaneously, individual members of the Congolese National military abandoned their posts and began looting the population, and the total security vacuum that allows for the constant, low level banditry and rampant sexual violence in Congo was amplified by the chaos.

MONUC forces, who were woefully underequipped to deal with any one of these civilian protection threats, were asked to implement three very different kinds of protection at one time. Refugees International was vocal in pointing out that the failure here fell squarely on the UN Security Council, which had issued a highly complex and incoherent mandate, without clarifying priorities or providing sufficient material or political support to get it done. If peacekeeping missions are to provide effective protection of civilians, it is imperative that mission mandates are crafted with an understanding of the fact that different types of threat require different capabilities and tools, and that those capabilities are put at the disposal of the missions.

Sometimes this sort of threat analysis will show that UN peacekeeping is not the answer to the problem at hand, and that some other political or military approach may be necessary. This is very often the case with the controversial norm, known as the Responsibility to Protect.

The Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm is a central part of the wider effort to keep civilians safe. After the genocide in Rwanda, and the failure of the international community to intervene to prevent an unfolding mass atrocity, individual diplomats and leaders of human rights and humanitarian organizations began to elaborate on the idea that there is a particular international duty to intervene in order to prevent, protect against, and rebuild communities in the wake of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. In 2007 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formally elaborated this concept, which they named “the responsibility to protect.”

The Commission raised important questions about sovereignty and the role of the state with regards to the protection of people within its borders. In its 2007 report, the ICISS asserted that “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.” It further stated that “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”¹⁰

All 192 UN member states endorsed the R2P norm in the 2005 World Summit outcome document, which asserted both the right and the responsibility of the international community to intervene, with or without the consent of the host government, in cases where genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and/or crimes against humanity can be reasonably expected or are being committed. This is defined in terms of both peaceful and forceful forms of intervention:

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”¹¹

The bulk of the debate has since focused on the international responsibility to intervene militarily to protect civilians as a measure of last resort.

The U.S. government has embraced R2P in principle, but not always in practice. In the 2008 report published by the Genocide Prevention Taskforce (co-Chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen) the authors “acknowledge[d] that the United States’ record in responding to threats of genocide has been mixed. Over the span of time, our top officials have been unable to summon the political will to act in a sustained and consistent manner or take the timely steps needed to prevent genocide and mass atrocities from occurring.”⁹

When genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity are being committed, it is important that world governments respond with quick, concerted diplomatic action, and, if necessary, that the UN Security Council give swift authorization for the deployment of a non-UN peace enforcement operation, with or without the consent of the host government. However, the authorization of non-consensual intervention continues to be politically controversial.

Specifically the permanent members of the UN Security Council are extremely reticent to authorize the deployment of international forces without the consent of the host government, even when the host government is perpetrating violence against its own people. One recent example was the lengthy Security Council debates over the deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur, and the insistence by Security Council members that it was necessary to submit to the many demands and compromises demanded by the Sudanese Government in order to secure its consent for the deployment. This made a farce of the international commitment to R2P given the fact that the Sudanese Government had been implicated in the very crimes that the Security Council was seeking to halt.

The US needs to work with allies, and engage with skeptics, to overcome this difficult political barrier and to improve the acceptance and acceptability of the responsibility to protect.

Building a UN Peacekeeping Mission

Former Secretary General Kofi Annan famously called the UN “the only fire brigade in the world that has to acquire a fire engine after the fire has started.” Even when peacekeeping is the most appropriate protection tool, the UN must always overcome significant challenges to deploy and support each new mission.

UN peacekeeping missions are notoriously slow to deploy, and the quality of the forces and equipment is inconsistent. This is largely due to the fact that the UN has no independent military capacity and depends entirely on the voluntary troop contributions of member states to make up the mission requirements.

Even after appropriate contingents have been identified, each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) then has to negotiate its own agreement with the UN, which dictates what those forces will be used for within the mission. This often limits where particular contingents can be deployed in the field, and the level of danger that they can be exposed to.

Forces acquired in this piecemeal manner have very different training standards and combat capabilities, and the philosophies of their commanding officers often differ greatly. In military terms, the different capabilities, philosophies, training and contractual limitations make robust military action challenging.

In an effort to enhance the overall operational standards of peacekeeping operations the United States is currently involved in international peacekeeping training through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) programs. These programs provide millions of dollars each year to develop military peacekeeping capabilities in potential troop contributing countries around the world. The problem is that the trainers use U.S. training modules as opposed to using the standardized modules developed by the UN for this purpose.

A coherent, standardized training program for current and prospective TCCs is essential to overcome some of the discrepancies in capacity between contingents and ensure that all forces have a common understanding of their role.

Furthermore, countries with advanced militaries, such as the U.S., need to go beyond just training and funding peacekeeping operations. These countries need to show a commitment to UN peacekeeping by committing more personnel and advanced support, such as engineers, heavy transport, and medical units. The availability of these resources is crucial to the deployment of new missions, and the early commitment of enabling units helps peacekeeping operations get off the ground quickly. This would set the foundation for more effective operations.

Robust Peacekeeping vs. Peace Enforcement

UN peacekeeping is not an appropriate tool to use when non-consensual intervention is needed. For example, peacekeepers should not be deployed in circumstances where the host government is also the perpetrator of violence against its civilians and is unwilling to give its consent for the deployment of international peacekeeping forces. This is the distinction between "robust peacekeeping" and non-UN "peace enforcement."

The UN's 2008 "Capstone" document outlines the crucial distinction between the two:

*Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.*¹⁹

The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy addresses such circumstances, stating that "where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices." For this sort of non-consensual intervention the US needs to contribute to the development of new tools, such as the African Union Standby force, and the European Union Rapid Deployment capacity, and adapt old ones like NATO to make the R2P a practical reality.²⁰

Achievable Peacekeeping Mandates: the Role of the UN Security Council

It is the UN Security Council that crafts the mandates and determines the character of each new UN peacekeeping deployment. Where peacekeeping is not appropriate, it is also the Security Council that can authorize the deployment of a non-UN peace enforcement mission.

For UN peacekeeping operations, it is critical that the Security Council recognize the limitations of the tool. In deliberations over the viability of a new UN peacekeeping operation the Security Council must consider:

- Whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security;
- Whether regional or sub-regional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation;
- Whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement;
- Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate;
- Whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated.²¹

If these questions can not be satisfactorily answered, and these conditions fulfilled, then the Security Council must consider whether or not a peace enforcement operation is the more appropriate way forward.

The US should use its leadership position on the Security Council to ensure that all new peacekeeping operations have clear, achievable mandates, and that they are well resourced to fulfill the tasks that the UN has set for them.

Policy Recommendations

As one of the most powerful members of the UN Security Council, and one of the most influential countries in the world, the US could do a great deal to improve the international capacity to protect civilians in times of conflict.

- ❑ The US Congress and Administration should continue to pursue the policy of paying US peacekeeping dues in full and on time.
- ❑ Through GPOI, ACOTA , and PKSOI the US should work more closely with the UN to provide standardized peacekeeping training, both bilaterally and through support to regional peacekeeping training centers, to increase global peacekeeping capacity.
- ❑ The US Administration should provide U.S. forces and assets, such as engineering units, tactical and strategic lift capacity, and other 'enablers' to help UN missions deploy quickly and completely.
- ❑ As a member of the Security Council, the U.S. should ensure that UN peacekeeping missions are only deployed where mandates are achievable, and that missions are resourced to meet the demands of the respective mandates.
- ❑ The US Administration should work with partners such as NATO, the EU and the AU to develop protection capacities that can be deployed quickly and respond effectively to counter threats against civilians where UN peacekeeping is not an appropriate mechanism.
- ❑ The US Administration should support the Responsibility to Protect as a global norm and use diplomatic resources to advance the concept among countries reluctant to accept it.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have

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- i* A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, UN DPKO, July 2009, p 4
 - ii* U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Susan E. Rice, Remarks on the UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect, at the International Peace Institute, Vienna, June 15, 2009.
 - iii* ICISS, 'Basic Principles,' The Responsibility to Protect; Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p XI.
 - iv* Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, A/RES/60/1, 2005, Paragraph 139.
 - v* Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers, 2008, p xxxi.
 - vi* United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, UN DPKO, 18 January, 2008, p 35.
 - vii* See Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers.
 - viii* Ibid, p.47.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Schaefer.

STATEMENT OF MR. BRETT D. SCHAEFER, JAY KINGHAM FELLOW IN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, other members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to speak before the committee today on U.N. peacekeeping issues.

One of the United Nations' primary responsibilities and one with which most Americans agree is to help maintain international peace and security. A critical component of this responsibility is the ability and willingness of the U.N. to engage in peacekeeping operations. U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if entered into with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial because there is little indication that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping will decline in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, in recent years we have seen an unprecedented expansion of the size and expense of U.N. peacekeeping operations. At the end of June 2009, there were 16 peacekeeping operations and two other political missions overseen by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The current peacekeeping budget is \$7.75 billion. This involves some 93,000 uniformed personnel and over 20,000 U.N. volunteers and other civilian personnel. This is a three-fold increase from as recent ago as 2003.

As noted by DPKO itself, "The scope and magnitude of U.N. field operations today is straining the Secretariat infrastructure that was not designed for current levels of activity." Frankly, DPKO is overwhelmed. This has contributed to serious problems of mismanagement, fraud, and misconduct. For instance: (1) Incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse have taken place in nearly every U.N. peacekeeping operation. In fact, the U.N. just launched a fact-finding mission into new allegations of sexual abuse in the Congo mission; (2) a 2007 report by the U.N.'s Office of Internal Oversight Services, the U.N.'s quasi-inspector general, found that over 40 percent of the total value of \$1.4 billion worth of peacekeeping contracts was tainted by corruption; (3) the OIOS also revealed in 2008 that it was investigating about 250 instances of wrongdoing, and according to the head of OIOS, "We can say that we found mismanagement, fraud, and corruption to an extent that we really didn't expect."

These problems cry out for improved accountability and transparency. Unfortunately, U.N. oversight is far less than it should be. For instance, the lead OIOS investigator of charges against the U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo was "appalled to see that the oversight office's final report was little short of a white wash" raising questions about OIOS's independence itself.

Meanwhile, the only truly independent investigator unit in the United Nations, the Procurement Task Force, was recently terminated for performing its job too well. Countries led by Russia and Singapore opposed renewing the mandate for the Procurement Task Force for 2009 after investigations by that task force led to convictions for their nationals.

There is also a political problem with peacekeeping. In general, the U.N. and its member states had accepted the fact that U.N. peacekeeping operations should not include a mandate to enforce peace outside of limited circumstances.

After reviewing past peacekeeping failures and drawing lessons from them, the Brahimi report stated very plainly, "The United Nations does not wage war." Ignoring this lesson can be costly in terms of lives and long-term peace and stability. It also places excessive demands on resources management and personnel. As recently reaffirmed by DPKO in its report this month, "U.N. peacekeeping can only succeed as part of a wider political strategy to end a conflict and with the will of the parties to implement that strategy. . . . In active conflict, multinational coalitions of forces or regional actors operating under U.N. Security Council mandates may be more suitable."

Yet, the U.N. is increasingly ignoring this lesson. The former Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations expressed concern that the council was approving missions without observing the conditions essential for success, including having clear, credible mandates and a peace-to-keep or a viable peace process in place. Indeed, it is precisely these types of situations—ones where conflict reigns; or where there is little genuine commitment by the parties to work toward peace; or there is insufficient support and engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors; or where the host country commitment to unhindered operations and freedom movement is lacking—which currently consume the bulk of U.N. peacekeeping budget and account for most uniformed personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping.

In sum, being more judicious in approving missions would free up resources for other missions that are vitally important. Quite simply, the Security Council has gone overboard in its attempts to be seen as being effective and doing something even if it violates the dearly learned lesson that U.N. peacekeepers are not war fighters.

Another aspect of the political problem is the great discrepancy in the financial burden among member states. The notion that wealthier nations should bear a larger portion of the cost is strongly entrenched in the United Nations, but a system that has the United States paying \$2 billion for peacekeeping while other states pay less than \$8,000 is indefensible and creates a free rider problem wherein countries paying virtually nothing have little reason to conduct due diligence on whether a proposed mission is appropriate, an existing mission is meeting its mandate, or if U.N. funds are being used properly.

To conclude, I believe that the U.S., the U.N. Security Council and other members states should: First, not let the pressure to do something trump consideration of whether an operation would improve or destabilize the situation; possess a clear mandate and achievable objectives; and have an exit strategy in case the mission goes south.

Second, they should improve oversight and accountability through an independent inspector general, perhaps modeled after the Procurement Task Force, dedicated to peace operations.

Third, the investigators and auditors should be embedded in every peacekeeping operation.

Fourth, the U.N. peacekeeping scale of assessment should be flattened out to make sure that all U.N. member states, particularly those on the Security Council, have skin in the game to encourage them to take their oversight responsibilities seriously.

Fifth, hold states that fail to fulfill their commitments to discipline their troops to account by barring them from participating in peacekeeping operations until they make a commitment to do so.

Finally, build up peacekeeping capabilities around the world. For its part, the United States should increase its commitment for the Global Peace Operations Initiative which contributes significantly to bolstering the capacity and capabilities of regional troops, especially in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me today and this concludes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaefer follows:]



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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

**United Nations Peacekeeping:
Challenges and Opportunities**

Testimony before
The United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs

July 29, 2009

Brett D. Schaefer
Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
The Heritage Foundation

One of the United Nations' primary responsibilities—and the one with which Americans most agree—is to help maintain international peace and security. The ability of the U.N. to undertake peacekeeping operations during its first 45 years was greatly hindered by Cold War rivalries. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the U.N. Security Council has been far more active in establishing peacekeeping operations. After an initial post-Cold War surge, the enthusiasm for U.N. peacekeeping missions was reversed by the debacles in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and missteps in these missions led to a necessary reevaluation of U.N. peacekeeping.

However, as troubling situations have arisen in recent years, many of them in Africa, the Security Council has found itself under pressure to respond and “do something.” The response, for better or worse, has often been to establish yet another peacekeeping operation.

U.N. peacekeeping is now being conducted with unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition, and increasing demands have revealed ongoing, serious flaws. Specifically, audits and investigations over the past few years have revealed substantial problems with mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in procurement for U.N. peacekeeping, and incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel have been shockingly widespread.

While the U.N. has limited authority to discipline peacekeepers who commit such crimes, it has failed to take steps that are within its power to hold nations accountable when they fail to investigate or punish their troops' misconduct. The U.N. Security Council has also yielded to pressure to “do something” in situations like Darfur and is considering intervention in Somalia even though it violates the central lesson learned in the 1990s—emphasized in the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*—that “the United Nations does not wage war.”¹

U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if entered into with an awareness of the limitations and weaknesses of U.N. peacekeeping. This awareness is crucial, because there is little indication that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping will decline in the foreseeable future. This requires the U.S. to press for substantial changes to address serious problems with U.N. peacekeeping. Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.'s credibility and ability to accomplish one of its key stated missions: maintaining international peace and security.

U.N. Peacekeeping

Within the U.N. system, the U.N. Charter places the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security on the Security Council.² The Charter gives the Security Council extensive powers to investigate disputes to determine whether they endanger international peace and security; to call on participants in a dispute to settle the conflict through peaceful negotiation; to impose economic, travel, and diplomatic sanctions; and ultimately to authorize the use of military force.³ This robust vision of the U.N. as a key vehicle for maintaining international peace and security quickly ran afoul of the interests of member states, particularly during the Cold War when opposing alliances largely prevented the U.N. from taking decisive action—except when the interests of the major powers were minimally involved.

As a result, between 1945 and 1990, the United Nations established only 18 peace operations, despite a multitude of conflicts that threatened international peace and security to greater or lesser degree.⁴ Traditionally, Security Council authorizations of military force have involved deployments into

¹U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, p. 10, at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf. The report is often referred to as the “Brahimi Report,” after the panel’s chairman, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi.

²Charter of the United Nations, Article 24, at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter>.

³In matters of international peace and security, the U.N. Security Council was originally envisioned—unrealistically, in retrospect—as the principal vehicle for the use of force, except for the inherent right of every state to defend itself if attacked, facing an imminent attack, or facing an immediate threat, which the Charter explicitly acknowledges. See *Ibid.*, Article 51.

