

**Question for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question 1a:**

Islamist extremists continue to expand their operations in Africa and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a critical program on the African continent. The budget documents show significant cuts in funding of this key program, thus suggesting counterterrorism programs in Africa are not of main concern. How high of a priority is the TSCTP and other counterterrorism programs in Africa?

**Answer:**

The State Department strongly supports the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and its East Africa counterpart, the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSII). Preventing the spread of terrorism and extremism in Africa is a vital U.S. interest and we have and will continue to provide significant resources to support long-term sustained engagement on the continent.

TSCTP and EARSII are the USG's primary tools supporting regional efforts to build long-term capacity in Northwest and East Africa to disrupt terrorist organizations and facilitation networks, secure vulnerable borders, extend effective government control over remote areas, discredit violent ideology and address underlying conditions that provide terrorists with recruits, sanctuary and resources. Department of State resources will continue to support training and equipping partner country militaries, law enforcement and intelligence units required to monitor and protect vulnerable border areas and difficult-to-govern areas exploited by terrorist organizations. State Department and USAID programming will focus on improving local government capacity to deliver basic services and providing educational and vocational training opportunities to

populations potentially vulnerable to radicalization. USAID and State Department public diplomacy and strategic communications programs will continue to increase the capacity of moderate leaders to discredit extremist messages and promote democratic rule of law.

**Question 1b:**

Do the proposed cuts to the TSCTP stand at odds with the Administration's stated intent to "assume a primary role in the USG strategy for countering terrorism through attacking terrorist networks and countering violent extremism?"

**Answer:**

Funding levels for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) reflect our strong commitment to an effective and sustainable counterterrorism effort in the region. Although funding levels are adjusted each fiscal year to reflect specific programmatic requirements and partner country priorities, we have either increased or maintained State Department resources available for most key accounts. Programs receiving lower funding levels in FY 2011 are noted below. USAID will provide a separate response regarding its TSCTP activities funded with Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds.

The State Department's TSCTP activities are supported by resources from several primary accounts including Economic Support Funds (ESF), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). In past years, we supplemented those at times with Section 1206 and 1207 and Regional Security Initiative (RSI) programs; the funding source of these is Defense Department

appropriations. The Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) oversees the RSI. The Department of Defense also conducts training support using Title X authorities.

The FY 2011 levels projected represent the best current estimate but may be understated because some qualifying activities will not be identified until operational plans are finalized following enacted appropriations. The FY 2011 request for \$5 million in State Department Africa Regional ESF matches our FY 2010 request. Our FY 2011 request for \$20 million in PKO matches our FY 2010 request and represents a \$5 million increase from FY 2009 funding levels. The Administration's request for FY 2011 AF Regional and NEA Regional NADR is \$8.8 million. The overall FY 2011 NADR funding level represents a \$7 million decrease from the FY 2010 level, but is consistent with FY 2008 and FY 2009 requests. The Department's Diplomatic Security Bureau, the Bureaus of African and Near East Affairs, and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism closely coordinated the establishment of the FY 2011 levels to ensure that critical NADR programs are adequately resourced. The FY 2011 request for INCLE is \$5.5 million, a \$1 million increase from the FY 2010 requested level. Increases in INCLE funding in FY 2011 will support efforts to improve basic policing skills and organization and should also increase the effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Assistance programs building more specialized counterterrorism capability in partner country security forces. In addition, the new regional training center in West Africa, supported by INCLE funds, will conduct courses to support police professionalization.

**Question 2a:**

**Zimbabwe**

The budget request includes a \$10 million increase in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Zimbabwe. For what purpose will these funds be used and how will they be monitored?

**Answer:**

We intend to use the \$10 million increase in ESF funding in FY 2011 to expand economic growth activities designed to accelerate Zimbabwe's recovery and help the people of Zimbabwe realize the tangible benefits of the democratic transition process. The majority of the funding will be used to revive the agricultural sector through activities that increase production. The funding will also assist farmer unions and other agricultural associations to enhance their advocacy skills to demand policy reforms that will improve the agricultural environment. Agricultural research institutions will be assisted to improve seed varieties and livestock breeds.

Funding will also include technical assistance to build the capacity of the Ministry of Finance – currently led by Tendai Biti of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to identify and stop revenue leakages, strengthen customs policy and procedures, facilitate trade, and improve tax administration. In addition, our funding will assist the Central Statistical Office in the Finance Ministry to conduct research and analysis that will improve decision making around monetary and fiscal reform.

We carefully structure our assistance to comply with U.S. law, including any restrictions on assistance for the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ). This includes

funding for the planned macroeconomic growth technical assistance to the Finance Ministry and Revenue Authority, which will go through grantees, contractors, and other third parties. We also scrutinize this funding to ensure that it does not benefit any individual or entity on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, which is maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the U. S. Treasury Department. We routinely monitor entities that benefit from our assistance to ensure that resources are used for their intended purpose. Furthermore, annual audits track expenditures.

**Question 2b:**

How do you intend to continue to isolate the negative forces of the transitional government, particularly Robert Mugabe and his thugs, while strengthening reform-minded elements?

Our targeted OFAC sanctions are imposed specifically on individuals and entities that have hindered democracy and abused human rights in Zimbabwe. Negative forces in the transitional government are isolated via their inclusion on our Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Our measures will remain in place until genuine, sustained democratic and political opening has taken place in Zimbabwe.

Reform-minded ministers are embracing change, and abandoning the failed policies of the past, and we strongly encourage all political actors in Zimbabwe, of whatever party, to do the same. Our humanitarian, health, and democracy assistance is directed at strengthening the forces for reform while avoiding the hands of corrupt members of Mugabe's ZANU-PF party. We seek ways to ease the suffering of the

people of Zimbabwe and strengthen the country's institutions without aiding those forces who cling to power through repression and corruption.

**Question 3:**

- A. Where does PEPFAR fit into the Global Health Initiative?
- B. If PEPFAR will be at least partially (if not fully) absorbed by the Global Health Initiative, how do you intend to track spending on abstinence and fidelity programs in order to meet the statutory obligations under the Leadership Act?
- C. Given the Administration's stated intent to press for full "integration of services" and expand access to family planning and reproductive health, please describe how you intend to preserve the Conscience Clause under the integration strategy.

**Answer A:**

The Administration's commitment to PEPFAR remains strong. In December 2009, PEPFAR released its Five-Year Strategy, outlining goals from the program that include, among others, providing direct support for treatment for more than 4 million people on treatment, prevention of more than 12 million new HIV infections, and care for more than 12 million people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children.

The Global Health Initiative (GHI) is designed to build upon the impressive results and momentum of PEPFAR and other USG health programs – not replace them. It will leverage the full range of USG assets in supporting a long-term strategic approach to global health. It will carry forward existing commitments, enabling partner countries to improve health in communities impacted by HIV and other diseases.

**Answer B:**

The Global Health Initiative is an umbrella of management, integration, and coordination among existing U.S. government health programs. PEPFAR will not be absorbed into the GHI; rather, it will be part of the GHI but remain distinct, consistent with its legislative authorization. At the same time, the unified whole-of-government

approach across health issues under the GHI will enable PEPFAR to better achieve its goals and improve the health of people living with HIV. The GHI will not change the statutory obligations regarding tracking spending on abstinence and fidelity programs, and PEPFAR will continue to do so.

**Answer C:**

We will ensure that integration of services under the GHI will be done in such a way that programs remain compliant with all legislative requirements. We will continue to maintain open channels of communication with interested groups throughout PEPFAR to afford them an opportunity to raise any concerns with particular procurements.

**Question 4a:**

**Maternal/Child Health versus Family Planning/Reproductive Health:** Funding for Maternal/Child Health programs appears to be separated from Family Planning/Reproductive Health in the budget explanation. However, the descriptive paragraph of FP/RH then identifies integration of FP/MCH and FP/HIV as if they are one-in-the-same. (See budget explanation page 57).

Please provide the complete breakdown of funding for FP/RH across all accounts and agencies, including our contribution to UNFPA.

**Answer:**

The FY11 FP/RH budgets by country and account, which total \$715.4 million, are attached. They are also included in the FY11 CBJ summary tables at the following link: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138174.pdf>. The FP/RH information starts on page 71 on screen and on page 63 in hard copy.

**Question 4b:**

In terms of implementation of the GHI, are maternal health and family planning to be regarded as the same thing? By extension, are maternal health and reproductive health the same thing?

**Answer:**

Since 2002, the GHCS account has been structured and appropriated by Congress into the following five categories:

- Child Survival and Maternal Health
- Vulnerable Children
- HIV/AIDS
- Infectious Diseases: TB, Malaria, Other ID (Avian flu, antimicrobial resistance, surveillance, etc)
- Family Planning/Reproductive Health

The funding streams and types of activities supported for FP/RH and MCH are distinct. The maternal health funds will finance activities that surround safe delivery and post-partum care for mothers; the family planning/reproductive health funds will support improved access to voluntary family planning and other RH activities, including actions against gender-based violence, fistula, female genital cutting, and child marriage. In many cases the health workers who deliver MCH information and services are the same ones who deliver family planning information and services. In these instances, it is often cost-effective to provide integrated training of these health staff. Likewise, logistical systems that supply health commodities to the same service delivery points can operate more efficiently through a single supply chain. In these instances, the funding would be

apportioned commensurately with the hours of training or volume of supplies being provided.

**Question 5a:**

- a. Please provide a description of the steps the Department has taken to investigate allegations regarding abuse of the personnel system (including tampering with the Foreign Service promotion process and not implementing competition for Civil service jobs) by senior HR managers.(IG/HR)
- b. Please provide the results of any such investigations (IG/HR)
- c. Please provide a detailed description of the measures the Department has taken or plans to take to correct systemic defects in the personnel system to prevent such alleged abuses in the future. (HR)
- d. Where does the appointment of a permanent Inspector General stand? (IG)

Please provide a description of the steps the Department has taken to investigate allegations regarding abuse of the personnel system (including tampering with the Foreign Service promotion process and not implementing competition for Civil service jobs) by senior HR managers.(IG/HR)

**Answer:**

OIG Response:

(Investigations) Since August 2008, OIG-INV has conducted two separate investigations based upon allegations of abuse of the personnel system and tampering with the Foreign Service promotion process.

(Inspections) In 2007, the OIG conducted an inspection of the Bureau of Human Resources (Report Number ISP-I-07-45, September 2007.)

Also, in 2009, the Office of Inspector General conducted an assessment of the Foreign Service promotion system. The Report entitled, *Review of the Integrity and Fairness of the Foreign Service Selection Board Process* (Report Number ISP-I-10-47, March 2010). The report was just completed and has been issued to the Department. Congressional distribution of the report will take place during the week of March 15, 2010. The report is attached and is presented as an advance copy for the Ranking Member.

**Question 5b:**

Please provide the results of any such investigations (IG/HR)

**Answer:**

OIG Response:

(Investigation results) Both of these investigations determined that there was no evidence that any personnel regulations had been violated nor any records altered to affect the promotion process.

(Inspection Results) The 2007 inspection of the Bureau of Human Resources was focused on the performance of the entire bureau, but it included a review of the promotion process. The OIG inspection included the following key judgment:

- The Foreign Service promotion process is managed well despite the perennial problem of recruiting panel members. Implementation of an electronic employee evaluation report (EER) process should help streamline the process.

**The specific 2009 assessment of the Foreign Service Promotion System was more highly focused on the promotion process. The key judgments in that report are:**

- OIG concludes the processes by which annual boards promote, low-rank, and award Foreign Service personnel are fundamentally fair and trustworthy.
- The Office of Performance Evaluation (HR/PE) effectively organizes and supports the work of a multitude of annual boards that evaluate and reward Foreign Service personnel. Recruitment of personnel qualified to serve on the boards is a daunting task.
- Procedural safeguards are adequate but should be enhanced.
- Board members take their responsibilities very seriously, consider themselves bound by their oaths, and zealously protect the confidentiality of their deliberations. Other than the members, no one is allowed in the room where/when a board is voting.
- The procedures for forwarding recommendations by the Department Senior Review Board (DSRB) for presidential awards to the Interagency Selection Board (IASB) and the Secretary of State should be better documented.
- Longevity of service and depth of experience among key personnel in HR/PE result in a pattern in which members seem to perform their duties almost by rote. The complicated processes should be codified in a single procedural manual.
- Incorporation of technological advances (particularly digital access to performance files) has increased the efficiency of promotion board deliberations. However, there are cogent reservations relative to the concept of moving to “virtual” boards – even though that might reduce costs and ease the burden of composing the boards.

- The prospective, approximately 30 percent, expansion in the cadre of Foreign Service personnel between FY 2009 and FY 2013 will increase the workload on all aspects of performance evaluation. Implications for efficient management of the anticipated work should be addressed by Department management.

