

**TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE
NEW APPROACHES?**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE NEW APPROACHES?

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman, (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. After the ranking member and I make our opening remarks, I will recognize the chairman and ranking member of the Europe Subcommittee for 3 minutes to make opening statements and other members of the committee for 1 minute should they wish to make opening remarks. Members are welcome to place written statements in the record, and we welcome our panelists and everyone who is with us for a hearing on a subject that is actually much more interesting than it sounds.

For over four decades after the Second World War, the United States and Europe were focused on confronting the threat posed by the Soviet Union. That threat disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but it was replaced with a much wider, more complex array of security challenges, many of which emanate from outside the Euro-Atlantic region. Do we have the right tools, institutions and approaches to deal with these new threats? That is the subject of our hearing today.

In addition to the potential instability in Southeastern Europe, we are confronting the ever-growing likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran, the menace of al-Qaeda that continues to spread around the world, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We also need to determine how to deal collectively with concerns such as energy security, sea piracy and climate change.

The existing transatlantic and European institutions—such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, and the European Union—have done a remarkable job building peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic zone for many decades. But they are now re-evaluating their roles and capabilities to ensure that they can confront the challenges of the 21st century as effectively as possible.

NATO has been an extraordinarily successful military alliance for the past 60 years, but the purpose for which it was created no

longer exists. Since the Cold war has ended, it has transformed to address new threats—but as demonstrated by the current difficulty in obtaining sufficient troop levels in Afghanistan, many alliance members question the desirability of engaging in out-of-area missions. Other allies question whether NATO should—and indeed is structured to—take on issues such as energy security.

As NATO reviews its Strategic Concept, what should be its mission for the foreseeable future, and what changes, if any, need to be made to the structure of the alliance?

The OSCE is the Euro-Atlantic organization with the most comprehensive membership, comprising 56 countries, all with equal standing. But Russia has argued that rather than fulfilling its goal of a continent-wide security organization, the OSCE has focused mostly on human rights and so-called “soft” security concerns. Thus, Russia’s leadership has reiterated its call to strengthen and expand the OSCE’s responsibilities.

Following its meeting in Corfu last June, the OSCE set up a process to consider ways to increase security from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Can and should the OSCE become the preeminent security organization in the transatlantic region and do more to strengthen its political-military and economic and environmental dimensions in addition to its human dimension?

Finally, the European Union has evolved from its initial function of preserving peace between France and Germany to developing a single economic union and seeking a more unified approach to foreign policy among its 27 members. The U.S. has often been critical of the EU for a lack of coherence in its foreign policy decision-making and its comparatively low defense spending. The recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is expected to herald a more united common security and defense policy—maybe.

The EU is effectively handling humanitarian and training responsibilities in Afghanistan, and it has conducted peacekeeping missions in Chad, the Congo and the Balkans. But is the EU adequately structured and resourced to address the new threats, and do we want it to do more?

While these three institutions are studying these issues internally, and academic commentators—including our witnesses—have begun to identify the questions, there have been few answers about the next steps. Some people talk about strengthening the existing institutions to address the new threats, but they do not say how or whether that is all that is necessary. Others contend that we need to fundamentally rethink and restructure how the transatlantic community addresses these new threats.

This debate has also been fueled by the re-emergence of Russia as a major power. The Euro-Atlantic community learned the hard way in August 2008 that none of its institutions was sufficient to prevent the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

Russian President Medvedev has proposed a new treaty to rectify what he perceives as the failure of existing structures to create a unified security sphere in Europe. His treaty is centered on the concept of indivisible security: That is, that one country cannot guarantee its security at the expense of another’s. Some in the West reject this proposal, arguing that it is designed to undermine and weaken NATO. Others believe it has generated an important

dialogue about the existing institutional framework. How should the transatlantic community respond to Russia's proposal?

Russia is a vital actor on issues such as Iran and Afghanistan, nonproliferation and counterterrorism. While a new treaty may not be necessary, do we now have an historic opportunity to put the Cold War behind us once and for all and forge a strong partnership to face the new threats together? Is it time to reconsider the prospect of Russia joining NATO?

The issues that will be discussed during this hearing are vital to the security of all of our countries. I am delighted we have such an extraordinary and distinguished panel of experts with us today to help us consider these issues from the American, European and Russian perspectives, and we look forward to their testimony. But before we go to their testimony, I want to turn to the ranking member for any comments that she may wish to make.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, and happy St. Patty's Day to you. I am not one of those who think it fashionable to believe that this is now the Pacific Century and that the transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe is largely unremarkable. On the contrary, what happens in Europe remains very important to us today, just as it was important to earlier generations of Americans.

There are two major issues that I hope will be discussed in depth this morning: The European relationship with Russia, as the chairman pointed out; and the role that Europe needs to play in the world.

We all continue to want what was sought when the Cold War ended 20 years ago: "A Europe whole and free." However, it is naive to think that can be accomplished with the kind of regime that rules Russia today. We should not welcome into our ranks a regime that: Sponsors widespread corruption; represses its political opponents; and mounts open aggression and intimidation against neighboring countries. We should also recall the lessons of history and how appeasement in Europe has been a certain path to a bitter, devastating outcome.

The leaders in Moscow today, despite their occasional soothing statements, quite simply recognize that they need to create the image of an "enemy" for their people in order to justify their continued rule. Our efforts to appease them will only lead them to raise the ante. Why? They have done little to nothing to set a strong foundation for Russia's future economic progress. They have also done little to set forth a realistic foreign policy that will provide true security for Russia in the future.

Instead, they have enriched themselves while sponsoring the most shameful methods to eliminate their internal critics, all the while keeping the Russian people distracted by creating a façade that their country faces a threat from the West, particularly from the United States.

It is easy to see what is wrong with the policies of those who lead Russia today, but we need to see what is wrong with our own policies toward Russia.

We cannot expect to have any real credibility if we condemn Russia's invasion of Georgia, but then make excuses for that invasion, ignore Russia's continue occupation of Georgian territory, re-admit

Russia into NATO's councils and then offer to sell it our advanced weapons.

We cannot make major reductions in our strategic nuclear forces and play with negotiating away our right to deploy strategic missile defenses simply to cater to the Russian leadership.

We cannot talk of human rights with sincerity if we ignore the all-too-obvious campaign of beatings and murders of independent reporters, lawyers and activists in Russia in recent years. No. This is not the time for appeasement, arms sales and abandonment of those struggling for democracy in Russia and the countries that once formed the Soviet Union.

It is important that the leading states of Europe set for themselves a role that reflects the reality of the world as it is and of the events and policies in Russia as they are rather than continuing to take the paths of least resistance and wishful thinking.

For decades during the Cold War, the democracies of Europe were basically asked to focus only on their own defense from attacks by the Soviet block while the United States provided leadership around the world and invested in the preparedness of its troops, in global force projection capabilities, in the introduction of precision-guided munitions and advanced technologies; the states of Europe grew comfortable with deploying forces that focused mostly on their own defense.

Now the United States seeks real, comprehensive support from the leading states of Europe in the fighting in Afghanistan. I am hopeful that the attempts by leading countries within the European Union to: Develop strategic airlift capability; to procure advanced military technologies; and to prepare at least some troops for rapid deployment are a sign that they recognize that Europe cannot continue to leave the United States to assume all the responsibility for global security and stability.

I am hopeful that the EU's mission to combat piracy off the coast of East Africa is indeed a sign of new activism, but I am not overly optimistic. The leading European states continue to allocate insufficient funding to defense, and, when they do deploy troops to truly important military operations, such as in Afghanistan, many of them limit their troops' exposure to combat by means of "caveats."

The leading European governments cannot expect the United States to continue to offer our guarantee for their European security if those governments continue to carry on as usual by: Flirting with sales of arms to China and Russia; trading with countries like Iran; and looking away when dictators repress opposition whether in Cuba, Russia, Sudan or Iran. Europe remains important to the United States, obviously, but our calls for support must not go unheeded.

Moreover, the future of small states, like Georgia, cannot be sacrificed for the sake of European commerce and unwillingness to stand up in defense of a "Europe whole and free." Finally, we all welcome the European Union's efforts to improve European defense capabilities, but we hope that those efforts will not come at the expense of the NATO alliance and its ability to ensure the security of Europe and to address new threats.

Thank you, as always, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, and now I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, and I want to extend a welcome to all of our panelists, but particularly to Ambassador Ischinger, who served his country so well here and was a resource for members of this committee as well as Dmitri Trenin, whom I have had the opportunity to meet in Moscow and I must say is well respected and well regarded both here and in Russia and has done much to advocate for democracy in Russia. Mr. Chairman, the evolution of European security and the concept of an integrated Europe in the destructive aftermath of World War II has really been dramatic and swift in an historical context.

Through a shared commitment with the United States, the modern transatlantic security structure was developed to deter the Soviet Union as you have said and to promote cooperation and prosperity for Europe. When one views the historical context from Churchill's 1947 speech in Zurich calling for closer European integration and cooperation, the formation of NATO in 1949 and Schumann's 1951 speech that led to the European Coal and Steel Community, the end result is that the 27-member European Union enjoys an unprecedented level of peace on their continent, which is welcome by all.

But with peace comes a recognition that today's threats are different. The Cold War is over, and the development of a new security strategy taking into account the United States, Europe and Russia must take a new turn. In fact, I believe the shared common interest of the United States and Europe must view Russia as a potential partner for continued peace and security. In today's globalized world, the relationship is simply too important to ignore. It is not going to go away. Russia is an essential partner for security and progress in Europe and its relationship with NATO, and OSCE is an important foundation to overcome East-West security concerns.

While NATO should remain the cornerstone to Europe's security, their ongoing strategic review should ensure pragmatic dialogue and policies toward Russia. While there is diversity in the opinions and beliefs as to the blueprint and infrastructure, it is imperative that future transatlantic security continues to embrace the concept of Europe whole, free and united, and with that, I yield back.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and on behalf of the ranking member of the Europe Subcommittee, but in his absence, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome the panelists. I am going to have to run in and out of this hearing because I have another hearing right down the hall in another major committee which I am a member. Just a few points, and I will be coming back. If I can't hear all your testimony, I will read it. Let me just note people understand that I worked for Ronald Reagan, and I was one of his primary speech writers, and even before that, I was the ultimate cold warrior.

I was in Czechoslovakia with the students there in 1968. I went to Vietnam to work with anti-Communist elements there in 1967,

and I have been engaged in a lot of anti-Communist activity in my life, but the Cold War is over, and Russia is no longer dominated by the Communist Party. It is time for us to understand the Cold War is over, and people can't get over that, and people keep vilifying Russia at our expense. The fact is the challenge we face today is far different than the one that I faced when I was younger and that our country faced years ago.

The fact is radical Islam is on us. Radical Islam wants to slaughter our people. We need Russia on our side. We do not need to vilify Russia. We recognize their shortcomings, work with them on it and try to establish a positive relationship. China is the next major challenge we face. It is emerging, and there have been enormous changes in Russia, anyone who has visited Russia knows that. I went to Russia in 1985 as part of a delegation from the White House, and I have been back a number of times. It is a different country in a better way.

Well, the fact is, China hasn't had one iota of reform. They still slaughter people for their religious beliefs in China, the Falun Gong and others. They are rebuilding their military and aimed it at us. Yet, we end up vilifying Russia and not permitting Russia to have any of the trade benefits that we have heaped upon China. We need to have a new alliance system that will deal with the challenges of the future, and that new alliance system has to include Russia, or the United States will be vulnerable.

It is time to get out of the Cold War mentality and figure out what is going to work to create a more peaceful world in the future to meet these serious challenges. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding this hearing because we need to encourage a national discussion on how we are going to shape the future and what alliances we have to have if we are going to have a peaceful future. Thank you very much.

Chairman BERMAN. I thank the gentleman, and I am going to yield 3 minutes. Our committee is very privileged to have on it the current president of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly in a statement that not everyone thinks we have gone to a Pacific orientation. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this hearing, which is quite timely. Welcome to the panel. I may have to go. We have got a markup going in another committee, but I too will read the testimony if I am not here partially to listen to it. I will be very brief. As all of you know, NATO is currently undergoing its own self-analysis and a new strategic concept. The panel of experts chaired by Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was just down at NDU for a session, which I attended as the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

We are eager and will participate, and next weekend, the NATO PA standing committee will finalize our contribution to and our intervention to the Secretary General, who was here, and who we had a meeting with 2 weeks ago. Having said all that, this new strategic concept I would ask that you give your opinion as to what should or should not be included because it is critically important. I may have to re-assess some of my positions because I find myself agreeing with Mr. Rohrabacher on several points that he made, so

either he or I may wish to reconsider our position, but seriously, this idea of NATO is in many respects sort of like the U.N.

I get so disgusted with the U.N., but if we didn't have a place for people to go and talk, we would have to create one, and NATO, for all of its shortcomings, if it were not to exist, we would be well-advised to create something similar, and so this strategic exercise is very, very timely, and I too agree what has been one of my frustrations is sometimes the inability of the Russian members of the DUMA who attend our NATO meetings to set aside those issues that we disagree on and dive wholeheartedly into those that we do and help us, nuclear proliferation, radical fundamentalism.

All of those things are in our mutual interest to work together on, and yet we get clouded by our inability to set those aside or work on those because of the other areas which made us great. Having said all that, I will look forward very much to your contributions. Thank you for being here.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does anyone else seek recognition for opening statement? The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just agree with several of the comments that have gone before. It is really time for leadership to take center stage on this whole issue of how to deal with Russia in a modern concept. As it has been stated, we are no longer in the Cold War, but leadership requires boldness. It requires looking at situations with the intelligence and common sense that presents the immediacy of now and the future, and there is no question about it.

When it comes to every major issue facing Europe and the north Atlantic, Russia is dead center. I am a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and have an opportunity to have visited Russia, and I have engaged with them. It is not a perfect country, but let me just say if we are going to have global peace, if we are going to learn how to work with our resources in a way that provides for energy security, for a way to deal with nuclear non-proliferation.

There is no question that we have to re-set our relationships with Russia and be bold enough to entertain the possibility of looking at Russia as a partner with NATO. Thank you, sir.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and now I am very pleased to introduce really an excellent panel. Several of them I know. I actually, on one of those rare occasions, did my homework and spent until very late last night reading all their testimony, and I do commend it very much to the members of the committee. There are really some fascinating and interesting statements there.

Our first witness is Thomas Graham. He is senior director at Kissinger Associates. He was special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, and director for Russian Affairs at the NSE from 2002 to 2004. From 2001 to 2002, Mr. Graham served as the associate director of the policy planning staff at the Department of State.

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is the chairman of the Munich Security Conference. He previously served as Germany's Deputy Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2001, Ambassador to the United

States from 2001 to 2006 and as Ambassador to the U.K. from 2006 to 2008. In December, Ambassador Ischinger became the co-chair of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, which will examine the security challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic region and prepare recommendations for reforming the existing architecture.

Ms. Sally McNamara is senior policy analyst in European Affairs at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom of the Heritage Foundation. Before joining Heritage, she worked at the American Legislative Exchange Council as director of International Relations. Previously, she worked as an aide in the European Parliament and as a press officer for the UK Conservative Party.

Mr. Dmitri Trenin is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. I have known him a long time, but not that long. From 1972 to 1993, he served in the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces during which he spent 6 years from 1985 to 1991 as a staff member of the delegation to the United States-Soviet nuclear arms talks in Geneva. After retiring from the Russian Army, Mr. Trenin held posts as a senior research fellow at the NATO defense college in Rome and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe and Moscow. Thank you all very much for being here. Mr. Graham, why don't you start? All the testimony in their entirety will be put into the record.

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS GRAHAM, SENIOR DIRECTOR, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC. (FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL)

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on a very timely issue of transatlantic security. As you said, Mr. Chairman, the Cold War is over, but I would like to stress that the post-Cold War world is also over. The hopes that we had a generation ago that we would be witnesses the march of democracy and free markets around the globe under American leadership is not the case today.

Rather, we have entered a period of tremendous global flux and uncertainty that will endure until a new global equilibrium is established. This has consequences for Europe and European security. First, and of greatest importance, I think it is clear that global dynamism is shifting away from Europe and the Atlantic region to Asia and the Pacific region. Now, Europe remains important. It remains important for the United States for a variety of reasons. Our closest traditional allies lie in that area.

But Europe and the struggle for domination in Europe is no longer the central drama of the current period, and that means that the United States no longer has to worry about the domination of Europe by a single power. Remember, we fought two hot wars and one cold war in the 20th century specifically to prevent the domination of Europe by a single power. Today, in the current environment, we need a unified Europe. A unified Europe that can work with the United States in dealing with global challenges in Europe and beyond.

This means that the United States should be encouraging a much greater role for a unified Europe both within NATO and the EU as a security organization that is capable of dealing with the problems in Europe and beyond, so the goal of the United States

should be through its policies and actions to encourage the further unification of Europe, specifically, the further unification of Europe in defense and security policy. Now, Mr. Chairman, you have described in great detail the global challenges that we face, and I think you are absolutely right that the challenges now emanate from beyond Europe and not so much from inside Europe.

That is a consequence very much of the success of the policies that the United States and our European allies have pursued for the past 65 years. In fact, the concerns about instability in Europe and security threats emanating for Europe is probably at its lowest in history, so we need to work on the global challenges, and here Russia becomes a much more important player. Now, Russia is of course a major challenge to all of us in the United States and Europe.

It is a new Russia, but it is also a Russia that has made clear over the past several years that it intends to pursue an independent foreign policy as Russia has historically, but this is a Russia that contrary to where it was in the immediate post-Cold War environment no longer seeks integration with the West and specifically with Europe. Now, this presents two challenges for us. The first is, how do we deal with the states of the former Soviet Union? This is an area that is critical to Russia's great power aspirations and the way they think of themselves as a great power.

Historically, this is the region that has given Russia its geopolitical heft in the world. For various reasons, the Russian elites believe that primacy in this region is important for Russia's security and prosperity today. The Russians believe that they ought to have a zone of privilege in the former Soviet space to use President Medvedev's formulation. Now, clearly neither Europe nor the United States is prepared to recognize a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, but we do need to find a way that we can work with the Russians to minimize the risk that challenges there will undermine our ability to work elsewhere.