⁴Since 1945, there have been approximately 300 wars resulting in over 22 million deaths. The U.N. has authorized military action

relatively low-risk situations such as truce monitoring. The bulk of these peace operations were fact-finding missions, observer missions, and other roles in assisting peace processes in which the parties had agreed to cease hostilities.⁵ U.N. peace operations were rarely authorized with the expectation that they would involve the use of force.⁶

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has been far more active in establishing peace operations. In the early 1990s, crises in the Balkans, Somalia, and Cambodia led to a dramatic increase in missions. The debacle in Somalia and the failure of U.N. peacekeepers to intervene and prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda or to stop the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, Bosnia, however, led to a necessary skepticism about U.N. peacekeeping.

This lull was short-lived. With a number of troubling situations, many of them in Africa, receiving increasing attention from the media in recent years, the Security Council has found itself under pressure to respond and “do something.” The response, for better or worse, has often been to establish another peacekeeping operation.

The Security Council has approved more than 40 new peace operations since 1990. Half of all current peacekeeping operations have been authorized since 2000. These post-1990 operations often have involved mandates beyond traditional peacekeeping in terms of scope, purpose, and responsibilities. Moreover, these missions often have been focused on quelling civil wars, reflecting a change in the nature of conflict from inter-state conflict between nations to intra-state conflict within nations.⁷

This expansion of risk and responsibilities was justified by pointing out the international consequences of the conflict, such as refugees fleeing to neighboring countries or widespread conflict and instability. As a result, from a rather modest history of monitoring cease-fires, demilitarized zones, and post-conflict security, U.N. peace operations have expanded to include multiple responsibilities, including more complex military interventions, civilian police duties, human rights interventions, reconstruction, overseeing elections, and post-conflict reconstruction.⁸ Such actions, while they may be justified in some

to counter aggression just twice: in response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

⁵For example, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to observe the cease-fire agreements among Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel and still operates today. The UNTSO and U.N. Emergency Force I (UNEF I) missions are examples of “traditional” U.N. peace operations. Interestingly, the first venture into peacekeeping was taken by the General Assembly in 1956 after the Security Council was unable to reach a consensus on the Suez crisis. The General Assembly established UNFII to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces and facilitate the transition of the Suez Canal to Egypt when British and French forces left. Because the UNEF resolutions were not passed under Chapter VII, Egypt had to approve the deployment.

⁶This restraint was reinforced by the U.N.’s venture into peace enforcement in the Congo (1960–1964), in which U.N.-led forces confronted a mutiny by Congolese armed forces against the government, sought to maintain the Congo’s territorial integrity, and tried to prevent civil war after the province of Katanga seceded. According to a RAND Corporation study, “U.N. achievements in the Congo came at considerable cost in men lost, money spent, and controversy raised.... As a result of these costs and controversies, neither the United Nations’ leadership nor its member nations were eager to repeat the experience. For the next 25 years the United Nations restricted its military interventions to interpositional peacekeeping, policing ceasefires, and patrolling disengagement zones in circumstances where all parties invited its presence and armed force was to be used by U.N. troops only in self-defense.” See James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Tetschlik, and Anga Timilsina, “The U.N.’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq,” RAND Corporation, 2005, p. xvi, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf.

⁷According to one estimate, 80 percent of all wars from 1900 to 1941 were conflicts between states that involved formal state armies, while 85 percent of all wars from 1945 to 1976 were within the territory of a single state and involved internal armies, militias, rebels, or other parties to the conflict. See Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, and Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 11, at <http://www.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8196.pdf>.

⁸The broadening of U.N. peacekeeping into these non-traditional missions and the mixed U.N. record in pursuit of these missions raise legitimate questions as to whether the U.N. should be engaged in these activities. Such questions are primarily political matters that can be resolved only by the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members. For more information, see John R. Bolton, “United States Policy on United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies in the Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia–Eritrea, Kosovo and East Timor,” testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, January 21, 2000, at <http://www.aei.org/speech/17044>.

cases, represent a dramatic shift from earlier doctrine.

At the end of June 2009, there were 16 U.N. peacekeeping operations and another two political or peace-building operations⁹ directed and supported by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Eight of these operations, including political missions, were in Africa (Burundi, Central African Republic and Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and Western Sahara); one was in the Caribbean (Haiti); three were in Europe (Cyprus, Georgia,¹⁰ and Kosovo); and the remaining six missions were in the Middle East (Lebanon, the Syrian Golan Heights, and a region-wide mission) and Asia (Afghanistan, East Timor, and India and Pakistan).

The size and expense of U.N. peace operations have risen to unprecedented levels. The 16 peacekeeping missions cited above involved some 93,000 uniformed personnel from 118 countries, including over 74,000 troops, over 2,000 military observers, and about 11,000 police personnel. There were also over 20,000 U.N. volunteers and other international and local civilian personnel employed in these operations. Additionally, more than 2,000 military observers, police, international and local civilians, and U.N. volunteers were involved in the two political or peace-building missions directed and supported by the DPKO.¹¹

All told, including international and local civilian personnel and U.N. volunteers, the personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping, political, or peace-building operations overseen by the DPKO totaled more than 115,000 at the end of June 2009. These operations involved the deployment of more uniformed personnel than were deployed by any single nation in the world other than the United States. (See Attached Table.)

This activity has led to a dramatically increased budget. The approved budget for the DPKO—just one department in the U.N. Secretariat—from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010, was \$7.75 billion.¹² This is approximately a threefold increase in budget and personnel since 2003.¹³

By comparison, the annual peacekeeping budget is roughly triple the size of the annualized U.N. regular biennial 2008–2009 budget for the rest of the Secretariat.

In general, the U.S. has supported the expansion of U.N. peacekeeping. Multiple administrations have concluded that it is in America's interest to support U.N. operations as a useful, cost-effective way to influence situations that affect the U.S. national interest but do not require direct U.S. intervention. Although the U.N. peacekeeping record includes significant failures, U.N. peace operations overall have proven to be a convenient multilateral means for addressing humanitarian concerns in situations where conflict or instability make civilians vulnerable to atrocities, for promoting peace efforts, and for supporting the transition to democracy and post-conflict rebuilding.

The U.S. contributes the greatest share of funding for peacekeeping operations. All permanent

⁹The U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).

¹⁰The U.N. Security Council ended the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia in June 2009 when Russia blocked its extension. In addition, within the past year, the Security Council ended the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (July 2008) and the replaced (September 2008) the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) special political mission directed by DPKO with the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSS) which is directed by the U.N. Department of Political Affairs.

¹¹United Nations Peacekeeping, "Current Operations," at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/currentops.shtml#afriac>; United Nations Peacekeeping, "Monthly Summary of Contributions of Military and Civilian Police Personnel," at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>; "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *Background Note*, June 30, 2009, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>; and "United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Missions," *Background Note*, June 30, 2009, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf>.

¹²U.N. Department of Public Information, "General Assembly adopts peacekeeping budget of nearly \$7.8 billion for period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010," U.N. General Assembly document GA/10841, June 30, 2009, at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/ga10841.doc.htm>.

¹³Harvey Morris, "U.N. Peacekeeping in Line of Fire," *The Financial Times*, May 17, 2008, at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/67ae1fe4-23ac-11d1-b214-000077b07658.html>.

members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are charged a premium above their regular assessment rate. Specifically, the U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the U.N. regular budget, but the U.N. peacekeeping budget assessment for the U.S. is just under 26 percent for 2009.

China is assessed 3.15 percent; France, 7.4 percent; Russia, 1.4 percent; and the U.K., 7.8 percent for the U.N. peacekeeping budget.¹⁴ Thus, the U.S. is assessed more than all of the other permanent members combined. Japan and Germany, even though they are not permanent members of the Security Council, rank second and third in assessments at 16.6 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively.

Based on the U.N.'s budget of \$7.75 billion for peacekeeping from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010, the U.S. will be asked to pay more than \$2 billion for U.N. peacekeeping activities over that time.¹⁵ The 30-plus countries assessed the lowest rate of 0.0001 percent of the peacekeeping budget for will be assessed approximately \$7,750 each.¹⁶

Although the U.S. and other developed countries regularly provide transportation (particularly airlift) and logistic support for U.N. peacekeeping, many developed countries that possess trained personnel and other essential resources are reluctant to participate directly in U.N. peace operations. The five permanent members contributed a total of 5 percent of U.N. uniformed personnel as of June 30, 2009.¹⁷ The U.S. contribution totaled 10 troops, 9 military observers, and 74 police. This is roughly comparable to Russia and the U.K., which contributed 328 and 283 uniformed personnel, respectively. China and France contributed more at 2,153 and 1,879 personnel, respectively.

The top 10 contributors of uniformed personnel to U.N. operations, which together account for slightly less than 60 percent of the total, are nearly all developing countries: Pakistan (10,603); Bangladesh (9,982); India (8,607); Nigeria (5,960); Nepal (4,148); Rwanda (3,584); Jordan (3,231); Ghana (3,159); Egypt (2,956); and Italy (2,690).¹⁸ A number of reasons account for this situation, including the fact that major contributors often use U.N. peacekeeping as a form of training and income.¹⁹

While the U.S. clearly should support U.N. peacekeeping operations when they support America's national interests, broadening U.N. peace operations into non-traditional missions, such as peace enforcement, and the inability to garner broad international support in terms of troop contributions, logistics support, and funding raise legitimate questions as to whether or not the U.N. should be engaged in the current number of missions and whether these situations are best addressed through the U.N. or through regional, multilateral, or *ad hoc* efforts.

Specifically, there are strong indications that the system as currently structured is incapable of meeting its responsibilities. Indisputably, the unprecedented frequency and size of recent U.N.

¹⁴U.N. General Assembly, "Scale Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236," A/61/139/Add 1, 61st Session, December 27, 2006.

¹⁵This is, of course, a best guess on the part of the U.N. If a new mission is approved during the year, if a mission is closed unexpectedly, or if a mission does not deploy on schedule, the estimates will be adjusted. The U.S. is perpetually out of sync because it prepares its budget requests a year in advance. Shortfalls and other unforeseen changes are usually addressed in a subsequent or supplemental appropriation.

¹⁶This discrepancy in payments helps explain why few U.N. member states raise serious concerns about fraud, corruption or mismanagement at the U.N. They pay virtually nothing, so have little to lose. Nations like the U.S. and Japan, on the other hand, have a lot at stake. Unsurprisingly, those two countries are often the ones urging greater transparency and accountability in U.N. procurement and budgets.

¹⁷Troop contributor data are as of June 30, 2009. See U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Monthly Summary of Contributions (Military Observers, Police and Troops)," at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2009/june09_1.pdf.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹According to the United Nations Foundation, "The U.N. pays the governments of troop contributing countries \$1,110 per soldier each month of deployment." This amount is far greater than the amount that these nations pay the troops participating in the missions. United Nations Foundation, "Season of the Blue Helmets," *UNF Insights: New Ideas for International Cooperation*, at http://www.globalproblems-global-solutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/unf_insights_issue_1_season_bluehelmets.pdf.

deployments and their resulting financial demands have challenged and overwhelmed the capabilities of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As noted by DPKO in its new *Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* report, “The scope and magnitude of UN field operations today is straining the Secretariat infrastructure that was not designed for current levels of activity.”²⁰ This stress has contributed to serious problems of mismanagement, misconduct, poor planning, corruption, sexual abuse by U.N. personnel, unclear mandates, and other weaknesses.

Mismanagement, Fraud, and Corruption

The U.N., as illustrated by numerous instances in recent years of mismanagement and corruption unearthed by investigations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the now defunct U.N. Procurement Task Force,²¹ has proven to be susceptible to mismanagement, fraud, and corruption. This also applies to U.N. peacekeeping.

For instance, the U.N. Secretariat procured more than \$1.6 billion in goods and services in 2005, mostly to support peacekeeping. An OIOS audit of \$1 billion in DPKO procurement contracts over a six-year period found that at least \$265 million was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse.²² The U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded:

While the U.N. Department of Management is responsible for UN procurement, field procurement staff are instead supervised by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which currently lacks the expertise and capacities needed to manage field procurement activities.²³

The Department of Management and the DPKO accepted a majority of the 32 OIOS audit recommendations for addressing the findings.²⁴ A Department of Field Support was also created in 2007 to oversee support for peacekeeping operations, including personnel, finance, technology, and logistics. However, recent reports indicate that these new procedures may not be sufficient to prevent a recurrence of fraud and corruption. Specifically, according to a 2007 OIOS report, an examination of \$1.4 billion worth of peacekeeping contracts turned up “significant” corruption schemes that tainted contracts involving more than \$619 million—over 40 percent of the total value of the contracts.²⁵ At the time of the report, the task force had looked at only seven of the 18 U.N. peacekeeping missions that were operational over the period of the investigation. A report on the audit of the U.N. mission in Sudan revealed tens of millions of dollars lost to mismanagement and waste and substantial indications of fraud and corruption.²⁶

Moreover, the OIOS revealed in 2008 that it was investigating about 250 instances of wrongdoing ranging from sexual abuse by peacekeepers to financial irregularities. According to Inga-Britt Ahlenius, head of the OIOS, “We can say that we found mismanagement and fraud and corruption to an extent we

²⁰ U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” United Nations, July 2009, p. 33, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf>.

²¹ Brett D. Schaefer, “The Demise of the U.N. Procurement Task Force Threatens Oversight at the U.N.,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo no. 2272, at February 5, 2009, at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm2272.cfm>.

²² U.N. Security Council, “Peacekeeping Procurement Audit Found Mismanagement, Risk of Financial Loss, Security Council Told in Briefing by Chief of Staff,” SC/8645, U.N. Department of Public Information, February 22, 2006, at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8645.doc.htm>.

²³ David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, “United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and Processes Need Strengthening,” GAO-06-701T, testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 27, 2006, at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06701t.pdf>.

²⁴ U.N. Security Council, “Peacekeeping Procurement Audit Found Mismanagement.”

²⁵ U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Activities of the Procurement Task Force for the 18-Month Period Ended 30 June 2007,” October 5, 2007, at <http://tinyurl.com/9extd7> and George Russell, “Report Details Progress in Battle Against Corruption at U.N. Office,” Fox News, October 11, 2007, at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,301255,00.html>.

²⁶ Colum Lynch, “Audit of U.N.’s Sudan Mission Finds Tens of Millions in Waste,” *The Washington Post*, February 10, 2008, p. A16.

didn't really expect."²⁷

Worse, even the OIOS seems to be susceptible to improper influence. Allegations were made in 2006 that U.N. peacekeepers had illegal dealings with Congolese militias, including gold smuggling and arms trafficking. The lead OIOS investigator in charge of investigating the charges against the U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo found the allegations of abuses by Pakistani peacekeepers to be "credible," but the "the investigation was taken away from my team after we resisted what we saw as attempts to influence the outcome. My fellow team members and I were appalled to see that the oversight office's final report was little short of a whitewash."²⁸ The BBC and Human Rights Watch provided evidence that the U.N. covered up evidence of wrongdoing by its peacekeepers in Congo.²⁹

The absence of a truly independent inspector general at the U.N. is an ongoing problem. It underscores the irresponsibility of the U.N. in refusing to extend the mandate the independent U.N. Procurement Task Force,³⁰ which was making strong inroads on uncovering mismanagement, fraud and corruption in U.N. procurement. The U.N. needs more independent oversight, not less -- especially since U.N. procurement has increased rapidly along with the number and size of peacekeeping missions. According to the U.N. Department of Field Support, total value for U.N. peacekeeping procurement transactions was \$1.43 billion in 2008.³¹ If this procurement follows previous patterns revealed by Procurement Task Force and OIOS investigations, some 40 percent (nearly \$600 million) of this procurement could be tainted by fraud.