**Also, the report, *Review of the Integrity and Fairness of the Foreign Service Selection Board Process* did not document any abuses, but the review made thirteen recommendations including:**

- **Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Human Resources should certify that the results of each selection or other performance board have been signed or initialed by each member of the respective board before that board is dismissed. (Action: DGHR)
- **Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop and implement a process to obtain a signed pledge from each member of a promotion or other performance board to protect the confidentiality of the materials and deliberations of the board on which he or she is a member. The pledge also should specify that any introduction into board deliberations of non-record material will be reported to the director of the Office of Performance Evaluation. A copy of each signed pledge should be retained as part of the final report of the board in question. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with L)
- **Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Human Resources should amend relevant voting procedures to specify that a board member who is recused for any reason from consideration of a candidate's file must, thereafter, refrain from assigning a rank-order score to that candidate or participating in any discussions relevant to the individual. The bureau should seek incorporation of appropriate, explicit language in future precepts. (Action: DGHR)
- **Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Human Resources should consult with the Office of the Legal Adviser to formulate broader bases on which a Foreign Service employee can request recusal of a member of a selection board, then negotiate with the American Foreign Service Association to incorporate those changes in promotion board precepts. (Action: DGHR)
- **Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of Human Resources should discontinue annotation of any promotion lists provided to selection boards and to delete the relevant language from Selection Board Voting Procedures. (Action: DGHR)

- **Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Executive Secretariat and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should clarify regulations to reflect the Secretary's discretion in recommending candidates to the IASB. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with S/ES and L)
- **Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Management and the Executive Secretariat, should develop procedures to ensure that the decisions of the Secretary relative to recommendations and nomination of officers for presidential awards are made matters of record in the form of personnel channel action memoranda. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with M/PRI and S/ES)
- **Recommendation 8:** The Bureau of Human Resources should negotiate with the American Foreign Service Association to incorporate in the Precepts, a requirement that the members of each specialist board include at least two nonspecialist Foreign Service personnel. (Action: DGHR)
- **Recommendation 9:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop and incorporate in Department regulations the definition of conditions leading to formation of a reconstituted board, its purpose, membership, authorities, and responsibilities. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with L)
- **Recommendation 10:** The Bureau of Human Resources should develop and adopt a consolidated procedural manual for Office of Performance Evaluation operations and use it to brief and train assigned personnel. (Action: DGHR)
- **Recommendation 11:** The Bureau of Human Resources should ascertain the adequacy of the number of personnel to process the performance evaluation workload that will emerge from the prospective increase in the numbers of Foreign Service personnel. This assessment should encompass the related issue of office space and automation that may be required within the Office of Performance Evaluation for both staff and performance boards. (Action: DGHR)
- **Recommendation 12:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Management, should form a task force to analyze and make recommendations on plans to process the performance-related workload that will emerge as a result of the expanded Foreign Service. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with M/PRI)
- **Recommendation 13:** The Bureau of Human Resources should conduct a thorough cost/benefit analysis of the virtual board process including the

communications-related security/privacy aspects implied in use of virtual boards before further implementation of the concept of virtual boards.  
(Action: DGHR)

**Question5d:**

Where does the appointment of a permanent Inspector General stand? (IG)

**Answer:**

OIG Response:

OIG is unaware of any nomination by the Administration of a permanent Inspector General for the Department of State. Currently, Amb. Harry W. Geisel serves as the Deputy Inspector General.

**Question 7:**

On the issue of Nyi Nyi Aung, the U.S. citizen imprisoned and tortured in Burma, I request the following information: has the State Department formally raised this case with officials from the Burmese junta? On what specific dates, at what specific locations and at what diplomatic level have these demarches been made?

**Answer:**

Throughout the detention of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka, Nyi Nyi Aung), the Department of State has engaged Burmese authorities at senior levels to press for his fair treatment, protest reported mistreatment, and urge more frequent consular access. We have repeatedly made clear to the Burmese government that Mr. Lwin's immediate release is a high priority for the United States Government, both within the Administration and within the Congress.

Given the sensitivities surrounding the detention of Mr. Lwin and the importance of this case, we believe an in-person briefing is the best way to provide you with information on our diplomatic overtures in this case. The State Department is prepared to brief you and your staff about our efforts in Mr. Lwin's case at your convenience.

**Question 8:**

Madam Secretary, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act is a key legacy issue of our former Chairman and dear colleague Tom Lantos. The State Department has informed us in writing (on February 5<sup>th</sup>) of some of the impediments to implementation of a Kimberley-like process to restrict the international trade in Burmese rubies and jadeite as was done with conflict diamonds. However, the State Department has nonetheless pledged to “continue to explore this issue with other governments” including Thailand, China, India and the EU.

- What concrete measures will the Department undertake to ensure international support for implementation of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act?

**Answer:**

As noted in both the GAO report and in our correspondence with you on the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, there is little international support for the kind of global mechanism restricting trade in rubies and jadeite called for in the legislation. We will continue to discuss this issue with other key actors and we will continue to reaffirm with all relevant parties the need to maintain sanctions in the face of a lack of concrete progress by Burmese authorities.

**Question 9:**

For each category below, please provide us with the total amounts that you intend to spend in FY10 and (based on the budget request) in FY11 on the following activities prioritized in the North Korean Human Rights Act (P.L. 108-333), which was recently reauthorized and strengthened by Public Law 110-346:

- Support for human rights and democracy programs aimed at North Koreans (Sec. 102 of P.L. 108-333); Radio broadcasting for North Korea (Sec. 103); Actions to promote freedom of information inside North Korea (Sec. 104); and Humanitarian assistance to North Koreans outside of North Korea, including refugees and trafficking victims (Sec. 203).

**Answer:**

The U.S. Government remains deeply concerned about the deplorable human rights situation in North Korea, and the plight of North Korean refugees. Human rights are a top U.S. priority. Addressing human rights issues will have a significant impact on the prospect for closer ties between the U.S. and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The U.S. Government continues to identify concrete ways to address the DPRK's human rights abuses, including working through nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and with bilateral partners, to increase freedom of information and broadcasting efforts, and build the capacity of the human rights advocacy community.

In FY2010, pending the Foreign Assistance Act's required consultations with the Committees on Appropriations, we plan to allocate funds in the following areas:

Support for human rights and democracy programs aimed at North Koreans	Sec. 102 of P.L. 108-333	\$2.5 Million
Broadcasting for North Korea and actions to promote freedom of information inside North Korea	Sec. 103 and Sec. 104	\$1 Million
	Broadcasting Board of Governors	\$8.256 Million

In FY2011, we have requested funds for allocation in the following areas:

Support for human rights and democracy programs aimed at North Koreans	Sec. 102 of P.L. 108-333	\$1.5 Million
Broadcasting for North Korea and actions to promote freedom of information inside North Korea	Sec. 103 and Sec. 104	\$1 Million
	Broadcasting Board of Governors	\$8.134 Million

Both the FY2010 and FY2011 areas of spending are estimates. Funds may shift between the human rights and democracy category and the broadcasting and freedom of information category based on the absorptive capacity of the NGO community and evolving needs. In addition, we often fund programs that promote objectives across

categories. These valuable crosscutting programs are often difficult to capture when estimating spending by specific area of work.

The Department is currently programming humanitarian assistance to North Koreans outside of the DPRK, including refugees and human trafficking victims, for FY2010 and intends to provide humanitarian assistance to this population in FY2011. We are happy to arrange a classified briefing on our current programs and projections.

**Question 10:**

Madam Secretary, earlier this month U.S. Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, reportedly stated that the U.S. and Russia have agreed that a new arms control treaty (START) will mention a link between offensive nuclear arms and defenses against them.

- Please comment on what exactly was agreed to on this issue and whether the language will explicitly or implicitly limit U.S. efforts to deploy missile defense systems for itself or its allies.

**Answer:**

- In the Joint Understanding issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on July 6, 2009, President Obama reaffirmed a long-standing U.S. position when he acknowledged the interrelationship between offensive and defensive systems.
- It is not appropriate to comment on the details of an ongoing negotiation. However, the focus of the New START Treaty, as Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in London in April 2009, is strategic offensive arms, not missile defense systems.
- The United States has expressed its readiness to discuss the topic of missile defense, including potential cooperation, with Russia in a separate venue.

**Question 11:**

What is the U.S. policy on this matter and what steps are being taken to implement that policy before France approves this dangerous arms sale?

**Answer:**

We understand that reports of this potential sale have raised concerns among some of Russia's neighbors. Inflammatory comments from a senior Russian military officer added to this anxiety. Ultimately, details of this sale are a sovereign matter for France and Russia to decide, taking into account a host of factors, including international law and regional stability. We would urge all parties to focus on efforts to promote stability in the region and avoid actions that could escalate tensions. I made these points when I met with President Sarkozy in January.

**Question 12:**

Madam Secretary, please tell us whether the United States will provide defensive weapons to the military forces of Georgia to help deter a future attack by Russia. If not, why not?

**Answer:**

The Administration remains committed to supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia is focused on rebuilding Georgia's defense and security architecture and enhancing self-defense capabilities through an emphasis on doctrine, education, and training. This approach supports Georgian defense modernization and reform, helps Georgia in achieving its aspirations towards closer European and transatlantic integration, to include

potential NATO membership, and improves Georgia's ability to contribute to allied and coalition operations.

Additionally, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces train and equip infantry battalions for deployment to Afghanistan. Georgia will sustain this rotation for two years, has offered the forces without caveat, and will fight alongside the U.S. Marines as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Regional Command-South, Helmand Province.

**Question 13:**

What impact will Georgia's contribution to Afghanistan have on their own security capabilities needed to defend against the type of Russian aggression it experienced in August 2008—and, more importantly, what assurances does Georgia have from us that its defense will be respected by Russia as it deploys troops to Afghanistan?

**Answer:**

We welcome Georgia's continued support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, and Georgia's previous commitments in Iraq. We are providing extensive pre-deployment training support to the Georgian battalion scheduled to deploy with the U.S. Marines in Afghanistan this spring.

The United States maintains a bilateral security assistance program in Georgia, focused primarily on helping the Georgians with defense reform. We are also supporting the Georgian effort to deploy forces for service with ISAF in Afghanistan. We have pledged over \$1 billion in assistance to Georgia in the post-conflict period, a pledge fully implemented when President Obama signed the June 2009 emergency supplemental appropriating the last tranche of \$242 million.

In addition, the United States continues to strongly support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including by urging Russia to implement its 2008 ceasefire commitments and participate productively in the Geneva process.

**Question 14:**

Madam Secretary, last week it was reported that Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Riabkov, stated that Russia will honor a contract to deliver S-300 missiles to Iran and that Russia is against "crippling sanctions" on Iran.

- If not crippling sanctions, are we to assume Russia will only support weak and ineffective sanctions? Can these comments be interpreted as anything other than that Russia will not cooperate with us on issues relating to Iran?

**Answer:**

We are working very closely and in cooperation with Russia on our shared goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Russia does not support an Iran with nuclear weapons and – in addition to other helpful contributions to international nuclear nonproliferation efforts – voted in favor of the November 2009 IAEA Board of Governors resolution condemning Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA, its refusal to suspend enrichment, and its failure to comply with its Safeguards Agreement.

President Medvedev has repeatedly expressed frustration with Iran's un-cooperative behavior and called for "well-thought out and smart sanctions" to bring Iran back to negotiations on its nuclear program. We are talking frequently with Russia about next steps and look forward to their continued cooperation in an effective international sanctions regime.

We have repeatedly raised our concerns with Russia about a transfer of S-300 missiles, and to date that weapons system has not been delivered to Iran.

**Question 15:**

Madam Secretary, the U.S. is currently working with Central Asian countries to diversify our supply routes to Afghanistan.

- How do we balance between the need to cooperate with Central Asian states in the important resupply of our forces fighting terrorists in Afghanistan and the fact that some of the Central Asian governments with whom we may cooperate may in turn be feeding Islamic insurgencies by their corruption and repression?

**Answer:**

We can and are pursuing both of our objectives to promote stability and development in Afghanistan as well as to encourage greater political liberalization and respect for human rights in Central Asia.

The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is part of an overall strategy to support efforts in Afghanistan, and expanding cooperation with the Central Asia states to support efforts in Afghanistan is part of our overall strategy for Central Asia. Our Central Asia strategy includes other integrated priorities: we seek to promote development and diversification of the region's energy resources; we are working to encourage greater political liberalization and respect for human rights; we aim to help develop competitive market economies and promote economic reforms; and, we seek to address problems of poverty and food security. These issues are interconnected, and progress in one area can help reinforce progress in another area.

The United States has a long history of addressing areas of concern in both bilateral meetings with the governments of the region and through multilateral fora such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Department of State and USAID work with members of civil society and government officials to

improve governance and the rule of law, foster independent media, and advance religious freedom and civil liberties in Central Asia.

To promote stronger ties and practical cooperation, we have launched Annual Bilateral Consultations with the countries of Central Asia. Led by Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake, Jr., these consultations feature a structured dialogue to address the full range of bilateral issues. Each of the consultations covers inter-connected issues, such as energy, economic and political modernization, security, and people-to-people contacts. We aim to make progress in our relations with the countries of Central Asia in all of these areas. We understand that positive steps in one area can reinforce forward movement in others.