The second challenge we face is how Russia defines its own interest in Europe and how we should define those interests. As a process of European integration proceeds, much of what happens on the continent become in a sense European domestic affairs in which Russian involvement should be minimal. Yet, Russia believes that it should play a central role in Europe. I believe that it can compete as an equal with the major powers of Europe such as the U.K., France and Germany, but it realizes that it cannot compete effectively against a unified Europe which would have the potential power capability that far outweighs Russia much the way the United States power outweighs Russia today.

We will have to figure out a way in which we can in a sense bring Russia's sense of its own interest in Europe in conformity to the way the world is developing. Now, do we need new mechanisms, new architecture to deal with these new challenges? I would argue no, but clearly the architecture needs to evolve to take into account the new situation. A few preliminary thoughts on how we ought to do this. First, we need to move to a situation in which more of the discussion really has three pillars: The United States, a unified Europe in the guise of the European Union and Russia, and we should be setting up a triangular discussion, U.S.-EU, EU-

Russian, United States-Russian discussions on a whole range of security issues.

We already have annual U.S.-EU summits, semi-annual EU-Russian summits. We need to regularize and institutionalize United States-Russian summits, which now tend to be ad hoc, and make them a regular part of the architecture. We also ought to consider putting in place at least an annual event that brings the United States, the EU and Russia together specifically to discuss security challenges both in Europe and beyond. Finally, with regard to NATO itself some suggestions: First, we need to encourage the development of a European pole inside NATO.

This is already taking place, but the United States needs to be more forward-leaning in encouraging this. Obviously, this will change the way NATO operates, but I think that will be to our advantage, and it will encourage the Europeans to take more responsibility for what happens inside Europe as well as to develop the capabilities to deal with the global challenges. We ought to take the NATO Russia Council and focus that on the challenges that emanate beyond Europe.

Working with the Russians in developing missile defense capabilities, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, piracy and other such issues, and eventually the NATO-Russia Council over the longer term should become in effect a United States-EU-Russia forum for discussing these challenges. In addition, we need to reassure many of our allies, particularly in Eastern Europe, that Article V means something within NATO, and that means that we need to continue to develop contingency planning for the defense of those areas and begin to practice and conduct exercises to demonstrate that we have the capability to do that.

Finally, we also need to provide assurances for the countries that lie between Russia and NATO, specifically Ukraine and Georgia, and one thing that we ought to consider is a way of reiterating multi-lateral security guarantees for these countries so that they can feel more comfortable that they are not going to be a zone of geopolitical competition between Russia, the United States and Europe. Finally, I think that the long-term goal and ambition for the United States ought to be to turn NATO into a Pan-European security organization based on the pillars of the United States, the European Union and Russia.

Clearly, this is a long-term ambition. The goal is distant, but I think it provides a way of organizing our thinking at the moment. One final point on process; the days are long since past when the United States and Europe can agree on a policy or a set of programs and then present them to the Russians and hope that the Russians will acquiesce in fete accompli. We need to have Russia at the outset of our discussions if we want them to be with us at the end.

I think it is very important that as we discuss the NATO concept, for example, that we do reach out as we have already to the Russians to get their views, to take them into account, and to see the extent to which we can meet their interest or accommodate them without of course jeopardizing the long-term interest of the United States or Europe. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]

Statement*

by

Thomas Graham
Senior Director, Kissinger Associates

Prepared for the Hearing on

Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century
Do New Threats Require New Approaches?

March 17, 2010
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

*The views expressed in this statement are the personal views of the author, for which he alone bears responsibility.

The issue of European (and transatlantic) security has been engaged in earnest. Two years ago, shortly after his inauguration, Russian President Medvedev called for rethinking European security architecture in a major speech in Berlin. A year later, in part in response to Russian appeals, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) launched the Corfu process on European security challenges at an informal meeting of foreign ministers. At the same time, NATO initiated a review process that should lead to the adoption of a new strategic concept, to replace the current one from 1999, and a NATO-commissioned Group of Experts has conducted four seminars on the new concept, the last in Washington, DC, on February 22-23, 2010.

The reasons Russia, on the one hand, and Europe and the United States, on the other, began this review of European security were related, but ultimately reflected different concerns.

For Russia, the reason was a profound, long-standing, and growing dissatisfaction with developments in Europe since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It saw NATO expansion and military action against Yugoslavia, colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, a mounting U.S. security presence in Central Asia, and the U.S. decision (since rescinded) to locate missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, among other things, as part of a concerted Western effort to weaken and contain Russia. Russia had little choice but to acquiesce in the immediate post-Soviet years, because it was indeed weak. But as it recovered earlier in this decade, it became more vocal in expressing its displeasure and more assertive in defending its interests. The war against Georgia in August 2008 was meant to send the message that Russia had the will and ability to defend its interests, by force if necessary. It underscored the urgency of reviewing the state of European security.

In Europe and the United States, Russia's call for a review was initially met with great skepticism and suspicion as little more than a thinly-veiled attempt to erode transatlantic comity and undermine NATO. The Russo-Georgian war, however, ended the easy assumption that had prevailed from the end of the Cold War that the West could pursue its goals in Europe, notably NATO expansion, in opposition to Russia, and manage Russia's displeasure with symbolic gestures of respect. As relations between Russia and the United States deteriorated sharply in late 2008, many Europeans concluded that Europe at least had to take up Russia's call to rethink European security. But there was another, equally cogent, reason for a review. The participation of NATO countries in Iraq and NATO's role in Afghanistan raised essential questions about the scope of NATO's activities, while terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) highlighted the growing external threat to European security. A new global environment was emerging that the strategic concept of 1999 had not fully anticipated.

This new environment underscores a key point: Not only is the Cold War over, so is the post-Cold War world we had envisioned a generation ago. American hopes that the demise of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union had ushered in a prolonged era of global advance of democracy and free markets under American leadership have proved illusory. Rather, the advance has now halted, if not gone into reverse, and the

world has entered a period of great flux and uncertainty that will endure until a new global equilibrium emerges. Current trends and developments are producing profound consequences for European security, which we need to think through carefully. Three in particular stand out.

The Changing Role of Europe

First, and most important in strategic terms, Europe, in sharp contrast to the past 400-500 years, no longer lies at the center of the international system, and the struggle for advantage in, and at the extreme mastery of, Europe is no longer the central drama of world affairs. Europe, of course, remains important as one of the leading centers of economic prowess and will remain so well into the future. But clearly global dynamism is ineluctably shifting from Europe and the Atlantic region to East and South Asia and the Pacific region. The shift is most conspicuous in economic matters – with the rise of China and, to a lesser extent, India – but the shift is also occurring in the realm of geopolitics and eventually will affect all other dimensions of international relations. The ongoing economic crisis has only highlighted – and likely accelerated – this long-term trend.

The changing status of Europe should produce a corresponding change in the way the United States understands its interests in Europe. Since this country emerged as a global power a little over a century ago, its interests in Europe could be summed up in three simple imperatives: (1) prevent any one power from dominating Europe and by extension the global order, (2) minimize the risk of great-power confrontation in Europe that would destabilize the global system and destroy a vast amount of wealth; and (3) develop close commercial relations for the benefit of America's long-term prosperity. In pursuit of these goals in the 20th century, the United States fought two hot wars and engaged in a lengthy cold war. In the Second World War and Cold War, the challenge was heightened by the fact that the potential masters of Europe (Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union) were aggressive regimes existentially hostile to American values and interests.

In today's environment, however, the United States needs a united Europe that can act as a genuine global partner in meeting multiple challenges and managing an increasingly complex global system. As a consequence of the success of the United States and its European allies over the past 65 years in building and expanding NATO and encouraging Europe's economic integration, a united Europe will not so much be dominated by a single power as governed by a combination of supranational federal and national authorities. Moreover, it will be a Europe that shares America's values and interests, its worldview, in broad terms. Finally, a united Europe will minimize the risk of geopolitically consequential instability in Europe, something that will allow the United States to devote greater attention and resources to the emerging challenges beyond Europe, particularly in the broader Middle East and East Asia.

For this reason, the United States needs to overcome its ambivalence about European unity. Although rhetorically the United States has consistently supported European

integration, and at times played a major role in promoting it beginning with the Marshall Plan, it has been uneasy about the consequences of broader and deeper integration for its ability to advance its interests in Europe and with Europe. Since the founding of NATO, for example, Washington has played on differences among European states to manage the Alliance in ways that advanced U.S. interests, most recently, by pitting “new” Europe against “old” Europe. Similarly, Washington has been leery of a growing security role for the European Union, out of fear that it would diminish NATO’s role as the premier Euro-Atlantic security institution and therefore erode American influence in Europe.

Today, the United States should be pressing for greater European unity on foreign and security policy, and encourage greater influence for the EU President and “foreign minister” under the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the United States must continue to push for a greater European responsibility in dealing with the security issues inside Europe, such as the continuing conflict and instability in the Balkans. As the EU expands, many of these issues should become “domestic” European issues.

The movement toward greater unity on foreign and security policy will, of course, take considerable time. As this process moves forward, the United States will need to maintain a major presence in Europe, especially through NATO, to guard against any temptation to renationalize security policy. But the United States should seek in word and deed to foster greater European integration and unity.

The Russian Question

Just as Europe’s status is changing, so is Russia’s, but in a more limited, non-strategic, yet still significant way. Russia has recovered from the deep socio-economic crisis and national humiliation of the 1990’s and begun to reassert itself as a major power, even if it still faces formidable challenges – obsolete infrastructure, demographic decline, endemic corruption - to sustained economic growth and consolidation of its great-power status over the next decade and beyond. With recovery has come a new foreign-policy orientation. Whereas in the immediate post-Cold War years, Moscow’s goal was integration with the West, under Putin as president, it abandoned that goal in favor of re-establishing itself as an independent center of global power. Putin made that point clear in his remarks to the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, where he castigated alleged U.S. efforts to build a uni-polar world; detailed Russian grievances against the United States, NATO, and the OSCE; and vowed that Russia would pursue an independent foreign policy, as it had done throughout its history.

Consistent with this new foreign policy, Russia has sought to halt – if not reverse – developments it considers inimical to its interests. This has been clearest in its vehement opposition to the further expansion of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU. This goal also lies behind Russia’s moratorium on participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which it considers an infringement on its sovereign right to base its military forces as it sees fit on its own territory, and its effort to discredit and undermine those OSCE elements charged with democracy promotion, which it believes have been directly aimed at domestic political practices – and the legitimacy of the

regimes - in Russia and other former Soviet states. While many, particularly in eastern Europe, see such policies as an attempt to revise the Cold War settlement, Russia considers them an effort to regain the place it had in Europe before the West took advantage of Russia's temporary strategic weakness in the 1990's.

Nevertheless, Russia does not pose a strategic threat to Europe and the United States, nor is it a strategic rival, as the Soviet Union once was. Gone is the Cold-War ideological confrontation; remaining are the internal difficulties that preclude a global challenge to U.S. and European interests. But Russia does raise two critical issues for European security because its identity as a great power is caught up in the role it has historically played in Europe.

- How to deal with the states between Russia and the European Union (and NATO), the former Soviet space from Moscow's perspective, the new neighbors, from Brussels'. Russia sees primacy in this region as crucial to its great-power aspirations. Geopolitically, this region has given Russia its heft in world affairs. In the eyes of the Russian elite, the region remains critical to Russia's own security and prosperity. Moreover, the ability to project power into neighboring states is in and of itself evidence of Russia's great-power status. For these reasons, Russia has declared that it has "privileged interests" – to use President Medvedev's formulation – in the former Soviet space and looks askance at any encroachment by an outside power, be it the United States or the EU. Europe, backed by the United States, will, however, never accept a Russian zone of "privileged interests," both because they have legitimate interests in their new neighbors and because of their fundamental belief that the states of the region have a sovereign right to pursue their own interests as they see fit.
- How to define Russia's interests in Europe. Historically, Russia has played a major role in Europe, but much of what happens in Europe today is increasingly "domestic" politics, in which Russian involvement should justifiably be minimal. The issue becomes more acute with regard to those states slated for future EU membership, essentially the Balkans, an area in which Russia has had significant interests and continues to insist on its right to play a central role. Related to this concern are Russian efforts to retard the process of European integration to bolster its own standing. The reasoning is straightforward: Russia can compete as an equal with Europe's major powers – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; it cannot compete effectively against a united Europe, whose power potential would outweigh Russia's by an order of magnitude, as the United States' does today. Not surprisingly, Russia prefers to deal with European states bilaterally, as opposed to the European Union, and seeks to play them off against one another to advance its own interests, witness the way it has managed its energy policy toward Europe in recent years.

Resolving these conflicts in Europe is difficult, if not impossible, with a narrow and traditional focus on European security concerns. That approach encourages Cold-War paradigms and zero-sum thinking not only in Russia, but also in Europe and the United

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As for the consequences of globalization, the spread of modern communications technology and the rapid diffusion of information and knowledge have complicated the challenge of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, empowered international terrorists, and created a new vulnerability, given the ever greater reliance of advanced societies on computers and the integrated Internet for basic functions and services. While we have great experience in dealing with proliferation and terrorism, cybersecurity presents a new challenge which we are only in the early phases of addressing. Cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 underscored the complexity of this issue – in particular the difficulty of identifying the attacker with certainty – and the urgency of developing defenses within the NATO context.

Finally, there are a host of non-traditional security challenges that will grow in prominence in a globalized and, it is hoped, increasingly prosperous world: climate change and energy security; migration; piracy, narco-trafficking, and transnational organized crime; resource scarcity. And as the ongoing global economic crisis has demonstrated, the ease of cross-border financial flows has overwhelmed regulatory systems that are national in orientation and reach.

What is important to note about these emerging challenges and threats is that they are to a great degree common to the United States, Europe, and Russia. Shared challenges and threats do not necessarily mean shared interests – Russia’s tactical cooperation with China against U.S. and European initiatives and its sheltering of Iran are cases in point. But they could provide a foundation for cooperation on matters beyond Europe that would facilitate the resolution of continuing problems in Europe.

Institutional Framework

Do these global trends and developments call for a new European security architecture, as Russia insists? Probably not. A dense institutional network has emerged over the past 65 years in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region, which lies at the foundation of the region’s security and stability. For the most part, these institutions can be used to address the emerging challenges, and they are already doing so in many ways. But the architecture needs to evolve, new ways of doing business are required, and greater resources need to be committed. Of great importance is the need to do a much better job in engaging Russia.

The core issue is the relationship among the United States, the European Union, and Russia, or what should be the three pillars of Europe writ large. Can we develop a mechanism that is consistent with American interests, encourages a more unified European foreign and security policy, and persuades Russia to act as a constructive partner on “beyond-Europe” issues and work in good faith in resolving the outstanding “inside-Europe” issues? A modest first step would be institutionalizing a structure of triangular discussions with U.S.-EU, EU-Russia, and U.S.-Russian legs. Some elements are already in place, namely, regular U.S.-EU and semi-annual EU-Russia summits. The missing element is regular U.S.-Russia summits, which over the past decade have been ad hoc. Moscow and Washington should now commit themselves to at least annual

summits. Consideration should also be given to an annual U.S.-EU-Russia trilateral event, not necessarily a summit, but at least at the ministerial level. All these meetings would help inform the work of institutions in which all three are involved, such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council. (In connection with these meetings, the United States, EU, and Russia should undertake a commitment to be transparent with countries not involved – e.g., Canada, Georgia, Norway, Turkey, Ukraine – about the contents, particularly with regard to issues that affect those countries' interests.)

Even with regular summits, the most sensitive issue will remain NATO, which Russia continues to see as a first-order danger to its interests and ambitions. Can the United States and Europe find a way to assuage Russian concerns without jeopardizing their own interests? That will require balancing a number of interests, in addition to Russia's and their own, including those of Poland and the Baltic states, which still see Russia as a major threat, and those of the states in between NATO and Russia, which do not savor being fields of geopolitical competition. What might the outlines of a solution look like? A few thoughts follow:

- NATO's primary function must remain collective security, with a focus on enhancing security and stability in Europe. That entails reassuring all Alliance members, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, that NATO will honor its Article V obligations on collective defense against an armed attack. NATO should continue to move ahead on developing contingency plans for the defense of Poland and the Baltic states and conducting appropriate exercises. At the same time, NATO should encourage those states to pursue pragmatic policies toward Russia and to take care to avoid gratuitous affronts to Russian sensitivities.
- The United States should encourage the emergence of a unified European pole within NATO and closer NATO-EU security cooperation. That would turn NATO into more of an equal U.S.-European partnership, encouraging Europe to enhance its own security capabilities and to take on a greater share of the responsibility for ensuring stability and security inside Europe, as the United States focuses more on global hard-security challenges.
- A unified Europe pole inside NATO would fundamentally change the way the Alliance functioned. It would also ease the task of working with Russia in an enhanced NATO-Russia Council. That Council, created in 2002, has not lived up to its potential, in part because of American concerns that Russia would seek to use it to split the Alliance. But as the process of European unification proceeds that danger is reduced, and the Council eventually becomes in effect a U.S.-EU-Russian forum. It will be a long time before that outcome is reached. In the meantime, the Council should focus on developing cooperation on dealing with threats that emanate from beyond Europe. That would entail building on current cooperative programs and initiating some new ones on, for example, missile defense against threats from the Middle East; counternarcotics, particularly in and around Afghanistan; piracy, building on current cooperation of the coast of Somali; counterterrorism, including joint analysis, training, and operations; and the Arctic, including discussion of joint

- NATO should drop its resistance to cooperation with the Russian-led and dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). The Russians have requested such cooperation for several years, and the CSTO could provide assistance in dealing with the current challenge in Afghanistan, including terrorism and narco-trafficking.
- NATO should not offer Russia membership. Although that might have a certain appeal – in recent weeks three former senior German officials have advocated it – it is not likely to have the desired consequences. For any invitation would inevitably raise the question of the criteria under which Russia could become a member. Rather than focus on concrete cooperation, the sides would debate the criteria, a debate that will be divisive because of fundamental differences over the nature of the Alliance, civil-military relations, and democratic values.
- To deal with the concerns of the states in between NATO and Russia, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, the United States, Europe, and Russia might consider formally recommitting themselves to the principles of non-use of force and respect for state sovereignty, along the lines of the Helsinki Final Act. NATO membership for those states should be off the table for at least the time being, while the United States and Europe seek to engage Russia. In addition, consideration should be given to reviving the transparency and monitoring provisions of the CFE Treaty, while possibly eliminating those on troop levels within the core area and on the flanks, against which Russia has protested. Transparency and effective monitoring should provide sufficient warning time of any real threat of the use of force.