Sexual Misconduct

In recent years, there have numerous reports of serious crimes and sexual misconduct committed by U.N. personnel, from rape to the forced prostitution of women and young girls. The most notorious of these reports have involved the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). However, allegations and confirmed incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. personnel have also occurred in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.³²

The alleged perpetrators of these abuses include U.N. military and civilian personnel from a number of U.N. member states involved in peace operations and from U.N. funds and programs. The victims are often refugees—many of them children—who have been terrorized by years of war and look to U.N. peacekeepers for safety and protection.³³ In addition to the horrible mistreatment of those who are under the protection of the U.N., sexual exploitation and abuse undermine the credibility of U.N. peace operations and must be addressed through an effective plan and commitment to end abuses and ensure

²⁷Louis Charbonneau, "UN Probes Allegations of Corruption, Fraud," Reuters, January 10, 2008, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/InvestCrisis/idUSN10215991>.

²⁸Matthias Basanisi, "Who Will Watch the Peacekeepers?" *The New York Times*, May 23, 2008, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/opinion/23basanisi.html>.

²⁹BBC, "U.N. Troops 'Armed DR Congo Rebels,'" April 28, 2008, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7365283.stm> (September 10, 2008), and Joe Bavier, "U.N. Ignored Peacekeeper Abuses in Congo, Group Says," Reuters, May 2, 2008, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/featureCrisis/idL5N02278304>.

³⁰Schacter, "The Demise of the U.N. Procurement Task Force Threatens Oversight at the U.N."

³¹U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," p. 35.

³²See Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, "U.N. Staff Accused of Raping Children in Sudan," *The Daily Telegraph*, January 4, 2007, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.stm?xml=news/2007/01/03/sudan03.xml>; Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, "Sex and the U.N.: When Peacemakers Become Predators," *The Independent*, January 11, 2005, at http://www.stopdemand.org/afawcs01112578/ID_3/newsdetails.html; and Colum Lynch, "U.N. Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct," *The Washington Post*, March 13, 2005, p. A22, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/430286-2005Mar12.html>.

³³For more information on U.N. peacekeeping abuses, see Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., "The U.N. Peacekeeping Scandal in the Congo: How Congress Should Respond," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 868, March 1, 2005, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/76028_1.pdf.

accountability.³⁴

After intense lobbying by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, as well as pressure from several key Members of Congress, the U.N. Secretariat agreed to adopt stricter requirements for peacekeeping troops and their contributing countries.³⁵ The U.S. also helped the DPKO to publish a resource manual on trafficking for U.N. peacekeepers.

In 2005, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein of Jordan, the Secretary-General's adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, submitted his report to the Secretary-General with recommendations on how to address the sexual abuse problem, including imposing a uniform standard of conduct, conducting professional investigations, and holding troop-contributing countries accountable for the actions of their soldiers and for enforcing proper disciplinary action. In June 2005, the General Assembly adopted the recommendations in principle, and some recommendations have been implemented. Contact and discipline teams are now present in many U.N. peacekeeping missions, and troops are now required to undergo briefing and training on behavior and conduct.³⁶

Tragically, this does not seem to have addressed the problem adequately. In May 2008, the international nonprofit Save the Children accused aid workers and peacekeepers of sexually abusing young children in war zones and disaster zones in Ivory Coast, southern Sudan, and Haiti—and going largely unpunished. U.N. peacekeepers were deemed most likely to be responsible for abuse. According to a report issued by Save the Children, “Children as young as six are trading sex with aid workers and peacekeepers in exchange for food, money, soap and, in very few cases, luxury items such as mobile phones.”³⁷

A 2009 report found that, while the overall number of misconduct allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo operation was down in 2008 from 2007, the frequency of offences was still unacceptably high. Specifically, there were 56 instances of serious offences in 2008 including 38 instances of alleged sexual abuse and exploitation. There were also 202 reported allegations of lesser offences.³⁸ This is from a single U.N. mission, albeit the largest mission, and clearly illustrates that lack of discipline among U.N. peacekeepers remains a serious concern.

Moreover, despite the U.N.'s announcement of a “zero tolerance” policy on sexual abuse and other actions to reduce misconduct and criminality among peacekeepers, the perpetrators of these crimes are very rarely punished, as was revealed in a January 2007 news report on U.N. abuses in southern Sudan.³⁹ The standard memorandum of understanding between the U.N. and troop contributors

³⁴U.S. Institute of Peace, Task Force on the United Nations, “American Interests and U.N. Reform,” June 2005, pp. 94–96, at http://www.usip.org/tn/report/usip_tn_report.pdf.

³⁵See Kim R. Holmes, “United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1, 2005, at http://committees.house.gov/committees/intrel/ifa99590.000/ifa99590_911TM.

³⁶According to the U.N., “Conduct and discipline personnel are now deployed in the following peace operations: Afghanistan (UNAMA), Burundi (BINUB), Brindisi (UNLB), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Golan Heights (UNDOF), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Jerusalem (UNTSO/UNSCO), Kosovo (UNMIK), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNMIL), Nepal (UNMIN), India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), Sudan (UNMIS), Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and Western Sahara (MINURSO). In 2007, plans are underway to ensure that conduct and discipline experts are deployed to cover a total of 20 missions.” See United Nations Department of Field Support, “About the Conduct and Discipline Units,” at <http://www.un.org/3cplsc/cpka/C11/about.html>. Also see, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *United States Participation in the United Nations 2005*, “Part 1: Political and Security Affairs,” October 2005, pp. 43–44, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/74052.pdf>.

³⁷Corinna Csáky, “No One to Turn To: The Under-Reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers,” Save the Children, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_05_08_save_the_children.pdf. See also BBC, “Peacekeepers ‘Abusing Children,’” May 27, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7420798.stm.

³⁸“UN team looking into alleged sexual misconduct by blue helmets in DR Congo: MONUC peacekeepers on patrol in the DRC,” U.N. News Center, 24 July 2009, at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31574&Cr=monuc&Cr1=#>.

³⁹According to Fox News, “U.N. military officials have the power to direct the troops placed under their command, but are

appropriately grants troop-contributing countries jurisdiction over military members who participate in U.N. peace operations, but little is done if these countries fail to investigate or punish those who are guilty of such crimes.

A Political Problem

The problems of mismanagement, corruption, and misconduct cry out for fundamental reform of the U.N. peacekeeping structure to improve accountability and transparency. However, corruption, mismanagement, and sexual misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers are not the only problems with U.N. peacekeeping.

The other problem is a political problem. The vast expansion of U.N. peacekeeping—with the possibility of even more operations on the horizon like the proposal for a new Somalia mission with up to 27,000 peacekeepers—has led some to point out that the U.N. Security Council has gone “mandate crazy” in its attempts to be seen as effective and “doing something.”⁴⁰ The willingness of the council to approve missions where “there is no peace to keep”—such as Darfur or Somalia—violates a dearly learned lesson that U.N. peacekeepers are not war fighters.⁴¹

In general, the U.N. and its member states had accepted the fact that U.N. peace operations should not include a mandate to enforce peace outside of limited circumstances and should focus instead on assisting countries in shifting from conflict to a negotiated peace and from peace agreements to legitimate governance and development.⁴² As noted in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*:

[T]he United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.⁴³

Ignoring this lesson can be costly, straining the ability of countries willing to provide peacekeepers and pushing DPKO beyond its capabilities. As recently reaffirmed by DPKO in its “Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” report,

The single most important finding of the Brahimi report was that UN peacekeeping can only succeed as part of a wider political strategy to end a conflict and with the will of the parties to implement that strategy. . . . In active conflict, multinational coalitions of forces or regional actors operating under UN Security Council mandates may be more suitable.⁴⁴

relatively powerless when it comes to punishing them if they are accused of crimes against humanity. There are 13 misconduct investigations ongoing at the Sudan mission, [and] some include sexual abuse. From January 2004 to the end of November 2006, investigations were conducted for 319 sexual exploitation and abuse cases in U.N. missions throughout the world. These probes resulted in the dismissal of 18 civilians and the repatriation on disciplinary grounds of 17 police and 144 military personnel. . . . What’s frustrating to military commanders on the ground is that there is little they can do to offending peacekeepers, other than putting them on desk duty, restricting them to quarters, and requesting a full investigation and repatriation.” Liza Porteus, “U.N. Peacekeepers Accused in Sudan Sex-Abuse Case Get Reprimand,” Fox News, January 05, 2007, at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,241960,00.html>.

⁴⁰Morris, “U.N. Peacekeeping in Line of Fire.”

⁴¹ Even situations short of war that may require a U.N. peace operation are still rife with danger, as illustrated by the nearly 2,600 peacekeepers that have been killed in operations since 1948.

⁴² Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 20; Dobbins *et al.*, “The U.N.’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq,” p. xvi; and Victoria K. Holt, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center, testimony in hearing, *UN Peacekeeping Reform: Seeking Greater Accountability and Integrity*, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 18, 2005, at www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/hol051805.pdf.

⁴³U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 10.

⁴⁴ U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” p. 9.

These more aggressive U.N. missions also involve great demands in terms of resources, management, and personnel. Indeed, it is precisely these types of situations (DRC and Sudan) where conflict reigns or there little “genuine commitment to a political process by the parties to work toward peace” or “supportive engagement by neighbouring countries and regional actors” or “host country commitment to unhindered operations and freedom of movement”⁴³ that consume some 50 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget and account for about 50 percent of uniformed personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping.

Worse, this investment may not be helping the situation. Dr. Greg Mills, director of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, and Dr. Terence McNamee, director of publications at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), have conducted several case studies of U.N. peacekeeping operations for a forthcoming Heritage Foundation book titled *Comundrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives*. They have concluded that, in the cases of Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is an open question whether the U.N. peacekeeping missions have contributed to resolving the situations or to exacerbating them.

In other cases, such as the U.N. missions in Cyprus and the Western Sahara, established in 1964 and 1991, respectively, the U.N. presence is simply an historical palliative. The peacekeepers do little to keep the peace. Nor does their presence seem to have contributed to the process for resolving the decades-long political standoff. Instead, the missions continue out of inertia or because of requests by parties to the conflict that they remain in operation. It is an open question whether or not the U.N. presence has contributed to the intractability of the situation by providing the excuse not to develop a resolution to what is largely a political problem.

The next U.S. Administration should fundamentally re-evaluate all the “perpetual” U.N. operations that date back to the early 1990s or before—some, like UNTSO in the Middle East and UNMOGIP in Kashmir, date back to the 1940s—to determine whether the U.N. mission is contributing to resolving the situation or retarding that process. In cases where they are not demonstrably facilitating resolution of the situation, the U.N. should move increasingly toward the UNFICYP model where Greece and Cyprus pay for over 40 percent of the cost of the mission. Stakeholders wishing to continue U.N. peacekeeping operations that have not resolved the conflict despite being in place for decades should be asked to independently assume the financial burden of their continued operation. These missions are generally small and among the least costly, but such a re-evaluation would send a welcome message of accountability and assessment that too often has been lacking in the rubber-stamp process of reauthorizing peacekeeping operations.

Limited Success Stories

This is not to say that U.N. missions are never useful and should be rejected out of hand. U.N. missions have been successful in situations like Cambodia, where U.N. peacekeepers helped to restore stability following dictatorship and civil war. Indeed, no one wants another Rwanda, and the consequences of doing nothing could end in tragedy. But a long list of operations that have been less than successful indicates that the Security Council should be far more judicious when adopting decisions to intervene.

Darfur is particularly relevant. The U.S. has called the situation in Darfur “genocide.” The U.N. did not come to that conclusion, but it did recognize the widespread human rights violations and suffering. After the African Union mission failed to curtail the violence and suffering, the U.N. adopted a resolution authorizing a joint AU–U.N. peacekeeping force despite ongoing conflict and considerable evidence that neither the rebels nor the government-backed forces were prepared to abide by a peace agreement. Protected by China’s veto, Sudan also demanded that the peacekeepers be predominantly

⁴³ U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping,” p. 2.

African. This has led to a severe constraint on the number of available troops: There simply are not enough trained and capable African troops to meet the demand.

As a result, Jan Eliasson, the Secretary-General's special envoy for Darfur, told the Security Council that the situation in Darfur had deteriorated despite the efforts of U.N. and African Union troops.⁴⁶ The decision of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has led to further complications with humanitarian workers expelled and harassed.

In Darfur, the U.N. Security Council yielded to the pressure to act. Massive suffering was occurring and would likely have grown worse without U.N. backing and support for the AU peacekeeping effort. However, the council accepted demands from Sudan that vastly complicate peacekeeping efforts, such as restricting U.N. peacekeepers for that mission to African nationals. The council also entered a conflict situation against the lessons of its own experience. It compounded the error by failing to adopt clear objectives, metrics for success, or an exit strategy.

Because of these failings, not to mention the potential for deterioration toward broader conflict or a stiffening of resolve by President Bashir with an ICC indictment weighing on his mind, Darfur could very easily unravel despite the U.N. peacekeeping force.

What the U.S. Should Seek to Do

There are several actions that the U.S. should urge the U.N. and the Security Council to undertake to address the foregoing weaknesses. Specifically:

- **Seek to flatten out the U.N. peacekeeping scale of assessments.** Given the far larger financial demands of the recent expanded role for U.N. peacekeeping, the system for assessing the U.N. peacekeeping budget is becoming an increasing burden on the member states with larger assessments. It should be revised to more equitably spread the financial burden among U.N. member states. The notion that wealthier nations should bear a larger portion of the costs is strongly entrenched at the U.N., but a system that has the U.S. paying \$2 billion and other states paying less than \$8,000 is indefensible and creates a free rider problem wherein countries paying virtually nothing have little reason to conduct due diligence on whether a proposed mission is appropriate or an existing mission is meeting its mandate or if U.N. funds are being used prudently and are subject to appropriate oversight. All U.N. member states, particularly those on the Security Council, must have skin in the game if they are to take their oversight responsibilities seriously. There are many ways to address this issue and the Administration and Congress should press the U.N. to explore them.⁴⁷
- **Be more judicious in authorizing U.N. peacekeeping operations.** The pressure to "do something" must not trump sensible consideration of whether a U.N. presence will improve or destabilize the situation, which includes clearly establishing the objectives of the operations, ensuring that they are achievable, carefully planning the requirements for achieving them, securing pledges for providing what is needed to achieve them before authorizing the operation, and demanding an exit strategy to prevent a "perpetual mission" trap.⁴⁸

⁴⁶U.N. News Centre, "Darfur: U.N. Envoy Doubtful Parties Are Willing to Enter Serious Negotiations," June 24, 2008, at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27149&Cr=darfur&Cr1=>.

⁴⁷For more information see Brett D. Schaefer and Janice A. Smith, "The U.S. Should Support Japan's Call to Revise the UN Scale of Assessments," Heritage Foundation WebMemo no. 1017, March 18, 2006, at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wmi1017.cfm>.

⁴⁸An example of this thought process that should be pursued by the U.S. and other countries was summarized by former Assistant Secretary of State Kim R. Holmes: "While the Security Council is hammering out the details of a peacekeeping resolution, member states work with the U.N. to figure out what that mission will require. We consider causes, regional equities, resources, the need for military forces and civilian police, the involvement of rule of law and human rights experts, reconstruction needs, and more. From the outset, we work to ensure [that] each mission is right-sized, has a clear mandate, can deploy promptly, and

This process should also apply in reauthorization of existing missions, where there too often is a rubber-stamp approach. If a mission has not achieved its objective or has not made evident progress toward that end after a lengthy period, the Security Council should assess whether it is serving a constructive role in resolving the situation. If it is not, it should be ended or the expense of continuing the mission shifted to the nations, as in UNFICYP, seeking to continue it for political reasons.

In its deliberations, however, the council should recognize that short, easy missions are extremely rare. When authorizing a mission, the council should recognize that it may be there for a lengthy period. If the council seems unlikely to persevere, it should consider not approving the mission.

Critically, this recommendation should not be construed as implying that all U.N. peacekeeping operations should be or can be identical. On the contrary, differing circumstances often require differing approaches. Indeed, if peacekeeping missions are to be successful, the council must be flexible in the makeup and composition of U.N. peacekeeping operations or in choosing to stand back in favor of a regional intervention or an *ad hoc* coalition if those approaches better fit the immediate situation. However, in the process of deciding to authorize a mission, the council should not let an “emergency” override the prudent evaluation and assessment process that is necessary to ensure that the prospective mission has the largest chance of success.

- **Transform the DPKO structure to enable it to handle increased peace operation demands and to plan for future operations more effectively.** This requires more direct involvement of the Security Council; more staff, supplies, and training; and greatly improved oversight by a capable, independent inspector general dedicated to peace operations perhaps modeled after the defunct U.N. Procurement Task Force.