**Question 16:**

Madam Secretary, in light of the stated intention by newly-elected President Yanukovych in Ukraine to seek closer relations with Russia, how will such a reorientation of Ukrainian foreign policy impact the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership that was signed by our two countries in 2008 and which focuses on enhanced cooperation in the areas of defense, economics, trade, energy, democracy and emphasizes enhanced engagement between NATO and Ukraine?

**Answer:**

President Yanukovych has stated publicly that he supports strategic partnership with the United States and that he wishes to improve relations with Russia. We do not view these objectives as mutually exclusive, and we support Ukraine's right to chart its own foreign policy. The Obama Administration supports the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter and it will continue to form the basis of our strategic partnership with Ukraine. The United States supports Ukraine's deepening ties to NATO and to the European Union, recognizing that how far and how fast to proceed is a Ukrainian choice. We note that President

Yanukovich's first foreign visit was to Brussels; he has since travelled to Moscow and has been invited to Washington to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in April.

**Question 17:**

What will the State Department do to directly provide bilateral assistance through INCLE to the individual police forces in the Balkan states for improved operations, capacity and training to fight narcotics trafficking in the Balkans that may be providing financial support to extremists seeking to use that region as a staging ground for terrorist operations?

**Answer:**

Promoting the development of strong justice systems and criminal justice sector institutions are among the U.S. Government's principal foreign policy priorities in southeastern Europe. Rule of law is critical not only to the stability of the region, but to the aspirations of these nations for full integration into the European Union and Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as NATO.

The Department of State, through the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), has active bilateral law enforcement and criminal justice programs ongoing in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Croatia, with an average budget of \$25-30 million. The funding for these programs comes from the Assistance to Eastern Europe and Central Asia appropriation (AEECA), however, rather than International Narcotics, Crime and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding. The U.S. Agency for International Development also plays an important role in U.S. rule of law efforts through its broader constitutional, court and rule of law programs. These are also AEECA-funded programs, rather than Development Assistance (DA).

While each of the Department's Balkan programs is unique, the common program goals for all of the Department of State's programs include legal reform, police institution reforms, and capacity building for all parts of the criminal justice systems. Combating corruption is another cross-cutting priority. On the legal reform side, U.S. legal advisors – most of whom are Assistant U.S. Attorneys detailed from the U.S. Department of Justice – work with host government officials to modernize the criminal codes and criminal procedure codes and bring them into compliance with European and/or international standards – including provisions for the special investigative techniques needed to investigate and prosecute sophisticated criminal (or terrorist) organizations. They also work with local prosecutors to develop the skills needed to use those tools effectively and form task forces between host nation prosecutors and police to more effectively combat organized crime. INL has also provided support to develop and bring into operation an Organized Crime Court in Serbia. This court is currently hearing high-profile cases dealing with organized crime that affects not only Serbia, but the entire region.

In our policing programs, U.S. experts provide assistance tailored to the needs of each country, ranging building effective modern law enforcement agencies (organization, management, and internal affairs) to sophisticated applications, such as detecting/investigating financial crime, trafficking in persons, and, in some cases, war crimes. INL also supports integrated border management programs in the Balkans, including the development of information technology systems for border crossings, which are routinely used in the

investigation of criminal activity, and alerts officials of the movement of potential terrorists into (and between) Balkan countries.

To encourage regional cooperation, especially to counter transnational threats such as the flow of Afghan heroin through the Balkans to Europe, the Department funds two important regional programs, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative's Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime (SECI Center) in Bucharest, Romania. The ILEA brings law enforcement and other justice personnel together from neighboring countries to develop not only new skills, but solid personal and professional relationships. The SECI Center (soon to be renamed the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center or "SELEC") is an operational center staffed by police and customs officers from 13 countries of the region who facilitate information exchange and coordinate multi-country investigations and enforcement activities against criminal and terrorist groups. The program currently includes the assignment of a U.S. Department of Justice attorney-advisor who works with Center personnel to promote closer coordination between law enforcement operations and the critical follow-on prosecutions needed to dismantle criminal organizations.

Terrorism is a present concern throughout the region, and U.S. programs seek to provide countries with the legal frameworks and skills to confront it in its many manifestations – from clandestine movements, fraudulent documents and false citizenship claims, to money laundering and terrorist financing. INL-supported anti-organized crime and corruption courses have direct application to fighting terrorism and complex terrorist groups as well. Participants in these training activities have included members of special surveillance teams and special measures teams, including courses on the

following: informant management, advanced undercover techniques, advanced surveillance techniques, major case management, advanced firearms training, and fugitive tracking.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, we worked with the government to establish a Foreigners Affairs Service which has professionalized the issuance of immigration documentation, and worked to investigate and revoke citizenships of known and suspected terrorists. We have also helped to establish a modern, professional federal policing agency (the State Investigation and Protection Agency - SIPA), capable of tackling crime groups as well as a special rapid-reaction unit. We achieved a lot in assisting Bosnia protect its borders, including but not limited to providing an integrated management border system that enabled Bosnian border officials to have not only real-time data at all Bosnian entry/exit border points, but also access to Interpol and local warrants and the US Watch List. We are starting a biometric visa program which will enable Bosnia to track and ensure that persons entering Bosnia are, in fact, those who obtained the visas. Our legal and law enforcement advisors mentor Bosnian police and prosecutors on task force approach and handling terrorism cases, which resulted in a recent successful police raid on a secluded Wahabi village, as well as in several ongoing terrorism trials.

**Question 18:**

EUR - Why does the FY2011 budget proposal for Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding for the Balkans reduce total NADR funding to the Balkans by 7% from last year, with a 41% cut for funds to Bosnia? However, NADR funding to Bulgaria would increase by 38% and to Montenegro by 100%. Can you explain why these two countries would receive such a large increase when the rest of the region's funding was reduced?

**Answer:**

The overall drop in requested bilateral NADR funding to the Balkans can largely be accounted for by the shift of most funding in two NADR sub-accounts, the Counterterrorism Financing Program, and the Terrorist Interdiction Program, from bilateral to global line items in the FY11 request. These shifts were requested to provide flexibility to meet priority needs as they emerge. Operational plans for FY2011 will detail planned uses of these funds, some of which are likely to remain in the Balkan region. Additionally, the S/CT Antiterrorism Assistance Program is reorienting funding to high priority countries globally, and has reduced its request for funding in the Balkans. Additional NADR funds for the Balkans are included in the PM/WRA global account request for the International Trust Fund for Humanitarian Demining and Mine Victims Assistance in the Balkans.

For Bosnia, the shift in funding for the NADR Counterterrorism Financing sub-account from bilateral to global funding accounts for 17% of the drop in the request. The remaining 24% cut reflects the cyclical nature of funding for the Political-Military Bureau's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) Small Arms/Light Weapons Removal program in Bosnia: the funds appropriated in FY10 will suffice for a two year period.

Funding requested for Bulgaria NADR programs actually decreased from \$400,000 to zero in FY11, as previous-year funds will be used to maintain the program.

The additional funding requested for Montenegro is for an ongoing Conventional Weapons Destruction program that received FY08 and FY09 funding out of the

PM/WRA global account. The FY11 budget simply reflects a shift in the line items, not a change to the program.

**Question 19:**

How useful are a number of our NATO allies in standing up to terrorism, deterring aggression and bearing their share of the burden of military operations, and what concretely is the Department of State doing to support the President's call for our allies to do so and to persuade them to end unwise arms sales to Russia, refuse to sell arms to China and so on?

**Answer:**

We deeply appreciate the contributions and sacrifices of our NATO Allies in the cause of ensuring peace and security for our transatlantic community and working closely to help build stability around the world. Nowhere is this commitment more clearly demonstrated than in Afghanistan, where our Allies provide over 36,000 troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (and non-NATO troop contributors provide another 3,000 personnel). Over 650 non-U.S. Allied servicemen and women have given their lives in Afghanistan. Moreover, Allies and ISAF contributors have responded to the President's decision to deploy 30,000 more U.S. troops with a commitment to contribute approximately 9,500 more troops to the effort in Afghanistan in 2010.

Our NATO Allies join us in many collective security efforts, both through NATO or bilaterally or through other key organizations like the EU. Such efforts include counter-terrorism and counter-piracy naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, intelligence sharing, cooperation on homeland security, and close diplomatic coordination on non-proliferation and arms control issues. Finally, along with all of the new security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, our NATO Allies also remain

dedicated to the core tenet of the Alliance – the Article 5 commitment to collective security and the proven deterrent that such a commitment has offered over the decades .

While we and our Allies do not always see eye to eye on every international security issue, these are more differences over tactics than over fundamental strategy and values. Broadly speaking, we engage in a constant, deep, and valuable dialogue with our NATO Allies and other European partners in seeking the right balance between legitimate economic interest and regional and global stability and security.

**Question 20:**

Could you please describe the Administration’s transition strategy for Iraq, more broadly, and the role of the State Department within that strategy, in particular? Has the State Department developed a written strategy for Iraq transition? If so, would you please provide it to the Committee? If not, would you please provide the Committee at the very least, a written outline.

**Answer:**

The Administration’s strategy is to responsibly end the war through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility; build a lasting partnership with the Iraqi people and government, and support Iraq’s productive reintegration into the region.

The broad contours of the U.S. transition strategy have been largely set by the President’s Camp Lejeune speech, the U.S. – Iraq Security Agreement, and the U.S. – Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. The Administration has adopted a “whole of government” approach to the transition. Led by Vice President Biden, the Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID and the rest of the interagency are working together in lock-step to assure a smooth transition. Through a robust interagency committee structure – both here in Washington and in Baghdad– the State Department plays a lead role in determining which tasks currently performed by the U.S. military will

transition to the Iraqis, which will transition to State or other civilian agencies, and which tasks will sunset. A separate but closely related committee structure within the Department is actively planning for the future of those tasks that will transition to State.

In addition, starting in May of 2009 and ending in November, the interagency undertook a long-term transition planning process, and determined the programs and capabilities vital for a smooth transition from DoD to the Iraqis, and from DoD to State. The results of this review process are carefully reflected in our FY10 Supplemental and FY11 request.

An interagency team from State, DOD and USAID will jointly brief House and Senate oversight committee staffs and provide a detailed outline on transition planning on March 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>. We plan to provide Sensitive but Unclassified documents at those briefings. We welcome the opportunity to provide this or a more detailed brief to you or your staff, upon request.

**Question 21:**

When will INL assume responsibility for the police training program in Iraq? What is the strategy and timeline for this process?

**Answer:**

The State Department, in partnership with the Government of Iraq (GOI), will assume full responsibility for police training in Iraq on October 1, 2011.

Sustaining the progress that the Iraqi Security Forces have made over the past several years is vital to Iraq's stability and future as a society governed by rule of law and is crucial to achieving a stable, secure, and self-reliant Iraq. The police development program, as it transitions to Department of State management, will shift from a counterinsurgency mission to a civilian police model focusing on community policing. The State-led program will provide senior levels of the Iraqi Police Services and Ministry of Interior with the management, leadership and technical skills to maintain Iraq's internal security and support the rule of law. It will differ considerably from the current police training program, both in size and scope by emphasizing advanced professional, management, and leadership skills over basic training. The GOI has indicated to us that it wants the next phase of training to focus on such higher-order skills. The State-led program is designed to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for the police development mission to the GOI during the next several years.

The State Department is working closely with the Department of Defense to insure a smooth transition of responsibility for the police development program in Iraq. Some of the major milestones in the planning process are:

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| <b>March 2009 to Present</b> | Ongoing planning for INL program development in conjunction with GOI.                   |
| <b>August 2009</b>           | Police Development concept approved by Deputies Committee.                              |
| <b>November 2009</b>         | Established police transition team.   |
| <b>Summer 2010</b>           | Obtain GOI commitment for use of property/facilities.                                   |
| <b>Sum/ Fall 2010</b>        | Upon receipt of funding begin aircraft and vehicle procurement and facilities upgrades. |

**January to July 2011** Senior police program management staff deploy.

**August 2011** Facilities upgrades complete.

**September 2011** All remaining advisors and police program staff deploy.

**October 1, 2011** State assumes responsibility for Iraq police program.

**Question 23:**

As it pertains to United States security assistance to Yemen, could you comment on whether the Administration is considering developing a mechanism similar to the PCCF?

- a. Can you comment on the level of cooperation between the State Department and Defense Department as it pertains to the implementation of US security assistance programs to Yemen? How are our nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs (NADR) (NAY-DUHR) and our anti-terrorism assistance programs coordinated with our FMF, 1206 and other activities to ensure that our programs are well-synchronized?
- b. Is the Administration looking at other models, such as the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capabilities Fund, to provide security assistance to Yemen?

**Answer:**

At the strategic level, all U.S. security assistance programs to Yemen (to include NADR, FMF, IMET, 1206, and others) are coordinated between staff at the Departments of State and Defense as well as through the National Security Council, which convenes interagency meetings when necessary to provide oversight and policy guidance. Country team personnel from all relevant agencies on the ground in Sana'a identify program needs, draft proposals, and synchronize assistance to prevent overlap and meet U.S. policy aims.

The Administration continues to examine both existing and potential alternative models for providing security assistance, but has not requested an alternative mechanism.