Over the long term, growing cooperation among the United States, Europe, and Russia could eventually transform NATO into a pan-European security organization. Indeed, that should be our strategic goal, even if it is a distant one at the moment.

One final note on process. Although there is no easy path to bringing Russia into European security arrangements as a constructive partner, there will be no progress if Russia is not brought into the review of these arrangements from the outset. The days when the United States and Europe could agree on what needed to be done and then present it to the Russians as a *fait accompli* with confidence that the Russians would acquiesce have long since past. If we want Russia to be with us in the end, we must invite them in at the beginning. In this regard, the trip of the NATO Expert Group to Moscow to discuss NATO's new strategic concept was an important symbol of the desire for cooperation and the determination to take Russia's interests into account.

To be sure, this involves risks, but they should be manageable. There is after all much greater overlap in American and European views, than in American and Russian or European and Russian views. Moreover, the United States and Europe have well-developed habits of, and tested mechanisms for, cooperation, which are lacking for both with respect to Russia. And there are limits to how far either the United States or Europe

can go in taking into account Russian interests before that endangers their own – differences over the former Soviet space are the obvious example of these limits. But we need to reach out now to see how constructive a partner Russia is prepared to be: We will be better able to meet emerging challenges if we are working with Russia and not at cross purposes. Nevertheless, if in the end Russia decides to stand apart despite our best efforts, the United States and Europe will still be able to work together to meet the emerging challenges, as we have met the challenges for the past 65 years.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. Ambassador Ischinger?

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WOLFGANG ISCHINGER,
CHAIRMAN OF THE MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE
(FORMER GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES)**

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege and a personal pleasure for me to be back here in my personal capacity. You have my written testimony. Please allow me to summarize what I believe are my key views and salient points. I will be very brief. First, I think it is important to note that even if our main challenges of today and tomorrow present themselves in areas far away from Europe, far away from the transatlantic region, Europe and the United States are and will continue to be, will remain each other's principal and best allies. That is how we Europeans look at it, and it is our hope that it is a view that is shared by the United States.

By the way, if you look at transatlantic trade and investment statistics, the economic data support this political desire very strongly. Let me add also that I think it is important that from the United States you show a bit of patience with post-Lisbon EU. We Europeans have learned to understand that an incoming U.S. administration sometimes needs a bit of time to get into gear. A lot of things in Europe are new, so I would invite you to allow the EU to come to grips with the new system. I think we will be able to do better. We will be more effective in the future, but we take time.

Second, I share the view of those who believe that the key issue for the transatlantic community as we look at current and future challenges is Russia. My view is if we get Russia right, most of the other things, cyber security, terrorism and many other challenges, can be addressed more easily than if we do not get Russia right. This therefore is the key issue. During the debate on NATO enlargement, which began 15, 16 years ago, agreement was reached with NATO that NATO enlargement should be accompanied by initiatives which would address Russia's concerns.

At the time, in 1997, the NATO Russia Council was established, and while I believe this was the correct decision at the time, this council and its later incarnations never really lived up to expectations. In retrospect, this forum was never really used for discussing common challenges and searching for common strategies. As a result, the relationship between Russia and NATO, between Russia and the West, between Russia and Europe became increasingly burdened.

Third, Mr. Chairman, Russia for its part has repeatedly expressed the view that they feel, rightly or wrongly, marginalized in Europe. The proposal for a new security treaty as presented by President Medvedev is a demonstration of this frustration, but more importantly this security treaty with all its flaws and the many question marks that one can attach to this proposal, it does show that Russia considers itself as an element of Europe, as belonging to Europe, as wishing to be part of the European security architecture. I believe that is very important.

Fourth, our key problem today between the West and Russia is a fundamental lack of mutual trust. I have no time here to go into why there is such a lack of trust, but I believe that rebuilding and

building trust has to be at the core of our work as we move forward. The work which is currently being undertaken to develop the future strategic concept for NATO offers, in my view, a historic opportunity to deal with these issues.

It is a window of opportunity to develop something which I would like to call an offer for a new grand bargain, strategic bargain with Russia. The new NATO strategic concept should reaffirm, as it has just been said, the guarantee of Article V binding all members of the alliance together, but this concept, in my view, should also encourage sustained efforts to link Russia to the West or at a minimum to make sure that Russia understands that from our side of the bargain, of the possible bargain, the door is open, and it is for Russia to accept it or to decline the offer.

Sixth, regarding the institutional relationship between Russia and NATO, in a way we were further advanced 15 years ago than we are today. In the mid-'90s, as I recall, the Clinton administration occasionally raised the question should or should we not consider Russia a potential future member of the alliance?

I would like to inform you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee that recently a colleague of mine, the former Secretary of Defense of Germany, Vocko Ruhe, suggested that we should go back to those ideas and reiterate an offer in principal even if we are all agreed that there are many areas in which Russia lacks the conditions to be a member of the alliance, but we should make clear that if Russia wishes to comply with the requirements, there is no obstacle in principal to consider Russia a potential member of the Euro-Atlantic Security institutions, including NATO, in the future.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, allow me to say that one of the areas where I believe that trust building can be done in an effective and in a useful way is the area of nuclear weapons. From a European point of view, I speak as a West European, the ongoing United States-Russian arms control discussions are an important element in rebuilding trust, and that is why some of us in Western Europe have raised the question of whether we should not also raise the issue of negotiations about the remaining tactical nuclear weapons on both sides, in Western Europe, American weapons and of course if I can say it in this way the unaccounted for weapons on the Russian side, which have been a source of great concern for us over decades and many years.

In this sense, Mr. Chairman, trust building and keeping the door open and thinking out of the box on how we can organize our work with Russia in the future in my view is the key challenge, the key strategic challenge for us in 2010. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ischinger follows:]

Testimony of Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger

Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Co-Chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative
Former German Ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom

Before

United States Congress, House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, DC
Wednesday, March 17, 2010 at 9:30 a.m.
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2172

Towards a new Grand Bargain with Russia

Thank you Chairman Berman and Ranking Minority Member Ros-Lehtinen inviting me to participate in this hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is particularly nice for me to be back in Washington, D.C., where I served both as a young diplomat in the early 1980's and where two of my children were born. More recently, I had the distinct honor of being the German Ambassador to the United States from 2001 to 2006, and developed an even greater appreciation of the vibrancy of the U.S. political system and the importance of the European-American relationship.

1. In my concluding remarks as Chairman of the Munich Security Conference in 2009, I observed that we were witnessing a "political spring". Vice President Joseph Biden had delivered a remarkable speech in Munich, indicating that the Obama Administration wanted to push the reset button in US-Russian relations. However, the global "political spring" that was in the air a year ago has not yet finally materialized – especially regarding key issues of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

The legacy of the post-Cold war period has hampered progress. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former adversaries intended to create an inclusive system of common security, a security architecture that would integrate the former Soviet republics into pan-European and pan-Atlantic institutions. However, this has not been realized – resulting in a system that is in need of some repair. Most evidently, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the comprehensive security forum in Europe, has lost some of its appeal because some member states feel that their vital concerns are not sufficiently addressed.

During the debate on NATO enlargement in the 1990s, agreement was reached that such a move should be accompanied by initiatives which would address Russia's

concerns about whether or not it might pose a direct threat to Russia itself. To address this, the NATO-Russia-Council was established in 1997 and while this was the right decision, it never really lived up to its expectations.. In retrospect, this forum was never really used for discussing common threats and for searching for common solutions and too much time was spent on discussion of matters that were only of marginal importance. As a result the relationship between Russia and the West became increasingly burdened.

This manifested itself most clearly in 2008 when the NATO-Russia-Council was suspended in response to the Russian-Georgian war and marked the low point in a process of continuous deterioration. This crisis made it clear that the existing Euro-Atlantic security institutions are not adequately equipped to create the "Europe, whole, free, and united" we all wanted to pursue.

A common effort of the United States, Europe and Russia is therefore strongly needed to finally realize a sustainable Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The process of developing a New Strategic Concept for NATO provides a window of opportunity in 2010 for this and I hope that success in establishing it can be achieved.

2. In Central Europe, there is growing concern about Russia's role. Last summer, a number of distinguished politicians from Central Europe deplored the fact that "NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant - and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises."¹ Such concerns need to be taken seriously as only 20 years

¹ Adamkus, Valdas, *et al.*, 15 July 2009: An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe, in: *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 July 2009.

have passed since these nation's emerged from the Soviet bloc and the memories of previous times remain still a strong memory.

3. Russia, for its part, has perceived itself to be marginalized in Europe for quite some time, and this has been a source of considerable frustration. It does not want to be the odd man out while – as President Medvedev remarked – almost all other nations that emerged from the Soviet bloc have found their place in Europe. In this regard, it should be noted that the Russian proposal for a new European Security Treaty – despite legitimate concerns many in the West have raised about it – demonstrates that Russia defines itself as part of Europe and wants to belong to Europe.

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen gave a remarkable speech in Moscow about three months ago. He underlined that Russia is not a threat to NATO, nor is NATO a threat to Russia. Rather than fighting the ghosts of the past, he stressed, we should focus on our shared interests in fighting common threats to our security.

4. What is indeed needed in my view is nothing less than a *Grand Bargain* between North America, Europe, and Russia. We need out-of-the-box-thinking. This is why the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently decided to establish the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), launched in December 2009 and chaired by Igor Ivanov, Sam Nunn and myself. The EASI Commission will seek to develop and promote a comprehensive approach to our common security space. During the next two years, we will provide ideas and suggestions as to how to shape our security environment, and how to promote US-European-Russian cooperation.

There is a temptation to think small and this is perhaps one of the reasons why the Russia-NATO Council has not worked. All options should remain on the table that may serve to enhance our common security and to provide for a framing of European

security in win-win-terms. Unfortunately, there is still much suspicion, disappointment, and misperception. Too many still think in zero-sum terms, in which a stronger West means a loss for Russia or vice versa. We need to rebuild trust.

One step to rebuild trust might include the negotiated withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. Those who argue that such a move would mark the beginning of NATO's end, make the mistake to cling to a cold-war perception of Russia as a potential aggressor and not as a strategic partner with whom we will share common strategic interests. As we elaborate NATO's future strategic concept, we should accept the imperative that security and stability in Europe in the 21st century is only possible with Russia and not against Russia. NATO must live up to the criteria of mutual trust and partnership established in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 if we want Russia to look at NATO and its enlargement not as a threat and security challenge, but as an opportunity.

Those who argue that a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would constitute a material change to Alliance defense commitments and would make European NATO members more vulnerable miss an important point. As early as 1987, NATO Foreign Ministers proposed significant reductions of short range nuclear weapons in their Reykjavik declaration. And when 15 years ago US-Secretary of Defense William Perry pledged that NATO would have no intention, no need, and no plan to deploy nuclear weapons to the new member states, he correctly clarified that European NATO countries would be covered by the US nuclear umbrella regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons are stationed on their territory. In other words: extended defense does not require the physical presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries covered.

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The US, Europe, and Russia are confronting the same threats: the proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate change, international terrorism, failed states, migration, organized crime etc. The financial and economic crisis has only made it more obvious that cooperation is vital in times of strained budgets. Four examples may highlight the dimension of our common challenges:

- First, there is the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. We will not solve the problem if the West and Russia cannot agree on a common policy towards Iran. During the recent Munich Security Conference in 2010, Russian speakers have made it clear that they share our concern about the potential threat posed by Iran as a military nuclear power.
- Second, Afghanistan will continue to occupy the agenda of Western security policy. 2010 will be a crucial year for NATO: The stakes are high. Russia, too, has understood that a stable Afghanistan is in its vital interest. It has adopted a more and more constructive role.
- Third, we must revitalize the efforts of the Middle East Quartet and overcome the stalemate in the peace process. But a sustainable peace agreement requires a comprehensive security architecture for the whole region – including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey, covering also Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
- Fourth, strengthening the global non-proliferation regime is a shared high priority objective. Bilateral US-Russian and multilateral arms control initiatives can help improve the political climate, remove or reduce nuclear and non-nuclear military threats, and strengthen the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). This is why US-Russian arms control agreements are so important. The vision of a

world free of nuclear weapons can also contribute significantly to a strengthened non-proliferation regime.

6. The process of formulating a new Strategic Concept for NATO provides a window of opportunity for NATO members to open up a debate on a new grand bargain with Russia. Such a grand bargain would need to incorporate a wide range of issues of common concern. NATO's new Strategic Concept should encourage and propose determined efforts to link Russia to the West. The new Strategic Concept also offers a major opportunity to create a sustainable consensus among NATO members on the Alliance's policy towards Russia. This is, in my view, the key strategic challenge for the transatlantic community in 2010.

Conclusion

I thank you again, Chairman Berman, for inviting me to participate in this forum. It is important that we make the best possible use of the strategic opportunities that lie before us to strengthen US-European cooperation across a wide spectrum of issues of common concern, including, in particular, the future of the security architecture of Europe: "Europe whole, free, and united" should remain our common objective as we continue to keep the West's door to the Russian Federation open.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. Ms. McNamara?

STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY MCNAMARA, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and distinguished members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Since the end of the Second World War, the Transatlantic Alliance has been the backbone of American foreign policy. The post-war political, economic, security successes enjoyed by Western Europe and America and by the Euro-Atlantic community more broadly after 1990 are well known. How we got there is equally clear due in no small part to the resoluteness of NATO.

Therefore, it is hard to believe that we are now talking about demolishing the very architecture which underpinned this extraordinary success story. Whether it is the European Union's ham-fisted attempts to duplicate NATO's roles and structures or Russian proposals for entirely new European security architecture, supplanting NATO with either will kill the goose that laid the golden egg of transatlantic security. The question of whether new threats require new approaches is a rehash of a 20-year-old debate: Is NATO relevant anymore? The answer is unequivocally yes.

I was pleased to hear that the Cold War is over. I agree. NATO has focused on new threats and challenges, and we need only to look at Afghanistan for evidence of that. The alliance is currently active on three continents in missions ranging from counterinsurgency to counter piracy, and the reason NATO has seamlessly adapted to these new missions is because it was always an alliance of two things: A defense alliance and an alliance of values. Unless the transatlantic community has decided that neither security nor values matter any more, there can be no rationale for downgrading NATO.

NATO is not a perfect alliance. It has its failings epitomized not least of all by the inequitable burden sharing among the allies in Afghanistan, but the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. Reforming and revitalizing NATO is the answer to these new threats, not abolishing or undermining it. At the NATO summit in Lisbon at the end of this year, NATO will unveil its new strategic concept. As a truly strategic alliance, NATO must outline the threats it faces not only today, but tomorrow.

Most importantly, it must put resources and political will behind addressing those threats, but above all, the United States must reinforce the primacy of NATO in Europe security architecture. Simply put, neither the European Union nor Russia is capable of supplanting America's leadership role on the continent in a stable, productive or healthy way. In terms of economic development, the European Union does have a role to play, especially in this area abroad, but in security terms, its efforts have been dreadful.

Since the creation of a separate European defense identity in 1998, overall European defense spending, military capabilities and deplorable manpower have decreased. Since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty designed to answer the infamous question who do I call when I want to speak to Europe, little has been realized in terms of the EU's capability to act as we saw so devastatingly in

Haiti, and it is under the EU's leadership that Tehran now stands far closer to getting its hand on a nuclear weapon than it did when the EU began its carrots and flowers approach.

In this respect, NATO must remain the cornerstone of Europe's security. In terms of redefining the NATO-EU relationship, the United States should adopt a few simple principles. NATO's primacy in Europe's security architecture is supreme. The EU should be a civilian compliment to NATO rather than a separate military identify, and NATO must reserve its resources exclusively for NATO missions. Another important element of revitalizing NATO is ensuring that the alliance's Article V guarantee is credible.

However, Russia sees calls to strengthen Article V as a zero-sum game assuming anything that makes Article V stronger will make Russia weaker. In November, Moscow unveiled the text of its proposed legally binding European Security Treaty to organize European security arrangements. It is with some irony that this treaty was unveiled in the wake of Russia's simulation of a nuclear attack on a NATO member, Poland. Although the text of the treaty seems almost benign respecting members' territorial integrity establishing new processes for conflict prevention, we must sincerely doubt Russia's willingness to take them seriously.

Moscow unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It has not ratified the Energy Security Treaty. It redrew Europe's borders by force when it invaded Georgia in 2008, and it remains in permanent violation of the EU-brokered cease fire which it signed by unilaterally recognizing the break away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As long as Russia's foreign policy affirms a zone of privilege interest and identifies NATO and the United States as major threats to global security and Russian military interests, there is no reason to believe that a new treaty will make Russia a better partner than the existing architecture allows for.

President Obama has shown a greater willingness than almost any other U.S. President to accommodate Russia under the rubric of resetting United States-Russian relations, but abolishing or undermining NATO as suggested by Russia will ultimately harm American security interests. I would like to conclude with a quote from President Obama:

“NATO stands as an example of how the United States can advance American national security and the security of the world through a strong alliance rooted in shared responsibility and shared values. NATO remains a vital asset in America's efforts to anchor democracy and stability in Europe and defend our interests as well as values all over the world.”

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McNamara follows:]



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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

**Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do
New Threats Require New Approaches?**

**Testimony before:
Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives**

Wednesday, March 17, 2010

**Sally McNamara
Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs
The Heritage Foundation**

My name is Sally McNamara. I am Senior Policy Analyst for European Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

Testimony

Since the end of the Second World War, the transatlantic alliance has been the backbone of American foreign policy. Post-war, the indivisibility of Western European security from that of the United States heralded a sustained period of Western peace and unprecedented economic growth. The fall of the Soviet Union just over twenty years ago, and the triumph of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe thereafter has extended the breadth of European peace and prosperity at almost unimaginable speed.