A key element of this should include transforming the DPKO to incorporate greater flexibility so that it can rapidly expand and contract to meet varying levels of peace operation activity. Current U.N. rules do not permit the necessary authority and discretion in hiring and shifting resources to meet priorities. A core professional military staff must be maintained and used, but the DPKO should also be able to rely on *gratis* military and other seconded professionals to meet exceptional demands on U.N. peace operations.⁴⁹ This would readily provide the expertise and experience

has a clear exit strategy. This was particularly the case in getting peacekeepers into Haiti and expanding the mission in the Congo to target the main area of instability, the African Great Lakes region. Nevertheless, as this committee well knows, new CIPA requirements arise quickly. It is not possible to predict when conflicts will intensify to the point where they require U.N. action. We are cautious because, historically, U.N. missions are not as effective at peace enforcement, when offensive military action is needed to end the conflict, as they are at maintaining ceasefires and supporting peace agreements. But our focused analysis has helped the U.N. close down most of the peacekeeping missions begun during the early 1990s, once their jobs were done. It is helping member states [to] look for possible reductions in some long-standing missions, and press the U.N. to right-size or close other missions as they complete their mandates. The United States, in voting on peacekeeping mandates, always pushes for prudent mandates, force size, and missions that not only would succeed, but also just plain end.” Unfortunately, this type of analysis in the context of Security Council authorization of U.N. peacekeeping operations appears to be the exception rather than the rule. See Kim R. Holmes, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, “Statement Urging Congress to Fund Fully President’s 2006 Budget Request for the U.N.,” statement before the Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 21, 2005, at <http://www.state.gov/p/oir/s/irm/45037.htm>.

⁴⁹According to the Secretary-General, “[G]ratis personnel were not regulated until the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 51/243 and 52/234, in which the Assembly placed strict conditions on the acceptance of type II gratis personnel. Among the conditions set out in administrative instruction SI/A/1/999/6, is the requirement that type II gratis personnel be accepted on an exceptional basis only and for the following purposes: (a) to provide expertise not available within the Organization for very specialized functions or (b) to provide temporary and urgent assistance in the case of new and/or expanded mandates of the Organization.” See U.N. General Assembly, “Gratis Personnel Provided by Governments and Other Entities,” A/61/257/Add.1, August 9, 2006, at http://www.centerforreform.org/system/files/A_61_257_Add_1.pdf. The restrictions on gratis personnel were adopted at the behest of the Group of 77 developing nations, which thought that their nationals were not being given equal opportunity to fill positions at the U.N. because their governments could not afford to provide staff gratis. A possible solution could be to allow the countries to receive credits toward their assessed dues that are equivalent to the estimated salaries

needed to assess the requirements of mandates under consideration, including troop numbers, equipment, timeline, and rules of engagement, both efficiently and realistically.

- **Build up peacekeeping capabilities around the world, particularly in Africa, and further develop a U.N. database of qualified, trained, pre-screened uniformed and civilian personnel available for U.N. operations.** The U.N. has no standing armed forces and is entirely dependent on member states to donate troops and other personnel to fulfill peace operation mandates. This is appropriate. Nations should maintain control of their armed forces and refuse to support the establishment of armed forces outside of direct national oversight and responsibility. However, the current arrangement results in an *ad hoc* system plagued by delays; inadequately trained personnel; insufficient numbers of military troops, military observers, civilian police, and civilian staff; inadequate planning; inadequate or non-functional equipment; and logistical gaps.⁵⁰

The U.N. established a Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) in 1994, wherein member states make conditional commitments to prepare and maintain specified resources (military and specialized personnel, services, matériel, and equipment) on “stand-by” in their home countries to fulfill specified tasks or functions for U.N. peace operations.⁵¹ Some 87 countries are participating in the system and Japan recently announced its decision to participate.⁵² This is their prerogative, but the resources committed under the UNSAS fall short of needs. For its part, the U.S. is seeking to increase peacekeeping resources under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). This program contributes significantly to bolstering the capacity and capabilities of regional troops, particularly in Africa, to serve as peacekeepers through the U.N. or regional organizations like the African Union and should be expanded.⁵³

To speed up deployment on missions, the U.N. needs to further develop a database of information on individuals’ and units’ past experience in U.N. operations; disciplinary issues; performance evaluations; expertise (e.g., language, engineering, and combat skills); and availability for deployment.

- **Implement a modern logistics system and streamline procurement procedures so that missions receive what they need when they need it.** To be effective, procurement and contracting must “have a formal governance structure responsible for its oversight and direction,”

of gratis personnel. See “U.N. Gratis Personnel System Is Undemocratic, Says G-77 Chairman,” *Journal of the Group of 77*, January/February 1997, at <http://www.g77.org/uc/journal/janfeb97/6.htm>.

⁵⁰Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Lebanon, and Darfur all recently experienced difficulties in raising the numbers of troops authorized by the Security Council.

⁵¹U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS),” April 30, 2005, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milbud/ops2/unsas_files/sba.htm.

⁵²Japan Today, “Japan to join U.N. Standby Arrangements System for active PKO,” July 2, 2009, at <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/japan-to-join-un-standby-arrangements-system-for-active-pko>.

⁵³The State Department budget request includes a request for \$97 million for GPOI in FY 2010, down from \$105 million in FY 2009. Most of the funds for the GPOI, including the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), go to Africa-related programs. According to the State Department, “The United States has surpassed its commitment, adopted at the 2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit, to train and equip 75,000 new peacekeepers to be able to participate in peacekeeping operations worldwide by 2010. As of this month, the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has succeeded in training and equipping more than 81,000 new peacekeepers, and has facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to 20 United Nations and regional peace support operations to secure the peace and protect at-risk populations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan.... Starting in October 2009, GPOI will embark on its second phase (Fiscal Years 2010-2014) in which it will build on its success with a shift in focus from providing direct training to increasing the self-sufficiency of partner countries to conduct sustainable, indigenous peace support operations training on their own. In doing so, GPOI will help partner countries achieve full operational capability in peace support operations training and consequently develop stronger partners in the shared goal of promoting peace and stability in post-conflict societies.” See U.S. Department of State, “Peacekeeping Operations,” *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 86, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122415.pdf> and Bureau of Public Affairs,

“U.S. Department of State Surpasses Target of 75,000 Trained Peacekeepers by 2010,” *U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman*, July 23, 2009, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/July/126396.htm>.

as former Under-Secretary-General for Management Catherine Bertini advised Congress in 2005.⁵⁴ Critically, the new logistics system and the procurement system must be subject to appropriate transparency, rigorous accountability, and independent oversight accompanied by robust investigatory capabilities and a reliable system of internal justice.⁵⁵

The relatively recent restructuring of the DPKO into a Department of Peacekeeping Operations and a Department of Field Support does not appear to have led to any substantial improvement in peacekeeping procurement. This may be due to the fact that the new department did not receive requested personnel or funding, but it also appears to be a case of “paper reform” rather than actual reform. Most of the same people remain in place, and it is uncertain that procedures have changed substantively.

- **Implement mandatory, uniform standards of conduct for civilian and military personnel participating in U.N. peace operations.** If the U.N. is to take serious steps to end sexual exploitation, abuse, and other misconduct by peacekeepers, it must do more than adopt a U.N. code of conduct, issue manuals, and send abusers home. There must be real consequences for individuals and for governments to create incentives for enforcement. The remedy should not involve yielding jurisdiction over personnel to the U.N. or to non-national judicial authority, but it should entail commitments by member states to investigate, try, and punish their personnel in cases of misconduct.

Investigators should be granted full cooperation and access to witnesses, records, and sites where crimes allegedly occurred so that trials can proceed. Equally important, the U.N. must be stricter in holding member countries to these standards. States that fail to fulfill their commitments to discipline their troops should be barred from providing troops for peace operations.

Conclusion

U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if entered into with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial, because there seems to be little indication that the demand for U.N. peacekeeping will decline in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition of U.N. peacekeeping operations have revealed numerous flaws that are serious and need to be addressed. The Obama Administration and Congress need to consider carefully any requests by the United Nations for additional funding for a system in which procurement problems have wasted millions of dollars and sexual abuse by peacekeepers is still unacceptably high and often goes unpunished. Indeed, the decision by the Administration and Congress to pay U.S. arrears to U.N. peacekeeping without demanding reforms sent entirely the wrong message and removed a powerful leverage point for encouraging reform. Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.’s credibility and ability to accomplish one of its primary missions: maintaining international peace and security.

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⁵⁴Catherine Bertini, former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Management, statement in hearing, *Reforming the United Nations: Budget and Management Perspectives*, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., May 19, 2005, at http://committees.house.gov/committees/intr/ifa21309.000/ifa21309_06.htm.

⁵⁵U.S. Government Accountability Office, *United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak*, GAO-06-577, April 2006, at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06577.pdf>.

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UN Peacekeeping Operations

	Security Council Resolution	PERSONNEL				Total
		Troops	Military Observers	Police	Other	
AFRICA						
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad September 25, 2007	2,317	29	219	750	3,315
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur July 31, 2007	13,300	176	2,959	3,481	19,916
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan March 24, 2005	8,479	517	647	3,474	13,117
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire February 27, 2004	7,662	190	1,174	1,214	10,240
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia September 19, 2003	10,065	136	1,205	1,669	13,075
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo November 30, 1999	16,921	692	1,078	4,075	22,766
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara April 29, 1991	20	201	6	272	499
AMERICAS						
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti April 30, 2004	7,030		2,050	1,905	10,985
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC						
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste August 25, 2006		33	1,559	1,391	2,983
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan January 1949		40		72	112
EUROPE						
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus March 4, 1964	856		70	150	1,076
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia August 24, 1993		129	16	313	458
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo June 10, 1999		13	8	551	572
MIDDLE EAST						
UNDOF*	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force May 31, 1974	1,043	0		144	1,187
UNIFIL*	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization March 19, 1978	12,030	0		976	13,006
UNITSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization May 1948		151		223	374
Subtotal		79,723	2,307	10,991	20,660	113,681
UN Political or Peace-Building Operations Directed or Supported by UNDPKO						
AFRICA						
BINUB	Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi October 25, 2006		8	11	409	428
ASIA						
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan March 28, 2002		20	7	1,553	1,580
Subtotal			28	18	1,962	2,008
Grand Total		79,723	2,335	11,009	22,622	115,689

* Mission websites indicated that these missions also had military observers but the UN DP-KO Background Note data was used. Source: "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Background Note, June 30, 2009, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/Depts/dpko/ops/ops.html> (July 27, 2009); UNMOGIP data as of March 31, 2009 from the mission website at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/Depts/dpko/ops/ops.html> (July 27, 2009); UNAMA and BINUB figures from "United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Missions," Background Note, June 30, 2009, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/Depts/dpko/ops/ops.html> (July 27, 2009).

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. Then to conclude testimony, Colonel Flavin.

**STATEMENT OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. FLAVIN, USA, RETIRED,
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Colonel FLAVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for allowing me to share some information with you.

The Peacekeeping Stability Institute for the past 12 years have been engaged in looking at these various activities, and what I would like to do is summarize some of the initiatives that have taken place, and some that potentially will bear some fruit to aid and assist in this.

The great watershed events of the Balkans, Rwanda and post-conflict Iraq have served as catalysts to develop doctrine and concepts in various places. The U.N. Capstone Doctrine developed last year identified the key that safe and secure environment is a key issue for the U.N. governance, and getting all of the various parts of the U.N. together to act in unison, and also that local/national ownership was a key principle that the U.N. ought to look at.

Given the fact that this is the first capstone and the first time that these various principles were enunciated in a larger forum, the issue is how does that then provide guidance to the force commander and the force SRSG on how do you achieve a safe and secure environment.

The Challenges Forum, a 16-nation forum that has been around for about 10 years sponsored by the Folke Bernadotte Academy out of Sweden is a forum that can provide a place where various participants can provide papers to the U.N. in order to address this. The U.S. is part of this forum and right now they are focusing on how do you provide a safe and secure environment; how do you provide that guidance to the force commander?

The U.S. is paired with Pakistan on a working group to bring some of those thoughts to bear. There will be a meeting this November in New York where the initial thoughts will be put out, with a final meeting in Australia in 2010, reporting how you establish a safe and secure environment, how you can establish governance, and how you can bring all the people, portions of the U.N. together in an integrated manner in order to do this. So this challenges forum is an opportunity to fill one of the gaps that is out there.

Another gap is in the area of doctrine and concepts for field support. We discuss some of that in here, and the U.N. is beginning to develop significant doctrine on how they provide good field support. The U.S. has a lot of expertise in that over the last couple of years in their various deployments and others, and we are coordinating with the Department of Field Support in order to bring the expertise from the U.S. military in order to aid and assist, which we think is a useful way to do that.

The other thing is police. The essential task matrix and the essential task for police have just been established and put out there, so the police now have some standards and a good way ahead to

begin planning and training. This has happened in the last several months. We support the police through GPOI, which was mentioned, and CoESPU, the center at Vincenza where we have a U.S. military officer serving in that center. That is another opportunity to begin to push and encourage these essential tasks, and then take what the police has learned and move these essential tasks back into the military formations in order to assist them in developing some essential tasks.

As far as the U.S. is concerned, the U.S. Institute for Peace is just publishing a document, hopefully by the end of this week, on guiding principles for stabilization and reconstruction. These principles are based upon significant information gathered from the United Nations, from the NATO, from the EU, from the AU, and from the U.S., getting out a framework on how to establish safe and secure environments, how to go ahead with economics, how to go ahead with governance, and provide some excellent thoughts and guidance on that, and I think we are looking forward to taking that document to U.N. and moving forward.

The U.S. Army doctrine itself is coherent with this new U.N. Capstone Doctrine. After 5 or 6 years of work, our doctrine has come into line with this. As a matter of fact the framework in the new Field Manual 3-07 stability is very similar to the framework in the U.N. Capstone Doctrine. Discussing such things as security sector reform, which had never been discussed before. The joint doctrine will be developed later in accordance with that.

The key here is, how do you then move from doctrine to application in some of the areas? One of the areas is what if you are faced with mass atrocities, what if you are faced with some significant problems out there.

In that case the Harvard School, the Carr Center at Harvard and the Peacekeeping Institute have developed the Mass Atrocity Response Options and Operations, a way to take a planning process, take this doctrine, and figure out how do you respond to mass atrocities and the responsibility to protect, and that will be part of an ongoing process developing with the U.N. and with the Department of Defense in the Mass Atrocities Response Project.

The last, of course, is knowledge, knowledge by the troop contributing countries on how the U.N. works and what the U.N. needs and how to interface well with the U.N. in assisting in what they are doing. The U.S. and other key permanent five members, we have found out, are relatively ignorant of how the U.N. works in the military staffs and what the U.N. needs except for a small number of folks that actually have worked in the U.N., and so there is a project out there being initiated by the Joint Knowledge Online, at the Joint Warfighting Center, to begin to bring U.N. training online for all U.S. forces to take a look at what that is about and how they can interface directly with that, and other projects out there to bring training and awareness on these various things under the idea if we know better how the U.N. works, how the U.N. needs to function, and what are the opportunities out there we can then better address those opportunities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Flavin follows:]

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Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing

New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations

Wednesday, July 29, 2009 @ 10: 00 a.m.

Testimony of:

Colonel William J. Flavin

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U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
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GENERAL

Seven decades after peacekeeping began and ten years after the Brahimi report the world is facing increasing demands to engage and bring stability to regions where fragile governance is endemic. Global peacekeeping is at an all time high. The number of troops deployed in UN operations alone has risen 600% in the past six years. The number and sophistication of the spoilers have increased as has the demands on the international community to act. Peace building has become a part of most missions and has proved not only complicated and difficult but also dangerous. Security is at the heart of these conflicts. The challenge is how to establish a safe and secure environment so that the peace process and peace building can succeed.

The new USIP Book soon to be published, *Guidelines on Reconstruction and Stabilization*, states that in its broadest sense, security is an "all encompassing condition" that takes freedom, safety, governance, human rights, public health, and access to resources into account. This is commonly known as "human security." USIP defines security as the physical security which permits the freedom necessary to pursue a permanent peace.

