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***“New Directions on Old Paths?
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)”***

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Introduction

When one thinks of the Caribbean it is difficult not to think of one of the most enduring enmities in international relations, the struggle between Cuba and the United States. Since 1959, Cuba actively sponsored guerrilla movements and the US sponsored dozens of covert operations against Fidel Castro and an open invasion by CIA-trained exiles, faced a potentially catastrophic nuclear stand-off, and stood helpless while Cuba unleashed on US shores a horde of refugees, some 20,000 of whom were criminals and inmates of mental asylums. The US fought a militarily incompetent battle against Cuban reservist workers in Grenada, contributed to the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, helped track down Ché Guevarra in Bolivia, and trained Contras in Nicaragua. It has been a war, in and out of the shadows, so pervasive and challenging that it has engendered some of the classics in the study of foreign policy decision-making. Think of Irvin L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (1962), of Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decisions* (1971), and John Lewis Gaddis' *Strategies of Containment* (1982).

These are the realities which put the study of US-Caribbean relations during the Cold War in a distinct category. These are no longer the realities of the contemporary Caribbean and the threats they pose to US national security and, even more so, to the security and good governance of the many small nations of the region. The necessary changes in the perceptions and definitions of national

security in the region have been slow in coming.¹ Today, every country in the Caribbean has normal relations with Cuba and nearly all are grateful for the presence of Cuban medical teams in their countries. Other than in Cuba, there are no overtly Marxist-Leninist (i.e., Communist) parties in office (or even as a significant opposition) anywhere in the region. This is not what threatens them. The threat is much more insidious because while it has a clear external dimension, it feeds and festers on the domestic corruption which has spawned native criminal gangs, many with real links to the global supply chains of the drug trade. New threats require new strategies if we are to first contain, and then substantially defeat these threats. The following security arrangements were certainly well-meaning but as the situations I describe here demonstrate, they have not been up to the intended tasks:

Chronology of Post-Cold War US-Caribbean Security Arrangements

- May 1997 Bridgetown, Barbados Partnership for Prosperity and Security – Third Border Initiative launched by President Bill Clinton
- April 2001 President George W. Bush – Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec, Canada
- January 2004 CARICOM, Dominican Republic and the USA pledge to strengthen the Third Border Initiative

Having said this, let us understand that not every Caribbean country is affected in the same way the levels of violence and corruption we describe. Indeed,

some are up to now relatively free from these scourges. Since it is one of my key contentions that there is a very close relationship between generalized (but especially governmental) corruption and violence,² let us distinguish cases.

States with Low levels of Corruption and Violence
(Using the 2009 Transparency International [IT] Ranking)

Countries with Low Corruption and virtually no societal violence

- Barbados [rank = 20 score = 7.4]
- St. Lucia [rank = 22 score = 7.1]
- St. Vincent [rank = 31 score = 6.5]
- Dominica [rank = 34 score = 6.0]

[Note: Costa Rica ranks 43 with a score of 5.1]

Countries with high levels of corruption and violence

- 1) Trinidad/Tobago [rank = 79 score = 3.6]
- 2) Dominican Rep. [rank = 99 score = 3.0]
- 3) Jamaica [rank = 99 score = 3.1]
- 4) Guyana [rank = 126 score = 2.6]
- 5) Venezuela [rank = 162 score = 1.9]
- 6) Haiti [rank = 168 score = 1.9]

It should be clearly understood that the IT ranking is based on perceptions; no names or specific cases are mentioned. IT, as I do, paints with a broad brush. However, since perceptions both reflect and engender realities, we will analyze five of these six cases as worrisome “hot spots” in the region. They have to be analyzed in terms of their individual characteristics and in terms of what they contribute to making the region the insecure area that it has become.

Since Venezuela has a 4,000 km coastline on the Caribbean and an additional 185 km on the Atlantic, it is a Caribbean country. We begin our analysis there.

Venezuela

Venezuela neither grows nor processes any significant amount of illicit drugs. Nor is there any evidence that the Venezuelan government, as distinct from individual members of that government, is itself benefitting from the drug trade. What is patently evident is that Venezuela is now a major transshipment country. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), drug transshipments through Venezuela grew fourfold between 2004 and 2007, from 60 to 260 metric tons.³ Several factors explain this dramatic change:

- 1) The growing levels of corruption at all levels in the society. In his letter of presentation of a GAO Report, US Senator Richard Lugar describes a 2008 study by the office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) which designated three top officials who reported directly to President Hugo Chavez as “drug kingpins.”⁴ Corruption appears to be especially rampant among members of the national intelligence agency, National Guard, and Border Militia. The score of 1.9 and ranking at 162 (out of 180 countries) appear to be well deserved. Evidently, many and much can be bought in Venezuela.