The post-war political, economic and security successes enjoyed by Western Europe and the United States and by the Euro-Atlantic area more broadly after 1990 are well known. How the West triumphed over the Soviet Union is equally clear: the unwavering leadership of President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher combined with the steadfastness of NATO and the European Single Market to undermine the evil empire militarily, ideological and economically.

Therefore, it seems incredible that there is now serious talk of demolishing the very architecture which underpinned this extraordinary success story. Whether it is the European Union's ham-fisted attempts to duplicate NATO's roles and structures, or Russian proposals for an entirely new European security architecture, supplanting NATO with either, will kill the goose that laid the golden egg of transatlantic security.

Do New Threats Require New Approaches?

The question of whether new threats require new approaches is largely a question of whether current institutions are working or not; and whether new arrangements would work better.

With regard to NATO, this is a rehash of a 20-year old discussion: is NATO relevant anymore? The answer is unequivocally, yes. The extraordinary security enjoyed in greater parts of Europe than ever before is in no small part because of NATO. When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe emerged from the iron fist of the Soviet Union it was NATO they headed to in their droves. Thereafter NATO focused on new threats and challenges. It is currently active on three continents in missions ranging from counterinsurgency to counter-piracy. The reason NATO has so easily adapted to new mission is because it was always an alliance of two things: a defense alliance and an alliance of values. Unless the transatlantic community has decided that neither security nor values matter, there can be no rationale for downgrading NATO.

NATO is not a perfect alliance; it has failings, epitomized not least of all by the inequitable burden-sharing among the allies in Afghanistan. It is probably crunch time in addressing these long-standing failings too, since President Obama seems to have less

forbearance than his predecessors in tolerating them. But the perfect can not be the enemy of the good. Reforming and revitalizing NATO is the answer to addressing existing and future threats, not abolishing or undermining it.

Reforming and revitalizing NATO will be a massive undertaking requiring American leadership and an Administration committed to a NATO-first agenda. Without American leadership, NATO will fail. The golden opportunity to rejuvenate NATO is in the lead-up to the NATO Summit in Lisbon at the end of this year, where NATO's latest strategic concept will be unveiled. NATO's strategic concept outlines the alliance's purpose, organization, and tasks and it will be based on an updated threat perception. NATO, like any truly strategic organization, has built-in mechanisms to recognize and address the changing security environment, as it did with new strategic concepts in 1991 and 1999. Just as the OSCE molded itself to the post-Cold War environment under the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, so did NATO, hence how new threats can be addressed by existing institutions.

It is vital that in recognizing new threats, such as cyberterrorism and ballistic missile proliferation, NATO does not merely pay lip service to them. Resources and political will are required to confront the vast range of symmetrical and asymmetric threats facing the alliance. It is equally vital that NATO does not overburden itself with threats which it has neither the will nor the mandate to address, such as climate change. There are certain threats and challenges, while important to some members that simply do not belong in NATO's basket of responsibilities.

Above all, the United States must reinforce the primacy of NATO in Europe's security architecture. If the primacy of NATO in the transatlantic security architecture is not upheld, little else can be achieved. Neither the European Union nor Russia is capable of supplanting America's leadership role on the Continent in a stable, productive or healthy way.

NATO-EU Relations

In terms of economic development, the European Union has a role to play, especially in its near-abroad. But in security terms, its efforts have been dreadful. Since the creation of a separate European defense identity in 1998, overall European defense spending, military capabilities, and deployable manpower have decreased, creating fierce competition for limited resources. The European Security and Defence Policy (now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy) has provided NATO with little or no valuable complementarity, and the creation of an EU army or a permanent EU military headquarters can only come at NATO's expense.

After eight years of tortuous negotiations, the EU recently passed the Lisbon Treaty. The EU proclaimed that the Lisbon Treaty would answer the question famously attributed to Henry Kissinger: "Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?" It further claimed that it would allow the EU to speak with one voice on the international stage and more meaningfully contribute to global security missions. However, after just three months, it

has become clear that confusion remains rife across the EU in foreign policy terms and that the institutional changes secured in the Treaty have not created additional political will among the members to genuinely affect change on the ground. During the crisis in Haiti, the Lisbon Treaty did not magically give the EU the ability to stride across the world stage. In Afghanistan, the EU police training mission has been a staggering failure. And under EU leadership of the Iranian issue, the bottom line stands that Tehran is far closer to getting a nuclear weapon now than they were when the EU assumed leadership of the issue.

In this respect, NATO must remain the cornerstone of Europe's security. The EU has not yet resolved the elite-driven centralization tendency to craft Europe as a counterbalance to the United States, rather than to complement it. Therefore, in terms of redefining the NATO-EU relationship, the United States should adopt six simple principles:

- NATO's primacy in Europe's security architecture is supreme;
- The EU should be a civilian complement to NATO rather than a separate military identity;
- The EU should not duplicate NATO assets, including any separate EU operational planning and command capabilities;
- NATO must maintain at least one Supreme Command in the United States;
- NATO must reserve all resources exclusively for NATO missions; and
- The assets and resources for exclusively EU missions must be provided in addition to—not instead of—the members' contributions to NATO.

More Equitable Burden-Sharing

If the EU wants to act in areas of the world where NATO does not, NATO should not be expected to provide its resources for these missions. If the EU genuinely believes that global security is enhanced by engaging in military missions without NATO, then it should pay for such missions exclusively from European budgets and use European assets and manpower.

NATO clearly has its own problems to deal with in terms of equitable burden-sharing. How to more fairly share NATO's burden is a perennial issue, and one which has vexed even the most ardent supporter of the transatlantic security alliance. European leaders seemed shocked last month when U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that the alliance faces a "crisis" because of pitiful Continental defense budgets, and demilitarized political attitudes.

The only shocking thing about Secretary Gates' comments is that it hasn't been said earlier by this Administration. Only four European members of NATO spend the benchmark of two percent of GDP on defense; few European troops are capable of long overseas deployments; transformational initiatives are stalled in many countries; and America still provides the vast majority of high-end military equipment for NATO missions. Although there have been some stunning contributions in Afghanistan—from

the UK, Denmark, and Poland in particular—there have been some equally underwhelming efforts—from France, Germany, and Spain for example.

In Afghanistan, Continental Europeans have provided too few combat troops, with too many operational caveats, too little equipment and too little money. Neither have they stepped up to the plate in terms of civilian reconstruction efforts: Embedded Training Teams, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Police Mentoring Teams all remain understaffed. Within NATO there now exists a two-tiered alliance which Secretary Gates bluntly describes as, “some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security and others who are not.”

While a radical departure for NATO, new burden-sharing rules could be adopted. Traditionally, NATO has operated better behind the scenes, with frank diplomatic exchanges generally resolving its major disputes. But with an expanded alliance of 28 members, radical solutions may be necessary. Specifically, the benchmark of spending at least two percent of GDP on defense by NATO members could be made an enforced requirement for gaining membership and for retaining full voting rights within the alliance.¹

Russia

Another important element of revitalizing NATO is ensuring that the alliance’s Article V guarantee is credible. However, Russia sees calls to strengthen Article V as a zero-sum game: there is an intrinsic assumption in Moscow that anything which makes Article V stronger will make Russia weaker. Russia is deeply dissatisfied with NATO, and to a much lesser extent the European Union. As Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin has stated: “we’re told by the West that they like NATO and the EU as it is, they suit us fine. Well, they do not suit us. We don’t like it.”²

However, some European leaders, including French President Nicolas Sarkozy, are willing to seriously consider Russia’s concept of reorganizing Europe’s security architecture. This policy is likely to be dictated by France’s competition with Berlin over Russian markets, as well as Paris’s desire to sell to Russia advanced military equipment, such as the assault ship, *Mistral*.³ Incredibly, this comes in the wake of Russia’s recent simulation of a nuclear attack on a NATO member (Poland).⁴ The French position also

¹ Sally McNamara, “Principles and Proposals for NATO Reform,” *The Heritage Foundation*, December 11, 2008, at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/12/Principles-and-Proposals-for-NATO-Reform> (March 14, 2010).

² Dmitry Rogozin, “Russia, NATO, and the Future of European Security,” *Chatham House*, February 20, 2009, at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13622_200209rogozin.pdf (March 13, 2010).

³ Ariel Cohen and Owen Graham, “French Russian Rapprochement... Again,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 10, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704784904575111292346578052.html> (March 15, 2010).

⁴ Matthew Day, “Russia ‘simulates’ nuclear attack on Poland,” *The Daily Telegraph*, November 1, 2009, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6480227/Russia-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-Poland.html> (March 14, 2010).

disregards the tremendous extent to which Euro-Atlantic institutions are already open to Russian participation: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; the NATO-Russia Council; the EU-Russian Partnership and Co-operation Agreement; the Council of Europe; and, of course, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

When Moscow unveiled the text of its proposed legally-binding European Security Treaty in November, it seemed almost benign:⁵

- Respecting members' territorial integrity;
- Establishing new processes for conflict prevention and resolution, including the inadmissibility of the use and threat of force; and
- Establishing new forms of cooperation for dealing with new threats and challenges.

These are all surely good things; in fact, they are core principles of the international system writ large; and they are all possible within existing security arrangements. What is less clear is Russia's willingness to take them seriously: Moscow unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2007; it signed, but has not ratified the Energy Charter Treaty; it redrew Europe's borders by force when it invaded Georgia in August 2008; and it remains in permanent violation of the EU-brokered ceasefire to the war by unilaterally recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It seems almost comical that Russia claims the existing security structures are not working on the grounds that they were 'provoked' into invading Georgia. There are reasons to believe that a new European Security Treaty drafted on Russian principles would make Russia an even more problematic partner than the existing architecture allows for.

Furthermore, the detailed proposals surrounding Russia's draft European Security Treaty reveal the truer nature of this proposed restructuring. The invasion of Georgia demonstrated Russia's inclination toward military adventurism. It affirms its "zone of privileged interest" policy, announced by President Medvedev in the aftermath of the Georgia War. Moscow believes it is entitled to interfere, militarily and politically, in the affairs of its border states. Beyond that, Russia is seeking to reassert its global reach, reverse and contain the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community and most importantly, weaken the global position of the United States. Russia ultimately strives to abolish NATO and weaken the OSCE.

President Obama has shown a greater willingness than almost any other President to accommodate Russia under the rubric of 'resetting' U.S.-Russian relations. The abandonment of the third site missile defense installations in Poland and Czech Republic—on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland—was a particularly stunning concession to Moscow. Abolishing—or undermining—NATO as suggested by Russia will undermine vital American security interests and will be another bridge too

⁵ "European Security Treaty," *President of Russia*, November 29, 2009, at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml#> (March 14, 2010).

far; revitalizing NATO, and standing behind its treaty commitment to enlargement, including Eastwards enlargement, must be red-line issues which Washington will not concede to Moscow.

Conclusion

The ultimate question for transatlantic security in the 21st century is not whether new institutions are required but whether Russia intends to be a constructive partner *per se*. Russia has never experienced more peace and security on its Western border. Russia's proposed European Security Treaty would achieve four primary goals: legitimize Moscow's sphere of privileged interest policy; reduce American influence in Europe; eradicate the indivisibility of transatlantic security; and project greater Russian influence internationally.⁶

It is ironic that Russia has proposed a new security architecture, even though it does not play fair within existing structures. The European Union remains a flop in security terms. NATO—even with its problems and stresses—remains the heart of the transatlantic security alliance. A new U.S.-Russian relationship should be based on practicable, deliverable goals, such as Russian support of the U.S. and NATO effort in Afghanistan and the joint work to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons—a goal that Moscow says it shares with Washington. However, a new European security treaty should not be on the agenda. It is a thinly veiled attempt to rebalance Europe's geopolitical map and kill NATO.

I would like to conclude with a quote from President Obama,

“NATO stands as an example of how the United States can advance American national security--and the security of the world--through a strong alliance rooted in shared responsibility and shared values. NATO remains a vital asset in America's efforts to anchor democracy and stability in Europe and to defend our interests and values all over the world.”⁷

⁶ Donald N Jensen, “The US Reconsiders Transatlantic Security,” taken from *The Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security*, NATO Defense College, Rome, December 2009, at www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=143 (March 14, 2010).

⁷ Senator Obama, “Obama Statement on NATO Summit in Romania,” *United States Senate*, March 3, 2008.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, and finally, Mr. Trenin.

**STATEMENT OF MR. DMITRI TRENIN, DIRECTOR, CARNEGIE
MOSCOW CENTER**

Mr. TRENIN. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, esteemed Members of Congress, it is a great privilege and a great honor for me to speak in this audience. The problem with European security as I see it, to put it in a nutshell, is that two decades after the end of the Cold War Russia and the new states that emerged from the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine and Georgia and others, find themselves outside of a meaningful security framework for that part of the world.

The existing framework formed by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, the twin pillars of peace and security, has greatly expanded in the last decade. Yet, it has fallen critically short of the promise of a Europe whole and free. Mr. Chairman, you referred to the failure to prevent a war between Russia and Georgia. This illustrates the risks that exist in that part of the world.

Even before the Georgian war, it should have been clear that safe limits for NATO's enlargement to the East had been achieved. After Georgia, it became obvious to all. Right now, the mood is certainly less somber than it was 18 or 20 months ago. Yet, the fundamental problem remains, and it is just beneath the surface. The roots of this problem, as I see them, are largely psychological.

There is no longer an ideological divide across Europe, nor is there a military standoff, trade and travel thrive across borders, and yet there is a palpable obsession in Russia with America's intentions toward it and an equally strong obsession in many of the countries of central and Eastern Europe with Moscow's motives. To call this problem essentially psychological is not to dismiss it. Rather, it is to point to the depth and strength of the prevalent sentiments.

The respective fears are, in my view, baseless, but they are not harmless. They misinform and misguide and allow for wide manipulation. The time to act is now as the United States-Russia relationship is on the mend. As we know from experience, windows of opportunity do not stay open forever. The issue is how to go about squaring the circle of European security. In my view, no silver bullet can do it. The draft treaty proposed President Medvedev and referred to several times during this session, in my view, is too conservative to be realistic. Even though his proposed remedy is probably ineffective, his broad initiative can be constructive.

Regarding Russia's fears, in my view, it is the United States that needs to take the lead. The Obama administration has exercised care, tact and patience, and it has taken a number of Russian concerns aboard. This however is just clearing the ground, not yet building upon it. Start is good, but alone it is not good enough. No amount of strategic arms reductions is capable of altering the nature of the United States-Russian strategic relationship, which is basically unchanged from the years of the Cold War.

The confrontations' afterglow, ladies and gentlemen, shines on. If one looks for a game changer, which can replace that pattern, it is cooperation on missile defenses, in my view. The United States has already offered this to Russia, but the Russians are not jumping at

the offer. They evidently don't want to be a mere add-on to the U.S. program. They aspire to a parity-based deal. They claim an equal right with the United States to discuss and define threats. This is a long list. No question that working on that issue is going to be difficult, and the positive outcome, a joint United States-European-Russian missile defense system is not assured.

If however such a system were to become a reality at some point, this would constitute a dramatic improvement, I would say a revolution for the better in European security. As the further enlargement of NATO to the east, its prospects really depend on the countries' concern. Should an overwhelming majority in Ukraine, including a solid majority in Crimea, support accession, no force in the world would be able to veto or exploit it. The current circumstances are different as reflected in the recent election.

Georgia's situation is conditioned by the post-conflict realities on the ground. Admitting any country to the alliance should not lead to importing a real risk of military conflict with third parties. Above all, Americans, Europeans and Russians need to look to the future even as they draw lines unto the past. The security interests of the 21st century call for a common cause among them. This is evident, and this has also been evident in this discussion so far. Even now, on nuclear proliferation and climate change, energy, security, counterterrorism, cyberspace and the arctic. There is a lot that binds the three would-be partners together.

Russia of course will not be able to deliver Iran, but it is a key partner in any effort to bring the Iranian nuclear program to a peaceful resolution. Moscow will not determine the outcome in Afghanistan, but it helps with U.S.-NATO transit there and is able to contribute to an eventual settlement in Afghanistan. Russia will not solve the world's energy needs, but it can be helpful from Europe to East Asia to the Arctic. In the end, one needs to ask oneself a question: What is the future that we want?

If one wants a whole and peaceful Europe, one needs to build an inclusive security community, a community of countries that share security among themselves. Europe's general prosperity can be helped by common economic space. A freer Europe means the rule of law firmly established in all its countries including Russia, democracy through participation and adherence to international norms and commitments. It can be helped by visa-free travel and open exchanges. The future it shaped by the decisions taken today.

As far as the obsession with Russia is concerned, I think that it is Russia's turn to lead just as it is the United States' turn to take on Russia's obsession. Moscow needs to treat its neighbors' concerns seriously. Russia has already recognized Poland as a key country in the region and a key to better relations with the European Union. This needs to be expanded and deepened. The Russians need to develop a habit of regular consultations with the Poles like they have already developed with the Germans, the French and some of the others.

They need to open the archives much wider. They need to reach out to the Baltic States without provoking them unnecessarily with military exercises. To conclude, let me say that to motivate movement toward the desired future, we need a new narrative, not the divisive one of the Cold War days, which is still heard today some-

times, and not the rosy one of the immediate post-Cold War that hoped to do away with differences.

The Americans in view of their global role need to think about broadening the community of responsible stakeholders, specifically to include Russia, the Europeans about finally reuniting their family, which remains incomplete and thus insecure. As for the Russians, they need to find after all their place and role in the world. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trenin follows:]

**TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE NEW
APPROACHES?**

Testimony by **Dmitri Trenin**
Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 17, 2010

Chairman Berman,
Esteemed Members of Congress,
Ladies and gentlemen:

Thank you for inviting me to stand before this distinguished audience.

Transatlantic (i.e. NATO) or Euro-Atlantic (roughly, the OSCE) security today is embedded in a wholly different global context than 60, 35 or 20 years ago. Europe is no longer the battleground. It is no longer divided. And, in many ways, it is no longer central to the world's security dynamics. Other areas have risen to power, or plunged to chaos; the concept of security has changed greatly, and the nature of threats has mutated. Yet, we do have a problem there, even if this had not been recognized until the recent Georgia war.

The problem is, to put it in a nutshell, that, two decades after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the new states that emerged from the Soviet Union—Ukraine, Georgia and others—find themselves outside a meaningful security framework for that part of the world. The existing framework, formed by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, the great twin pillars of peace, stability and security, has greatly expanded in the last decade. Yet, it has fallen critically short of the promise of a “Europe whole and free”.