Security rests the four following elements: information, management of spoilers, reform of the security sector and protection of human rights.

Information:

Sharing timely information about threats and potential threats to the peace process or the population is vital to security. It requires developing deep links with and an understanding of the population.

Management of spoilers

Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests and will therefore work to undermine it. The peacekeeping mission should understand what gives power brokers power, including their financing, their roles in the previous regime and their standing in the community. It should recognize that they exist in the economic, political, and security arenas, both at the local and national level. They may have fed off the conflict or emerged in the wake of defeat as new spoilers. If reconcilable, spoilers should be encouraged to change their behavior over time. Depending on their motives and capacity at state and local levels, spoilers may need to be dealt with militarily, or through political or economic negotiations.

Reform of the security sector

Control of the security apparatus is the basic source of state power and its use will likely have been one of the major drivers of conflict. Its reform therefore is a priority. Security sector reform touches every aspect of an S&R mission: actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violence (e.g., police and military forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions that govern these actors and manage their funding (e.g., ministries of interior, defense, and justice; and national security councils),

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and oversight bodies (legislative and non-governmental). Reform aims to create a professional security sector that is legitimate, impartial and accountable to the population.

Protection of human rights

A human rights-based approach, where all actions uphold human rights, is required to establish the necessary conditions for each and every end state selected. This involves a mandate to protect and promote human rights and ensure that the host nation has the will and capacity to do so on its own. Rights protected under international law include life, liberty and security of person; the highest attainable standard of health; a fair trial; just and favorable working conditions; adequate food, housing and social security; education; equal protection of the law; and a nationality. These also include freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence; arbitrary arrest or detention; torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; and freedom of association, expression, assembly and movement.

Below is the status of the US and UN attempts to address the issues of security since the operations in the Balkans and Rwanda. There has been some progress at least in recognizing that this is an issue that must be addressed. This reflects my personal assessment and not that of DOD.

1. Policy and Direction

- a. **National Security Strategy 2006**: The national security policy contains some key phrases that deal with the issue of human security and civilian protection but this direction was not echoed in any of the following documents that provided guidance to the Department of Defense. Here are the two mentions of Genocide and civilian protection in the NSS:
 - i. In **Darfur**, the people of an impoverished region are the victims of genocide arising from a civil war that pits a murderous militia, backed by the Sudanese Government, against a collection of rebel groups.
 - ii. **Genocide**: Patient efforts to end conflicts should not be mistaken for tolerance of the intolerable. Genocide is the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The world needs to start honoring a principle that many believe has lost its force in parts of the international community in recent years: genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless America does its part. We must refine United States Government efforts – economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement – so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices. We must not allow

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the legal debate over the technical definition of "genocide" to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace.

- iii. **National Defense Strategy 2008:** This document contains neither Genocide nor Mass Atrocities nor Human Rights Violations nor any other code word for Genocide or anything about civilian protection.
- iv. **National Military Strategy 2005:** This document contains neither Genocide nor Mass Atrocities nor Human Rights Violations nor any other code word for Genocide.

2. Concepts and Doctrine

a. UN Concepts and Doctrine

- i. The UN made great strides with the publication of their capstone doctrine in 2008, **UN Principles and Guidelines** that provided overarching guidance. It states that one of the core business of UN peacekeeping is to "create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights."
- ii. The UN doctrine goes on to address the issue of civilian protection without mentioning genocide or mass atrocities. The following is an extract from the document:
 - 1. "In situations of internal armed conflict, civilians account for the vast majority of casualties. Many civilians are forcibly uprooted within their own countries and have specific vulnerabilities arising from their displacement. As a result, most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians."
 - 2. Although this guidance is essential, there is still a need for subordinate guidance to assist the Mission Commanders

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and the SRSG. For example, what guidance does a mission commander have in doctrine on how to establish a safe and secure environment that includes the protection of civilians? What guidance do the police have? The Challenges Forum is addressing this gap:

- iii. **Challenges Forum and Future Doctrine and Concept Development for 2008-2009.** The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is currently comprised of 16 partner nations and seeks to promote and broaden the international dialogue between key stakeholders addressing peace operations issues in a timely, effective and inclusive manner. In January 2009, PKSOI hosted a workshop that brought together military and civilian partners from governments and international organizations to plan and initiate a series of workshops and engagements designed to “operationalize” the three “core businesses of peacekeeping operations” as stated in the UN Peacekeeping Operations: **Principles and Guidelines** document. The series consists of three parallel workshop strands, the results of which will be presented at the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations in Australia in April 2010. These work strands are:
1. Working Group One: “Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.” Lead Pakistan; assist United States (PKSOI). The key questions that this group must answer are:
 - a. What is a secure and stable environment?
 - b. What are the short term immediate requirements?
 - c. What are the long term requirements?
 - d. What are the recurring operational tradeoffs?
 - e. How to determine the proper prioritization and sequencing of mandate’s tasks as related to their functional relationships in a balanced manner to include Military, Police, etc
 - A. Identified the points of friction/gaps
 - B. Synchronize the relationships
 - C. Consider capability and capacity limitations

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D. Where will risk be assumed or tolerated

2. Working Group Two: "Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance." Lead Canada (Pearson Peacekeeping), assist India.
 3. Working Group Three: "Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner." Lead South Africa, assist Australia.
- iv. **SPU Training Mission Essential Task List Development 2009**
Police are an essential part of providing for a safe and secure environment and ensuring human security. PKSOI is working with the UN on Police Training and Certification to develop a Formed Police Unit FPU Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Training Certification Standards. The results of this are being published now July 2009.
- v. **Center of Excellence for Standing Police Units (CoESPU) G-8 Action Plan June 2004:** This center was established as "... international training center that would serve as a Center of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations. The center will build on the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie and other similar forces to develop carabinieri/gendarme-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations." CoESPU commits itself to train 3000 Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, who will, following the principle of train-the-trainer, return to their countries. It has trained 1,932 stability police trainers from 29 countries and plans to complete the training of at least 4,500 additional personnel before the end of 2010. US has provided financial, technical, and staffing support to COESPU.

b. US Concepts and Doctrine

- i. **US Government Counterinsurgency Guide 2009** This is the only multi-agency doctrinal guide that the US Government possesses. It emphasizes that the central focus of COIN is on the people of the country and their needs. Neither genocide nor requirement to protect civilians or peoples is mentioned specifically but it is implied by the sections on security and security sector reform. Here is the section on Security: "Security operations, conducted in support of a political strategy, coordinated with economic development activity

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and integrated with an information campaign, will provide human security to the population and improve the political and economic situation at the local level. This should increase society's acceptance of the government and, in turn, popular support for the COIN campaign. COIN functions therefore include informational, security, political and economic components, all of which are designed to support the overall objective of establishing and consolidating control over the environment, then transferring it to effective and legitimate local authorities."

i. USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction:

USIP goal in writing this document was to develop guiding principles based on the collective experience of multiple actors to guide strategic-level, whole-of-government planning for stabilization and reconstruction. USIP, with support from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), conducted a comprehensive review of existing documents produced by international and U.S. actors to identify shared principles and to present them in a user-friendly format for policymakers and practitioners. This is to be published by the end of July 09. One of the key sections is "establishing a safe and secure environment." This provides key concepts and approaches to be followed.

- 1.** "A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by an end to large-scale fighting, an adequate level of public order, the subordination of accountable security forces to legitimate state authority, the protection of key individuals, communities, sites, and infrastructure, and the freedom for people and goods to move about the country and across borders without fear of undue harm to life and limb. The document has identified the following as the key components of a Safe and Secure environment in addition to addressing gaps and measurers of success. The constituents of a safe and secure environment are:

- a.** Cessation of large-scale violence
- b.** Establishment of public order
- c.** Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence
- d.** Physical security

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- e. Territorial security”
2. The document then identifies the following operational tradeoffs that the senior leadership in a mission must consider:
- a. **“Prioritizing short-term stability vs. confronting impunity** Dealing with groups or individuals who prosecuted the conflict may be necessary early on to bring certain factions into the fold or to mitigate tensions. But turning a blind eye to continued use of political violence against rivals or exploitation of criminal networks to generate illicit revenue will enshrine a culture of impunity that threatens sustainable peace.
 - b. **Using local security forces to enhance legitimacy vs. using international security forces to ensure effectiveness** While international security forces may be more effective in performing security functions, having local security forces assume these responsibilities would enhance legitimacy. But local forces often lack the capacity to perform effectively and may have a reputation for corruption and grave human rights abuses. Balancing this tradeoff involves training and mentoring local forces and gradually transitioning responsibilities from international actors.
 - c. **Applying force vs. maintaining mission legitimacy** Public order operations may require the use of force, especially where spoilers and a culture of impunity are widespread. Assertive action ensures credibility, but excessive force can also jeopardize the legitimacy of the mission, especially early on when a mission is under public scrutiny. Finding a way to balance this tradeoff is essential and should involve international stability police who are proficient in the use of non-lethal force.
 - d. **Public order functions performed by the military vs. the police** Achieving public order in these environments often presents a difficult dilemma as to which institution – military or police – should perform public order functions. While the military has training and experience in the use of force against violent spoilers, they lack the requisite skills in investigations.

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forensics and other critical law enforcement functions. Traditional police units, on the other hand, are trained in nuanced use of force and non-lethal means. Meshing the capabilities of both these organizations is critical to meet public order needs.

- e. **Short-term security imperatives vs. investments in broader security reform** With limited resources to work with, it may be difficult to balance short- and long-term requirements. The need for immediate security (i.e., protection for elections) may divert donor resources and energy from long-term SSR efforts. Demonstrating quick wins can build credibility, but may jeopardize the development of a foundation for deeper reform of the security sector. A proper balance must be struck.”

ii. US Military Doctrine and Concepts

- 3. **Army Doctrine:** The Army has adopted the concept of “Full Spectrum Operations” that directs that the military must continuously address tasks dealing with the population of a region. The Army must “shape the civil situation” as all future conflicts will most likely be “among the people.” There can be no lasting peace unless the Army supports all of the instruments of power to gain a sustain peace after major combat operations have succeeded.
 - a. **FM 3-0 2008** States that the nature of “land power is to gain, sustain and exploit control over land, resources, and peoples.” This will be accomplished through the following campaign Themes: Peace Time Engagement, Peace Operations, Limited Interventions, and Irregular Warfare. The objective is to create a “secure environment” so that a viable peace can be achieved through the use of the other instruments of power.
 - b. FM 3-0 does provide a provision for removing a government but not for violation of human rights or Genocide. The document states: “On the president’s order, Army forces support insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten US interests or regional stability.”

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- c. FM3-0 does provide adequate guidance at the operational level to accomplish any mission related to the prevention and response to Genocide or civilian protection. However, there is a lack of discussion or direct recognition concerning the protection of vulnerable or affected populations. The thrust of the doctrine is broad toward achieving viable peace. Limited Interventions include noncombatant evacuation operations, strike, raid, show of force, foreign humanitarian assistance, consequence management, and sanction enforcement. Several of these operations would be applicable in a limited response to Genocide. In the case that a government is the cause of the Genocide the document is silent.
- d. **FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 2006** The US ARMY and USMC manual is the only manual written that uses the word Genocide when describing the environment. This is how it is used: "A society is not easily created or destroyed, but it is possible to do so through genocide or war." Beyond that general statement the word is not used in the manual again.
- e. The basis for COIN is to build local capacity and address the drivers of conflict to control the insurgency. Civilian security is key and essential. The manual states: "The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace." It does not address the complicating issues associated with the requirement to protect populations. It does however go into some detail on the requirement to protect military contractors.
- f. The manual does recognize some international law that applies. It states: "Fundamental human rights. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights provide a guide for applicable human rights. The latter provides for derogation from certain rights, however, during a state of emergency. Respect for the full panoply of human rights should be the goal of the host nation... In conventional conflicts, balancing competing responsibilities of mission accomplishment with protection of noncombatants is difficult enough. Complex COIN operations place the toughest of

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ethical demands on Soldiers, Marines, and their leaders.”

- g. The manual does recognize that the host nation security forces may be a problem and need to be reformed: “During any period of instability, people’s primary interest is physical security for themselves and their families. When HN forces fail to provide security or threaten the security of civilians, the population is likely to seek security guarantees from insurgents, militias, or other armed groups. This situation can feed support for an insurgency. However, when HN forces provide physical security, people are more likely to support the government. Commanders therefore identify the following: Whether the population is safe from harm. Whether there is a functioning police and judiciary system. Whether the police and courts are fair and nondiscriminatory. Who provides security for each group when no effective, fair government security apparatus exists? The provision of security by the HN government must occur in conjunction with political and economic reform.”
- h. The manual provides some tools that will assist the commander in identifying issue related to civilian concerns such as a significant section on culture and another on civilian considerations.
- i. This manual still assumes that there is a host nation government that has legitimacy and the problem is with insurgent forces trying to undermine that legitimacy. In that situation this manual provides enough guidance for a military force to address Genocide or mass atrocity caused by forces not associated with the host nation government. It does come up short on addressing the problems associated with defining what civilian protection might entail. However, if the host nation government itself is the cause of the Genocide then that situation is not covered by this document.
- j. **FM 3-07 Stability 2008:** This document provides capstone guidance. “FM 3-07 Stability” has a chapter about Security Sector Reform and talks about military support to a comprehensive approach to increasing

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local capacity to provide security. In the aftermath of conflict or disaster, conditions often create a significant security vacuum within the state. The government institutions are either unwilling or unable to provide security. In many cases, these institutions do not operate within internationally accepted norms. They are rife with corruption, abusing the power entrusted to them by the state. Sometimes these institutions actually embody the greatest threat to the populace. These conditions only serve to ebb away at the very foundation of the host nation's stability. The following is an extract from that manual:

- k. "Security is the most immediate concern of the military force, a concern typically shared by the local populace. A safe and secure environment is one in which these civilians can live their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent conflict or victimized by criminals. Achieving this condition requires extensive collaboration with civil authorities, the trust and confidence of the people, and strength of perseverance.
 - l. The most immediate threat to a safe and secure environment is generally a return to fighting by former warring parties. However, insurgent forces, criminal elements, and terrorists also significantly threaten the safety and security of the local populace. The following objectives support a safe and secure environment:
 - A. Cessation of large-scale violence enforced.
 - B. Public security established.
 - C. Legitimate monopoly over means of violence established.
 - D. Physical protection established.
 - E. Territorial security established"
4. **Joint Doctrine:** JP 3-0 is the Joint Forces Capstone Doctrine. The following are taken from the current manual written 17 September 2006

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- a. Genocide or mass atrocity is not mentioned in this manual. There is limited guidance in this document concerning the protection of civilians. The only discussion of protection aside from protecting the force is the following: "protection extends to civil infrastructure of friendly nations and non-military participants (NGO, IO)." "Protection may involve the security of host national authorities and OGA, IGO, and NGO members if authorized by higher authority." "Limited contingency operations may involve a requirement to protect nonmilitary personnel. In the absence of the rule of law, the JFC must address when, how, and to what extent he will extend force protection to civilians and what that protection means." There is no discussion about any requirement to protect populations at risk.
- b. The general guidance for Stability Operations in this document states: "Of particular importance will be Civil Military Operations (CMO); initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablishing civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US military forces may support such activities as required/necessary."
- c. Again JP 3-0 does provide adequate guidance at the operational level to accomplish any mission related to the prevention and response to Genocide and civilian protection. However, there is still a lack of any in-depth discussion or direct recognition concerning the protection of vulnerable or affected populations. It does cover the support to an insurgency to over-throw a government but there is no mention of dealing with a government who is perpetrating Genocide.
- d. The joint staff has directed that a joint manual on stability be developed based on Army FM 3-07. This manual should expand on the work already started in the Army manual. JFCOM has develop a hand book "The Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform

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Handbook: A Practical Guide for Operational Planners and Commanders" as an immediate guide that will form the basis for future doctrine.