**Question 25:**

Given the gravity of the situation in Yemen, would the Administration commit to provide to Congress a multi-year, comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan for long-term security and stability in Yemen, to include: A financial plan and description of the resources, programming, and management of United States foreign assistance to Yemen, including the criteria used to determine their prioritization; and a complete description of both the evaluation process for reviewing and adjusting the strategy and implementation as necessary, and measures of effectiveness for the implementation of the strategy?

**Answer:**

The Administration has a whole-of-government approach to Yemen that aims to mobilize and coordinate with other international actors to help Yemen address the root causes of instability, encourage political reconciliation, improve governance, and build the capacity of Yemen's government to exercise its authority, protect and deliver services to its people, and secure its territory. Implementation plans for the Strategy are under continuous interagency review to incorporate changes in Yemen and internationally.

USAID's Yemen Country Strategy is publicly available online at:

[http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle\\_east/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen2010-2012Strategy.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen2010-2012Strategy.pdf)

The Administration looks forward to continuing to consult Congress through briefings and hearings.

**Question 26:**

Regarding the \$400 million in ESF for the West Bank and Gaza, what is our plan for phasing out this assistance to the Palestinians, particularly the use of the cash transfer? Please elaborate.

**Answer:**

The achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace that includes a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a U.S. national security priority and a focus of U.S. Government programs in the region. The Department's \$400.4 million request in FY2011 for the West Bank and Gaza ESF program provides support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to build transparent, accountable, and credible institutions of government; encourage economic development that can provide jobs for the Palestinian people; deliver higher quality government services; promote the rule of law in areas under the PA's control; and continue humanitarian and recovery assistance to the people of Gaza. Our assistance matches the priorities in PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's two-year reform and institution-building program, which aims to establish the foundations of an independent, viable Palestinian state that can meet the needs of its citizens without reliance on external donor support.

Prime Minister Fayyad has proven to be a good steward of donor resources, using donor support in a transparent and accountable manner to provide services to the Palestinian people, pursue institutional reforms, and improve the PA's fiscal position by paying off accumulated arrears. Prime Minister Fayyad's institutional reforms are lowering the PA's dependency on donor assistance. In 2008, the PA required \$1.8 billion in foreign donor assistance to meet its recurrent expenses. In 2009, the PA's recurrent deficit dropped to \$1.45 billion. The PA anticipates that it will need \$1.2 billion in 2010 to meet its recurrent expenses, and that external budgetary support will drop to 16% of GDP this year from 22% in 2009. Continued support from the U.S. government and the

international community for Prime Minister Fayyad's institution-building priorities will help the PA continue this positive trajectory.

**Question 27a:**

Could you elaborate on the FY 2011 request for \$250 million in ESF for Egypt?

**Answer:**

Economic assistance supports development objectives in Egypt as well as our bilateral engagement on political and economic reforms. We believe it crucial to maintain a robust ESF program focused on human resource development that provides visible assistance to the Egyptian people. Funds will improve coverage of primary health care among underserved populations and promote reforms and systematic improvements in the education sector. Together with job-creation programs, these initiatives will allow

more sustained and broad-based economic growth for the 40 percent of Egyptians living

in poverty. ESF for Egypt will continue to support efforts to increase access to justice and the protection of human rights, strengthen participatory local governance, and enhance the capacity of civil society organizations and the media.

USAID plans to ramp up its focus on basic and higher education to improve the quality of education available in Egypt, while the economic growth program will focus on workforce constraints to help more Egyptians transition from school to work. We will also provide assistance to support reforms prioritized in the reinvigorated trade dialogue and to boost capacity in the health sector. Programs will also continue the important work of promoting democracy and governance in Egypt. USG activity in these sectors will go a long way towards improving the lives of Egyptians as well as reinforcing positive messages about U.S. policy in Egypt.

**Question 27b:**

What performance metrics and evaluation mechanisms does the Administration have in place to ensure that these funds are spent effectively?

**Answer:**

USAID complies with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 which establishes requirements for strategic planning and performance measurement for all USG agencies. USAID/ Egypt, in conjunction with its counterparts in Washington is responsible for measuring progress towards the results identified in the planning stage of all projects to achieve foreign assistance objectives. The concept of performance management encompasses the tools used by the mission for assessing, learning, and reporting.

Performance Management tools used by USAID/Egypt include:

1. A mission developed performance management plan (PMP) that includes sets of indicators, with established targets, measuring results identified in the planning stage of each project. The PMP is used in monitoring the achievements of program operations.
2. Mission conducts semi-annual portfolio reviews of implementation and performance for each project. The portfolio reviews allow the mission to analyze performance information to track progress toward planned results. The mission uses performance information and evaluations to influence decision-making and resource allocation.
3. Formative evaluations are conducted on a periodic basis to identify the reasons for success or lack of it, to assess effects and impacts, or to indicate which, among a

range of program or project/activity alternatives, is the most efficient and effective. Summative evaluations are conducted at the end of projects to draw lessons for future interventions.

4. The USAID/Egypt mission is in the process of developing a performance management information system that will standardize tracking of performance and facilitate information retrieval and analysis.

**Question 27c:**

Given Egypt's continued failure in meeting economic and political reform benchmarks, is the Administration planning to phase out ESF to Egypt?

**Answer:**

The USG remains committed to supporting programs that promote political pluralism, good governance, and greater respect for the rule of law and human rights, in order to improve the implementation of constitutional and legal guarantees for rights, freedoms, and accountable public institutions. A similar percentage of the bilateral budget as in the past will fund programs addressing three priorities: access to justice and the protection of human rights, participatory local governance, and civil society (including the media).

The USG also remains committed to supporting economic growth and development in Egypt. Programmatically, decreasing the ESF program would severely limit our ability to carry out the USAID economic growth portfolio, including the USG Trade Initiative, particularly given the significant amounts of ESF earmarked for education and democracy and governance programming.

The policy implications of any unilateral cut to ESF would be substantial. Unilateral reductions will be seen by Egypt as a declining measure of the importance of U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, which would undermine bilateral cooperation on regional policy efforts in which Egypt is a significant actor, and undercut a robust development package aimed at building a more prosperous and democratic Egypt.

**Question 28:**

Madam Secretary, in FY 2010, the Administration contributed over \$267 million to UNRWA, even as we ran up trillion-dollar deficits. Last year, when Deputy Secretary Lew testified before our Committee on your FY 2010 budget request, he stated that UNRWA receives “the highest level of scrutiny” by the State Department. But UNRWA does not even vet its staff and aid recipients through U.S. watch lists for ties to violent extremist groups, in contravention of U.S. law – and State still has not required them to do so. The homicide bomber who killed 7 Americans at a base in Afghanistan previously worked in an UNRWA camp and had significant radical Islamist ties. UNRWA also continues to agitate against Israel and in favor of groups like Hamas. But the Administration just announced another \$40 million for UNRWA.

Madam Secretary, what’s it going to take for the Administration to cut off UNRWA?

**Answer:**

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides critical humanitarian services for 4.7 million Palestinian refugees and is a critical force for stability, especially in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. The Department continues to value UNRWA as a counterweight to extremism in the region. Without UNRWA, basic life-sustaining needs would either not be met or, more likely, would be met by extremist groups for political rather than humanitarian reasons. The Department of State continues to be vigilant about complying with U.S. laws designed to prevent potential support to terrorists and has taken significant steps to ensure that UNRWA remains effective, neutral, and impartial, including but not

limited to monitoring UNRWA's conformance with funding conditions of section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, as amended.

With funding provided in the FY 2009 supplemental appropriations bill to review programs in the West Bank and Gaza, the State Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a limited-scope review of UNRWA staff union elections in Gaza. The OIG issued its report on February 26, 2010, which noted that the "Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and UNRWA have extensive policies and procedures to monitor and evaluate compliance with both the UN neutrality policy and section 301(c)." UNRWA takes significant steps to prevent its programs from benefitting terrorists. For example, the Agency: (1) conducts criminal background checks on potential employees; (2) shares lists of its staff with relevant governments, including Israel; (3) prohibits staff participation in political activities; (4) notifies staff regularly on UN neutrality policies and procedures; and (5) screens against the UN 1267 list on a semiannual basis the names of all 4.7 million registered Palestine refugees, all UNRWA staff members and all persons and entities to whom or to which the Agency makes payments.

The Department will continue to monitor UNRWA closely to ensure that USG assistance is used as intended to support critical humanitarian services for Palestinian refugees.

**Question 29:**

Madam Secretary, on February 26, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that again endorses, if this time implicitly, the biased "Goldstone Report" which accused Israel of deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians for attack during Operation Cast Lead. While the U.S. has opposed multiple UN measures to endorse the Goldstone Report, Administration officials have also repeatedly legitimized the Report, claiming that it raises "serious" issues and needs to be considered "seriously". Will the

Administration commit, consistent with House Resolution 867, to opposing any consideration of the Goldstone Report in international forums?

**Answer:**

We have repeatedly expressed our view that the Goldstone Report is deeply flawed, even as we strongly support accountability for alleged human rights and international humanitarian law violations in relation to the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict. Among the Report's shortcomings are its unbalanced focus on Israel, the negative inferences it draws about Israel's intentions and actions, its failure to deal adequately with the asymmetrical nature of the Gaza conflict, and its failure to assign appropriate responsibility to Hamas for deliberately targeting civilians and basing itself and its operations in heavily civilian-populated urban areas. The Goldstone Report is also problematic in its many overreaching recommendations and its sweeping legal and political conclusions.

We have consistently maintained that thorough, independent and credible domestic investigations and follow-up are the appropriate measures for addressing the allegations contained in the report.

The United States opposed the February 26 UN General Assembly resolution following up on the Goldstone Report. In a statement to the General Assembly, we reiterated our view that the allegations in the Goldstone report should be resolved by credible domestic investigations and follow up, as well as our commitment to safeguarding the ongoing efforts to restart permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

As we move forward, we will continue to work with Israel and other key countries to promote a constructive approach that emphasizes the key role of domestic investigations and serves to further our ultimate goal of achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians.

**Question 30:**

Madam Secretary, the budget request includes over \$75 million for the UN Development Program. UNDP's board is chaired by Iran. UNDP has been accused of mismanagement and misuse of funds from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. Further, UNDP is now reopening in North Korea, which it left after allegations that it allowed assistance to benefit Kim Jong Il's regime. And UNDP admits that it will select North Korean personnel from a list handpicked by the regime.

- A. So why, Madam Secretary, are we continuing to send money to UNDP?
- B. Why should U.S. taxpayers be indirectly supporting the regime in Pyongyang?
- C. Why are U.S. officials continuing to attend UNDP board meetings, in violation of a Congressional prohibition on attending meetings of international organizations run by state sponsors of terrorism like Iran?

**Answer:**

As required by section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the United States withholds from U.S. contributions to UNDP the U.S. share of UNDP funds expended in North Korea and other specified countries. As a result, the amount the Department provides to UNDP continues to be less than appropriated.

Since March 2007, when UNDP suspended its operations in North Korea, the State Department has worked with UNDP management and other members of the Executive Board to institute a set of management and program monitoring mechanisms for UNDP programs. These include the following oversight mechanisms:

- (a) Human resource management, including discontinuing sub-contracting of national staff members by the government, more competitive recruitment, staff evaluation and selection entirely at the discretion of UNDP, agreement directly with an individual to become a UNDP staff member, and direct payment of salaries and entitlements to individuals;
- (b) Finance and banking, including local payments made in local currency and the agreement by the government to meet global UNDP banking standards;
- (c) Strengthened monitoring and evaluation, with the addition of an international monitoring and evaluation specialist in the country office, regular visits to projects, and ample reporting on a regular basis on the implementation of these measures as well as on the overall program.
- (d) Transparent communication, in line with UNDP worldwide standards.

In the North Korean context, the Government of the DPRK has agreed to give UNDP unhindered access to project sites and given assurances that UNDP will be able to physically verify the appropriate use of all project equipment and assets. UNDP will also establish a website on its DPRK program that will include detailed information on procurement and operations and will be available to the public.

Based on UNDP's commitment to enhanced oversight mechanisms for the DPRK program and because of our general principle to help the people of developing countries make positive changes to improve their political and economic well-being, the United States agreed with the majority of the UNDP Board to resume operations in North Korea.

We will monitor UNDP's implementation of their new management and oversight plan and work to ensure that UNDP operations serve the people, not oppressive regimes.

When we are aware of reports of irregularities or concerns in UNDP programs, we follow up with the management to address them immediately.

As a member of the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board, it is important that the United States participate in the negotiation, formulation, and approval of decisions that guide the policy of the UNDP. If the United States does not send delegations to the Executive Board, it cannot engage in the direct diplomacy critical to shaping the Executive Board's guidance for the organization in a way that reflects U.S. policies and concerns.

Iran's presidency of the UNDP Board expired at the end of 2009. The nation of Antigua and Barbuda is the new 2010 President of the Executive Board.