This creates risks. Even before the Georgia war it should have been clear that safe limits of NATO's enlargement to the east had been achieved. After Georgia, this has become obvious to all. As the events of 2008 demonstrated, these risks are not limited to Georgia and Ukraine, but can affect the rest of Europe, and even the United States.

Right now, the mood is certainly less somber than 18-20 months ago, when it reached the levels last visited during the early years of President Reagan and the brief tenure of General Secretary Andropov. The general foreign policy reset in Washington has allowed U.S.-Russian relations to bounce back from those lower depths. Now, there are fewer irritants around, and more cooperation, from START to Iran to Afghanistan. Still, the fundamental problem remains, just beneath the surface.

The roots of this problem are largely psychological. There is no longer an ideological divide across Europe, nor is there a military stand-off. Trade and travel thrive across borders. Yet, there is a palpable obsession in Russia with America's intentions toward it, and an equally strong obsession in many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with Moscow's motives.

To call this problem essentially psychological is not to dismiss it. Rather, it is to point to the depth and strength of the prevalent sentiments. The respective fears are baseless, but they are not harmless. They misinform and misguide, and allow for wide manipulation. The time to act is now, while U.S.-Russian relations are on the mend. As we know from experience, windows of opportunity do not remain open forever.

The issue is how to go about squaring the circle of European security. No silver bullet can do it. The draft treaty proposed by President Medvedev would build a new League of Nations, but the security architecture he envisions seeks to create constraints to compensate for the lack of trust. In a way, it is too conservative to be realistic. However, even though

Medvedev's proposed remedy is probably ineffective, his broader initiative can be constructive.

It has already resulted in what is known as the Corfu process, a new discussion round under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This could be useful, but in a limited way only: the OSCE is not where the action in Europe is. There may be more action in the recently revived NATO-Russia Council, where Moscow has submitted a similar proposal, but this step is also mostly about tinkering with the problem, not seeking to resolve it.

There are some more radical ideas floated around, including a new recurrence of the "Russia-in-NATO" theme. In my view, this is a great idea whose time, unfortunately, has passed. Russia will not, in the foreseeable future, give up its strategic independence. NATO can only live with so much diversity—and divergence—in its ranks. And no one will benefit from China as a would-be adversary. Thus, one needs to think harder about how to treat, and finally cure, the twin paranoias I have described above.

Regarding the Russian fears, the United States needs to take the lead. The Obama administration has exercised care, tact and patience, and it has taken a number of Russian concerns aboard. This, however, is just clearing the ground, not yet building upon it. START is good, but, alone, it is not good enough. No amount of strategic arms reduction is capable of altering the nature of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, which is basically unchanged from the years of the Cold War. The confrontation's afterglow shines on.

If one looks for a game-changer, which can replace that pattern, it is cooperation on missile defenses. The United States has already offered this to Russia, but the Russians are not jumping at the offer. They evidently do not want to be a mere add-on to the U.S. program; they aspire to a parity-based deal; they claim an equal right with the United States to discuss and define threats: a long list. No question working on these issues is difficult, and a positive outcome—a joint U.S.-Russian-European missile defense system—is not assured. If, however, such a system were to become a reality at some point, this would constitute a dramatic improvement of U.S., Russian and European security.

As to further enlargement of NATO to the east, its prospects really depend on the countries concerned. Should an overwhelming majority in Ukraine, including a solid majority in Crimea support accession, no one will be able to veto or exploit it. The current circumstances are different, as reflected in the recent election. Georgia's situation is conditioned by the post-conflict realities on the ground. Admitting any country to the alliance should not lead to importing a real risk of military conflict with third parties.

Regarding the fears expressed by the Central Europeans, especially the Balts and the Poles, it would be Russia's turn to lead. Moscow needs to treat its neighbors' concerns seriously. Russia has already recognized Poland as a key country in the region and a key to better relations with the European Union as a whole. It has shown Warsaw some respect and expressed willingness to treat it as one of the EU's important members. Last month, Prime Minister Putin invited Polish Premier Donal Tusk to visit Katyn together: a welcome and deeply symbolic step. The Russians, however, need to go further. They need to develop a habit of regular consultations with the Poles like they have already developed with the

Germans, the French and a few others. They need to open the archives much wider. And they need to reach out to the Baltic States without provoking them unnecessarily with military exercises.

Above all, however, Americans, Europeans and Russians need to look to the future even as they draw lines under the past. The security issues of the 21st century call for a common cause among them. This is evident even now, on nuclear proliferation and climate change; energy security and counter-terrorism; cyberspace and the Arctic. Russia, of course, will not deliver Iran, but it is a key partner in any effort to bring the Iranian nuclear problem to peaceful resolution. Moscow will not decide the outcome in Afghanistan, but it helps with the U.S./NATO transit there and is able to contribute to an eventual settlement there. Russia will not solve the world's energy issues, but it can be helpful, from Europe to East Asia to the Arctic.

In the end, one needs to ask oneself a question: What is the future that we want? If one wants a whole and peaceful Europe, one needs to build an inclusive security community, a common security space. Europe's general prosperity can be helped by a common economic space, a continent-size free trade area and WTO membership for all. A freer Europe means the rule of law firmly established in all its countries, democracy through participation, and adherence to international norms and commitments. It can be helped by visa-free travel and open exchanges. The future is shaped by decisions taken today.

To motivate movement toward the desired future, we also need a new narrative. Not the divisive one of the Cold War days, which is heard today sometimes; and not the rosy one of the immediate post-Cold War, that hoped to do away with differences. The Americans, in view of their global role, need to think about broadening the community of responsible stakeholders, specifically to include Russia; the Europeans, about finally reuniting their family, which remains incomplete and thus insecure; and the Russians, about finding, after all, their place and role in the world.

Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you, and thank all of you. Very interesting. I am going to yield myself 5 minutes. There are many issues to go off on, but I want to clarify two points that I am not sure I understand. Mr. Graham, you talk about creating a European pole within NATO. Could you just describe that a little more, and how does that relate to an EU security activity?

Mr. GRAHAM. Certainly. I think we are seeing a process where Europe is moving toward a unified security and defense policy. Obviously, with fits and starts, and it is not going to be linear, but that means that increasingly we are going to find that inside NATO we are not going to have a discussion between or among the United States and dozens of other European allies. We are increasingly going to have a discussion that is between the United States and EU positions as EU articulates a more common policy.

That means that the way we have gone about managing our relationship with NATO is going to change. It will become much more an institution that is built around two pillars: The United States probably with Canada and a unified European Union. That will lead to certain changes in, as I said, how we manage the dialogue inside NATO, how we divide up the various security roles, the various positions within our military and security structures, and so on.

What I am talking about basically is the recognition that as the process of European Union integration moves forward, we are going to find ourselves facing increasingly a unified Europe inside NATO. That is something that we should recognize. It is something that I think we should foster because I believe in the long run it is good for the United States, and it is good for the security of Europe and our ability to operate with Europe in challenges beyond the European continent.

Chairman BERMAN. There are a lot of questions that come off of that, issues like EU countries that aren't in NATO, to what the British and French think in the context of their entire security arrangements about subordinating some of their security forces to a larger European pole.

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely, but here I think the process of both NATO enlargement and European Union enlargement will overlap. There is already a tremendous overlap in membership.

Chairman BERMAN. Right.

Mr. GRAHAM. And I can foresee a time as Europe moves toward a more unified position on foreign and security policy that it becomes thinkable that countries like Sweden, Finland and Austria will themselves become members of the NATO alliance, so again, this is not something that describes the situation now. It is a direction in which we are moving. I think it is a direction that the United States for our own interest ought to encourage. It shouldn't be something that we should resist.

Chairman BERMAN. All right. Ms. McNamara, you talked about strengthening Article V commitments. Now, I thought I heard a very fascinating concept in terms of the ranking member's opening comments regarding Article V obligations and the participation of individual members of NATO and to what extent we are going to review Article V obligations differently based on how individual NATO members are meeting common threats and participating in

that, but, Ms. McNamara, what do you mean by strengthening Article V?

Ms. MCNAMARA. Article V is the heart and soul of NATO.

Chairman BERMAN. Yes.

Ms. MCNAMARA. If you don't have Article V, then you don't have NATO in my opinion.

Chairman BERMAN. We do have Article V.

Ms. MCNAMARA. Yes. In terms of making it credible, it is no secret that Central and Eastern Europe have some nervousness at the moment about whether their security concerns are taken as seriously as Western Europe. In terms of what Article V means, and I think it will evolve in this strategic concept, but at the moment it means more military exercises, it means more investment, more officer exchanges. Those sorts of things are all valuable, they are all credible, but it is also a political thing, and I think politics really does play a part within NATO, and I think unless Central and Eastern Europe feels part of the conversation on an equal level.

As long as they don't feel an equal partner in this conversation, then I think Article V cannot be credible. In terms of one of the worst things we can do for Article V, it is try and make NATO look like the European Union. I think that would be a disaster, and having an EU Corps within NATO I think goes to what Henry Kissinger said. He said if we have a European Corps, then America loses out in the conversations that matter the most because the conversation is brought to America that has already been concluded by the Europeans.

Chairman BERMAN. Unfortunately, my own time has expired before I ever got to the questions I really wanted to ask, but thank you. The ranking member I yield 5 minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I wish to comment on assertions that Russia has been helpful with Iran. Russian entities for years have facilitated the advancement of Iran's missile and conventional weapons capability. Russia is poised to sell advanced missile defense systems to Iran. During the last Congress, we had to make changes to the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act because a certification could not be met, that is that the President could not certify that Russian entities were not in fact continuing to provide equipment, materials, technology and other assistance to Iran's nuclear, chemical, biological and advanced-weapons programs.

Russia, with China, has been one of the biggest obstacles to securing comprehensive crippling sanctions at the U.N. Security Council against the Iranian regime. Are these the actions that we deem to be helpful? Rhetorical assurances from the Russian leadership on Iran do not negate all of the other Russian policies that undermine European and global security and stability and in turn threaten U.S. security interests.

Today, as I look at Russia's actions, I am reminded of what Winston Churchill called in the 1920s and 1930s as "The Gathering Storm." We all know what happened when such warnings were ignored, and hopefully we will not repeat those mistakes today with Russia.

Ms. McNamara, I wanted to ask you this question: Last September, President Obama decided, as we know, to abandon the es-

established plans to deploy missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic which were aimed at countering potential long-range missile threats emanating from Iran.

The previous plan had been unanimously endorsed by the NATO alliance at its summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Despite this decision, which was viewed by many as a step to appease Moscow, Russia is now complaining that Romania and Bulgaria have expressed a willingness to host missile defense components on their territory. Russia is also linking the issue of missile defense to the signing of the next START treaty. Could you please comment on Russia's strategy in regard to the issue of missile defense and its possible implications for the national security interests of the United States and our allies in Europe?

Ms. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. The abandonment of the third site missile defense agreement came at a very, very unfortunate time. It came on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet's invasion of Poland. I think it was a little tone-deaf to come out on this day. There is no doubt that the Czech Republic felt as if a dirty deal had been done, as if they had been traded away for the prospect of a future START agreement with Russia, and we still haven't actually got that agreement.

For Russia, there is no doubt their objections to a third site were not because it was worried about its strategic security interests. They knew very well that the third site couldn't harm them in any way. What it was about was what their stated policy is; the zone of privileged interest. They view they have a sphere of influence. I mean, you would have to be in a coma to think that it is surprising now that they are objecting to Romania or Bulgaria or any other Central or Eastern European or former satellite republic being involved in the phase adaptive approach.

I think when I talk about things on a political level, this is entirely political. I don't think Russia's objections were at all security-based. I think they were political.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I just have a little time. I wanted to ask the panelists if France and Russia are currently negotiating a sale of one or more of France's Mistral amphibious assault warships to Russia as well as a license for Russia to produce additional such vessels in its own shipbuilding facilities. If this contract is finalized, it would be the first time that a member of NATO has sold to Russia such a major weapons system. What message would this sale send to our allies, namely in the Baltic States? To anyone.

Ms. MCNAMARA. I think it would be an absolute disaster. I think in the words of a Russian general it will take us 40 minutes to do in Georgia what previously took us 22 hours to do, and those 22 hours were very, very valuable because that is what got the conflict on the front page of the international media and finally got Russia to back off, so I think the sale of this goes against everything that NATO is about, and it also goes against what the EU about. The EU has a code of conduct for arms sales, and one of the features of that is that you are not meant to jeopardize regional stability, and this would increase instability.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the ranking member has expired. The gentleman from Massachusetts. It is the intention of the chair depending on the time we finish the first round to have a second round and get reactions to many of these issues. Mr. Delahunt?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. I would just like to note my disagreement with the conclusion that has been articulated about Russia invading Georgia when the EU itself, its envoy, concluded otherwise. I think it is important to state that for the record because it keeps getting repeated, and it takes on a certain validity and legitimacy that it doesn't deserve, but I don't want to focus anymore on that. I want to go to Mr. Trenin's concept of obsession and a certain psychology here.

You, Mr. Trenin, talk about missile defense as being an opportunity to be a game changer in terms of the psychology that you refer to and presumably the obsession. What were, and I will ask the Ambassador to comment on this, the obsession that Russia has in terms of its national security, and I think we have to empathetic here. Whether it is real or not, it does create a fear that there is an encroachment that could threaten the national security interests of Russia.

How did this obsession evolve, and why is missile defense a potential game changer in terms of the psychology that currently exists, Mr. Trenin and Ambassador Ischinger? You don't have to pay any attention to him. That is you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TRENIN. Mr. Delahunt, thank you for your question. I think if you are certainly in Moscow, a lot of people at least would feel you are being surrounded by the United States, that you have very little power and the alliances to which you do not belong and which harken back to the days of the Cold War keep expanding. I do not share that view, but I understand the sentiments of those who are responsible for Russia's strategic assessment and Russia's foreign and security policy.

The one important paragraph in the Russian national security strategy says that the biggest military threat potentially to the Russian Federation is the United States acquiring through building missile defenses a first-strike capability against Russia. To me this is a fantasy that has little relevance to today's world. Now, this is an official statement, and this statement underlies Russian strategic thinking and Russia's defense policy.

Now, if you build a missile defense system which is operated jointly by the United States, Russia and Europe, then this can no longer be advanced, this can no longer be supported, this should be out of the Russian military doctrine and out of the Russian national security strategy.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I only have 1 minute left, and I want to ask the Ambassador to comment.

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you very much. First of all, I do not disagree in any way with what was just said by Mr. Trenin. I would just like to point out that in the original concept more than a decade ago when we created the NATO-Russia Council as a counterweight to the idea of NATO enlargement, a balancing act, the idea was that this would be underpinned or supplemented by shared projects in many different areas which were listed at the time.

Not much has been achieved in terms of doing things together, certainly not in any sphere that is relevant to military concerns and worries, which is why I believe that Mr. Trenin is correct in pointing out that a shared effort in the ballistic missile defense area could be a game changer. It would actually force people to abandon the classic zero-sum thinking and move into win-win types of thinking, which is where we should be moving. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join Mr. Delahunt in setting the record straight. A Russian military retaliation against a Georgian breaking of a long-term truce by sending their military into Ossetia and Abkhazia would be no different in my mind than a United States military action against Serbia if it launched its troops into Kosovo. We shouldn't have a double standard here. The double standard is very clear.

We demand Russia accept that Kosovo is independent, but no, when it comes to people who don't want to be part of Georgia, now we insist that they be forced to remain part of Georgia and that Georgia has a right to use military force. It is ridiculous. If we are going to have to be friends with Russia, they have to know that we have a single standard for them and for us. That standard should be truth, truth, and we haven't heard that when it comes to Georgia as my friend says, a repeated distortion of what happened there.

Let me note I went to the Reagan Library this weekend with my children. Excuse me, not the library, the ranch, up there at Ronald Reagan's ranch, and I was ushered up there because of course I was a former speech writer for the President, and I have been up to the ranch during the days when Reagan was there, and there was a picture that I saw prominently displayed at the ranch, and it was a picture of President Reagan and Gorbachev and their families who were there. Reagan brought the Gorbachevs up, and let me note that is after a lifetime of being anti-Soviet on Ronald Reagan's part.

He invited Gorbachev up, and there was Gorbachev and Reagan, and Reagan had given Gorbachev a cowboy hat, and if you look real close at the picture, Gorbachev had the cowboy hat on backwards. Let us note that it was an obsession about the Cold War that seems to still be preventing us from moving forward with the type of relations that we need to have with Russia on our part and on the Russian's part as we have heard today. Missile defense, what Ronald Reagan championed and which I wrote numerous speeches with him on and worked with him on those speeches was very clear.

Ronald Reagan thought of missile defense as a way to end the Cold War and as potentially a method of cooperating with our former enemies. He made that very clear, and the fact that we put a missile defense system in place that was clearly aimed at Russia was a total rejection of what Reagan's vision missile defense was, and I would agree with the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, when they say that missile defense—

Chairman BERMAN. Some of the witnesses.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Some of the witnesses when they say that missile defense is something that could be used as a vehicle to overcome this obsession on both sides, in Moscow and in Washington, and also let me add Ronald Reagan did not want to have huge mountains of nuclear weapons, and if we have a missile defense system coupled with a logical and rational reduction of nuclear weapons so that we don't have to waste money, limited defense dollars on weapons that will never be used, I think that would go a long way toward making this a more peaceful world, and I would hope that our administration follows that course. I have 1 minute for anyone who disagreed on the panel or disagreed with what I had to say.

Chairman BERMAN. Go right ahead.

Ms. MCNAMARA. I don't want to disagree. I just want to say missile defense, one of the original architects of the concept of missile defense was actually Winston Churchill when the V-2 rockets were raining down on London, and for him then I think missile defense is very much what the motivating factor should be today. It should be a protect and defend strategy, and if Russia wants to be part of that, then okay, but we look at the third site, there is this I think unfair bias that the third site was directed against Russia. It was absolutely nothing of the sort, and Russia knew that, and there was also deep verification measures within the third site so that Russia could absolutely be 110 percent sure that third site wasn't a threat against them.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we did not plan that missile defense system with cooperation with Russia, and if they ended up with some sort of missile defense system on our border, we would probably feel a little bit upset about it as well, as well as of course creating a military alliance that went right up to our border. If we have a chance for future peace, we have to be a partner with Russia against China and radical Islam, or we lose.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I assume there was no picture at the ranch of President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, but—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, there was. In fact, there was a picture of the Prime Minister.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you for clarifying that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. She wasn't wearing a cowboy hat, however.