5. **The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO)**

Project: Based on the paucity of doctrinal writing on the topic of protection, mass atrocities and genocide, the MARO project was started. MARO is a partnership between PKSOI and the Carr Center at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard. The Director of the Carr Center, Professor Sarah Sewall, envisioned the project's objective as developing a military concept of operations to guide intervention in a mass atrocity. An Annotated Planning Framework, was developed in August 2008. It is generically written to serve as a guide and tool for combatant command-level planners in modifying their planning methods to better fit this mission. The framework was developed in concert with several military and civil planners and was considered May 09 by Unified Quest the US Army Title 10 War Game and will be examined at the International Experts Workshop Sep 09 in UK. Despite a National Security Strategy (2006) that declares "...genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide.... We must refine United States Government efforts – economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement – so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide... Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required..." This has as of yet not found its way into the Defense directives that would drive defense planning. MARO is an attempt to gain awareness so that the QDR and guidance from the DOD will address these issues.

c. **Assessing the Situation for the Whole of Government**

- i. Addressing the causes and consequences of weak and failed states has become an urgent priority for the U.S. Government (USG). To address the issues of mass atrocities and human security understanding must occur. Conflict both contributes to and results from state fragility. To effectively prevent or resolve violent conflict, the USG needs tools and approaches that enable coordination of U.S. diplomatic, development and military efforts in support of local institutions and actors seeking to resolve their disputes peacefully.

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- ii. A first step toward a more effective and coordinated response to help states prevent, mitigate and recover from violent conflict is the development of shared understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. Achieving this shared understanding of the dynamics of a particular crisis requires both a joint interagency process for conducting the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information.
- iii. ICAF (Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework) ICAF is an NSC approved assessment tool to develop a commonly held understanding across relevant USG Departments and Agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that informs US policy and planning decisions. It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated.
- iv. ICAF is now a part of Army doctrine FM 3-07 and is taught to the USMC at their training centers as a tool to begin to understand the dynamics of the situation.

d. Education and Training

- i. **United Nations:** UN has just posted the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs), which are based primarily on the Capstone doctrine and the DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control. The Core Pre-deployment Training Materials are now posted on a new website, the Peacekeeping Resource Hub (peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org) and DPKO is starting to work with training centers on integrating them into their pre-deployment training programs.
 - 1. The finalization of the CPTMs has been a huge step forward in the improvement of the new UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards, are unfortunately still not quite complete. Following a positive response from the C-34, ITS has begun the process of issuing formal UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for specific categories of staff (individual police officers, military experts on mission, staff officers, etc.). This is an authoritative document transmitted to Member States which outlines the objective of pre-deployment training for those personnel, and the required course specifications. It is through this Standards document that DPKO are making it clear to Member States that the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (and the relevant Specialized Training

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Materials, where they exist) must be covered during pre-deployment training. This should hopefully start to rectify the problem of certain topics in the old SGTMs being left out by Member States who may not have felt that topic was important.

2. By the end of the year, we intend to have a set UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for:
 - a. - Individual police officers
 - b. - Formed Police Units (FPUs)
 - c. - Military experts on mission (military observers, liaison officers etc.)
 - d. - Military staff officers
 - e. - Civilians
- ii. **United States:** The US military has taken several initiatives to address the educational issues.
1. POTI (Peace Operations Training Initiative): POTI is an extensive on line course that allows individuals to become familiar with how the UN plans and conducts operations as well as key issues such as protection of civilian and populations at risk. It is available with little or no charge to Africa, Latin America and Canada and some other allies but not to US personnel. PKSOI is coordinating with OSD to pay for a certificate that allows DOD personnel to take this online education. PKSOI is also coordinating with SCRS through the training and education sub-PCC to make this distance learning available to the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.
 2. US Army War College: PKSOI facilitated the participation of UN DPKO officials in the US Army War College run Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Courses, Elective Courses, and Strategists Courses. The UN DPKO Military Advisor, Former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and planners from the UNDPKO have participated annually in support of these educational opportunities.
 3. US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Ft Leavenworth: PKSOI conducts UN training and awareness for the C&GSC class every year and collaborates with UN DPKO to ensure

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currency. CAC is expanding its education this year to support the new FM 3-07 Stability Operations doctrine and will be looking to raise awareness Army-wide on the UN and its operations.

4. Joint Knowledge on Line: PKSOI on behalf of SOUTHCOM working with US Joint Forces Command is developing an on-line instructional package on the UN Integrated Mission Planning Process to be completed in Aug 2009. PKSOI is coordinating through UN DPET which will review the contents for possible use in a UN context. This supports the needs of the COCOM as well as DPKO.

5. Army Training

- a. CTC Realistic Challenges: CTCs have shifted from their traditional focus to train on stability tasks using the population as the center of gravity. They have contracted for role players to replicate not only local actors but also members of the other agencies of government. Security of civilians is one of the issues that are addressed. It is always a challenge to obtain the correct role players and members of the current other agencies of government to insure valid portrayals of the issues.
- b. Training Advisors: Significant efforts are underway to prepare US forces to train others. The Field Manual that supports this effort does discuss civilian protection based on FM 3-07. The Army Universal Task List does contain tasks on commander's obligations to civilian populations. This was just published this year so the concepts are working their way through the system but needs monitoring. The FMs that deal directly with advising and training are silent on any issue dealing with civilian protection so more work needs to be done.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you, and thank all of you. There is so much you have given us here, and the vote bells have gone off so we have about 6 or 7 or 8 minutes just to take a few of these ideas up.

I earlier indicated that we would go to Mr. Payne first, but I now am going to—no, go ahead. He raised the issue of the word. Take a few minutes.

Mr. PAYNE. Okay, I will just use half of the time, that will be fine.

Just quickly, you know, there has been the notion of a U.N. army standing group. What is your opinion on that real quickly? Each of you can respond. Well trained sort of special force type, that, or a standing kind of army waiting. Yes.

Colonel FLAVIN. I will go ahead and make the first mention on that. Part of the issue that we discussed here is the lag time between U.N. resolutions and the fact you have to be on the ground, and as I see, maybe there is some opportunity for some element to go in and fill that lag time while the U.N. begins to generate its force. The Share Brig used to be a concept for that, the Standing High Readiness Brigade that Denmark had supported. That, of course, has disappeared and gone away.

I know the Latin American colleagues down there are talking about a potential of putting some type of standing organization together that can fill that gap. I see that this is an opportunity that we may want to push, especially since we have some of our allies and others talking about such various things and opportunities, and I think that would go a long way to sort of stabilizing the situation until the U.N. can go through and generate the appropriate force and get in there. We know the Share Brig was used initially in the Eritrea/Ethiopia adventure to some effect. Thank you.

Mr. SCHAEFER. The U.N.—

Chairman BERMAN. Quickly, if you want to weigh in on this.

Mr. SCHAEFER. Yes, please. The U.N. does have a standby arrangement system wherein countries can pledge certain parts of their armed forces, or police or other support units to have ready at the request of the United Nations for deployment rapidly. That is their prerogative, and some 87 countries are already part of that system. Japan just announced that they would be part of it, which is rather remarkable step for them considering their constitutional constraints on use of armed force.

The U.S. through GPOI is contributing greatly to the capabilities of regional troops to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. I think that Ambassador Rice earlier noted that about 50,000 troops trained through GPOI are currently deployed or have been recently deployed on U.N. peacekeeping operations, so the U.S. is contributing greatly through that program to increase the amount of troops available for deployment on U.N. peacekeeping operations.

As far as the idea of having a U.N. army or any kind of armed force independent of a national government, I think that is a very risky idea; something that the United States specifically should avoid. Having armed forces outside of the responsibility of a sovereign government is nearly always a bad idea, and we see the

ramifications of that in a number of unstable states around the world.

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Williamson.

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Payne, let me make just a couple quick points.

One, some countries like Canada have made peacekeeping a principal objective of their armed forces, and my suggestion of standardized training, standardized processes and standardized equipment could accelerate deployment, and it should be done. However, I do think we have to keep in mind that peacekeeping operations are not unlimited. There are, unfortunately, problems where we will not have the capacity, the resources, et cetera, to deploy; and second, governments should be mindful of a realistic deployment schedule.

In Sudan, when UNAMID made its transfer, the Secretariat made very clear they would not be able to successfully do that until June 2008. One permanent member of the Security Council found that unacceptable, and pushed for January deployment. It was unready, mistakes were made that we are still paying for now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to give my time to the members on your side.

Chairman BERMAN. One question which is bugging me and we have a few more minutes here. Ms. Weir talks about the clear mandate, achievable mandate, but you have got a political process that decides the mandate. Is the absence of clarity a product of a lack of discipline, a lack of knowledge, or is it a result of a political negotiations at the Security Council between different parties with different interests that end up clouding the mandates?

In other words, is it something you can't take politics out of politics, and therefore the desire for the clarity is something that conceptually makes sense but impractical life in this structure cannot be achieved?

Ms. WEIR. I think the lack of clarity in the mandate, if I could, the political discussions are actually just a desire to do more better. What you see at the Security Council is a lot of people, a lot of countries with interests, but also a desire to keep people safe and to stabilize these countries.

Chairman BERMAN. So it is not a tension between the countries, it is almost an effort to try and do more than you can really pull off. Do you agree with that?

Ms. WEIR. If I could just finish. I think it is all of these things, but what you see when you get a mandate so complex that it incorporate everything that everyone wants to pile onto it is a mission that actually cannot achieve any of the things that anyone set on the table.

So if you look at the MONUC mandate, for example, prior to October, there were so many conflicting roles that the Security Council decided they wanted this mission to play, that in fact they were paralyzed. They could not do anything with it. So what I am suggesting is that I think the politics needs to be taken into account, and all of these interests need to be discussed, but at the end of the day the Security Council has the responsibility to sit down and decide amongst themselves what are the priorities; at the end of

the day what do they want to get done, and to make those priorities clear within the mandate and then resource the mission to fulfill those priorities.

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Mr. Chairman, both when I was Assistant Secretary and when I was Ambassador for Political Affairs, I dealt with negotiations of actual practical getting it done. Churchill said there are two things you shouldn't watch. One of which is making sausage and the other was making laws. And the United Nations Security Council is a sausage factory. This is not some abstract diplomatic exercise, academic exercise. It is 15 countries with interests, perspectives with drive, and I would suggest to you you are absolutely correct that it is a very rambunctious political process where compromise is made.

The question is United States as a permanent member has to have greater clarity of what is acceptable, when is there overreach, and when it has gone too far because some time in our anxiousness to deploy a peacekeeping operation we have failed that very operation by not demanding minimum standards of clarity and operational effectiveness. Thank you, sir.

Chairman BERMAN. Thanks. Bill? Ileana? Anybody. I have more if you are running out.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ambassador, give us an example of where we failed, where the U.S. failed to demand clarity.

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Let me give you a practical example that I think I make reference in my written testimony. The African Union peacekeepers in Sudan were inadequate, inadequate because of their mandate which was just to observe and report, inadequate because of their number, inadequate because of their resources.

The United States was actually the biggest contributor. We spent \$400 million building the bases for the African Union. We wanted to move that to a joint U.N.-African Union force which is very understandable. But a key decision was made to get that that has impinged on UNAMID's ability to be effective, and that is the words predominantly African force.

As soon as we did that both the African Union and Khartoum had a veto over the composition. U.N. no longer could operate—

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am familiar with that, and I remember. I mean, you were an advocate for more boots on the ground, and an advocate for more NATO involvement, and yet at the same time we couldn't deliver NATO, and I have a memory of, I think it was your recommendation that we jam, and yet the administration said no. I mean, I think innately inherently structural you have got to remember that this is a consensus party. We don't have a U.N. per se that exists that has the authority of a sovereign state, and I think—I guess I would conclude by saying it is still, for the dollars spent and the money and the blood and the treasures saved, it is a good investment. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Don? We have got about 2 minutes and 20 seconds.

Mr. PAYNE. The U.S. mainly stays out of any U.N. operation. I am not looking for boots on the ground, but maybe Ambassador Williamson, do you think that the U.S. could be more of assistance like with drones or with telecommunications? You know, Sheikh Sharif said he could take care of the hijackers if he could just have

communications from some intelligence. They could take care of them on the ground. They don't want to take care of them on the sea. But do you think—and the U.S. is not there, but that the United States and Britain and France could be of more assistance, or the U.S., let us stay with the U.S., we don't want troops on the ground, but we have so many assets that could assist the other people on the ground. What do you think about that?

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first respond to the final comment of your predecessor. Congressman, I agree 100 percent, which is why my statement began with the importance to U.S. in projecting its policies and the value of U.N. and U.N. peacekeeping. So we are in agreement there. It is a question of how we make it even better.

Secondly, I think, Congressman Payne—

Chairman BERMAN. Real quick.

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Okay. Congressman Payne, my view is we should not allow the major engagements which are serious and consequential to allow our military capabilities to take a pass on some of these other issues of consequence morally and for regional stability which is in our interest. So, sir, I would argue that if it is a legitimate inquiry for elected members in the Congress to raise the question if there can be some de minimis contribution to more effective peacekeeping from across the river. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you all very much. The area that I am confused at—you don't have the time to help me get out of the confusion—is this whole issue that a number of you mentioned of the host country's role. First of all, and to responsibly protect, sometimes it is to protect civilians against the host country.

Secondly, the host country may not in some areas have the capability to deal with the issue, and so this notion of the critical nature of that host country's permission or invitation is a little confused in my own mind in terms of how you sort through that.

Thank you all very much. We have got to run.

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128

Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Chairman

July 28, 2009

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing and briefing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building:**

DATE: Wednesday, July 29, 2009
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
SUBJECT: New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations

WITNESSES: **Panel I**
The Honorable Susan E. Rice
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Panel II
The Honorable Richard S. Williamson
Partner
Winston & Strawn, LLP
*(Former Special Envoy to Sudan and Ambassador to the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights)*

Ms. Erin A. Weir
Peacekeeping Advocate
Refugees International

Mr. Brett D. Schaefer
Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
The Heritage Foundation

Colonel William J. Flavin, USA, Retired
Directing Professor
Doctrine, Concepts, Training, and Education Division
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
U.S. Army War College

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Wednesday Date 7/29/09 Room 2172 RHOBStarting Time 10:02 A.M. Ending Time 1:01 P.M.Recesses (to)Presiding Member(s) Howard L. Berman (CA), Chairman**CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:**Open Session Executive (closed) Session Televised Electronically Recorded (taped) Stenographic Record TITLE OF HEARING or BILLS FOR MARKUP: (Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)
New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations**COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**see attached**NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:**n/aHEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)


n/a

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: (Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): (Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Yeas</u>	<u>Nays</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Not Voting</u>
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TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or
TIME ADJOURNED 1:01pm

Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director

**Attendance - HCFA Full Committee Hearing
New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations
Wednesday, July 29, 2009 @ 10:00 a.m. , 2172 RHOB**

Howard L. Berman (CA)
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega (AS)
Donald Payne (NJ)
Brad Sherman (CA)
William D. Delahunt (MA)
Diane E. Watson (CA)
Gerald E. Connolly (VA)
Michael E. McMahon (NY)
Gene Green (TX)
Lynn C. Woolsey (CA)
Sheila Jackson-Lee (TX)
Barbara Lee (CA)
Brad Miller (NC)
David Scott (GA)
Jim Costa (CA)
Keith Ellison (MN)
Ron Klein (FL)

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (FL)
Christopher H. Smith (NJ)
Edward R. Royce (CA)
Ted Poe (TX)

Briefing on
“The Responsibility to Protect: Implications for International Peacekeeping Operations”
Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the United States House of Representatives
29 July 2009

Statement
by
Dr. Edward C. Luck¹
Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to brief this distinguished Committee on the responsibility to protect and its implications for international peacekeeping operations. At the outset, let me express the standard caveat of an international civil servant briefing a Member State parliament. In accordance with past practice, my attendance today before the Committee is on a purely informal basis, and nothing in my oral remarks and written briefing statement should be understood to be a waiver, express or implied, of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations or its subsidiary organs under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

¹ Edward C. Luck is Special Adviser to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and an Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations. His work for the world body focuses primarily on the conceptual, institutional, and political development of the concept of the responsibility to protect. In addition, he is Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the International Peace Institute, an independent think tank. He is currently on public service leave as Professor of Practice in International and Public Affairs of the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, where he remains Director of the Center on International Organization.