**Question 31:**

Madam Secretary, our Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, has spoken of a "new approach" at the UN consistent with a "new era of engagement." But the key element of this "new approach" is that the U.S. has unconditionally surrendered our strongest leverage to produce real change at the UN: our funding. Instead of conditioning our contributions on real reform, the U.S. has paid billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to the UN – no questions asked, no matter what outrages the UN commits. And what did we get in return? The AP reported last month that "The United Nations has cut back sharply on investigations into corruption and fraud within its ranks, shelving cases involving the possible theft or misuse of millions of dollars."

So what's it going to take, Madam Secretary, for the U.S. to finally condition our contributions to the UN on real reform?

**Answer:**

We take very seriously our responsibility to U.S. taxpayers that our contributions to the UN are being spent in a transparent, ethical, efficient, and effective manner. The United States has long insisted that the UN must robustly guard against fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Our commitment is unwavering.

We believe that the Office of Internal Oversight Services is and must be at the forefront in this effort. Due in large part to U.S. efforts, working with a coalition of like-minded states, the UN General Assembly agreed in December 2008 to transfer the functions of the Procurement Task Force (PTF), which had been established on a temporary basis, into the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). While that transition has not gone smoothly, we continue to advocate for a robust investigation function in OIOS.

We have been working to ensure that consistent with the mandate from the UN General Assembly, the OIOS Investigations Division has the expertise, capacity, and independence to effectively investigate allegations of fraud, corruption, and misconduct in the procurement area.

In general, we do not support withholding U.S. assessed contributions. It is important that we honor our treaty obligations. In addition, we do not believe that withholding has been shown to be an effective means of influencing an organization's policies. Withholding can make the work of a Secretariat more difficult, but has not swayed the decisions made by the governing bodies, where policies are determined.

The United States is committed to making further improvements in UN management, accountability, and transparency. The United States will continue to engage closely with Secretary-General Ban and other UN members to seek collaborative approaches to improving the UN's effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency.

We will continue to be a driving force for efforts to promote ethical conduct, accountability, and oversight throughout the UN system. U.S. leadership is essential to continued progress on UN management reforms.

**Question 32:**

Madam Secretary, last year the U.S. joined the misnamed UN “Human Rights Council,” seeking to change it from within. Many of us criticized that decision at the time, believing the Council was deeply structurally flawed and that U.S. participation would only legitimize the Council’s biased behavior. Several months later, the Council remains a swamp of anti-Israel, anti-freedom bias. It mandated and endorsed the anti-Israel Goldstone Report. And UN Watch, which monitors the Council, recently reported that the Council remains unchanged, and that the U.S. has taken few real steps at the Council to advance our interests or combat human rights abuses.

- a. Madam Secretary, where’s the beef?
- b. If the U.S. joined the Council to change it from within, why has the U.S. not called for a special session of the Council on Iran, even as Iran has repeatedly and brutally repressed its own people?
- c. Why has the U.S. not introduced and pushed for a resolution condemning the Iranian regime’s human rights violations?
- d. Why has the U.S. not called for a special session of the Council on North Korea, or Syria, or Sudan?
- e. Why has the U.S. not introduced and pushed for a resolution condemning human rights violations by Cuba, or Syria, or Sudan? Or by Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela, or Russia?

**Answer:**

The U.S. has a clear strategy for the Human Rights Council -- promoting and helping the Council operate in a more effective way. This way must be based on human rights principles and focus effectively on those places where human rights abuses are occurring. We have four clear objectives 1) supporting strong and unbiased country mandates; 2) ending the disproportionate attention to Israel; 3 strengthening the special procedures mechanisms; and, 4) planning a thoughtful and a thorough process to the 2011 HRC review. Iran is one of our most pressing human rights concerns. As the result of robust U.S. diplomacy, Iran’s Universal Periodic Review featured strong statements from over 20 like-minded countries highlighting the poor state of human rights in Iran and over 145 on-the-record recommendations to the Government of Iran on how to improve the

state of human rights in the country. We believe it is also very important for the Council to focus on the human rights abuses that are taking place in Burma, North Korea, Sudan, and other countries of concern, and to ensure that focus on these abuses is maintained and addressed. Even before we became a full member, for example, we worked with our allies to preserve the Council's mandate on human rights in Sudan.

**Table 12h: Family Planning and Reproductive Health by Account  
FY 2011**  
(\$000)

	FY 2011 Total	GHCS-USAID	ESF	AEECA	IO&P
<b>TOTAL</b>	715,740	590,000	65,267	10,473	50,000
<b>Africa</b>	304,776	304,776	-	-	-
Angola	4,000	4,000	-	-	-
Benin	3,000	3,000	-	-	-
Democratic Republic of the Congo	13,500	13,500	-	-	-
Ethiopia	35,000	35,000	-	-	-
Ghana	15,000	15,000	-	-	-
Guinea	3,000	3,000	-	-	-
Kenya	26,000	26,000	-	-	-
Liberia	7,000	7,000	-	-	-
Madagascar	14,000	14,000	-	-	-
Malawi	15,000	15,000	-	-	-
Mali	10,000	10,000	-	-	-
Mozambique	14,000	14,000	-	-	-
Nigeria	30,300	30,300	-	-	-
Rwanda	14,000	14,000	-	-	-
Senegal	13,000	13,000	-	-	-
South Africa	1,500	1,500	-	-	-
Sudan	6,000	6,000	-	-	-
Tanzania	27,000	27,000	-	-	-
Uganda	23,000	23,000	-	-	-
Zambia	14,000	14,000	-	-	-
Zimbabwe	2,000	2,000	-	-	-
USAID Africa Regional	2,250	2,250	-	-	-
USAID East Africa Regional	2,950	2,950	-	-	-
USAID West Africa Regional	9,276	9,276	-	-	-
<b>East Asia and Pacific</b>	26,500	26,500	-	-	-
Cambodia	6,000	6,000	-	-	-
Philippines	18,500	18,500	-	-	-
Timor-Leste	2,000	2,000	-	-	-
<b>Europe and Eurasia</b>	8,790	-	-	8,790	-
Albania	530	-	-	530	-
Armenia	790	-	-	790	-
Azerbaijan	980	-	-	980	-
Georgia	1,500	-	-	1,500	-
Russia	2,852	-	-	2,852	-
Ukraine	1,900	-	-	1,900	-

**Table 12h: Family Planning and Reproductive Health by Account**  
**FY 2011**

(\$000)

	FY 2011 Total	GHCS-USAID	ESF	AEECA	IO&P
Eurasia Regional	166	-	-	166	-
Europe Regional	72	-	-	72	-
<b>Near East</b>	<b>29,850</b>	<b>8,000</b>	<b>21,850</b>	-	-
Egypt	5,000	-	5,000	-	-
Iraq	3,850	-	3,850	-	-
Jordan	13,000	-	13,000	-	-
Yemen	8,000	8,000	-	-	-
<b>South and Central Asia</b>	<b>131,700</b>	<b>86,600</b>	<b>43,417</b>	<b>1,683</b>	-
Afghanistan	32,520	12,500	20,020	-	-
Bangladesh	26,600	26,600	-	-	-
India	24,000	24,000	-	-	-
Kazakhstan	300	-	-	300	-
Kyrgyz Republic	175	-	-	175	-
Nepal	11,000	11,000	-	-	-
Pakistan	35,897	12,500	23,397	-	-
Tajikistan	905	-	-	905	-
Turkmenistan	157	-	-	157	-
Uzbekistan	146	-	-	146	-
<b>Western Hemisphere</b>	<b>36,300</b>	<b>36,300</b>	-	-	-
Bolivia	9,100	9,100	-	-	-
Guatemala	6,600	6,600	-	-	-
Haiti	9,000	9,000	-	-	-
Honduras	3,500	3,500	-	-	-
Nicaragua	2,700	2,700	-	-	-
Peru	3,900	3,900	-	-	-
USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional	1,500	1,500	-	-	-
<b>Asia Middle East Regional</b>	<b>2,300</b>	<b>2,300</b>	-	-	-
Asia Middle East Regional	2,300	2,300	-	-	-
<b>Global Health</b>	<b>100,524</b>	<b>100,524</b>	-	-	-
Global Health - Core	100,524	100,524	-	-	-
<b>International Partnerships</b>	<b>25,000</b>	<b>25,000</b>	-	-	-
New Partners Fund	5,000	5,000	-	-	-
Global Health Initiative Strategic Reserve	20,000	20,000	-	-	-
<b>International Organizations</b>	<b>50,000</b>	-	-	-	<b>50,000</b>
UNFPA UN Population Fund	50,000	-	-	-	50,000

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by  
Representative Shelley Berkley  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing  
Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal  
Year 2011 International Affairs Budget  
February 25, 2010**

*(Received after printing of transcript)*

**Question 2a:**

**Iran – Nuclear Weapons and Sanctions**

The most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report indicated that Iran has already begun efforts to enrich uranium to a 20 percent level, while its stockpile of low-enriched uranium is well over 4,500 pounds. When do you expect to see action by the Security Council on a new Iran resolution?

**Answer:**

There is growing understanding in the international community that Iran should face consequences for its defiance of international obligations regarding its nuclear program.

All of our partners in the P5+1 agree that we share a crucial goal of not allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity. And we all remain committed to achieving that goal via a dual-track policy – engagement and pressure.

We are having very serious and high-level conversations with our P5+1 partners and others about the importance of holding Iran accountable, including discussing how to operationalize the pressure track in more specific ways.

We want to make sure that at the end of this process, we have the appropriate measures in place to secure Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and UN Security Council Resolutions. We are making progress toward such an outcome, but it is unclear how long this will take.

**Question 2b:**

Once that vote takes place, when would you expect the sanctions to actually come into place?

**Answer:**

Generally speaking, once the UN Security Council adopts a Chapter VII resolution, Member States are obligated to begin taking steps to implement the adopted provisions.

**Question 2c:**

Once sanctions are actually in place, how long before they actually have an impact?

**Answer:**

In the past, we have seen some provisions make impacts very quickly. For example, the financial provisions of UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803 resulted in multiple banks around the world, including major institutions like Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered, and HSBC, freezing accounts and eventually cutting off business altogether with Iran. With other provisions, it depends on the ability of the UN Member State to implement the measures domestically.

**Question 2d:**

If other Security Council members do not support sanctions, what is our alternative strategy?

**Answer:**

Our focus at the moment is on building support for an UNSCR so as to sharpen the choices that Iran faces.

**Question 2e:**

What are our next steps if sanctions fail?

**Answer:**

Our focus at the moment is on getting the international community behind the most effective sanctions possible.

**Question 2f:**

Can the U.S. impose sanctions unilaterally to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear program?

**Answer:**

The United States has a number of tools at its disposal to deal with the Iran nuclear issue, including through implementation of existing UNSCRs and Executive Orders. At this time, we are focused on getting the international community behind the most effective sanctions possible.

**Question 2g:**

In light of Iran's non-responsiveness to our offers of engagement, the Administration has indicated it will pursue sanctions targeted at Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). How optimistic are you that such sanctions can be effective in time to avert Iranian success in

achieving nuclear-threshold status and when do you think Iran will achieve that status? How can we be certain that the IRGC will not be able to circumvent such sanctions?

**Answer:**

We believe that the IRGC is at the core of many of Iran's most troublesome nuclear activities. We believe that the international community should focus its attention and pressure on the IRGC in order to address critical ties between Iran and those that supply its nuclear program. Even if potentially imperfect, pressure against the IRGC is the right thing to do.

**Question 4:**

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 2007 claimed Iran stopped its covert nuclear weapons program in 2003. However, the IAEA stated in its most recent report that it had concerns about Iran's nuclear activities, which it believes continued well beyond 2004.

- Does the State Department believe Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003?
- Will there be a new NIE to address these questions?

**Answer:**

The U.S. Intelligence Community, including the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), continually reviews available information about Iran's nuclear program. INR is among the agencies that coordinate NIEs and has been participating in the coordination of a Memorandum to Holders – or update – of the 2007 NIE on Iran's nuclear program. That document has not yet been completed, so I am not in a position to comment on its conclusions.

I would note that, in his annual global threat testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, DNI Blair stated, "We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. ... We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." In addition, the DNI's most recent Unclassified Report to the Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons (the "721 report") reaffirmed that, "in fall 2003, Iran halted its nuclear weapon design and weaponization activities." You may also have seen that DIA Director Burgess told Voice of America in January 2010, "The bottom line assessments of the NIE still hold true."

**Question 5:**

What actions has the State Department taken to implement the Iran Sanctions Act? Specifically, what companies are investing in Iran's petroleum sector, and what sanctions will be applied to them?

**Answer:**

The Department of State takes its obligations under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) very seriously and we have reviewed dozens of reports of potentially sanctionable activity under the Act. In addition to this ongoing process, we recently conducted a preliminary review of a number of reported activities that were mentioned in the letter that you, along with 49 other Members of the House, sent to President Obama in October. During the course of this review, we found the activities of some companies to be problematic and therefore warranting more thorough consideration under the standards delineated in the ISA. We are continuing to collect and assess information on these cases. It is worth noting that the Iranian government, in its efforts to deny its increasing international isolation, promotes and publicizes all manner of transactions and reputed investments that may or may not have any truth to them.