2) The banning of US counter-narcotics effectiveness, from the DEA to over flights of US surveillance aircraft.

3) The fact that Venezuela's substantial purchases of armaments from Russia and China are meant to defend against a much-hyped conventional struggle with Colombia and/or the US rather than controlling the very large number of planes or fast boats which depart from Venezuela enroute to the islands and Central America.

This apparent loss of control over corrupt members of its military and police is incontrovertible. Much more speculative – but not for that less worrisome – is the ultimate goal of Venezuela's role as supporter of Iran and a group closely allied to it, the Hizbollah. Robert M. Morgenthau, the District Attorney of Manhattan, has alleged that this relationship leaves open “a window susceptible to money laundering by the Iranian government, the narcotics organizations with ties to corrupt elements in the Venezuelan government, and the terrorist organizations that Iran supports openly.”⁵ Critically important for the Caribbean is the presence of Hizbollah. Whether they are involved in the drug trade, as Morgenthau alleges, or not, they are definitely involved in collecting and laundering funds in the Caribbean. It is known that substantial numbers of Syrian-Lebanese in the region contribute to Hizbollah. The amounts coming from these Diasporas were recently revealed in the collapse of the Ponzi scheme run by Hizbollah-connected Salah

Ezzedine.⁶ Despite their vocal anti-Americanism, there is no evidence that any of these activities pose any immediate threat to the Caribbean region.

Haiti and the Dominican Republic

Neither corruption nor drug running is new to either Haiti or the Dominican Republic (DR). They survive and even flourish, regardless of who is in power. More recently, and directly related to the new permissiveness in Venezuela, there has been a dramatic increase of “suspicious” flights out of that country to these two countries which share an island. In 2008 there were 22 suspicious flights to Haiti and 70 to the DR. Interestingly enough, there were only 31 to Central America and Mexico.⁷ The number of flights to the DR indicates a very porous situation among state agencies as well as the long-standing and very well organized network of criminal gangs operating between Puerto Rico and the DR. But drug corruption is not the only type of corruption in either society. In the DR there have been a series of banking scandals of truly impressive proportions. First it was private banks, then, charges were leveled against officials of the Central Bank. As far as customs is concerned, a recently deceased Director of Customs referred to the customs and public administration in general as being in a putrid state [*“un estado de podredumbre.”*]⁸ All this has been grist for the mill of a very active press, both print and Television. This explains the explosion of anti-corruption groups in the civil society, viz., Alianza Dominicana contra la Corrupción, Fundación Justicia y

Transparencia, and the official Dirección Nacional de Persecución de la Corrupción Administrativa. At least there is public awareness of the situation. No such civil society agitation exists in Haiti. A little history will illustrate.⁹

By November 1988 Haitian army Colonel Jean-Claude Paul had become something of a household name in South Florida because of his indictment in a Miami court on drug smuggling charges. Paul was the closest thing to a General Noriega (of Panama) that Haiti had, and as such was no push-over. Then-President Leslie Manigat was counting on his support, so in return he defended him against the drug-running charges. Manigat would say that it was Paul's Haitian nationalism that antagonized the Americans.

Whoever may or may not have been involved in drugs in Haiti might be hard to discover. What is not hard to discern is the fact that Haiti had become – at least since 1983 according to the DEA – a major transshipment point for Colombian cocaine. President Jean-Claude Duvalier's brother-in-law was jailed in Puerto Rico, accused by the Carter administration of transporting drugs. Haiti did not become a major center of US concern, however, until 1987. By that year, the pressure was turned on President Manigat to rid his regime of one officer in particular, his loyal supporter, Colonel Paul. The Haitian situation had gone beyond personalities; it was now believed to involve systematic and well-organized links between the Colombian cartels and Haitian gangs operating in the

US, the Miami River appears to have been their main point of entry into the US. An analysis of Haitian vessel activity on the Miami River alone, according to a high US customs official, revealed that approximately 45 percent of the vessels, and 60 percent of the vessel agents were documented for alleged involvement in alien and narcotics smuggling activities. Several factors have to be taken into account:

- 1) Haiti's government and its law and order institutions have hardly ever governed outside the capital city, Port-au-Prince. This leaves some two dozen active ports virtually unsupervised. A 5,000-man police force is hardly sufficient in a country with 9 million people.

- 2) Haiti has the largest cabotage trade in the region; thousands of large and small sailing and motor vessels ply an active trade with the whole Bahamas Archipelago, up to Miami. There are well-organized Haitian gangs in both the Bahamas and Miami which insure that the supply chain remain intact and profitable.

- 3) The excellent job done by the 7,000-member MINUSTAH force is substantially geared towards keeping the peace in a few volatile cities and regions of the country. It is not a counter-narcotics force.