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to get your reaction to something. As I mentioned earlier, I am a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and I am one of the General Rapporteurs there, and as such, I have been asked to do a paper and lead a discussion on Russia, the NATO, this new strategic alliance, and in that discussion, in that paper, which we will do this coming May in I think either Belarus or Latvia, I will make that recommendation that we offer membership to Russia in NATO for some of the very pressing reasons that we mention on this committee.

It seems very illogical for us to move with a new strategic concept for NATO given this new opportunity, this new window when every basic issue, energy security, cyberspace, the high north, the

climate change, missile defense, all of these. Russia, the largest country in the north Atlantic should be at that table. In that regard, I would like to take benefit of your joint expertise to share with us what the response you feel will be, what some of the challenges and problems might be and the reaction from the membership from your perspective if you could. Maybe I will start with you, Ambassador, and certainly Ms. McNamara on extending membership to Russia in NATO.

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you. Thank you very much. First, let me say, as I said in my opening statement, I believe this is an important point whose time has come, but we need to make it clear that all we can do is explain that there is a door that is open. Russia will have to walk through that door and would need to accept the conditionalities and the principles that govern our Transatlantic Alliance. In other words, this is not an invitation without a certain number of clearly established conditions.

In principle, I certainly share the view that this is a point that should be made in the context of the future strategic concept because there is in my view no better way than to express our continued commitment to this fundamental idea of Europe whole, free and united provided that Russia can meet the conditions. Thank you.

Ms. MCNAMARA. Russia does not want to and will never want to join NATO. They have stated on several occasions that they thought NATO should be abolished when the Warsaw Pact was abolished, so I like the idea that we have this hand of friendship out to them, but I think Mr. Ambassador is right. The North Atlantic Treaty itself says any European country or North American country that abides by the rules of NATO, the door is open to them.

We have a permanent open-door policy, so I don't think the problem is opening the door. The problem is Russia doesn't want to walk through it, and if you look at the things that we hold dear, not using energy as a weapon, not resolving your conflicts by military means, territorial integrity, not using cyber attacks, respecting human rights, on all of these things Russia is failing at the moment, and so they don't qualify to get in, so I think we don't need to say Russia needs to get into NATO. All we need to do is reaffirm the North Atlantic Treaty, which I think is one of the best written treaties in the world.

We stand behind the fact that NATO has an open-door policy, but it is my expert testimony that Russia has no intentions of walking through the door.

Mr. GRAHAM. While I agree sort of long term that what we want to see is Russia part of NATO, I think the offer at this point actually will focus the discussion more on what the conditions are for getting in becomes an ideological debate of some sort that actually detracts attention away from what we ought to be doing at this point, and that is looking at areas of concrete cooperation between NATO and Russia. We have talked about some already, but I think the concrete cooperation is the key.

That is what builds the trust. That creates the habits of cooperation that makes thinkable over the longer term NATO transforming itself into a Pan-European security organization, but I do think if you make the offer to Russia now, you will find yourself

side-tracked in a discussion of what that really means, which I think is a waste of valuable time.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I am going to recognize the gentleman from New Jersey. I yield 5 minutes. We have a vote going on. We will have to take a short recess to make those votes.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and let me thank our panel for their great and incisive insights today. Mr. Graham, you spoke of the unified defense policy for the EU, and I am wondering if you might speak to the issue of lessons learned from the Balkan War. I, like many colleagues, made trip after trip. I was actually in Vukovar immediately prior to its fall, and I remember during the Bush administration, and it carried right into the Clinton administration, there was always talk about let Europe handle it.

Right where you sit, and I chaired the hearing, and we had the translator when Mladic and the Dutch peacekeepers sold out Srebrenica, killing over 8,000 people in a matter of just a few days, and I am hoping that lessons learned from that are being very judiciously applied. I would ask you to speak to that. In follow up to the question about whether or not Russia should be invited into NATO, what do you consider the risks to be with regards to China? The border between China and Russia obviously is thousands of miles long.

The population density on the Chinese side vis-à-vis the Russian side is something in the order of 250:1 in many places. There is occasionally a fire fight of incursion that occurs, and even though they may have mutual agreements right now, there are potential cinder blocks or sparks that could ignite into a war. That would then bring NATO and by extension obviously the United States into a war with China. Is that a concern? If you could speak to that very quickly.

Finally, I have co-chaired or chaired the OSCE Helsinki Commission here. I have been on the commission since 1983 and strongly oppose the Kazakhs getting the chair and office at the OSCE because of their human rights beliefs, which are not good. The Kazakh government has sought to de-emphasize human rights because of security and their closeness to Russia. Is that a concern that you might share—as to whether or not they change by taking the Russian view of the OSCE and its many principles in trying to change it? We have had a major fight with Russia trying to undermine what was the consensus for years. Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, very briefly on Balkans. Obviously, in the 1990s the Europeans didn't cover themselves with glory in those series of events, and the United States did play an important role in putting together the final settlements. The point is that we need this to change over time, so we need to engage in a serious discussion with our European partners on the roles and responsibilities that Europe will assume inside Europe for European security and stability. I think they have learned the lessons as well, so that is a discussion we need to have.

On Russian and NATO with regard to China, that is another reason why I don't believe that we should make the offer explicit at this point because it does raise that issue, but through, as I said,

a process of concrete cooperation with the Russians, I think you put that issue to the side. We will also need to obviously engage with conversations with the Chinese going forward as to what greater cooperation between Russia and NATO might mean for China's relationship both with Russia and NATO and the United States.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Trenin?

Mr. TRENIN. In my view, it is a great idea whose time is passed. It could have been had in the early 1990s. It could have been had in the early 2000s. Right now and for the foreseeable future, Russia will not give up its strategic independence. NATO can only live with so much divergence and so much diversity in its ranks, and clearly no one wants China as it would be adversary. As to Russia-China relations, it is the best relationship that Russia has had with China in many, many years, but it is a very different relationship.

For the first time since the two countries have known each other, Russia sees China as a stronger party, and Putin sees his best, most important achievement as President fixing every inch of the China-Russian border, and that speaks volumes about their friendly relationship. It is friendly, but it is very, very important that it is very serious.

Ms. MCNAMARA. Talking about the Balkans War, the EU has learned absolutely nothing. If you remember, when we started the unfortunate conflict, I am sure you remember this line: This is the hour of Europe. The follow up line to that was: This is not the hour of the Americans. For the EU, this was about their aggrandizement, not about the safety and security of the people of the Balkans. In terms of what they have learned, they said we need the Maastricht Treaty and then we will be able to do more. We need Amsterdam. Then, we need Lisbon. None of these things have done anything.

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Ischinger, I am going to just give you an additional 30 seconds here to get your reactions.

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you. Well, just two very brief points. First of all, I think that the EU has been on an important learning curve because of the events in the 1990s. I believe that mainstream Europe continues to believe that America should continue to consider itself and to be a European power. Even as we grow, we don't want the United States to consider its own role in Europe to be terminated, not so.

On the Kazakhstan issue, on the Kazakhs question because that has not been referred to, let me just say that I don't think too many people were happy with this development for the very reasons that you outlined yourself. However, my own personal impression has been that surprisingly or maybe not so surprisingly the leadership in Kazakhstan has gone out of their way to play a useful and relevant chairmanship role in the OSCE. In other words, I think the actual conduct has not justified the concerns that we had as we went into this.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The committee will recess for about 15 minutes as we take our votes, and then we will be back to at least give me a chance to ask the question I wanted to ask.

[Recess.]

Chairman BERMAN. This is my ideal time because I am the only one here I have to recognize. I recognize myself for another round while we wait for some of my colleagues to get back from the votes. We have a process here sometimes where the staff suggests questions, and one of the questions they suggested to me was one that says that a lot of us in the West believe—we see it in the context of Iran, we see it in the context of our mission in Afghanistan, counterterrorism—that Russia is an important actor on these kinds of threats that we have all alluded to in this hearing on proliferation issues.

We also see it as a difficult partner, and is that view of Russia as a “difficult partner,” is that a difference caused by the issue of core values? Is it caused by a different perception of the threats facing us? I guess I would add to the question—or is it what Mr. Trenin talked about—to the extent that there is a Russian obsession that—I forget his terms—it was not well placed, but it was not a harmless obsession with U.S. intention that therefore clouds perceptions and maybe comes across as separate from core values.

What is the cause of the difficulties of the incredible amount of work that seems to have to be done to sometimes get a true partnership on these major threats. Any of you? Ambassador, did you want to start?

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to start. I just offer one or two observations. I believe it is correct to find in many areas Russian behavior as that of a difficult partner, certainly not an easy partner. Russia has not been known to say yes and amen to each and every proposal that we have made. I do not share the view that the reasons for this lie primarily in different perceptions on values. I believe that the fundamental reason why Russia has been a difficult partner is that Russia tends to define its interests in a very straightforward manner.

Russian interests are Russian interests, and the additional problem has been, and I believe I alluded to this earlier, is that there has been a tendency to believe that whatever is good for NATO or for that matter the United States, cannot possibly be good for Russia, this is thinking in zero-sum terms. I believe we would see Russia to be a less difficult partner if we managed to create more mutual trust, and if we manage to create in the way that Russia deals with us and we deal with Russia more of a thinking in win-win terms.

Russia knows that it is not in Russia’s interest for Iran to be a military nuclear power, but I am certain that there are a number of strategists in Moscow who are not interested in giving on the silver platter so to speak a dramatic international political victory to the United States so long as more fundamental issues between the United States and Russia have not been resolved, so I believe this zero-sum thinking is one of the reasons, which has made it more difficult than it should be to reach common positions. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Well, unfortunately, my time has expired. I may be able to get back to this. Although, I just want to point out the ranking member raised this specific issue of Iran and Russia, and in a sense you are giving your thoughts about why that is so. The only person here who has not yet had a chance to question is

the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner, so he is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your patience. Voting is a necessary inconvenience around here unfortunately, but thank you for your patience. I just have I guess one question, two parts. The stumbling block to many with respect to moving ahead with a United States-NATO-Russia relationship is the situation in Georgia. I have a slightly different version of events than have been expressed here. Well, not slightly, but a different version.

Regardless of that, it appears to many that the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia or the Russian behavior there is in violation of the Sarkozy agreement, and until we get that resolved, it is sort of difficult to move in the direction I think we all want to see us go. If that is the stumbling block that many that share my opinion believe it to be, how and what is the best form in your opinion to address this, NATO, U.N., OSCE, EU, a combination of all of the above? I guess to all of you or to those who wish to respond, how do we move this ball down the field? Yes, sir.

Mr. TRENIN. Mr. Tanner, I think that before we finally resolve the issue, which I think will take a long time, and it is not clear to me how the issue will be resolved. What is clear to me as I look into the future is that Georgia will probably not be restored in the border in which the international community recognizes it, but that is for the future. I think we need to make sure that there is no war again. I think we need to make sure there is no fighting, there are no shootings on the border, and I think that it is no accident as people say that in the past 15 months the situation in Georgia and around Georgia has been relatively calm.

There hasn't been a single major incident, and this is not an accident. People worked on that, and I think the Russians recognize the commitment of this administration in Washington to transparency in their relations with Georgia and the fact of that relationship on Russia. I think there are fewer Russian fears than there used to be, and I think this is all for the good, and let me say just one thing. The very idea of Russia recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia was predicated on the fear of a war of revenge wages by Georgia and fully supported by the United States of America.

They only recognize that in order to deter what they thought was another, but more serious, attack on them supported by the United States. Otherwise, it was foolish for the Russians to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just tied their hands, but that is a product of fears and misjudgment but based on a high-degree of mistrust between Moscow and Washington in the times of the previous administration.

Ms. MCNAMARA. Really, the only thing I think I agree with Mr. Trenin on is that I think we are going to go through a very, very long time before this dispute gets solved. Where I depart from him, whether you think Georgia was to blame or not, and I have serious reservations about the EU's report, I think the EU report should be renamed blame the victim. That is the only credibility that report had. The disproportionate use of force by Russia and their unilateral recognition thereafter was hugely provocative, and they

have also militarized the region heavily, 10,000 Russian troops, five bases. This is not really the actions of someone who wants to resolve this peacefully going forward.

However, I think we are sending mixed messages. On the one hand, we are saying Georgia is an ally, they are going to get into NATO someday, but on the other hand, the Americans won't even entertain upgrading Georgia military equipment to help them in Afghanistan, and of course Georgia was one of the first countries to respond when President Obama outlined his new counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan. I think the Americans need to make it very clear that Georgia is an ally of the United States, and I think there needs to be a little bit more energy on the part of the United States. In terms—

Chairman BERMAN. I am sorry. The time of the gentleman has expired. That is the problem with 5 minutes. It goes by fast. The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A couple of different questions that are related to one another with regards to this discussion we have been having this morning with Russia. The Kremlin has been described both during the Soviet era and now today as a bit of a puzzle palace to say the least, and I am still trying to get a better understanding as to the decision-making process as they transition with a new President. Clearly, it seems to be that the Prime Minister is still involved to a high degree in the different factions that are taking place.

How would the four of you describe the decision-making process taking place today within the Kremlin as it relates to these very foreign affairs issues that we are talking about? Multiple factions? Different camps? Different schools of thoughts? Who wants to start? Yes, Mr. Trenin.

Mr. TRENIN. Well, thank you, sir. I believe on the important issues dealing with foreign and security policy there is a shared responsibility by the President and the Prime Minister, but clearly the Prime Minister is the leading actor in this duo, and on all important foreign policy issues, he weighs in very heavily, so it is Mr. Putin, but as far as the execution of foreign policy is concerned, Medvedev is the man who fully assumes the presidential duties, so you have an interesting and strange, almost unheard of situation in Russia in which you have dual leadership, but there is leadership within that dual leadership, and it clearly belongs to the Prime Minister.

Mr. COSTA. Do you see it continuing to change?

Mr. TRENIN. Well, I see Mr. Putin being almost as influential today as when he was president of the Russian Federation.

Mr. COSTA. Ms. McNamara, do you agree?

Ms. MCNAMARA. I absolutely agree. I think the decision making is opaque, but it is transparent from the point of view that we all know that Putin is in charge, and I don't think he is going anywhere. This is deeply undemocratic. I think going to this broader question of decision making and where they are going, Russia is not the enemy, that they are a strategic competitor, and I think going to the heart of the relationship is the fact that United States and Russian interest core values and threat perception fundamen-

tally differ, and I think until we realize that, we are not going to get a partnership going forward that we want.

Mr. COSTA. Ambassador?

Ambassador ISCHINGER. I have nothing to add.

Mr. COSTA. Okay.

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Except to the very last point if I may? I believe that strategically there is a convergence of interest between the West and Russia. There are very few central challenges that I can think of that we can solve and address without Russia in a meaningful way, and there are very few issues that Russia can resolve without cooperation with the West. That is the challenge that we should focus on and explore as best we can.

Mr. COSTA. Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, I agree with what is said about Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Putin, but I would add a further point that we tend not to focus on. Much depends on what type of information the top decision makers are getting, both Medvedev and Putin, and obviously there are a number of different sources, a number of different factions, if you will, within the Russian Government, within their military, security services, foreign policy organizations that pass information forward that provide the basis for decision making, whether it be Putin or Medvedev.

What we have found is that much of the information that is passed forward from our perspective actually distorts what our policies are, what our intentions are and what we are actually doing in the world, and this is another argument for much more intense engagement with the Russians using the channels that we have, creating channels that provide us as much direct access to the senior leaders and also those that pass up the information.

Mr. COSTA. Don't you think that is internally within Russia deliberately done by many?

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, look, I mean, there are numbers of opponents to better relations between Russian and the West within the Russian bureaucracy.

Mr. COSTA. Okay.

Mr. GRAHAM. But there are also a number of people that would be prefer to have better relations, and we need to understand that is a reality, we need to deal with it, but I think it is incumbent upon us to pass as much information forward on our positions as possible.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. My time has expired.

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. I yield to the ranking member 5 minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for the time, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I have a resolution, House Resolution 982, calling on France not to proceed with such ship sales to Russia, which I have referred to in my previous questions. This issue is of tremendous importance to our allies in the Baltic States, and our friends in Georgia, and I would ask that you give your full consideration, Mr. Chairman, to consider House Resolution 982 at the next committee markup. It is no commitment your considering it.

Chairman BERMAN. I got distracted. Remind me of what H. Res. 982 is? I am bad with numbers.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is the measure dealing with the French sale of ships to Russia that I had referred to in my previous set of questions.

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, you did.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I also would like to ask unanimous consent if I could to insert into the record at this point the text of a bipartisan letter that I and 70 other Members of Congress sent to President Obama last December, asking that he focus on the important issue of the murders of Russian reporters, activists and lawyers in his discussion with the Russian leadership.

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection, it will be included in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

December 11, 2009

The Honorable Barack H. Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing to express concern regarding the alarming situation facing proponents of human rights and the rule of law in the Russian Federation.

As you know, Natalya Estemirova, a prize-winning human rights activist in Russia's volatile North Caucasus region, was found murdered in Ingushetia on July 15th after being kidnapped from her home in neighboring Chechnya. Sadly, Estemirova's brutal murder serves as yet another startling example of the pattern of murders of journalists and human rights activists in Russia. Estemirova in fact worked with the late journalist Anna Politkovskaya, a prominent critic of the Russian government's human rights abuses in Chechnya, who was herself murdered in Moscow in 2006, and with Politkovskaya's attorney, Stanislav Markelov, who was shot to death earlier this year along with opposition newspaper reporter Anastasia Baburova. Russian authorities have yet to solve those murders or those of other independent journalists and human rights activists. Considering such troubling instances of the use of mortal force against reporters and activists, international media watchdog groups view Russia as one of the most dangerous places in the world for working journalists.