We work aggressively on three fronts to ensure that our review of such reports is serious and thorough and that we have a rigorous process in place for implementation of the ISA. First, we raise in our bilateral engagement with numerous countries the need to strengthen our cooperation in promoting a united front of restricting investment in Iran's energy sector. Second, we supplement our efforts by working with our Embassies overseas to collect information on potentially sanctionable activity. Finally, we review with the intelligence community reports of activities of some companies that warrant further scrutiny under the ISA. Through these mechanisms we ensure that credible reports are examined fully while reports with no substance to them are put to rest. We look forward to sharing with you the conclusion of our review when it is complete.

**Question 6a:**

What steps are you and Senator Mitchell taking to urge President Abbas to resume negotiations without preconditions?

**Answer:**

We are engaged in intensive discussions with the parties to re-launch negotiations as soon as possible. Special Envoy Mitchell has traveled to the Middle East in recent weeks to emphasize to the parties the importance of taking actions that build confidence on both sides for credible negotiations.

**Question 6b:**

Do you believe President Abbas has the political will and strength to make the compromises necessary for any peace agreement with Israel?

**Answer:**

President Abbas is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people and has consistently demonstrated his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through negotiations toward the two-state solution. While compromises will be necessary, we believe that President Abbas shares our common objective of a better future for

the Palestinians and that, through good faith negotiations, an outcome can be achieved that reconciles both sides' goals.

**Question 6c:**

We have not heard much about steps the Arab States are taking to promote peace and bolster President Abbas. What should the Arab states be doing and how does that compare with what they are actually doing?

**Answer:**

We continue to call on all parties to take steps that promote an environment for successful negotiations. As President Obama has said, Arab states must recognize that the Arab Peace Initiative was an important beginning but not the end of their responsibilities. We have asked Arab states to enter into a regional dialogue with Israel on issues of common concern—such as health, education, and water—in parallel with the resumption of direct negotiations between the parties. We continue to emphasize to our friends in the region the key importance of supporting President Abbas so he has the political strength necessary to be a true partner for peace.

**Question 6d:**

Some in the Palestinian leadership have called for a strategy of unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state; some in the EU are talking about recognizing such a state. What would the U.S. response be to such an effort?

**Answer:**

The U.S. has consistently affirmed that the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state can only be achieved through negotiations between the parties. Our position—and the position of the Quartet, of which the EU is a member—is that unilateral actions taken by either party cannot prejudge the outcome of negotiations and will not be recognized by the international community.

**Question 7a:**

I am concerned about the direction Turkey is heading in. Of late, they have made several disparaging comments about Israel and they excluded Israel from joint naval exercises.

- What is your assessment of Turkey's direction? Are they hoping to integrate more with the Arab world, or are they leaning more toward the western world and the EU in particular?

**Answer:**

The United States and Turkey share a vital partnership based on a long history of cooperation, our shared values, our common strategic interests, and our membership in NATO.

From the Balkans to Afghanistan, we are working together to help stabilize regions of the world where instability affects us all.

We continue to support strong relations between our allies Turkey and Israel, and hope that they will continue to maintain a close relationship. Following Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's visit to Turkey in January, both governments confirmed to us their commitment to their bilateral relationship.

President Obama stated in his address to the Turkish Parliament in April 2009 that Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European institutions. Turkey continues its EU accession process, which we strongly support, and has pledged to accelerate implementation of EU reforms in 2010.

**Question 7b:**

The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, James Jeffrey, recently stated in an interview that, Turkey is "a peaceful country. It doesn't invade its neighbors. It has security concerns in Cyprus." As you know, there are more than 40,000 Turkish troops occupying Cyprus.

- Is it U.S. policy that Turkey did not invade Cyprus?
- Does the State Department believe Turkey has legitimate security interests in Cyprus?

**Answer:**

As I noted earlier in my testimony on February 25 in response to Rep. McMahon's question, our policy on Cyprus remains unchanged. The United States supports a just and lasting settlement that reunifies the island into a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. To this end, we support the ongoing Cypriot-led negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's Good Offices Mission under Alexander Downer.

**Question for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by  
Representative Elliot Engel  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing  
Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal  
Year 2011 International Affairs Budget  
February 25, 2010**

*(Received after printing of transcript)*

**Question 1:**

- **Drug Policy:** We need a more holistic approach to our counternarcotics strategy in the Western Hemisphere.

I strongly support the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), the Merida Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). But, we need to do a better job weaving these efforts together.

What efforts are you taking to better integrate these efforts, so that our successes in certain countries do not contribute to problems in other countries?

I have suggested designating a coordinator at the State Department to oversee all of our Western Hemisphere security initiatives. Would you consider doing this?

**Answer:**

As the dynamic of the illicit drug trade throughout the Western Hemisphere varies from country to country, we are working with our bilateral and inter-agency partners to implement multiple programs and initiatives in a coordinated, integrated fashion to help prevent drugs from reaching the United States, build local capacity to address criminality, and provide alternative and economic opportunities outside of the drug trade.

We are implementing distinct initiatives in the Andes, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean to address the different circumstances in each region. By keeping these initiatives separate but coordinated, we will ensure that the individuals responsible for developing and implementing our programs have the regional expertise required to succeed, and we will ensure that these initiatives are complementary. Our initiatives throughout the hemisphere recognize that all stages of drug cultivation, production, and trafficking must be addressed, and that all sub-regional areas must be addressed simultaneously in order to achieve sustainable results.

Our counternarcotics programs in the Western Hemisphere are geared to build effective partnerships that can better develop, mobilize, and sustain the capabilities of the whole region. The Colombian National Police (CNP), which have benefited from significant U.S. training and equipment, are at the forefront of sharing their expertise with other police forces throughout the

hemisphere. From 2007 to 2009, Colombia trained more than 5,800 Mexican security and judicial officials, and more than 150 police officers from 18 other Latin American countries. We envision similar initiatives under the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and we are working with our partners in both regions to best see where regional expertise can serve to develop and reinforce host-nation capabilities.

Other training facilities in the Western Hemisphere have capitalized on the assistance provided by the U.S. and are creating economies of scale by training their counterparts in the region. For example, Mexico, with U.S. assistance, is developing the capacity at their new Corrections Academy to train corrections officials from around the region, and the canine academy in Guatemala also provides expert, regional training.

We agree that these initiatives must be well coordinated, and we also want to ensure they are mutually supportive. The existing coordination processes and mechanisms within the Department of State and with other federal agencies involved in supporting these initiatives allows us to do this effectively and does not necessitate creating a new position at this time.

**Question 2:**

Yesterday, the OAS's human rights agencies criticized Venezuela for its deteriorating human rights situation. This follows their recent condemnation of President Chavez's closure of RCTV and several other cable TV stations.

How are you working with our partners in the OAS to call attention to the closing of democratic space in Venezuela?

**Answer:**

OAS bodies have recently been frank and outspoken about the erosion of basic democratic freedoms in Venezuela, and we and other OAS member states have drawn attention to these issues in the OAS Permanent Council. We also continue to provide strong support to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the follow-up mechanism to the Inter-American Corruption Convention, and OAS election observation missions, which allow the OAS to gauge the state of democracy in our region, including in Venezuela.

On March 3, at the first meeting of the Permanent Council after the IACHR released its highly critical February 24 report on the state of democracy in Venezuela, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS Carmen Lomellin underscored our support for the work of the IACHR and urged Venezuela to address the issues in the report rather than smear its authors. Canada, Panama, and Argentina joined the United States with statements of support for the IACHR, and other members, including Brazil, admonished the Venezuelans' disrespectful and undiplomatic tone.

At the February 3 meeting of the Permanent Council, Canada drew attention to the threat to freedom of expression in Venezuela represented by the new restrictions the Venezuelan government had imposed on RCTV, provoking an ad-hominem attack from the Venezuelan Permanent Representative. The United States, Guatemala, and Panama all endorsed Canada's remarks. Others spoke more generally in support of freedom of expression.

The United States consistently supports OAS programs that seek to strengthen respect for human rights and freedom of expression, support crisis prevention, and open space for independent civil society within the Inter-American system and within OAS member states, including in Venezuela. At a special meeting of the Permanent Council March 3 with candidates for Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, the United States called on the OAS leadership to provide "strong and consistent support for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression" as well as "more effective mechanisms for foreseeing and counteracting emerging threats to democracy." Several other member states, including Canada, Chile, Panama, and St. Kitts and Nevis (speaking on behalf of the 14 Caribbean Community members) made similar comments, and both candidates agreed to explore ways to act more "swiftly and flexibly" in defense of democracy. The U.S. Mission is working with other like-minded delegations to follow up on those commitments.

**Question 3:**

I am extremely concerned about the imprisonment of USAID contractor Alan Gross in Cuba. I understand his health is deteriorating, and I hope he will be released as soon as possible.

Can you please update me on the State Department's efforts on this situation?

**Answer:**

United States Interest Section (USINT) personnel have visited Mr. Gross on two separate occasions and have requested an additional visit. USINT personnel have delivered correspondence and much-needed medicines to Mr. Gross and are monitoring his condition carefully. We are in close touch with Mr. Gross' family to facilitate their efforts to maintain contact with Mr. Gross and address his continuing health problems. During Migration Talks held in Havana on February 19, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Kelly raised Mr. Gross' condition and incarceration with Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodriguez on three separate occasions. The U.S. delegation noted this is a matter of grave importance to the United States and called for Mr. Gross to be released on humanitarian grounds and allowed to return to his family. We also pressed for Mr. Gross to be allowed regular contact with his family. We are continuing to pursue every available avenue to work towards Mr. Gross' release.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by  
Representative Eni F.H. Faleomavaega  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing  
Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal  
Year 2011 International Affairs Budget  
February 25, 2010**

*(Received after printing of transcript)*

**Question 1:**

Would you stop in American Samoa during your upcoming trip to Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea?

**Answer:**

American Samoa has an important role to play in the Asia-Pacific and we work with its territorial government on a wide-range of maritime and regional issues. We are still considering the itinerary for the upcoming trip and hope to have a clearer picture of specific stops in the near future.

**Question 3:**

Madam Secretary, it has been 10 years since the OSCE held a security summit (in Istanbul). The security context that was defined in Istanbul was drastically altered after September 11, 2001. New security threats and challenges have emerged (post 9/11) that endanger not only Europe but the United States as well. From my perspective, an OSCE meeting, bringing together all member states, to discuss and come to solutions regarding the security of all nations will be beneficial to the United States. Can you and the President support this summit?

**Answer:**

The Administration is considering Kazakhstan's proposal to host an OSCE summit in 2010. The Administration believes that any such high-level meeting should be based on having sufficient substance, and we are looking for progress in the Corfu Process discussions on European security, initiating two OSCE border projects in Afghanistan, and establishing an OSCE mission in Georgia, among other priorities in our OSCE agenda.

In June, OSCE participating States will have an opportunity to review the Kazakhstani Chairmanship's report summarizing the results of the Corfu Process discussions to date. This report will be a key decision point with respect to a summit.

**Question 4:**

Madam Secretary, it has been 10 years since the OSCE held a security summit (in Istanbul). The security context that was defined in Istanbul was drastically altered after September 11, 2001. New security threats and challenges have emerged (post 9/11) that endanger not only Europe but the United States as well. From my perspective, an OSCE meeting, bringing together all member states, to discuss and come to solutions regarding the security of all nations will be beneficial to the United States. Can you and the President support this summit?

**Answer:**

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In June, OSCE participating States will have an opportunity to review the Kazakhstani Chairmanship's report summarizing the results of the Corfu Process discussions to date. This report will be a key decision point with respect to a summit.

**Question 5:**

I understand that you have requested \$13 million for USAID programs for Pacific Island nations in FY 2011 including \$9.5 million for global climate change adaptation, \$2.5 million for HIV/AIDS programming in Papua New Guinea, and \$1 million for disaster management and mitigation in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Can you give us some more detail on how the funds will be allocated by country?

**Answer:**

The bulk of the FY 2011 funding for the new mission is \$9.5 million for global climate change. USAID will design this program over the next several months, working through regional institutions, such as the South Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) so that U.S. aid dollars will benefit eligible nations in the region.

Seven island-nations will be potential recipients of USAID regional assistance – Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu; additional countries in the region also may benefit through our work with SPREP and

PIF. Although Fiji will be the site of the headquarters of the new regional Mission, we do not anticipate providing bilateral assistance to Fiji given the current political situation.

All other island-nations in the region are either protectorates of other developed nations, or freely associated with the U.S., with the exception of Vanuatu, which has better development indicators than its neighbors and is the recipient of a \$65.69 million Compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

As cited in the question, USAID also plans to allocate: 1) \$2.5 million for HIV/AIDS programs in Papua New Guinea to improve the capacity, quality, and effectiveness of activities for prevention, support, and treatment of at-risk populations and those living with the disease; and, 2) \$1 million to improve readiness for responding to disasters in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, based on the USAID-DHS (FEMA) agreement to provide relief and reconstruction assistance in these countries in the event of a declared (by the U.S. President) disaster.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton  
Representative Michael T. McCaul  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing  
Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal  
Year 2011 International Affairs Budget  
February 25, 2010**

*(Received after printing of transcript)*

**Question 1a:**

In recent months, thousands of Iranians peacefully protested the actions of their government; however, retaliatory use of force by the Iranian regime resulted in hundreds of citizens imprisoned and countless others killed. Today, I am introducing a resolution that expresses my concern over the Government of Iran's continued oppression of its people and which calls on the Administration to take measured action. Support of those interested in a positive change in Iran's government is key, especially as elements of that government are currently supporting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, how do you propose to counter Iranian influence, especially as U.S. military forces are drawn down?

