

**Testimony of the Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs,
U.S. Department of State,
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House Foreign Affairs Committee**

**“Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Countering Nuclear Terrorism:
The NPT Review Conference and the Nuclear Security Summit”**

21 April 2010

Thank you, Mr. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, and other esteemed members of the Committee, for the opportunity to report on the strides that the Department of State is making to reduce the chances of an attack by terrorists armed with nuclear material. In his speech in Prague last year, President Obama explained the inter-related pillars that are needed to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons: disarmament, nonproliferation, peaceful nuclear energy, and nuclear security. President Obama pledged American leadership in this effort, and as Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, I am pleased to share with you both the underlying goals of the Nuclear Security Summit, some of the results from the Summit, including commitments made by the participants, and thoughts for initial steps following the Summit to meet the President’s vision to secure all known vulnerable nuclear material in four years.

The specter of nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to global security today. We know Al Qaeda has tried to obtain or develop a nuclear attack capability to use against the United States. And we also know that nuclear materials—that is, highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—exist in large quantities around the world. While it is impossible to predict the likelihood of a nuclear attack by terrorists, they have openly declared their desire to launch mass casualty attacks on civilian population centers. The bombings in Bali, London, Madrid, Mumbai, Islamabad and recently Moscow, show that the target set is truly a global one. Given the catastrophic and perhaps existential political and economic repercussions of a nuclear strike anywhere in the world, nations everywhere share a common interest in establishing the highest levels of security and protection for nuclear weapons-usable material. The international community also shares a common responsibility to strengthen national and international efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling of these materials, and to detect and intercept nuclear materials in transit. In an increasingly globalized world, today’s threats are indeed diffuse, adaptable, and evolving; all of which makes confronting them even more essential.

That is why the President is pursuing an international effort to secure all known vulnerable nuclear material in four years. We gained valuable momentum and international cooperation towards this effort last week at the Nuclear Security Summit, attended by more than 47 nations, as well as the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), and the President of the European Union’s (EU) European Council.

The Summit was a call to action for countries around the world. It provided an unprecedented forum to raise awareness of the threat of nuclear terrorism to the highest levels of foreign governments. It reinforced the importance of existing nuclear security mechanisms and urged additional participation in mechanisms that already exist. The Summit also emphasized the need for the strongest possible political commitments by each State to take responsibility for the security of the nuclear materials under its control, to continue to evaluate the threat and strengthen security measures as changing conditions may require, and to exchange best practices and practical solutions for doing so. The Summit also stressed the principle that all States are responsible for ensuring the best security of their own nuclear materials, for seeking assistance to do so if necessary, and providing assistance if asked.

Through the joint Communiqué agreed upon at the Nuclear Security Summit, the participants demonstrated a determination to answer the charge to secure the nuclear materials under their control. In the Communiqué, States established that they will:

- Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes;
- Work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary;
- Recognize that nuclear materials require special precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials as appropriate, and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel;
- Endeavor to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and work toward acceding to those not yet joined, consistent with national laws, policies and procedures;
- Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture;
- Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated activities;
- Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations as well as the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction within their respective mandates and memberships;
- Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education and training, and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance;
- Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral

mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement and the development of new technologies;

- Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture;
- Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize peaceful nuclear energy and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security; and lastly,
- Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to secure those materials as well.

The Communiqué also launches a Work Plan, which was issued as guidance for national and international actions to actualize the pledges contained in the Communiqué. These steps include:

- Recognizing the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as an important legally binding multilateral instrument addressing threats posed by acts of nuclear terrorism;
- Recognizing the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as the only multilateral legally binding agreement dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material in peaceful uses, and the value of the 2005 Amendment to the convention in strengthening global security;
- The need to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on preventing non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related material, in particular as it relates to nuclear material;
- Recognizing that the IAEA is facilitating the development by member States, in the framework of the Nuclear Security Series, of guidance and recommendations relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or malicious acts involving, *inter alia*, nuclear material, and associated facilities, and is providing guidance in developing and implementing effective nuclear security measures;
- Recognizing States' rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noting the responsibility of each State for the use and management of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction and recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are particularly sensitive and require special precautions;
- States must be mindful of the responsibilities of every Participating State to maintain effective nuclear security and a robust domestic regulatory capacity;
- Understanding the large role of the nuclear security industry, including the private sector in nuclear security and recognizing that national governments are responsible for standard setting within the State. Emphasizing the importance of the human dimension of nuclear security, the need to enhance security culture, and the need to maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts; and,
- Underscoring the value of exchanging accurate and verified information, without prejudice to confidentiality provisions, to detect, prevent, suppress, investigate and prosecute acts or attempted acts of nuclear terrorism.