Estemirova and many other human rights activists and journalists who have been murdered in Russia have worked to expose the involvement of government authorities in massive human rights abuses in the North Caucasus. In fact, earlier this month, Memorial, a Russian human rights group, and Human Rights Watch issued a report accusing Russian and Chechen local authorities of severe human rights violations in Chechnya.

On a related matter regarding human rights and the rule of law in Russia, we are concerned about the designation of Vladislav Surkov to serve as the Russian government's representative in the new U.S.-Russia Working Group on Civil Society, part of the bilateral presidential commission to be established under an agreement between you and President Medvedev. Mr. Surkov is reportedly one of the masterminds behind Russia's authoritative policies of the past years, which have resulted in the Kremlin consolidating its power, restricting activities of political opposition parties and cracking down on independent media and NGOs. Further, Mr. Surkov's designation has

been strongly criticized in an open letter signed by over twenty of Russia's leading human rights activists.


The United States should not participate in any such Working Group on Civil Society unless and until the Russian government has taken concrete, verifiable steps to address the significant shortcomings in its treatment of political and media freedoms in Russia. Having the Russian government replace Mr. Surkov as the co-chair of the Working Group on Civil Society with someone who has not been involved in establishing oppressive and undemocratic policies in Russia would be a positive starting point in that regard.

We ask that your Administration raise with the appropriate officials of the Russian government and with officials of the leading member-states of the European Union, the critical issue of the continuing murders in Russia of independent journalists, lawyers and human rights activists such as Ms. Estemirova.

Mr. President, in closing, we respectfully request that you and members of your administration take these extremely troubling and important matters into consideration as you formulate and implement United States foreign policy towards Russia, and that you demand immediate steps by the Russian government to end what appears to be government-sponsored repression.

We look forward to working with you and members of your Administration on these and other important matters.

Sincerely,




ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN
Ranking Member
House Foreign Affairs Committee

JAMES MCGOVERN
Co-Chair
Congressional Human Rights
Caucus



BARNEY FRANK
Member of Congress



FRANK WOLF
Co-Chair
Congressional Human Rights
Caucus

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And to the panelists: Regarding the arms sales to Georgia—do you think that the United States or other NATO allies should sell strictly defensive weapons to Georgia to help that country deter another potential attack on its territory by Russia? I know that we have differing views on the earlier attack. Do you think that the United States and other NATO allies should sell strictly defensive weapons to Georgia to help that country deter another potential attack?

Ms. MCNAMARA. Well, I think arms sales should be based on general principles. America decides to sell arms to certain countries and have different trade treaties with different countries depending on how trustworthy they are, how much technology they want to transfer, et cetera, et cetera. If we have decided that Georgia is an ally, then I don't see why not. However, one of the things you do have to consider in any arms sale is regional stability.

If we think Georgia is an ally and can contribute to regional stability, then okay, but I think you have to look at it on a case-by-case basis, but I see absolutely no objection to selling them defensive weapons, and we mustn't forget as well that NATO has stated on the record that they do view Georgia as a future member of the alliance. We have the NATO-Georgia Commission. They are a special ally if you want to put it that way.

They don't have the membership action plan, but they are a special ally, and we have designated them 1 day to be a full member, so I find it pretty objectionable that we are thinking about selling an assault ship to Russia, but we won't give defense weapons to Georgia. I find it quite unconscionable on some level.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield to you.

Chairman BERMAN. Any other panelists want to answer?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TRENIN. Thank you. I think one needs to consider that from the standpoint of Georgia, Russia occupies the territories in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and from the standpoint of Georgia, the most important duty of the Georgian Government is to restore the territorial integrity of the Georgian state. As people sell arms to Georgia, they need to consider that those arms may be used in the ways that a sovereign government in Georgia would decide to use them, and that I think is a major concern that should be weighing on people's minds.

Ms. MCNAMARA. I think if Georgia uses defensive weapons to defend itself, then that is a good thing.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Yes, sir? Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, just briefly on this. I mean, you always have to be concerned about the consequences. I would pick up on what Dmitri Trenin says. If you are going to make the sale, you have to have to have some sort of sense of what the Georgian Government is going to do with them, and no matter what we may think about what the Russians have done or may do, the fact of the matter is that as in August 2008, the United States is not prepared to do anything militarily, and if you get involved in another shooting conflict, it will redound to our disadvantage.

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Just one sentence. Thank you. If, as I believe, our key job is to try to build trust and the working rela-

tionship with Russia, I would advise restraint, and I would support the considerations offered by Dmitri and by Tom. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, to all of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you will excuse me, I have to attend another event.

Chairman BERMAN. I understand. Thank you very much. All right. Yes. We are now on second rounds. Okay. Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Ambassador, in your remarks, you mentioned that we need to rethink what security means in terms of our dealings with Russia, and I think you used the words it needs to be rethought from a standpoint of from each other to with each other, and you see, that is sort of where I think we have got to be useful going forward, find those areas that we can work together on, Russia, the United States and NATO. I think that has to be the arrangement.

I don't think it should be Russia and the United States without incorporating the role of NATO. I think that NATO to do anything other than that rushes itself off the cliff of irrelevancy. How can you rethink a new strategic concept for NATO, and you are leaving Russia on the sidelines when it is Russia plays such a critical role in every major feature and concern? The whole issue of energy, their use of energy as a political weapon, how can that be dealt with with Russia in isolation?

The fear within the European countries themselves are divided of that. It just seems to me that common sense says we have got to find a way to rethink and reinvent this. I am reminded of the advice that Frank Sinatra gave the answer to the question that asked Frank Sinatra why have you been on top, the '30s, the '40s, the '50s, the '60s, even into the '80s up to the time near his death he was packing them in in Madison Square Garden, and when the question was put to Frank Sinatra why have you lasted, Frank Sinatra simply said because I have constantly reinvented myself, and so how do we move forward with this in getting a way to do this.

Pointedly, I want to ask you a question about that, but really where are the problem areas within Russia? What is the thinking on one side or the other and what is that reasoning? Where is the resistance within the European block at we need to work with? Why not identify these problem areas to a greater cooperation and try to defeat these, and most of them from my experience in dealing with this issue is simply fear, and leadership requires that you have the boldness to lead, and that succumbs the fear. Where do we start with this, and where are the problem areas that are preventing us from this corporation?

Ambassador ISCHINGER. You raise a key issue, and I am sure the other panelists have their own views. My view would be that one of the areas that we should focus on are those areas where mistrust is greatest, and for a number of reasons, mistrust appears to be significantly greater on the military side than in some other areas. This is why I believe that measures which would create an atmosphere and a culture of cooperation of shared objectives would be helpful. That can be done, for example, in the very large area of arms control where I am pleased to see that the United States

has taken initiatives and is working hard to move forward, but that is an area that is larger than just the START follow-on treaty.

I happen to believe that one of the biggest challenges for the West, one of the biggest global challenges is the prevention of further nuclear proliferation. If we wish to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, we need, if we can, to have Russia on our side as a partner in an effort to strengthen the treaty, to make the upcoming review conference a success and not a dismal failure like the one that we had 5 years ago, et cetera, et cetera, so military and arms control and proliferation would be my issue number one. Others are not unimportant, but would have to be in the back seat.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman is expired. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I would suggest that the misrepresentation of Russia's military retaliation against Georgia's invasion of Ossetia and Abkhazia has not done the cause of world peace or the cause of more cooperation between our countries' service. Let us note that the Russian military action was preceded by the Georgian military attack, which violated a long-term truce, and while I certainly would agree that it was a disproportionate response, let us note such a disproportionate response could be predicted if Serbia sends their military into Kosovo.

Chairman BERMAN. Would the gentleman yield just for 1 second?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As long as it is not off my time.

Chairman BERMAN. It is only 10 seconds of your time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Go ahead.

Chairman BERMAN. The Georgian move was in South Ossetia, I am unaware of a move in Abkhazia by the Georgians.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. All right. Well, I will take a look and see exactly how that proceeded, but one thing we do know is it wasn't dissimilar to what our position is in Kosovo and perhaps it wasn't all that different from what happened when Great Britain was in a dispute over the Falkland Islands and used a disproportionate response when the Argentineans attacked, and it would be wrong to say that Great Britain attacked the poor Argentineans and used force, and thus we should be suspect of Great Britain.

It doesn't go. It is not consistent. We are either going to be consistent in our dealings with our dealing with the Russians, or they are not going to trust us. Let me ask a yes or no or a one-answer question from all the panelists. Which country represents the most dangerous long-term threat to American security and world peace? China or Russia? One answer. Write it down.

Mr. GRAHAM. Neither.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Same answer.

Ms. MCNAMARA. No comment.

Mr. TRENIN. Neither country, and certainly not Russia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Certainly not Russia?

Mr. TRENIN. Certainly not Russia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. Let me note the courage of the last man to speak the truth when we are here to have an honest discussion. Let me tell you something. It is very

clear that China is an emerging threat and a greater threat every day. We have headlines in the paper where we find out, and we talk about Russia's relationship with Iran, which we have pushed them into Iran's arms by excluding them from the EU market and the United States' market when they needed it the most.

Let us note the Chinese, who we have totally open markets with, are now arming Iran, arming Iran and selling all kinds of weapons systems to Iran, and that is consistent with a pattern throughout the world. Yet, do we try to magnify any flaw of China? No. In fact, we are magnifying the flaws of Russia while accepting all of these things of China while sending over our technology and massive investment by our private sector.

In fact, I would suspect that some of the technology that they are selling to Iran originated in the United States? Mr. Chairman, we have a totally inconsistent approach to China and Russia, and unless we understand that it is Russia who offers us some hope of a cooperative relationship because they have had the reform, and China has had no democratic reform and is in fact worse off now in terms of civil liberties than it was 25 years ago that it is going to hurt our cause. It is going to hurt the cause of world peace. It is going to leave us in jeopardy.

There are areas we can work with Russia on, the arctic is an example. Instead of trying to make that an international solution to what we are going to do in the Arctic, we should be working with Russia and have them work with us to find a formula that is good for Russia and good for us rather than just trying to establish a global solution, missile defense it has been said here quite often and let us note the threat that we face right now, not just China in the future, radical Islam is at our throats.

They slaughter people in Russia, too. Our President didn't even bother to go and stand next to Putin when they murdered hundreds of its children a few years ago. When our people were lost, Russians have built a magnificent monument to the people that were lost in 9/11, to the victims of terrorism and didn't get so much as a thank you. Listen, we need to reach out to the Russians so they will be our friends, or we will pay a dear price because China is going to be our enemy.

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, for a second round.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On that cheerful note, we have talked a lot about what is right and what is wrong with our current policy with regards to Russia, and the inconsistencies I think clearly are there not only today but in the previous administration. Mr. Trenin, what would you suggest because I am always very focused in terms of setting the expectation bar at a level that is achievable, what do you think with this administration if you were to be advising is achievable here in the next couple of years?

Mr. TRENIN. Well, Mr. Costa, I think that it is clear that after the START follow-on treaty is signed, which I expect to happen very soon, the big thing of course will be its ratification, but on the diplomatic front, the big thing will be moving onto the next issues, and the next issues will be related to missile defense, and I think

that turning a problem into an opportunity would be something that is both important, timely and achievable.

Mr. COSTA. What about Iran?

Mr. TRENIN. With regard to Iran, I think that the Russians have been moving toward a position that is closer to the position of the United States.

Mr. COSTA. What is achievable?

Mr. TRENIN. Well, I think the achievable thing, it does not depend on Russia. The problem is that as I sit here today, I see the Iranian leadership so split that they are essentially unable to reach out to the international community, and I am very, very worried about what will happen over Iran.

Mr. COSTA. Ms. McNamara, what do you think is achievable?

Ms. MCNAMARA. Over Iran, I don't think Russia is going to be any meaningful help to you whatsoever. I don't think it is in their interests to do so. They may eventually support sanctions, but the only sanctions they will support are going to be so watered down as to be meaningless. We have already had three rounds of sanctions against Iran.

Mr. COSTA. Are the sanctions won't affect them?

Ms. MCNAMARA. I mean, of course. They have——

Mr. COSTA. I mean, in things that they view critical in terms of——

Ms. MCNAMARA. They have a huge economic interest.

Mr. COSTA. Right.

Ms. MCNAMARA. But apart from that, they have geopolitical interest.

Mr. COSTA. Sure.

Ms. MCNAMARA. And I think the rise of Iran they see as a counter-balance to the United States' power in that region. I think in terms of sanctioning Iran, we have to go down a coalitions-of-the-willing approach, and I hope Germany will be part of that because they have 5,000 companies currently doing business in Iran.

Mr. COSTA. All right. So you think trade is achievable in the next couple of years?

Ms. MCNAMARA. Certainly, Russia wants to be a member of the World Trade Organization, and they want to get rid of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. However, being a member of the international community means you have to be in good standing. I don't think the United States should give away things for free. I think in terms of taking a relationship forward, these should be on the table, but you have got to earn it.

Mr. COSTA. Yes. Do either of the two of you care to opine on what is achievable here in the next 2 years? Mr. Graham? Mr. Ischinger?

Ambassador ISCHINGER. On Iran, I belong to the school of thought that does not think that sanctions will change a lot for a number of reasons, including the inability of the Iranian leadership to react to whatever we are doing, so I don't think that the sanctions issue will take us closer to a solution. I believe that there are a lot of things that are achievable, but they are in the area of bilateral United States-Russian relations, including missile defense, including arms control and a number of issues related——

Mr. COSTA. Incremental progress, yes. Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. Building on that, I think there are a number of areas, nonproliferation. We are already working very closely with Russia on a lot of nonproliferation issues, securing fissile material inside Russia, the former Soviet space. That has been expanded. That is something that we can build on with the Russians, and both of us exercise global leadership. Civil nuclear, if the 123 Agreement is eventually resubmitted to the Congress, is ratified or allowed to go through, that would open up the possibility for cooperation on civil nuclear energy, very positive, an area where Russia has certain unique technologies we don't. It would be valuable doing a joint venture somewhere in a third country. All of this I think also creates an environment in which is easier—

Mr. COSTA. What you can build on.

Mr. GRAHAM. That we should build on but also helps us with Iran in that area as well.

Mr. COSTA. Right. Quickly before my time expires, I am concerned about the gaps in NATO defense and assets and forces and with their flat or declining defense how do expect NATO to continue to perform? Who wants to take a whack at it? One person.

Ms. MCNAMARA. I think you are absolutely right. There are only five countries in the whole NATO alliance who spend the benchmark of 2 percent of GDP on defense, and I think that has got to change. Will it change? I don't think so in the immediate future, so NATO has got to do better with what it has got. What we can't do is say we are going to have a second defense identity within the European Union to draw on those resources because most of the resources come from the member states, and so the worst thing that we could do is have a separate defense identity within the European Union because it is not additionality. It is taking away from NATO.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I know you guys are probably wanting to go somewhere else, but I want to just, if you don't mind, yield myself another 5 minutes to just pursue a couple of issues that were left dangling. Unfortunately, Ambassador Ischinger's most recent comment requires me as the sponsor of a piece of sanctions legislation vis-à-vis Iran to say you may be right, but I don't know that you are right.

Absent an effort to get a meaningful international sanctions regime at the same time keeping the avenue for engagement open so that there is a diplomatic alternative to deal with this issue if the regime chooses to exercise it, without that kind of regime, you are left with only two consequences. One is living with a nuclear Iran and figuring out how to live with a nuclear Iran and all that means, and the other one is a military confrontation, and so it is not quite on the subject of our hearing, but the issue was raised about the French sale to Russia.

In fact, I was asked to move a resolution on that subject through the committee. Ms. McNamara had a chance to respond, but no one else did. Do any of you have thoughts on either that sale or what our response or the NATO response should be to that sale? Mr. Trenin?

Mr. TRENIN. The sale is actually pretty controversial within Russia, and people say that this is a blow to the Russian domestic de-

fense industry, not unheard of, but I think that most sensible Russians see it as a symbol of trust between Russia, and they underlined that, a major NATO power. To them, to those who are for the deal, the thing is that this will create a bond, a security relationship, not just between Russia and France, but between Russia and NATO, and I just wanted to highlight that.

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. I will just second what Dmitri has just said. I agree that is important. It is important. It is important for building trust, but I also think it underscores as Dmitri said the problems that exist in the Russian defense industry, which is another reason why I think Russia doesn't pose the threat that many people here think it does.

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador?

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Arms exports are almost always problematic. That is true in this case also, but when one weighs the pros and cons, I would definitely come down on the side of Dmitri and Tom. I think trust building is at this moment the most important point. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one sentence to your question on the sanctions. I did not mean to indicate that I would be opposed to sanctions. I just have a great deal of hesitation that they will bring about a rapid solution of our problem in regard to Iran. Thank you.

Chairman BERMAN. Ms. McNamara wants to respond to the responses.

Ms. MCNAMARA. Just very quickly. In terms of building trust with Russia, well your NATO partner should also be able to trust you, and there is absolutely massive push-back on this sale from many NATO allies, not least of all in Central and Eastern Europe. I think it would behoove France to take into account the trust it has built with its own NATO partners who it has an alliance guarantee with rather than those outside the alliance.

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. In the prepared testimony, we didn't spend much time or any time talking about it that I remember, there was sort of a reference to the Russian decision on the conventional forces agreement, and then I think it was Mr. Graham's testimony that suggested a way to deal with it is to restructure it not so much to focus on where Russian forces are stationed, but on a level of transparency on where they are stationed and notifications as a way of both getting that agreement sort of back into operation and an area to build trust in.

I guess, Mr. Trenin, would the Russians be open to that kind of a suggestion and particularly important, I guess, for some of the Eastern European countries?

Mr. TRENIN. Well, I think we missed an opportunity earlier this decade when the CFE Treaty, the adapted CFE Treaty was not ratified, and I think that it needs to be made clear that the Russian—

Chairman BERMAN. Refresh my memory.

Mr. TRENIN. There was a treaty signed in 1990 between the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand and NATO on the other hand, so that is the treaty from which Russia pulled out. Russia pulled out of the treaty that operated on the assumption of the Warsaw Pact and NATO facing each other in Eu-

rope. Now, there was another treaty, the adopted treaty, concluded in 1999, which took account of the changes, geopolitical, geostrategic changes in Europe in the decade of the 1990s.