Jamaica

Jamaicans were not at all ready to conclude that John Issa, Chairman of the hotel chain, Super Clubs, was personally involved in the case of the 1,100 pounds of hash oil found in the water tank of his yacht, “My Zein.” What they did find objectionable was his claim that no one in Jamaica would believe that he was involved because,

... [I]t may sound arrogant, but my reputation is of being one of the businessmen in Jamaica with integrity. There are not many.¹⁰

Was Issa contributing to a “name-and-shame” trend? This came as the island was reeling from negative stories from the UK, the US and even Costa Rica. In the latter country a rash of killings by Jamaican gangs has led to new immigration controls on people from that island.¹¹ Other cases were agitating public opinion on the island:

1) The widely-rumored (later confirmed) unwillingness of the Prime Minister to respond to a request that a major “don” (Jamaican term for drug lord) of his constituency be extradited to the US.

2) The apparent demotion of a senior Acting Deputy Superintendent of Police following his confrontation with a Member of the House of Representatives who intervened to defend a constituent, a reputed “don,” against a Police anti-drug -trafficking action.

3) The resignation of the Minister of National Security, Colonel Trevor MacMillan. In February he had given an alarming account of the crime scene in Jamaica and elsewhere in the region. His words were stark: “terrifying,” “merciless killers,” frighteningly” increasing.

(4) The fact that more than 60 members of the Police Force were arrested for corruption and association with criminal gangs in the first 11 months of 2009.¹²

None of these four cases surprises Jamaicans in the know. As early as 1994, the courageous journalist Dawn Ritch of *The Jamaican Gleaner* was revealing the links between drug trafficking, crime and the political protection the “dons” received in what are known as “garrison” constituencies. It all began in the 1970s. Ritch listed virtually every electoral constituency on the island, the name of the representative from that constituency and the “posses” (gangs) which controlled them.¹³ Both constituencies represented in the 2009 incidents mentioned above figured prominently in Ritch’s analysis. And, yet, the paradox is that Jamaica has a functioning democratic system. Note the following apparently contradictory statements in the World Bank’s *Country Study on Jamaica* (2004):

(1) Jamaica has a strong democracy, high caliber bureaucracy and good regulatory framework.

(2) Jamaica has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world, but a relatively low rate of property crime. In 2000 the recorded intentional homicide

rate was 33 per 100,000 inhabitants, lower only than Colombia (63) and South Africa (52). (p. 115).

In fact, Jamaica's murder rate is 30 times that of Britain. Although the figures show Jamaica to be, comparatively, a good performer in terms of Bureaucracy Quality and Infrastructure, there is disagreement on that. "In Jamaica", says a more recent World Bank study, "the government is considered to be bureaucratic and inefficient in providing services, particularly in the branch offices of the customs and licensing agencies."¹⁴ Where there is no disagreement is on the high incidence of corruption and on the fact that Jamaica fails terribly in the area of homicides and in the costs it imposes on businesses (viz., in lost production and in disincentives to investment). The World Bank calculates that the economic cost of crime in 2001 was 3.7% of G.D.P. And, yet, that island of 11,000 sq. km has fairly sizable national security and justice systems. In 2000 the Ministry of National Security and Justice received 5.1% of the total budget to sustain the following forces:

- Police and Correctional Services (+/- 5,000).
- Jamaican Defence Force (2,500).
- National Reserve Force (1,000).
- Jamaican Constabulary Force (8,500).

To this list should be added the 14,198 private security guards who (in 1999) worked for 298 security companies. There is an official “Private Security Regulation Authority” which registers and trains this private force.¹⁵

The crucial element here is that public corruption and organized crime are not recent situations, which makes short-term solutions all the more difficult. Since the unique nexus between politics, drugs and arms smuggling, and organized crime goes back several decades, an accommodation of sorts has been reached between the politicians and the gangs. There are no equivalent cases of such early origins elsewhere in the region. Already by 1977 a major study noted that the “size of the ganja industry and the corruption and vested interests which relate to it” help to explain part of the political and criminal violence which has occurred in Jamaica since the early 1970s.

It is notorious that it has taken Jamaican civil society and academia a long time to mobilize against the drug trade, corruption and their links to the political system. It was long assumed that, to the extent that there was a mafia, it was the Colombian one and that this was a concern for the United States. Now there is ample awareness that Jamaica has its own mafias, making profitable links with the Colombians or anyone else who will enrich their coffers, and that they pose real threats to the economy and political system. It is true that the island has made significant strides through an initiative known as “Kingfisher” in stopping the

“fast” boats coming from San Andres (Colombia) and small planes coming from Venezuela. Yet, enough gets through and Jamaica produces enough marijuana to supply a very large domestic and even larger international market. In Jamaica the imperative to localize control (and profits) has real strength.