We anticipate and welcome working with as many nations as possible on this critical effort. This Summit was intended to lay the groundwork for activities to improve security for vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. It succeeded in this goal, as evidenced by the unanimous agreement on the Communiqué and Work Plan, as well as the various announcements of new national commitments toward nuclear security by several of the States in attendance. But the real work lies with each nation that attended the Summit and others around the world. The Summit spearheaded real progress as evidenced by the National Commitments made by many participating nations, including:

- Armenia: Ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; passed new export control law
- Argentina: Joined the Global Initiative on Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and is moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Also signed an MOU with the United States to initiate cooperation on the Megaports Initiative.
- Australia: Moving toward the ratification of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
- Belgium: Contributing \$300,000 to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund
- Canada: Returning a large amount of spent highly enriched uranium fuel from their medical isotope production reactor to the United States; championing the extension of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; funding highly enriched uranium removals from Mexico and Vietnam; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices workshop in Ottawa; unveiling \$100 million in new bilateral security cooperation with Russia
- Chile: Removed all highly enriched uranium (18kg) in March 2010
- China: Announced cooperation on nuclear security Center of Excellence
- Egypt: Passed new comprehensive nuclear law in March 2010 that includes nuclear security, criminalization of sabotage and illicit trafficking provisions as well as envisaging an independent regulatory authority
- France: Ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; incorporating training in nuclear security at the European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute and the International Nuclear Energy Institute
- Finland: Invited an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency
- Germany: Moving toward ratifying 2005 Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
- Georgia: Signed instrument of approval for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on April 7, 2010
- India: Announcing the creation of a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component

- Italy: Signed a Megaports agreement (to install detection equipment at ports) with the U.S.; establishing a school of nuclear security in Trieste, in collaboration with the Abdus Salam International Center for Theoretical Physics and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to train personnel from developing countries
- Japan: Launching an integrated regional support center; research and development on detection and forensics; contributing new resources to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear Security best practices conference
- Kazakhstan: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium; cooperative work on BN-350 reactor shutdown and fuel security; hosting a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism activity in June; considering an International Nuclear Security Training Center
- Malaysia: Passed new export control law
- Mexico: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor and eliminating remaining highly enriched uranium working through IAEA
- New Zealand: Contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; contributing to the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative
- Norway: Contributing \$3.3 million over the next four years to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; contributing \$500,000 in additional support to Kazakhstan's efforts to upgrade portal monitors to prevent nuclear smuggling as part of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
- Philippines: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
- Republic of Korea: Hosting 2012 Nuclear Security Summit; hosting a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism activity
- Russia: Signing Plutonium Disposition protocol; ending plutonium production; contributing to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund
- Saudi Arabia: Hosting a UNSCR 1540 conference for Gulf Cooperation Council
- Thailand: Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
- Ukraine: Removing all highly enriched uranium by next Summit – half of it by year's end
- United Arab Emirates: Signed a Megaports Agreement with the U.S.
- United Kingdom: Contributing \$6 million to International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund; inviting an International Physical Protection Advisory Service security review from the International Atomic Energy Agency; ratification of the international Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2005 Amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
- Vietnam: Converting a highly enriched uranium research reactor; joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
- IAEA: Completing final review of the next revision of INFCIRC 225, the IAEA nuclear physical security guidance document
- For the United States, President Obama has requested \$1.6 billion in the Federal Budget for fiscal year 2011 for cooperative international nuclear security activities, a 31% increase over fiscal year 2010. The United States will also pursue its own Summit commitments through the enhancement and coordination of existing activities between the Department of State, (DOS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense (DOD).

The Department of State will spearhead international diplomacy efforts in support of the Four Year Effort, including the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), which has become the major international financial mechanism for reducing WMD threats around the world, including securing nuclear material. The GP was launched by G8 Leaders at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada in 2002 as a \$20 billion commitment over ten years (2002-2012), of which the U.S. has pledged half. Eight years later, the 23 GP members have now allocated more than \$18 billion and, by 2012, we will exceed the original \$20 billion commitment. To date, the GP has undertaken complex and challenging projects in Russia and across the Former Soviet Union to dismantle or eliminate former weapons programs, whose impact has been significant. Efforts are underway to extend the GP for an additional ten years with more funding, and to expand its scope to other countries in line with the current mandate to expand GP projects to regions that present the highest risks for proliferation and terrorism. The U.S. strongly supports extending the G8 Global Partnership beyond 2012 to address the full range of WMD threats worldwide, and we plan to provide up to \$10 billion in continued funding during the period of 2012-2022 for threat reduction efforts, subject to Congressional appropriations. The GP supports the Four Year Effort by providing a mechanism to work with and provide assistance to other nations to secure nuclear material, as well as other material and expertise that could be utilized for WMD.