The Responsibility to Protect

Let me begin with a few words about the evolving concept of the responsibility to protect, commonly referred to by its RtoP or R2P acronym, and then turn to the implications of RtoP for international peacekeeping.

Four years ago, at the World Summit, the assembled heads of State and government agreed to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to prevent their incitement.² They agreed, as well, on the need for the international community to assist the State in fulfilling this responsibility to protect and to respond in a “timely and decisive manner,” under Charter rules and procedures, when national authorities are “manifestly failing” to meet their responsibility and peaceful means have proven “inadequate.”³ Subsequently, the Summit’s Outcome Document was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly and the Security Council affirmed its RtoP provisions.⁴

Earlier this year, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented the General Assembly with a detailed plan for implementing this historic, unanimous, and unqualified commitment.⁵ Drawing on the provisions of the Outcome Document, the Secretary-General posits that RtoP rests on three co-equal pillars: 1) the protection responsibilities of the State; 2) international assistance and capacity-building; and 3) timely and decisive response.

Concerning the first pillar, the Secretary-General has stressed that neither the United Nations nor the international community at large have either the capacity or the desire to try to substitute for a State’s core responsibilities towards the population on its territory. We need to

² A/60/L.1, 20 September 2005, para. 138.

³ *Ibid.*, paras. 138 and 139.

⁴ A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005 and S/RES/1674, 28 April 2006, para. 4.

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, A/63/677, 12 January 2009.

do everything possible to encourage States to protect their people from such atrocity crimes. When they need assistance in building the institutions, legislation, social structures, education, and procedures to do so, we should not hesitate to provide such assistance, as detailed under the second pillar. Civil society and regional and sub-regional organizations may be important conduits for such capacity-building, and the Secretary-General's report talks of neighbors helping neighbors and of transnational networks for learning and for the transmission of good/best practices. Each of these dimensions was quite visible in the one case in which the United Nations has applied RtoP principles: in the post-election violence in Kenya in early 2008. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has commented that he also saw his mediation efforts there on behalf of the African Union (AU) through an RtoP prism.⁶ The United Nations has now decided to include RtoP principles in its approach to peace operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well.

The UN's recent "New Horizons" study notes that "many UN peacekeeping missions also serve as early peacebuilders." Likewise, "peacekeeping transition and exit strategies depend on countries providing for their own security, and the UN will need to find effective ways to support this goal through better rule of law and security sector reform (SSR) assistance."⁷ Just as conflict too often begets more conflict, atrocities have a way of laying the basis for further atrocities down the road. Scholars have long contended that the best predictor of genocide is past genocide. Here, the UN's new Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) – another key product of the 2005 Summit – could play a critical role. In the post-conflict, post-trauma period, the

⁶ Roger Cohen, "How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya," *The New York Review of Books*, vol. 55, no 3 (August 14, 2008) and Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the Summit Meeting of African Leaders in Nairobi, SG/SM/11908, 7 November 2008.

⁷ *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (United Nations: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department of Field Support, July 2009), p. 5.

international community tends to be the most engaged and thus has the most potential leverage for helping to foster those societal values and attitudes and those governmental and judicial structures, procedures, and institutions that would make a relapse less likely.

Like the 2005 Summit, the Secretary-General's plan for operationalizing RtoP emphasizes prevention. That is what the first two pillars are largely about. As the Secretary-General puts it, "our goal is to help States succeed, not just to react once they have failed to meet their prevention and protection obligations. It would be neither sound morality, nor wise policy, to limit the world's options to watching the slaughter of innocents or to sending in the marines."⁸ To no one's surprise, the just concluded General Assembly debate on the Secretary-General's RtoP proposals demonstrated a strong preference for such non-coercive and preventive measures.

Peace Operations and RtoP

In contemporary UN parlance, "peace operations" serves as an umbrella term to encompass the whole range of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and, in extreme situations, peace enforcement missions. As noted above, the linkage between RtoP and post-conflict peacebuilding is widely understood and accepted. The choice of Burundi and Sierra Leone as the first two country situations to be addressed by the PBC underscored this connection.

Unfortunately, however, editorial writers and media pundits usually associate RtoP with the other end of the spectrum, i.e., with the coercive use of force to compel national authorities and/or armed groups to stop threatening or committing mass atrocity crimes. Perversely, that is the aspect of RtoP that is most contentious among UN Member States and least likely to be invoked, especially if the preventive and non-coercive aspects of the strategy succeed. Even the third – response – pillar involves a wide array of options under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the

⁸ Speech in Berlin, Germany, SG/SM/11701, 15 July 2008.

Charter, ranging from mediation and fact-finding and working with regional and sub-regional partners to references to international tribunals, sanctions, and other enforcement measures. In Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, for example, timely quiet diplomacy led to the cessation of incendiary media that could have incited much greater domestic violence. The Security Council, under Article 34 of the Charter, can investigate any situation that "might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute." As the Secretary-General has underscored, what is needed is "early and flexible response, tailored to the specific needs of each situation."⁹

As the title of this session rightly suggests, Mr. Chairman, the most urgent challenges, both conceptually and materially, are now to peacekeeping, not to its enforcement and peacebuilding cousins. Over the past decade, the Security Council has regularly assigned UN peacekeeping operations the additional task of protecting civilians (POC). This is at a time when attacks on civilians, including large-scale sexual violence, by rebel groups and government forces alike have become an almost commonplace feature of contemporary conflict. In a number of these theatres, peacekeepers are confronted by multiple armed groups, as national governments cannot control their territories. Clearly these are vastly more demanding situations than the more static and predictable ones assigned to inter-positional peacekeeping in earlier years. As the "New Horizons" study notes, POC mandates place an emphasis on "police, rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian actors."¹⁰ These components – like the military ones – tend to be in short supply. Moreover, most national militaries "do not traditionally maintain proactive

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ *New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, op. cit., p. 20.

civilian protection doctrines, operating concepts or tactics beyond the requirements of international humanitarian law.”¹¹

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I need to make one more distinction. While POC and RtoP are related concepts, they are not identical. Protection of civilians is a broader and more generic term than RtoP, as the former can refer either to individual acts of protection or to broader protection policies. RtoP, on the other hand, refers only to the most egregious and large-scale abuses, i.e., genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Such mass atrocities are at the extreme end of the POC spectrum. RtoP is a relatively new and still evolving concept, whose military dimensions are still subject both to some political contention and to further policy refinement. I will confine my comments, therefore, to the propositions that the Secretary-General has voiced in this regard.

In his *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon identifies three possible scenarios for the use of force to advance RtoP standards. The least likely and most extreme, as noted above, would be both coercive and without the consent of the government on whose territory it would take place. Under the third pillar, such a use could be envisioned if four conditions are met: 1) there is a determination by the United Nations Security Council that national authorities are “manifestly failing” to protect their populations from some of the four specified crimes; 2) peaceful means have proven inadequate; 3) the Security Council authorizes the use of force to protect the population; and 4) either regional/sub-regional organizations or Member States are prepared to provide the necessary forces, the lift to deploy them, and the logistics capabilities to sustain them. The first three conditions are specified in paragraph 139 of the 2005 Outcome Document. According to Article 53(1) of the Charter, enforcement action by regional arrangements requires the authorization of the Security Council.

¹¹ Ibid.

The two more likely scenarios, addressed by the Secretary-General under his second – assistance – pillar, paradoxically have received little public or official attention. One is a preventive deployment aimed at discouraging such violence against populations from occurring or from escalating. During the 1990s, the leadership of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia welcomed the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to forestall the eruption of the kind of mass violence that had engulfed several of its neighbors.¹² Similarly, with the consent of the government of Burundi, first South African, then African Union, and finally United Nations peacekeepers were deployed there to help keep the internal tensions and violence from reaching the genocidal proportions they did in neighboring Rwanda.

The third possibility is when the government is not the perpetrator of such crimes, but they are being carried out by an armed group that controls a portion of the country's territory. Such was the case in Sierra Leone, where the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) became infamous for their efforts to intimidate the people by, among other atrocities, severing the limbs of thousands of civilians. Again with government consent, United Nations and then British forces helped to resist the RUF attacks and then to defeat the rebels. The coercive use of force was required, but it was applied in defense of the State and for the protection of civilians from RtoP crimes. Similarly, in 2003 the European Union-led and Security Council-authorized Operation Artemis, again with government consent, helped the UN peacekeepers in the particularly violent Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) transition to a more robust mandate.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, at a time of peacekeeping overstretch, when more is being asked of the blue helmets in more places than ever before, one could well query whether the

¹² From 1992 – 1999, the mix of military units and civilian police monitors under the United Nations Protection Force and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force helped to bring a modicum of stability to the country.

responsibility to protect might prove to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Is it going to add one more layer of demands on the already overburdened military, police, and civilian personnel deployed by the UN in many of the world's most difficult theatres? There are several reasons to think not. One, RtoP emphasizes prevention. If it succeeds, then the demand for UN peace operations might actually decrease in some places. Two, it largely utilizes non-military means. Three, it occupies a rather narrow, though immensely important, segment of the POC spectrum. Four, most RtoP-type interventions in the past have been carried out by regional, not global, actors and there is no reason to assume a reversal of this pattern in the future. Five, the most demanding scenario – a coercive intervention against the will of the government of the country – is the least likely one. In such an extreme case, moreover, regional action, authorized by the Security Council, would be a more feasible route than enforcement action by the UN itself. The world body is also not well positioned to provide military assistance to a beleaguered government when rebel groups are the ones violating RtoP standards. It seems more feasible, on the other hand, to envision additional consent-based preventive deployments of UN peacekeepers down the road, as in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Such missions, however, should not be as demanding as many of the UN's current assignments.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend you for convening this most timely discussion of the growing challenges to international peacekeeping and for including the responsibility to protect on your agenda. This relationship demands further reflection and your efforts to shed light on it are most appreciated. Thank you for your attention.

July 29, 2009

Chairman Berman's opening remarks at hearing, "New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations"

This morning we are quite privileged to be joined by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Susan Rice, as well as a distinguished private panel that will follow her testimony and question period.

I want to begin on a different point by thanking Ambassador Rice for her efforts to rebuild the UN human rights mechanism, which has been badly compromised by a pathological focus on Israel, and tarnished by a failure to focus on some of the world's worst human rights violators.

But the purpose of this hearing is to examine the challenges faced by international peacekeeping operations, and to explore various options for making such operations more effective, particularly in protecting innocent civilians.

Since 1948, the member states of the United Nations have supported 63 peacekeeping operations on four continents.

Today, the UN fields more than 90,000 uniformed peacekeepers and thousands of civilian personnel in 15 peacekeeping missions, from Congo to Haiti to Lebanon.

We support UN peacekeeping efforts because it is in our national interest to see that states do not fail, that voids are not opened for terrorists to fill, and that economies and lives do not crumble under the weight of war.

And for those reasons, it's very important that we pay our UN peacekeeping dues in full, as we propose in the State Department authorization bill passed by this committee and the House last month.

Around the world, many UN peacekeeping operations have yielded positive results on the ground.

In the Balkans and East Timor, in Kashmir and Liberia, in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, UN blue helmets have worked to create the political space for peace, prevent mass atrocities, and avoid the collapse of states.

As we consider the future of peacekeeping, it's important to recognize that such operations have become increasingly complex.

More than ever before, they are designed to address the root causes of conflict, and to build sustainable peace.

This is reflected in the sheer scale of current operations, which have an average of nine times as many troops, observers and police, and 13 times as many civilians, as the average operation did 10 years ago.

But these expanded peacekeeping mandates have put a severe strain on the system.

The demand for resources often exceeds the supply provided by the international community, and as a result, peacekeeping missions frequently lack the troops, helicopters and other equipment they need.

At a time when peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in complex and unstable situations, and sometimes become the targets of combatants, that can be a recipe for disaster.

The United States has taken some important steps to address the lack of capacity and resources.

For example, the U.S. military has assisted in the strategic movement of troops, equipment, and supplies to support UN peacekeeping missions.

In Darfur, we have funded over 25 percent of the cost of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping operation and constructed and maintained 34 Darfur base camps for over 7,000 AU peacekeepers.

And through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we will provide training and material assistance to 75,000 troops from a number of African countries, many of whom will be deployed with UN peacekeeping missions.

What else can the U.S. and other nations do to increase the capacity of the United Nations and regional organizations to respond to emerging crisis?

Are expanded peacekeeping mandates the right approach to dealing with the types of conflicts we face today? Or are we asking our peacekeepers to do too much?

And what steps can we take to help ensure that UN peacekeeping operations have adequate personnel and resources to carry out their missions?

One of the key tests of the international peacekeeping system is its ability to protect civilians, consistent with the emerging international norm known as "the responsibility to protect."

This concept, endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2006, holds that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Should they fail to do so, the international community has a responsibility to step in and protect threatened populations – with the use of force if absolutely necessary.

But strong words have not always been matched by strong actions.

Since 1999, when a UN peacekeeping operation was established in the Eastern Congo, over 5 million people have died as a consequence of war, and an additional 45,000 perish every month.

And in conflict zones from Congo to Bosnia to Darfur, peacekeepers have been unable to prevent the use of rape as a weapon of war, and even genocide.

How can we equip the United Nations to more effectively protect civilians and prevent mass atrocities?

What can the United States do at the Security Council to discourage or overcome political foot-dragging – as we saw in Kosovo and Rwanda – that prevents rapid deployments at times of humanitarian crisis?

What is our strategy for making sure that women form a critical mass of peacekeepers and peacemakers, both to reduce sexual violence in conflict and to ensure that post-conflict reconstruction prioritizes the wellbeing of women and girls?

And finally, the key question: Is the international peacekeeping system, as it is conceived today, capable of preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities?

Or do we need to develop an entirely new model for our increasingly complex world?

We thank Ambassador Rice and our other panelists for being here today to share their insights on this important set of issues, and we do look forward to your testimony.

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11)

New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations
Wed, July 29
10am

Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing, and many thanks to our witnesses—including Ambassador Rice—for appearing before the Committee.

There are compelling reasons that justify continued US participation in international peacekeeping missions. An international peacekeeping force oftentimes has more legitimacy in the eyes of a local population than a unilateral force. Moreover, a United Nations (UN) force can be more cost-effective. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have served U.S. foreign policy well in places as far-flung as the Korean peninsula, the Middle East and the Balkans for the past sixty-one years. According to a 2007 GAO report, the major reason for this is the generally higher cost in the United States of civilian police, military pay plus support, and facilities. Peacekeeping operations also presuppose that we actively participate in the UN general assembly, which in turn enhances our engagement on the diplomatic front.

In order to ensure peacekeeping operations have a maximum effect, the UN must implement reforms, such as holding accountable the perpetrators of waste and fraud. An effective international force also requires the proper equipment (such as radios with the same frequencies), and similar tactical training.

But there are larger philosophical issues that continue to permeate the debate about international peacekeeping. For example, when do we deploy a peacekeeping operation (PKO)? The Brahimi Report states that the UN should deploy PKOs only after peace has been established. If this is the case, is it ever appropriate to use PKOs to address egregious human rights violations? The difficult answer to this requires a precise differentiation between the concepts of “Right to Protect” (R2P) and

"Protection of Civilians" (POC). To what extent, if any, do PKOs integrate themselves in situations like Srebrenica, Rwanda, Northern Uganda, and Haiti.

One thing is certain—the United States has a renewed commitment to peacekeeping operations. This month, the House voted to appropriate \$2.125 billion for peacekeeping operations in FY2010 through the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 3081). And last month, the House passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2010 and FY2011 (H.R. 2410), which included language reaffirming the importance of peacekeeping operations.

Currently, there are over 100,000 civilian and military personnel engaged in 18 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. The US, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), has trained a reported 46,115 troops from 21 countries in international peacekeeping operations. Launched in 2004, the GPOI's ultimate goal is to train 75,000 international peacekeepers by 2010. As of January of this year, troops trained through the GPOI were deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission. I look forward to hearing today's testimony about these operations and the future of international peacekeeping.

Statement
Congresswoman Diane E. Watson
Full Committee: Foreign Affairs
Thursday, July 29, 2009
10:00 a.m.

“New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations”

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely hearing on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Much like our own aid programs, UN peacekeeping operations rest in a clunky, bureaucratic structure. The changing demands on the UNPKO require that the UN reform their structure to respond with agility, efficiency, and cohesiveness.