**Answer:**

Iraq and Iran share a long history and are bound by extensive economic, cultural and religious linkages. We accept that Iran has legitimate interests in Iraq, and we respect its ties with Iraq. A proper relationship between Iraq and Iran will be predicated on Iran's full respect for Iraq's sovereignty. However, we do not accept Iran pursuing its interests in ways that jeopardize the safety of Iraqi citizens and U.S. and Iraqi forces, or that undermine the sovereignty and stability of Iraq.

We think that supporting a self-reliant, democratic, and stable Iraq is the best way to counter the illegitimate exercise of Iranian influence. This includes supporting Iraq's security forces, expanding the country's governmental capacity, strengthening its democratic institutions and promoting its economic development. Our forces will continue to work with Iraqi security forces to expose and counter enemies to Iraqi national security, including Iranian supported militants. We will also continue to urge regional and international actors to support the Government of Iraq and increase their engagement with Iraq, its institutions and people. The more extensive Iraq's ties with others, the easier it will be to minimize Iran's activities. Finally, as the Iraqi government continues to increase its regional and international engagement and expand legitimate trade and investment ties, we are confident it will continue a policy on Iran that encourages constructive, peaceful relations based on mutual respect.

**Question 1b:**

In Afghanistan, how do the civilian efforts by the State Department and USAID outlined in this budget and in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy work to support US military efforts and address Iranian influence in the region?

**Answer:**

The challenges in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are immense. The civilian efforts outlined in the budget and Stabilization Strategy, combined with U.S. combat operations and efforts to build Afghan and Pakistani security capacity, constitute an innovative, whole-of-government approach to protect our vital interests in this volatile region of the world. For example, in Afghanistan, our focus is to assist Afghan institutions to develop the capacity to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance – especially in the agricultural sector – to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield. With the help of U.S. advisors and specialist, Afghan Ministries are at the forefront of delivering assistance in ISAF cleared areas, as demonstrated recently during Operation Moshtarak in Marjah. These important civilian efforts immediately following military operations, greatly enhance the trust and confidence in the Afghan government and our coalition partners in ISAF. Our efforts also stabilize areas, thus making it much harder for militants to move back in.

The U.S continues to encourage the Afghan government to promote good relations with its neighbors, including Iran, and to tackle cross-border narcotics and commercial goods trafficking. The international community is helping the Afghans build a sustainable, self-sufficient security force to make the Afghan government more capable, credible, and responsive to the needs of the Afghan people. By doing so, we are helping to build an Afghanistan more capable of defending itself against undesired outside influences.

**Question 3:**

Does the State Department have the resources to effectively manage PCCF? Given that most of the expertise on what is required for this initiative resides within the Department of Defense, specifically CENTCOM, how closely will you consult with DoD?

**Answer:**

The Department of State (DOS) historically has played a strong role in the management of security assistance programs that provide critical support to key partners and allies around the globe and has both the capacity and institutional capability to manage PCCF. The Bureau of Political Military Affairs currently manages over \$5.5B in

military assistance annually, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Exchange and Training (IMET) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

The Department of State (DoS) has and will continue to work closely with DoD and CENTCOM to ensure a seamless transition of PCCF from DoD to DoS management. This included close State-Defense coordination on the development of State's internal PCCF management processes. To ensure the success of this endeavor, we are dedicating the necessary resources both in terms of experienced personnel and funding to support effective program management.

**Question 4:**

The proposed budget includes a dramatic increase in aid to Yemen, from \$67M in FY2010 to \$109M in FY2011, purportedly to assist with nation building efforts. Given the wide-spread corruption within the government and the internal conflicts, how do you propose we effectively manage this funding? What type of additional support should we accept from our allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia?

**Answer:**

It is important to clarify that we do not give cash or budgetary assistance to the government of Yemen for development assistance. While we do work with the various ministries in the design and implementation of our aid programs, all funds go through USG accounts to implementing partner organizations. All USAID grantees are vetted before receiving funds, and must provide performance and financial reports on a quarterly basis. The USAID prime grantees are checked against Department of State, OFAC, and United Nations lists before receiving funds.

As part of our policy review of Yemen that began last year, USAID has developed a new country strategy for Yemen, which it will begin to implement in the coming months. Of the FY 2011 request for \$106.6 million, \$55 million is for USAID, an increase of \$7 million over the FY 2010 estimate of \$48 million. One objective of USAID's new governance program is to improve Yemeni governmental capacity to manage and account for donor funds that run through its institutions. This objective is in part designed to respond to concerns expressed by Gulf state donors that they cannot fulfill their donor pledges because of the Yemeni government's poor management, lack of transparency, and corruption.

The FY 2011 request for \$51.6 million for security funding is a \$32.4 million increase over the FY 2010 Estimate of \$19.25 million. This includes a \$22.5 million increase in FMF primarily to regularize funding for the FY 2009 1206 FMF program. The FY 2011 increase also includes a \$10 million increase in INCLE to initiate a robust criminal justice sector reform program in Yemen that provides equipment and training to the Yemen police and develops Yemen judicial system capacity. All equipment transferred to Yemeni forces is covered by end-use agreements, which ensure

transparency by requiring Yemen to grant the U.S. government full access to monitor how the equipment is being used.

Saudi Arabia and Yemen's other Gulf neighbors continue to work with the government of Yemen to increase the level and effectiveness of international aid. The Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General will host a meeting of Gulf and other partners of Yemen in Riyadh on 27-28 February. This meeting will share analysis on the barriers to effective aid in Yemen, leading to a joint dialogue with the government of Yemen on priority reforms.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#22b and #22d)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

The State Department's budget justification states that "in Afghanistan, our civilian mission is also growing. As we prepare to send 30,000 new troops, we are also tripling the number of civilians on the ground." In your testimony before the Committee in December, you mentioned that there will be a total of 974 by the end of the year. Now your request mentions "1500 staff in Kabul and the provinces and public diplomacy programs.

- b. What is the breakdown of the civilian request, both in terms of attaches, Foreign Service officers, and 3161 contract employees?
  
- d. Could you also provide us a breakdown and progress report of Embassy and consulate construction in Afghanistan?

**Answer:**

- b. The all-agency civilian request is for approximately 1500 employees: the focus of the increase is for the field and for those assigned to Kabul that are supporting the field. The majority of the positions in the increase are USAID (approximately 125) and State (approximately 300). State's component includes "3161" Temporary Excepted Civil Service Employees as well as Foreign Service. We continue to work with Embassy Kabul to refine and prioritize their request, including finalizing the types of position, keeping in mind absorptive capacity on the Kabul compound and the field.
  
- d. Construction at the Embassy in Kabul and at the consulates in Mazar-e Sharif and Herat continue to move forward. The Department achieved possession of the building in Herat on March 12, 2010. The

project is to be awarded in April 2010, with a notice to proceed issued shortly afterwards. In Mazar-e Sharif, the Department achieved possession of an existing building on February 17, 2010. The Department is currently in the process of renovating this facility to serve as the temporary Consulate facility in Mazar-e Sharif. The Embassy projects are divided into two separate projects, referred to as the FY 09 project and the FY 10 project. The FY 09 projects include an unclassified annex with 820 desks and constructing staff apartments yielding 193 beds. The 35% design for this section is due in May 2010. Another piece of the FY 09 project is the construction of non-permanent housing and offices to allow swing space for the Embassy during construction. The 90% design for this is due in Mid-April, and construction will follow. The FY 10 projects include a classified chancery addition, which will yield 302 desks, and Staff dependent apartments, yielding 420 beds. These projects are in the bidding stages, as a potential bidder meeting was held on March 11, 2010. Final Request for Proposal reviews to be done April 19 – May 3, 2010.

**Questions for the Record Submitted by  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton  
Representative Michael T. McCaul (#2)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

Historically, we have had difficulty coordinating with the ISI in Pakistan. Although recent captures potentially indicate a stronger commitment to defeating the Taliban, incidents such as preventing direct access to AQ Khan and failing to provide timely intelligence information still hamper cooperation. Given the increase in resources allocated to Pakistan, how will you provide oversight for the management of this funding? What incentives does Pakistan have to use the funds for their intended purposes? Given the historic trust deficit between the US and Pakistan, how do you balance the need to effectively manage these funds against Pakistan's wariness over putting additional conditions on aid?

**Answer:**

We have put in place several critical measures to improve accountability of our assistance to Pakistan including: pre-award assessments of potential implementing partners to identify potential risks and vulnerabilities, embedding accountants within Pakistani institutions and requiring separate dollar and local currency bank accounts for U.S. direct assistance projects. Our decision to provide a substantial amount of our FY 2010 assistance directly through Pakistani federal and provincial agencies reflects a U.S. Government decision to use Pakistani entities and processes to a greater extent to help build capacity and demonstrate partnership.

In some sectors like energy, where projects will be implemented via agencies such as the Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistani entities have extensive experience in international procurements. When necessary, USAID will establish units within ministries receiving U.S. funding to help manage specific projects and mentor ministry staff, with special emphasis on our capacity building role. This is a common practice with the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and other major donors.

The U.S. Government has established offices of the USAID and Department of State Inspectors General (IG) in Islamabad, and the Embassy is working closely with the IGs to develop better mechanisms to guard against waste and fraud. The IGs produce a quarterly report on our progress in implementing our assistance programs in Pakistan. The State and USAID IGs have taken important steps to strengthen oversight despite the limitations imposed by the security situation. These include utilizing Locally Employed Staff and third party independent monitoring units to provide oversight of projects in the conflict-affected areas, as well as reviewing regular reporting from implementing partners. Pakistani implementers and international entities are required to meet the same U.S. Government standards as U.S. contractors and to have appropriate oversight mechanisms in place.

As you indicate in your question, we need to leverage our assistance to ensure the Government of Pakistan makes the policy reforms necessary to ensure our funds are managed effectively and have a real impact on the lives of Pakistanis. U.S. Government assistance will only be sustainable in the long-term if the Government of Pakistan builds a stable foundation for future growth by undertaking meaningful policy reforms and expanding its resource base. In parallel with our assistance portfolio, we are working with the international financial institutions and other donors to urge the Government of Pakistan to increase revenues, as required under the IMF agreement. Donor coordination plus patient and strategic partnership with the Government of Pakistan are essential to lasting reform.

The U.S. Mission in Pakistan has increased efforts at the policy level to help ensure that ground-level aid projects receive the increased institutional and regulatory support needed for sustainable impact. For example, in the energy sector we are working through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan's Energy Sector task force, jointly chaired by the Government of Pakistan and Asian Development Bank, to lay out an energy sector reform and stabilization strategy. The U.S. Government has seconded staff to the Task Force and looks forward to the release of its recommendations in July.

The U.S. Government is also planning to jointly fund projects with bilateral and multilateral partners, as appropriate, to leverage further reform and investment in the sector. Similarly, on education, we have teamed up with the UK-Pakistan Education Task Force to press for structural reforms,

tailored by province, that are essential to bring momentum to the basic education sector. USAID is also adopting best practices to foster better management and administrative capacity building of Pakistani institutions, including through counterpart contributions by recipients of USG funding, requirements that recipients budget for future costs (e.g., building maintenance) associated with USG-funded projects, and community participation in assistance planning.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Michael T. McCaul (#5)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

The Afghanistan/Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy focuses on putting together a true “whole-of-government” approach to the region. How will the proposed new international executive secretariat balance the need to coordinate the U.S. interagency with its roles and responsibilities of coordinating with our partners and allies? How will this body coordinate both with CENTCOM as well as military commanders on the ground?

**Answer:**

The State Department’s Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) includes representatives from nine different U.S. government agencies and also has dedicated counterparts in several State Department Bureaus. Working together in shared quarters enables this interagency team to quickly share information and viewpoints across the government, as well as to reach rapid consensus on key issues when necessary.

S/SRAP’s International Partnership Team additionally convenes regular meetings with representatives from the Washington embassies of the more than 30 countries and international organizations that have SRAP equivalents. This forum allows us to quickly share information about breaking issues, such as urgent needs for police trainers or the results of President Karzai’s visit in May 2010. It also facilitates coordinated messaging, for instance on anti-corruption or the Kabul Conference, and enables an immediate donor response when needed, for example in the wake of the recent flooding in Pakistan or when the World Food Programme faced an urgent shortage of funds in early 2010.