DOS also leads U.S. participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which is a cross-cutting strategic framework of 77 partners and four official observers (IAEA, EU, INTERPOL and UNODC) with the purpose of enhancing individual, regional and collective capabilities to combat the shared threat of nuclear terrorism. Other significant DOS efforts that are consistent with the Four Year Effort include the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), which seeks to establish partnerships and action plans with key governments to enhance their ability to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to nuclear smuggling attempts; as well as efforts to coordinate United States contributions to UNSCR 1540 in order to help countries meet their obligations to prevent WMD, delivery means, and related materials from getting into the hands of terrorists.

The Department of Energy (DOE) provides the largest United States contribution in terms of capital and programmatic capability to worldwide threat reduction efforts. DOE provides the first line of defense against nuclear theft and terrorism at dozens of the most vulnerable sites via its Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program. DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) seeks, reduces, and protects vulnerable nuclear material located at civilian sites worldwide by converting research reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); removing and disposing of excess and vulnerable nuclear materials, thereby achieving permanent threat reduction at civilian sites; and increasing physical protection at sites with vulnerable nuclear material to reduce the risk of theft until such time as the material can be safely removed. DOE's Second Line of Defense Program will continue to work with international partners to enhance their capabilities to detect, deter, and interdict the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials as they move across international borders. DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security also co-leads with DOS efforts to develop international (HEU) guidelines to minimize HEU in civilian nuclear applications, similar to the existing International Plutonium Management Guidelines document. This effort helps reduce the prospect of terrorist access to, and use of, fissile material. DOE will also lead efforts to implement the amended Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement

that was signed on April 13th which calls for the United States and Russia to each dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium – enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

The Department of Defense (DOD) will support the Four Year Effort through several existing and proposed programs within its Cooperative Threat Reduction program, including Nuclear Weapons Storage Security/Transportation Security, which enhances the security, control and accounting of nuclear weapons stored in Russia. In conjunction with DOE, DOD also contributes to the President's Four Year Effort by working toward the establishment of regional Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security in partner nations which will assess equipment and manpower, provide material security training, and demonstrate enhanced security procedures and processes. Through such Centers of Excellence, lessons learned could be provided and discussed without requiring direct site access to sensitive facilities. DOD will also explore new initiatives, such as providing best practices to countries and regions outside of the Former Soviet Union.

I would also like to highlight several themes that were repeated by the States attending the Nuclear Security Summit. First, all participants agreed that the Four Year Effort, as reflected in the Communiqué and Work Plan, was a worthy goal. Many States emphasized the need for strong, global, nuclear security architecture, as typified by the various existing international treaties and regimes discussed in the Summit documents. Some States emphasized the importance of increasing funding for the IAEA's Nuclear Security Program without negatively impacting its technical cooperation program. All States also agreed that the nuclear security agenda should not remain confined to the attending States but should involve all countries around the world. Several States emphasized the importance of nuclear security "peer review" and highlighted a need for enhanced information exchange and intelligence-sharing.

To draw some conclusions for the Committee, the Summit fostered a common understanding of the threats posed by nuclear terrorism and the potential vulnerabilities of nuclear material. Summit participants also pledged to be responsible stewards of nuclear material through the various actions described in the Work Plan. The United States plans to broaden the conversation by reaching out to countries not represented at the Summit and inviting them to join forces with us in ensuring the security of nuclear materials by 2013. Finally, all States agreed on the need for at least one additional, if not more, follow-on Summits, and South Korea will host the next Summit in 2012. The Summit Sherpas will consult on the precise timing of follow-on events at their next meeting later this year.

Conclusion

The Nuclear Security Summit focused on the issue of securing nuclear material leaving broader issues of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the NPT Review Conference, which my colleague, Ambassador Susan Burk, will speak to. I believe that the spirited international cooperation and momentum that the Summit has generated will contribute to achieving a successful NPT Review Conference in May, because nuclear security is an essential foundation for progress in disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I will conclude by stating that the task set before the global community by the Nuclear Security Summit is clear: we must work urgently to reduce the risk of terrorists, criminal organizations, or extremists getting their hands on nuclear weapons, or the materials, expertise and technology necessary to build them. We cannot afford to be divided in this endeavor. By

bringing together our allies and other States around the globe, at the Summit and in other future forums, we will ensure that we bring every resource to bear on meeting this important challenge.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.