Currently, training is not standardized. There has been even less regularity for technical, logistical, and financial assistance. Even so, nations of have become comfortable with passing the peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN, without the necessary support. In the changing role of UN peacekeepers, we must be careful to understand how the US fits into the new role of UN peacekeepers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I yield back the remainder of my time.

Opening Statement by Congressman Keith Ellison
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Hearing on
“New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations”
Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member for organizing today’s important hearing.

It’s an honor to welcome you to the Committee, Ambassador Susan Rice. I wish to use this opportunity to formally congratulate you for your appointment as our Ambassador to the United Nations.

I believe that the U.S. can improve the way we conduct our foreign policy and better serve the interests of American people by focusing more on our roles in multilateral diplomacy. Our participation in, and contributions to, UN peacekeeping operations worldwide constitute an important aspect of that multilateral diplomacy. I think this is an area that deserves our continuous and active support. I’m also glad that we now sit on the UN Human Right Council as I believe that the way to change things is to engage and be a part of it—to drive the changes from within.

I plan to travel to Sudan and Kenya during the August recess, and this is why this hearing is of immense interest to me. I would like to hear from you updates about the UN-AU Hybrid Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur, and the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan. Also, as we all know that there’s an escalation of violence in Somalia, I would like to hear about the possibility of UN peacekeeping deployment

in Somalia. In particular, I hope you will enlighten me about the relationship and dynamics between peacekeeping operations in Sudan and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and unification of rebel groups, and the upcoming elections and referendum.

Once again, thank you and a very warm welcome to you all.

Committee on Foreign Affairs
“New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations”

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Questions for the Record

Response from The Honorable Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Rep. Barbara Lee

Question 1:

FY 2010 Peacekeeping Appropriations

The FY 2010 State, Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, which recently passed the House July 9, 2009, provides \$2.1 billion, \$135 million below the President’s request and \$263.5 million below 2009, for Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities.

Given increasing demand for peacekeeping operations, and a near tripling in the number of UN personnel deployed internationally since 2003 (from 36,000 to 93,000), do you believe additional resources are needed to meet growing peacekeeping needs around the globe?

Answer:

The Department supports the President’s FY 2010 request for \$2.260 billion for Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA). We note that the President’s FY2010 request included \$135.1 million to pay a portion of a UN assessment for a logistical support package for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The House and Senate markups of the FY 2010 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bills would both provide up to \$55 million for AMISOM in the Peacekeeping Operations account to support UN assessed costs of AMISOM, in addition to the \$2.125 billion in the CIPA account.

Question 2:

I am greatly encouraged that the Administration has made a commitment to reverse the trend of United States arrears to the United Nations.

What impact have past United States arrears had on ongoing peacekeeping missions and their ability to address the severe strain missions around the globe?

Answer:

The Administration is committed to putting the United States on sound financial footing with respect to UN peacekeeping assessments, and we appreciate Congressional support for this goal. The United States is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, and the prompt payment of our assessments for UN peacekeeping operations in accordance with our international obligations is important for the effectiveness of key missions and the operation of the normal quarterly reimbursement process to troop contributing countries. Prompt payment of our assessments sends a message to UN members that the United States fully supports UN peacekeeping and enhances our ability to take a leadership role in UN peacekeeping activities to advance U.S. security policy objectives and to respond to international crises. It also ensures prompt reimbursement to troops contributing countries, strengthening their commitment to providing troops. U.S. withholdings required by statute in the late 1990s have prevented the United Nations from providing full reimbursement to troop contributing countries for certain closed missions.

Question 3:**United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)**

I understand that the Administration is currently conducting a review of our assistance to Haiti and further expects the Security Council to evaluate the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) later this year.

Will this review of Haiti policy include specific benchmarks related to the progress of judicial institutions, security sectors, and sustainable development in Haiti that must be met prior to any drawdown or termination of the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH)?

Answer:

The Administration's overall goal is a stable, self-sustaining, democratic Haiti with a government that effectively promotes economic prosperity, is responsive to the needs of the Haitian people, and contributes to Caribbean stability. In this context, we are conducting an overarching policy review that seeks to identify past USG policy successes and failures, including an evaluation of current policies and programs as well as the exploration of new opportunities for policy and programming innovations. The review is closely examining peace and security initiatives, humanitarian assistance, and assistance targeting social safety nets and economic development. Many of these areas of analysis are cross-cutting. The resulting strategy will provide a set of options that will deepen our partnership with the Government of Haiti (GOH), strengthen its capacity to meet the needs of its people, and help it achieve short and long-term security and development goals, including downsizing and eventual draw-down of the MINUSTAH force. Before considering any draw-down of MINUSTAH's force levels or the termination of its mandate, however, we will engage with the UN and our partners on the Security Council to assess Haiti's advancement on the benchmarks as laid out by the Secretary-General. We will also consult these partners before the consideration of MINUSTAH's mandate renewal in October.

Question 4:

What additional factors, if any, will the Administration consider in deliberating on the process of transitioning security or stabilization responsibilities to host countries such as Haiti or Liberia?

Answer:

Each country emerging from conflict has unique challenges, yet often there is a need to strengthen or rebuild the host country's security institutions, with a particular focus on military or police as appropriate. Similarly, there is often a need for reform or reconstruction of the "rule of law" sector – legal, judicial and corrections systems. The U.S. is a contributor to bilateral and multilateral programs supporting security sector reform and the rule of law in many places around the world. Such programs play an important role in supporting the transition from peacekeeping to host government responsibility for security and stabilization.

In the case of Haiti, the Administration is currently conducting a multi-sectoral policy review. The review will identify past U.S. policy successes and failures, including an evaluation of whether to continue, alter, or terminate current policies and programs, and the exploration of opportunities for policy and programming. The review will closely examine peace and security assistance programs, as well as other key parameters, to develop options to deepen our partnership with the Government of Haiti (GOH) to help it achieve its short and long-term goals, including the eventual transition of security and stabilization responsibilities to the GOH.

The U.S. is Liberia's principal bilateral partner. The U.S. works closely on a continuing basis with the UN Mission in Liberia and the Government of Liberia to regularly review Liberia's progress in a number of key areas. These areas include the extension of Government authority throughout Liberia; measures taken to address corruption and other factors impeding effective, transparent governance; the development of Liberia's own security and rule of law institutions (military, police, judiciary, legal and corrections systems); and related measures designed to support Liberian self-sufficiency and promote long-term, sustainable peace.

Question 5:**UNAMID**

The African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) force continues to operate well below capacity, some reports indicate as low as 40% in terms of operational capabilities and at around 80% its intended deployment strength.

What can the United States do to ensure the success of the AU/U.N. Hybrid Operation in Darfur?

Answer:

The United States has done, and continues to do, several things to ensure UNAMID's success. We have provided a substantial amount of training and

equipment to African Troop and Police Contributing Countries through the African Contingency Operations Training Program (ACOTA) and approximately \$17 million worth of airlift assistance to move critical equipment into Darfur. Presently, we are working with Italy to help procure needed equipment for an Ethiopian multi-role logistics unit, and are working with the Department of Defense to identify all UNAMID assets and explore options for acquiring and deploying them to the mission, with an emphasis on helicopters. We are also prepared to deploy expert military advisors into key leadership roles in UNAMID, pending the issuance of their visas by the Government of Sudan. We highlight UNAMID as a priority in every appropriate international forum, and we actively encourage potential donors to help fill critical equipment and other asset gaps, such as helicopters.

We will continue to engage with UN and diplomatic officials in New York, Sudan, and foreign capitals to ensure UNAMID remains a priority peacekeeping operation. We will also continue to urge the UN's Department of Field Support to address and improve UN requirements that slow the acquisition and deployment of needed assets. Finally, we will maintain our demand to the Government of Sudan that they must cooperate fully with UNAMID, and refrain from any actions to prevent UNAMID from discharging the mandate to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian operations, and create conditions conducive to a lasting political settlement to the Darfur crisis.

Question 6:

What critical resources essential to the mission's success have not been provided by the international community? What steps are you taking to ensure that such resources will be forthcoming?

Answer:

UNAMID, like all peacekeeping missions, must rely on member state contributions for its most critical military assets; unfortunately, UNAMID is still missing many force enablers, including troop and police contingents and air assets. Since UNAMID's inception, the United States has supported UNAMID with over \$100 million in equipment and training to troop-contributing countries (including Rwanda, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Tanzania), in addition to nearly \$800 million in assessed UN dues. We regularly engage potential donors to help fill UNAMID's gaps. Currently, we are working with the Italians to obtain equipment to allow the deployment of a multi-role logistics unit offered by Ethiopia. We are also working with the Department of Defense to ensure we identify all missing assets for the mission, and to explore all opportunities to acquire those assets for deployment to UNAMID. The U.S. is an active participant in the Friends of UNAMID, a group of countries focused on the success of UNAMID and a resolution of the crisis in Darfur. Utilizing the Friends group, the U.S. consistently calls attention to the mission needs for UNAMID.

In an effort to ensure UNAMID has the needed assets, the U.S. will continue to explore opportunities to provide in-kind and personnel assistance to UNAMID. The U.S. will work closely with the UN and the international community in New York, Sudan, and foreign capitals to identify needed assets, and will help ensure UNAMID receives the personnel, material,

financial, and political support it needs. The U.S. will also strongly encourage UNAMID to exert all efforts to expedite deployment, and to work closely with the international community to acquire missing assets for UNAMID.

Question 7:

United States Contributions (Human Resources)

As of June 30th this year, an estimated 93 U.S. personnel serve under U.N. control in five operations, in comparison to more than 250 U.S. personnel just one year ago.

Ambassador Rice, in your recent comments during a Security Council debate on peacekeeping, you highlighted the United States willingness to contribute more military observers, military staff officers, and civilian personnel to directly assist in UN peacekeeping operations.

This sentiment is particularly timely considering the demands of increasingly dynamic and logistically complex peacekeeping missions.

What steps is the Administration taking to fill the critical gap in U.S. operational support that may be constraining missions such as those in Darfur where we are also currently working to intensify our diplomatic efforts?

Answer:

The Administration is having an active, ongoing discussion internally and with the United Nations on the needs of UN peacekeeping operations, and how the U.S. can help fill the gaps, either ourselves or by working with other partners. This discussion includes consideration of whether and when U.S. personnel – military, police and civilian – might be the best solution in a given situation.

In addition to the specific gaps in operational support, the U.S. can play a very helpful role in re-energizing faltering peace processes, expanding the pool of willing and able troop contributors, and supporting host governments in building indigenous institutions. The United States contributes slightly more than one-quarter of the UN peacekeeping budget, provides equipment and training assistance to troop contributing countries, and strategic lift to UN peacekeeping missions. For example, as of June 2009, over 81,000 military personnel from 75 countries have been trained through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

In the case of Darfur, the United States has offered to contribute eight military observers and five police officers. They have not yet been able to deploy, pending the issuance of visas by the Sudanese Government. Through GPOI support, the Department of Defense also provided airlift assistance for the Rwandan Armed Forces deploying to the African Union/UN hybrid mission in Darfur. The Department of Defense transported nine heavy vehicles and 18 tons of cargo (tents, water purifiers, etc.) from Kigali into El Fasher.

Question 8:

Will there be a particular emphasis on providing qualified technical experts to support ongoing missions as opposed to additional military or civilian observers?

Answer:

While seconding civilian technical experts has not been a primary focus of our efforts to support UN peacekeeping in the past, we are seeking ways to expand our ability to do so. We actively encourage the UN to recruit qualified Americans for all activities, including peacekeeping, and we support the UN both through our assessed and voluntary contributions to its peacekeeping, relief and development programs, and by ensuring that their programs and our bilateral programs have common goals, such as sustainable peace, economic growth and opportunity, and good governance.

In addition, it is a goal of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to second members of the Civilian Response Corps to UN peacebuilding missions. S/CRS is coordinating closely with the UN in Afghanistan to ensure U.S. programs assisting the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan supporting the prioritization, implementation, and monitoring of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy are compatible with UN and other international efforts.

I look forward to continuing conversations with you as we develop these ideas.

Question 9:

How do you see the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Civilian Response Corps, and the Civilian Reserve Corps interacting and cooperating with the United Nations in order to assist in meeting the goals of peacekeeping missions around the world?

Answer:

S/CRS has plans to develop a response capacity of 4,250 trained, equipped and ready civilians comprised of 250 Active, 2,000 Standby and 2,000 Reserve component members to respond to reconstruction and stabilization crises that occur in conjunction with or following peacekeeping operations. S/CRS currently has funds for and is developing a Civilian Response Corps of 250 Active and 1,000 Standby members. In addition to using these personnel for US operations, our near-term goal is to be able to rapidly deploy civilian experts with needed skill sets to UN peace operations (perhaps in tandem with international partners) and to help build the AU's civilian peace support capacity.

S/CRS's long-term international strategy is to also build civilian capability with bilateral and multilateral partners, including the UN, to ensure that crises affecting U.S. interests are supported by civilian response capacity from partner nations and organizations. Investment in developing UN and regional civilian peace operation capabilities, such as EU and AU, will

benefit the U.S. by ensuring financial, technical, and political burden-sharing, and by reducing duplication.

Recent and current S/CRS peacebuilding work has included coordinating U.S. team assistance to the 2009 Presidential election in Afghanistan in cooperation with the UN, and supporting the prioritization, implementation, and monitoring of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy with UNAMA. We are also encouraging processes that will help synch U.S./NATO/EU civilian-military planning efforts with UN planning. These activities are only a sample of the work S/CRS has carried out and can carry out in support of international reconstruction and stabilization efforts globally.

Question 10:

Sexual Violence

Violence against women and girls is an extreme human rights violation, a public health epidemic and a barrier to solving global challenges such as extreme poverty, HIV/AIDS and conflict. It devastates the lives of millions of women and girls and knows no national or cultural barriers.

UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon recently called on States and other parties to commit to concrete actions to help curb sexual violence including more robust measures of accountability.

What can be done within the international peacekeeping framework to better address the mounting epidemic of sexual violence?

Answer:

The U.S. is a leader in international efforts to combat sexual violence. Secretary Clinton visited the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during her recent trip to Africa, to underline the importance that the United States places on preventing and halting such atrocities, especially in the war-torn eastern regions. She has made a personal commitment to addressing violence against women and girls, and the wreckage it creates for societies. During her visit, she announced that the U.S. would provide more than \$17 million in new funding to prevent and respond to gender and sexual violence in the DRC, including training for health care workers in techniques to repair the terrible damage that violent and repeated rape does to women's bodies. Our medical, legal and counseling support will reach 10,000 women in the Kivus, and we will recruit and train police officers, with a particular emphasis on women, on programs to protect against and investigate sexual violence.

UN peacekeeping is a tool of international peace and security. We are supporting the UN's programs to develop specific guidelines to help peacekeepers operationalize Security Council's mandates to protect civilians and prevent rape. We, the UN and other key countries are actively seeking ways to anticipate and respond to situations on the ground more effectively. The UN Organization Mission to the DRC (MONUC) has developed "joint protection teams" that include military, medical staff and other experts who can provide protection and other assistance when there are attacks. Additionally, the mission has recently issued mobile telephones to community leaders so they can report immediately when attacks are taking place so

that MONUC can be deployed to protect civilians. As part of the assistance package Secretary Clinton announced during her visit, U.S. technology experts will also be setting up a program to equip women and front-line workers with mobile devices to report abuse, using photographs and video, and to share information on treatment and legal options. MONUC is also in the process of establishing a six-person sexual violence unit to focus on this issue. In Darfur, UN peacekeepers conduct firewood patrols, providing armed escort for women gathering fuel to cook for their families. The UN Mission in Liberia, in close coordination with the Liberian government, conducted a nationwide rape awareness campaign that has encouraged women to report attacks to the authorities.

On the political stage, the U.S. in 2008 introduced the landmark Security Council resolution 1820, which expressed international outrage at the use of sexual violence as a tool of war. We have begun discussions with fellow Council members on what the Security Council can do further to increase protection of women facing these atrocities, and provide more accountability to those committing the violence.

This will be a continuing, cooperative effort, and I look forward to working closely with you.