S/SRAP coordinates regularly with CENTCOM and military commanders in Afghanistan through detailees from the Joint Chiefs and Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as through regular video conferences with ISAF, USNATO, and others.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by  
Representative Ros-Lehtinen (#1d)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**MEPI and the Global Engagement: Different but Complementary**

*Africa*

1. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the Global Engagement Initiative: Islamist extremists continue to expand their operations in Africa and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a critical program on the African continent. The budget documents show significant cuts in funding of this key program, thus suggesting counterterrorism programs in Africa are not of main concern.

d. How is the Global Engagement Initiative different from the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which itself is seeing a significant increase in the budget request?

Answer

MEPI is focused exclusively on the Middle East and North Africa and operates in all countries of the region except Iran; Global Engagement's programming is global in scope and supports activities in many countries and regions in which MEPI does not operate. MEPI's place in the NEA Bureau enables targeted programmatic support to back up regional policy goals, with rapid response to emerging challenges and opportunities.

MEPI uses a bottom-up approach: it promotes the political, economic, and social empowerment of citizens through work with civil society actors, including small, direct grants to local groups. The socio-economic challenges of the NEA region demand substantial governmental reform; MEPI works to catalyze that change.

Global Engagement is supporting sizable, flagship initiatives around four focal areas: entrepreneurship, science and technology innovation, education and exchanges. All of these areas are key elements of the President's vision as laid out

in both Cairo and Accra. MEPI's well-established areas of focus are civil society, political competition and consensus building, rule of law, and civic education.

In response to the framework laid out by the President in Cairo, MEPI is finding creative ways to use new media to support civic activists, to include youth and women in a new culture of entrepreneurship, and to promote a spirit of civic engagement. In this way, MEPI's work may seed local capacity in certain NEA countries for the Global Engagement Fund's larger partnerships.

In addition, please note that the President's FY11 request for MEPI was a straight-line from his FY10 request, not an increase as the question states. It is true that the FY11 request is a 32% increase over MEPI's actual budget in FY10, but the President did not increase his request for MEPI from FY10 to FY11.

**Questions for the Record submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Eni Faleomavaega (#2)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

I have encouraged President Obama to make a similar stopover in American Samoa on his upcoming trip to Indonesia, Guam and Australia. Can I count on your support to encourage President Obama to refuel in American Samoa?

**Answer:**

While no future dates have been set yet for President Obama to visit Indonesia, Guam, and Australia, the Obama Administration continues to engage at appropriate levels with the Pacific region and look for opportunities to reschedule.

Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell intends to travel to Port Vila, Vanuatu, to attend the 2010 Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue on August 6. He will be meeting personally with many of the Pacific Island leaders to discuss issues of shared interest and opportunities for further cooperation.

**Questions for the Record submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Eni Faleomavaega (#6)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

Had you been able to travel to Papua New Guinea, you were scheduled to deliver a follow up speech to the one Asia Pacific Architecture speech that you gave at the East West Center, and the topic would specifically address U.S. policy toward the Pacific Islands. I would appreciate it if you could give us a preview of the major themes of the new policy.

**Answer:**

In a number of ways, the United States is a full member of the Pacific Island community. The Administration intends to enhance its engagement in the Pacific, and more energetically promote friendship, stability, security, and prosperity throughout the region.

Ongoing U.S. programming seeks to assist and engage the Pacific Islands on issues related to development, climate change, health, and disaster response. Most visibly, USAID is working on plans to place personnel in the Pacific this fall in Suva, and to place an individual in Port Moresby. These personnel will be responsible for designing, implementing, and monitoring development assistance and cooperation activities in Pacific countries focused on climate change adaptation. USAID has requested \$13 million in Pacific funding for FY2011, of which \$9.5 million is for climate change programming alone.

In Vanuatu, the \$65 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact has proved a model program for encouraging good governance in the region. The compact focuses on improving road infrastructure on main island Efate and most populous island Santo, and both roads are on track to be completed by November 2010, well ahead of the scheduled date of April 2011. Since its entry into force April 2006, the compact has spurred foreign investment and created jobs, making it widely popular with the Vanuatians.

Multilaterally, the United States continues to engage with the Pacific Islands Countries on global negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. We hope to continue to make progress based on the principles and actions outlined in the Copenhagen Accord.

The Obama Administration continues to provide high-level attention to the

Pacific Islands region. Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell intends to travel to Port Vila, Vanuatu, to attend the 2010 Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue on August 6. He will be meeting personally with many of the Pacific Islands leaders.

Meanwhile I continue to look for opportunities to bolster meaningful U.S. engagement with the Pacific Islands. The United States values its strong allies in the Pacific and is committed to working with them on issues of mutual interest.

**Questions for the Record submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Eni Faleomavaega (#7)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

Can you give me some details on your plans regarding annual meeting with Pacific leaders and the President's plans for a Hawaii summit?

**Answer:**

The United States government is strengthening its engagement in the Pacific, and high-level interaction with Pacific Island leaders is an integral part of our effort. Last September I held a very productive meeting with Pacific Island leaders on the margins of UN General Assembly. Schedule permitting, I hope to hold similar discussions at this year's UN General Assembly in September.

On August 6 Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell intends to travel to Port Vila, Vanuatu, to attend the 2010 Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue. He will be meeting personally with many of the Pacific Island leaders to discuss issues of shared interest.

The President's plans for a summit in Hawaii next year are still under development. Until then, we continue to explore opportunities for further engagement with our Pacific Island counterparts and will make known our finalized plans.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by  
Representative Barbara Lee (#3)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

**Non-Military Foreign Assistance Budget**

Is it your assessment that the State Department's ongoing Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) will provide a clear picture of the current and future needs to achieve our diplomacy and development goals including the United Nations Millennium Development Goals?

**Answer:**

Yes. We launched the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) in July 2009 with the goal of strengthening and elevating diplomacy and development cooperation as key pillars of U.S. foreign policy. The QDDR effort arises in the context of broader shifts in the world, many of which go to the very core of how we define and practice both diplomacy and development cooperation. Through aligning policy, strategy, authorities, and resources, the QDDR will provide the blueprint for our diplomatic and development efforts. The end goals are unified smart power; clear, mutually reinforcing State and USAID roles and missions; and tangible organizational change leading to excellence in performance. By using all of the tools of American power, we can pave the way for shared peace, progress, and prosperity. This effort will help enable the Department and USAID to get ahead of emerging threats and opportunities and to make the case effectively for OMB, the Congress, and the people of our country for the resources we need.

Work on the QDDR is almost complete and should be ready for release later this fall.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#1c)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the Global Engagement Initiative:

Islamist extremists continue to expand their operations in Africa and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a critical program on the African continent. The budget documents show significant cuts in funding of this key program, thus suggesting counterterrorism programs in Africa are not of main concern.

**Answer:**

Reductions to the TSTCP request are not being offset on a one for one basis by the Global Engagement request. In June 2009, President Obama delivered a speech at Al Azhar University in Cairo that called for engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect with Muslims around the world. We plan to use the President's request for \$100 million of ESF funds for Global Engagement activities in the FY 2011 budget to establish and expand programs that address areas in which he pledged that we would invest and engage and that further the goals of deepening and broadening our relationships with Muslim communities. Funding requested for Global Engagement activities will be targeted at Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities. This funding will help to fill gaps in these focus areas for FY 2011 and we will seek to transition to base funding in FY 2012.

Question for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehman (#3d)  
House Foreign Affairs Committee  
February 25, 2010

**Global Health**

**Question:**

President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Global Health Initiative:

Please describe precisely how the GHI "Strategic Reserve" will be used, including detailed information about the ten "Partner-Plus" countries to receive assistance.

**Answer:**

The criteria for selection of GHI Plus countries includes: partner country commitment; engagement of partners with a national health plan; existence of a basic health information system; presence of at least three robust health programs; magnitude and severity of health problems; potential to leverage other health investments; potential to leverage other USG investments in related sectors; regional diversity; and focus on low-income countries. For FY 2011, the following eight countries have been selected: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nepal and Rwanda.

Pending the enactment of the FY 2011 appropriations, the eight GHI Plus countries would be supported in FY 2011 by a \$200 million GHI Strategic Reserve Fund (GHI Fund), with the Department of State and USAID each providing \$100 million. The Strategic Reserve would provide catalytic resources to the GHI Plus countries, above the country requests, and would be programmed to advance innovation, while achieving outcomes across a range of programmatic areas (e.g., HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal and child health), and the expansion of integrated platforms to foster a full range of health services and systems.

FY 2011 funding would be used to: accelerate the scale-up of proven cost-effective and integrated interventions; design and implement an intensive monitoring and evaluation program directly linked to outcomes; and broadly disseminate findings for the benefit of both the countries involved and other governments and partners. The funds would be programmed to rigorously accelerate progress, and to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of national health programs.

### **GHI Plus country data**

<b>GHI Plus Country</b>	<b>Income Category</b>	<b>Population mid-2010</b>	<b>Annual Births per 1,000</b>	<b>Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 live births</b>	<b>Percentage of Population with HIV/AIDS Male ages 15-49</b>	<b>Percentage of Population with HIV/AIDS Female ages 15-49</b>
Average Developed World	Upper Income and Upper Middle Income	1,237	11	6	0.7	0.3
Bangladesh	Low Income	164.4	22	45	0.1	0.1
Ethiopia	Low Income	85.0	39	77	1.6	2.4
Guatemala	Lower Middle Income	14.4	34	34	1.1	0.4
Kenya	Low Income	40.0	37	52	4.3	8.0
Malawi	Low Income	15.4	44	80	10.2	13.5
Mali	Low Income	15.2	46	116	1.2	1.7
Nepal	Low Income	28.0	28	64	0.7	0.3
Rwanda	Low Income	10.4	42	102	2.3	3.2

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by  
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#6)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

There is also an allegation that in a recent grievance State's attorneys asserted that the grievant – who had gone to Congress with allegations of malfeasance by senior HR managers – had to relinquish all his/her communications regarding these allegations with Congress to State.

Please provide the legal basis for the contention that State Department whistleblowers may not engage in private communications with Congress.

Please provide the number of times and under what circumstances the Department has told employees that their whistleblower activities with Congress are subject to State Department scrutiny.

**Answer:**

The Department does not contend that whistleblowers may not engage in private communications with Congress.

The Department believes the question involves a single employee who filed a grievance alleging that senior Department employees manipulated the results of his/her reconstituted Foreign Service selection boards. In that grievance, the employee refused to produce any direct evidence of this allegation, stating instead that he/she had provided the evidence in support of the allegation to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and its Chairman, Henry Waxman (House Committee). Accordingly, the Department asked for the factual information that the employee had given to the OSC, the OIG, and the House Committee that would corroborate his/her allegations before the Foreign Service Grievance Board. The employee ultimately stipulated that he/she had not given to the OSC, the OIG, or the House Committee any information pertinent to his/her grievance that he/she had not already given to the Department. The Department accepted this stipulation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to  
Secretary of State Clinton by  
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (22a-d)  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
February 25, 2010**

**Question:**

The State Department's budget justification states that "in Afghanistan, our civilian mission is also growing. As we prepare to send 30,000 new troops, we are also tripling the number of civilians on the ground." In your testimony before the Committee in December, you mentioned that there will be a total of 974 by the end of the year. Now your request mentions "1500 staff in Kabul and the provinces and public diplomacy programs.

- a. Is this still the final number that you envision?
- b. What is the breakdown of the civilian request, both in terms of attaches, Foreign Service officers, and 3161 contract employees?
- c. What is the sustainment strategy?
- d. Could you also provide us a breakdown and progress report of Embassy and consulate construction in Afghanistan?

**Answer:**

The all-agency civilian request is for approximately 1500 employees: the focus of the increase is for the field and for those assigned to Kabul that are supporting the field. The majority of the positions in the increase are USAID (approximately 125) and State (approximately 300). State's component includes "3161" Temporary Excepted Civil Service Employees as well as Foreign Service. We continue to work with Embassy Kabul to refine and prioritize the request, including finalizing the types of position, keeping in mind absorptive capacity on the Kabul compound and the field, and availability of Foreign Service officers to fill available slots. As we proceed with recruitment, we are also developing plans to create an experienced cadre of Afghanistan experts within the State Department, which will help satisfy long-term sustainment requirements.

Construction at the Embassy in Kabul and at the consulates in Mazar-e Sharif and Herat continue to move forward. The Department achieved possession of the building in Herat on March 12, 2010. The project is to be awarded in April 2010, with a notice to proceed issued shortly afterwards. In Mazar-e Sharif, the Department achieved possession of an existing building on February 17, 2010. The Department is currently in the process of renovating this facility to serve as a temporary Consulate facility.

The Embassy construction program is divided into two separate projects, referred to as the FY 09 project and the FY 10 project. The FY 09 project include an unclassified annex with 820 desks and constructing staff apartments yielding 193 beds. The 35 percent design for this section is due in May 2010. Another piece of the FY 09 project is the construction of non-permanent housing and offices to allow swing space for the Embassy during construction. The 90% design for this is due in Mid-April, and construction will follow. The FY 10 projects include a classified chancery addition, which will yield 302 desks, and Staff dependent apartments, yielding 420 beds. These projects are in the bidding stages, a potential bidder meeting is planned for mid-March. Final Request for Proposal reviews is to be complete by late April or early May.