The Russians as well as the Ukrainians, the Belarusians and the Kazakhs ratified that treaty, but no NATO country did because Russia had not withdrawn from Georgia and Moldova, and that I think—

Chairman BERMAN. No NATO country ratified it.

Mr. TRENIN. No NATO country ratified that.

Chairman BERMAN. It wasn't just our fault?

Mr. TRENIN. No, no.

Chairman BERMAN. Okay.

Mr. TRENIN. I think that it is very important that the CFE Treaty is brought back or at least a system that guaranteed military security in Europe is brought back, and I think it is important to start negotiations, discussions on the new parameters of the treaty or the treaty that exists, the 1999 treaty that was signed by NATO countries, but not ratified by those countries. Absent that treaty, we have a certain amount of insecurity in Europe, and it is in everyone's interest to minimize that amount.

Chairman BERMAN. Anybody disagree with that? Okay. On that note of unanimity, I think we will thank you all very much for being here, very interesting, a lot more issues we could cover, but not enough time. So with that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Chairman

March 12, 2010

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via WEBCAST)**:

DATE: Wednesday, March 17, 2010

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches?

WITNESSES: Mr. Thomas Graham
Senior Director
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
(Former Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council)

The Honorable Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference
(Former German Ambassador to the United States)

Mr. Dmitri Trenin
Director
Carnegie Moscow Center

Ms. Sally McNamara
Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
The Heritage Foundation

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

**Attendance - HCFA Full Committee Hearing:
Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches?
Wednesday, March 17, 2010 @ 9:30 a.m. , 2172 RHOB**

Howard L. Berman (CA)
William D. Delahunt (MA)
Diane E. Watson (CA)
Michael E. McMahon (NY)
John S. Tanner (TN)
Lynn C. Woolsey (CA)
David Scott (GA)
Jim Costa (CA)
Ron Klein (FL)

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (FL)
Christopher H. Smith (NJ)
Dana Rohrabacher (CA)
Donald A. Manzullo (IL)
Edward R. Royce (CA)
Ted Poe (TX)
Bob Inglis (SC)

Verbatim, as delivered

March 17, 2010

Chairman Berman's opening remarks hearing, "Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches?"

For over four decades after the Second World War, the United States and Europe were focused on confronting the threat posed by the Soviet Union. That threat disappeared with the end of the Cold War, but it was replaced with a much wider, more complex array of security challenges, many of which emanate from outside the Euro-Atlantic region.

Do we have the right tools, institutions and approaches to deal with these new threats? That's the subject of our hearing today.

In addition to the potential instability in southeastern Europe, we are confronting the ever-growing likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran, the menace of al-Qaeda that continues to spread around the world, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We also need to determine how to deal collectively with concerns such as energy security, sea piracy, and climate change.

The existing transatlantic and European institutions -- such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, and the European Union -- have done a remarkable job building peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic zone for many decades.

But they are now re-evaluating their roles and capabilities to ensure that they can confront the challenges of the 21st Century as effectively as possible.

NATO has been an extraordinarily successful military alliance for the past 60 years, but the purpose for which it was created no longer exists. Since the Cold War's end, it has transformed to address new threats -- but as demonstrated by the current difficulty in obtaining sufficient troop levels in Afghanistan, many Alliance members question the desirability of engaging in out-of-area missions. Other allies question whether NATO should -- and indeed is structured to -- take on issues such as energy security.

As NATO reviews its Strategic Concept, what should be its mission for the foreseeable future, and what changes, if any, need to be made to the structure of the Alliance?

The OSCE is the Euro-Atlantic organization with the most comprehensive membership, comprising 56 countries, all with equal standing. But Russia has argued that rather than fulfilling its goal of a continent-wide security organization, the OSCE has focused mostly on human rights and so-called "soft" security concerns. Thus, Russia's leadership has reiterated its call to strengthen and expand the OSCE's responsibilities.

Following its meeting in Corfu last June, the OSCE set up a process to consider ways to increase security from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Can and should the OSCE become the pre-eminent security organization in the transatlantic region and do more to strengthen its political-military and economic-environmental dimensions, in addition to its human dimension?

And finally, the European Union has evolved from its initial function of preserving peace between France and Germany to developing a single economic union and seeking a more unified approach to foreign policy among its 27 members. The U.S. has often been critical of the EU for a lack of coherence in its foreign policy decision-making and its comparatively low defense spending. The recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is expected to herald a more united common security and defense policy – maybe.

The EU is effectively handling humanitarian and training responsibilities in Afghanistan, and it has conducted peacekeeping missions in Chad, the Congo and the Balkans. But is the EU adequately structured and resourced to address the new threats? And do we want it to do more?

While these three institutions are studying these issues internally and academic commentators – including our witnesses – have begun to identify the questions, there have been few answers about the next steps. Some people talk about strengthening the existing institutions to address the new threats, but they do not say how, or whether that is all that is necessary. Others contend that we need to fundamentally rethink and restructure how the transatlantic community addresses these new threats.

This debate has also been fueled by the re-emergence of Russia as a major power. The Euro-Atlantic community learned the hard way in August 2008 that none of its institutions was sufficient to prevent the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

Russian President Medvedev has proposed a new treaty to rectify what he perceives as the failure of existing structures to create a unified security sphere in Europe. His treaty is centered on the concept of indivisible security: that is, that one country cannot guarantee its security at the expense of another's. Some in the West reject this proposal, arguing that it is designed to undermine and weaken NATO. Others believe it has generated an important dialogue about the existing institutional framework.

How should the transatlantic community respond to Russia's proposal? Russia is a vital actor on issues such as Iran and Afghanistan, non-proliferation and counterterrorism. While a new treaty may not be necessary, do we now have an historic opportunity to put the Cold War behind us once and for all and forge a strong partnership to face the new threats together? Is it time to reconsider the prospect of Russia joining NATO?

The issues that will be discussed during this hearing are vital to the security of all of our countries. I am delighted that we have such an extraordinary and distinguished panel of experts with us today to help us consider these issues from the American, European, and Russian perspectives, and we look forward to their testimony.

**Congresswoman Barbara Lee, of California
Questions for the Record**

Committee on Foreign Affairs

"Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches?"

March 17, 2010

Response from Mr. Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.

Climate Change

Question:

Bipartisan and nonpartisan national security experts have recognized that the threat America faces from climate change is real, and there is an urgent need to address it.

As the world works toward a binding international agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions, how critical are the United States' bilateral relations with countries including Russia, or with regional political bodies such as the European Union, to building consensus for meaningful global action to meet the mitigate the far-reaching impacts of climate change?

Answer:

Both Russia and the European Union are critical to building consensus for meaningful global action on climate change. Russia is the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases behind the United States and China, and its current development plans for the next decade will lead to a significant increase in those emissions. Europe as a whole is also a large emitter of greenhouse gases - the European Union emits more greenhouse gases than Russia, although no individual member comes close to Russia's level. Europe, in sharp contrast to Russia however, has been a leader in efforts to reduce those emissions. As a result, good bilateral relations with Russia and the European Union will be important to the United States' achieving its goals on global climate change.

Nuclear Disarmament

Question:

Many believe the arms control process to be the key to improving trust and laying the foundation for a strong U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, in contrast to recent tension and especially following the Georgian conflict.

How critical is a new agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for both the U.S. Russia relationship, and European cooperation on non-proliferation efforts as a whole?

Answer:

A new agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is an important step in restoring trust in the U.S.-Russian relationship. For Russia, the treaty validates it as a major power and ensures a semblance of parity in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, although the United States is clearly the superior power by any measure. The new agreement should provide a foundation for further cooperation on non-proliferation issues, including Iran and North Korea. That said, one should not overestimate the value of this new agreement in improving U.S.-Russian relations. Distrust is deep because Moscow believes the United States has taken advantage of its strategic weakness for the past two decades, for example, to advance NATO to its borders and erode the Russian position in the former Soviet space. The new agreement is a start in rebuilding trust, but much more needs to be done.

With regard to Europe, the new agreement demonstrates that the United States and Russia are serious about meeting their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals. This will provide the United States greater leverage in persuading other countries, including those in Europe, to do more to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and to take stronger measures against those countries, such as Iran, that are not abiding by the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Question:

In an Op-ed coauthored last year by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Senator Sam Nunn, Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former Secretary of State George Shultz, entitled “A World without Nuclear Weapons,” they make the case that nuclear deterrence is “decreasingly effective” for maintaining international security.

In your opinion, how might a willingness to change our nuclear strategy to move away from a Cold War posture of massive attack readiness impact the U.S.-Russia relationship, ongoing nuclear negotiations, as well as larger nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts?

Answer:

Any changes in nuclear strategy vis-à-vis Russia must be undertaken with great care, in part because of the still considerable mutual distrust in the relationship. Movement away from a Cold War posture of massive attack readiness would have to be done in a way that the Russians find credible and verifiable. Moreover, the Russians would be wary of reciprocating such a gesture. With the overall decline in the capabilities of their conventional forces, the Russians have grown more reliant on their nuclear forces to deter attack. While nuclear deterrence might be “decreasingly effective” for maintaining international security, the Russians believe it is still sufficiently effective for maintaining their own security.

**Congresswoman Barbara Lee, of California
Questions for the Record**

Committee on Foreign Affairs

"Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches?"

March 17, 2010

Response from Ms. Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation

Climate Change

Question:

Bipartisan and nonpartisan national security experts have recognized that the threat America faces from climate change is real, and there is an urgent need to address it.

As the world works toward a binding international agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions, how critical are the United States' bilateral relations with countries including Russia, or with regional political bodies such as the European Union, to building consensus for meaningful global action to meet the mitigate the far-reaching impacts of climate change?

Answer:

According to The Heritage Foundation's Senior Policy Analyst, Ben Lieberman, "[the] risks of global warming need to be weighed against the risks of global warming policies."¹ The latter may well exceed the former, especially in the context of national security. Classifying global warming as a national security threat represents unwarranted alarmism and fails to take account of the real security risks that arise from costly domestic legislation and international treaties designed to address it.

The argument is made that unchecked warming would lead to sea level rise, increased floods and drought, food insecurity and other disasters likely to further destabilize many already-unstable nations and regions. This implies that America will have to deal with conflicts exacerbated if not caused by the consequences of the global warming. However, the alarming claims relied upon to make this argument are not well supported.² They have been further weakened by 'climategate' and other scandals revealing that many of the most alarming assertions are without any scientific merit.

¹ <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/02/19/hype-of-global-warming-far-scariest-than-science-shows/>

² <http://www.climatechangereconsidered.org/>

The risks of global warming policies for national security are evident. Domestic legislation, like the House's Waxman-Markey bill or the Senate's Boxer-Kerry bill would have reduced U.S. gross domestic product by nearly \$400 billion dollars annually and over \$9 trillion cumulatively by 2035.³ They would have also raised the cost of energy, as would similarly strict global measures had they been adopted at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen last year. The potential impact of such a hit to the American economy on defense budgets (and just as the Department of Defense's fuel costs would be rising) raises clear national security concerns.⁴

Another common argument is that unchecked global warming will exacerbate food shortages. Food productivity, however, has risen in recent decades even during periods of warming, and claims that African food production is at risk from warming is just one of the claims in the 2007 UN IPCC report that was found to be baseless. On the other hand, global warming policy in the form of bio-fuels mandates has caused corn and other crops to be diverted from food to fuel use, causing food shortages in 2008. In other words, the very instability some would like to blame on global warming was actually created by global warming policy.⁵

Nuclear Disarmament

Question:

Many believe the arms control process to be the key to improving trust and laying the foundation for a strong U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, in contrast to recent tension and especially following the Georgian conflict.

How critical is a new agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for both the U.S. Russia relationship, and European cooperation on non-proliferation efforts as a whole?

Answer:

Arms control could make an important contribution toward a better U.S.-Russian relationship. Unfortunately, the negotiation of the START follow-on treaty seems to have squandered that opportunity. The Obama Administration used the negotiations to "reset" the U.S.-Russian security relationship. However, the Russian government has responded by defining that new relationship around U.S. acceptance of Russia's right to threaten the U.S. and its people with nuclear annihilation under what is described as 'the strategic balance'. Nobody should be

³ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/The-Economic-Consequences-of-Waxman-Markey-An-Analysis-of-the-American-Clean-Energy-and-Security-Act-of-2009>;

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/What-Boxer-Kerry-Will-Cost-the-Economy>

⁴ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Copenhagen-Climate-Change-Conference-Could-Threaten-National-Security>

⁵ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/05/Ethanol-and-Other-Biofuels-A-Global-Warming-Solution-Worse-Than-the-Problem>

under illusions about what ‘the strategic balance’ means: it is the balance of nuclear terror. While the START follow-on treaty seeks to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides in accordance with Russia’s relative lack of capacity, it leaves nuclear weapons, and the Russian threats that go with it, at the center of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Thus, it will have the unintended effect of codifying a confrontational relationship between the U.S. and Russia.

Regarding non-proliferation, the Obama Administration asserts that if the U.S. reduces its strategic nuclear forces, it will be leading by example and states such as Iran and North Korea will abandon their nuclear weapons programs and U.S. allies, including in Europe, will be more persuasive regarding all states observing global nonproliferation goals. This is no evidence that backs the Obama Administration’s assertion. The U.S. has been reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. Yet, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs have continued to advance. Equally, European countries have remained reluctant to confront Iran in particular over its nuclear program, especially Germany.⁶

Question:

In the past, the United States missile defense program often inflamed tensions and crippled bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on a number of issues, from energy security to North Korea. How has the Obama Administration’s change of course with regard to the Bush Administration’s European missile defense policies changed the outlook for U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations?

Answer:

It has emboldened the Russians to use arms control to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies, particularly those that Russia considers to be within its exclusive sphere of influence.⁷ To reiterate the answer to the first question, the START follow-on treaty will serve to restore nuclear weapons to their position at the center of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship and all but invites Russia to resort to nuclear threats toward both the U.S. and its allies.

Question:

In an Op-ed coauthored last year by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Senator Sam Nunn, Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former Secretary of State George Shultz, entitled “A World without Nuclear Weapons,” they make the case that nuclear deterrence is “decreasingly effective” for maintaining international security.

In your opinion, how might a willingness to change our nuclear strategy to move away from a Cold War posture of massive attack readiness impact the

⁶ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/10/The-German-Elections-False-Dawn-for-the-Obama-Merkel-Era>

⁷ <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/President-Obama-Must-Not-Surrender-to-Russia-on-Missile-Defense>

U.S.-Russia relationship, ongoing nuclear negotiations, as well as larger nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts?

Answer:

If the U.S. adopted a more defensive strategic posture, and used the arms control process to persuade Russia to do the same, it would have advanced the nonproliferation effort. The Obama Administration, however, did not pursue this course. It favored maintaining the balance of nuclear terror on the basis of the current Russian preference for retaining a threatening posture toward the U.S. and its allies. A defensive posture by the U.S. would make the goal of protecting the people, territory, institutions and infrastructure of the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack, and not merely retaliating for such an attack, the chief objective. It would require a mix of offensive and defensive and conventional and nuclear weapons in the U.S. strategic arsenal, with all making essential contributions toward holding at risk the targets that represent the means of strategic attack on the U.S. and its allies. This is the strategic posture the U.S. needs to address the current and emerging threats of the post-Cold War world.⁸

⁸ <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/strategic-nuclear-arms-control-for-the-protect-and-defend-strategy>

**Congresswoman Barbara Lee, of California
Questions for the Record**

Committee on Foreign Affairs

"Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches?"

March 17, 2010

Response from Mr. Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Climate Change

Question:

Bipartisan and nonpartisan national security experts have recognized that the threat America faces from climate change is real, and there is an urgent need to address it.

As the world works toward a binding international agreement to curb greenhouse gas emissions, how critical are the United States' bilateral relations with countries including Russia, or with regional political bodies such as the European Union, to building consensus for meaningful global action to meet the mitigate the far-reaching impacts of climate change?

Answer:

Russia is a major player in the global politics of climate change. Russia's carbon emissions have gone down some 30% by comparison to 1990, due to the virtual collapse of the Soviet Union's highly militarized industry. Between 2000-8, Russia's economy was growing rather briskly, and is likely to resume growth once it finally emerges from the current recession. As one of the world's Top Ten economies (in purchasing power parity terms), its growth will have an impact on the global climate situation. At present, the Russian government has pledged to stay well below the 1990 levels, in terms of CO₂ emissions. Russia, the biggest country on earth, is also one of the world's greatest depositories of oxygen-breathing forests (Siberia), and clean water (Lake Baikal). Relations with Russia on climate-related issues are of the same importance to the United States as relations with other key players, with the exception of China and the European Union.

Nuclear Disarmament

Question:

Many believe the arms control process to be the key to improving trust and laying the foundation for a strong U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, in contrast to recent tension and especially following the Georgian conflict.

How critical is a new agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for both the U.S. Russia relationship, and European cooperation on non-proliferation efforts as a whole?

Answer:

The new START agreement is important for several reasons:

- it demonstrates the ability of the two administrations to conduct productive negotiations and reach agreements: “the reset is for real”;
- the agreement goes broadly in the direction of reducing nuclear arms, which is important in view of the forthcoming NPT treaty review conference;
- the agreement restores the arms control and verification framework, which increases transparency, predictability and mutual confidence in U.S.-Russian strategic relations;
- the agreement on START opens the way to talks on other strategic issues, including missile defense;
- the new START treaty would improve the general climate between Russia and the US/NATO, and thus contribute to a more secure Europe

Question:

In the past, the United States missile defense program often inflamed tensions and crippled bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on a number of issues, from energy security to North Korea. How has the Obama Administration’s change of course with regard to the Bush Administration’s European missile defense policies changed the outlook for U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations?

Answer:

The change in the US nuclear strategy announced by President Obama can have a positive impact on US-Russia relations. Historically, Moscow has followed the U.S. rather closely in most of its strategic innovations. During the G.W. Bush Administration, e.g., there was discussion in Russia on preventive use of nuclear weapons, development of bunker-busting nuclear weapons, etc. Had this been incorporated into the Russian military doctrine, Russia could have been on a dangerous course. This did not happen, and the doctrine, adopted in February 2010, while stressing nuclear deterrence as the mainstay of national security, featured a rather conservative nuclear posture, limited to deterring an attack on Russia itself.