Three dimensions of crime in Jamaica go a long way to explain a situation in which the state is perceived as unable to maintain law and order:

(1) The entrenched presence of organized crime gangs (yardies or posses) in narcotics, extortion, arms trafficking, all having close ties with criminals in metropolitan countries, have allowed them to be highly adaptive. Many of them had been deported to Jamaica from the US, Canada and the UK where they had been involved in typical organized crime misdeeds: drug offenses, illegal possession of firearms, fraud/false documents. A more recent criminal modality is kidnapping of well-to-do Jamaicans. Again, the complaint from the police is that they are “not exposed to enough training in kidnapping situations.”¹⁶

(2) The low level of public trust in the reliability of the police force. Aside from accusations of individual police corruption, there is a deeply-entrenched belief that the police are gratuitously brutal and trigger-happy. It is undoubtedly true as the news media editorialized, that the “tight lips” attitude of people in the very insecure parts of Kingston “cripples” crime fighting efforts.¹⁷ It is equally true, however, that there is a historical reason for such attitudes. In 1998

police were involved in 151 of the 169 “fatal shootings” (defined as committed by persons with gun permits) while 10 were committed by private guards, the rest by private citizens. Things have not improved much since.

(3) The sense that both the police and the court system exercise weak controls over public and private corruption. It is a universal fact that given the cyclical, and rotating, nature of political office holders, societies tend to have short memories about corruption. It is also a result of a situation recently highlighted by the generally-praised former Minister of National Security, Dr. Peter Phillips: the increasing sophistication and internationalization of corrupt criminal schemes and the inability of the legal system to keep up with these. He points out that the island passed the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) allowing forfeiture of illegally acquired wealth in 2006 but it has seldom been successfully utilized. “It is a new law,” says one of the island’s top criminal defense attorneys, “and the cases take time to prepare.”¹⁸ It is this which explains the frustration of a Peter Phillips who suggests something which Jamaicans are not prone to vent in public. This national inadequacy, he said, is going to require that you work closely with your international partners, with forensic accounting, “and the tracing of property, even into foreign jurisdictions. That also requires [political] will....”

We conclude by again quoting from the 2004 World Bank Jamaica Country Study: “....very poor rule of law and crime negates the positive elements in the

business environment.”¹⁹ This point is not lost on an important team of young criminologists at the University of the West Indies who assert that,

Crime has imposed a significant developmental cost on the society. It has a negative effect on the development of human capital, introduces inefficiencies into the economy, undermines the work ethic, diverts resources from investment to crime management and imposes costs in other ways. It has, of course, also had some positive linkage effects, such as the growth of the private security “industry.”²⁰

Trinidad and Tobago

Across the Caribbean, in Trinidad, crime is so out of control that there are now “advisories” as to which streets **in the city** are not safe to transit. The islanders are surprised and shocked to learn that their crime rate is higher than Jamaica’s.²¹ The 7,000-man strong Police Force and 3,000 Defence Force appear incapable of controlling law and order on the 5,000 sq. km. island. As a recent editorial in the *Trinidad Guardian* noted, with high-powered rifles and machine guns in the hands of the criminal gangs,” the Besson Street Police seem helpless to restore law and order.”²² This has led to a new cross-class, cross-race alliance of citizens in Port-of-Spain and elsewhere who are critical of government inaction and who demand, as the *Trinidad Guardian* editorialized, “Shape Up or Ship Out, Mr. Mayor.”²³ It is not just kidnappings, extortion and assaults in broad daylight, it is also terrorist bombs and arson. By April, 2009, the same Prime Minister and

the same Minister of National Security were again promising a “new” crime plan. The island’s National Security Council said the Minister “was still reviewing it.”²⁴ Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was telling the general Assembly of the United Nations that the rate of crime was due to the removal of the preferential markets for sugar and bananas by the EU,²⁵ as if the oil and gas-rich island produced much of either. Similarly, the Attorney General blamed the rise in crime among young males to the “influx of women” into the teaching profession.²⁶ Clearly, there is a complete disconnect between the political leadership and the dramatic changes in the nature of the society. Since you cannot use a constant (i.e., the political system) to explain a variable (i.e., exploding crime rates), it is evident that it is not the political system which causes the latter.

While civil society was mobilizing and merchants – as occurred in Kingston, Jamaica – were threatening to close down the city, this exchange between the press and Prime Minister Patrick Manning took place:

Asked about the US Federal Bureau of Investigations’ involvement in the investigation [of terrorist bombings], Manning said the police had a free hand to seek assistance from whomever they wished. “I am not myself aware that they have gone to the FBI. They very well might have. I do not know.”²⁷

What could be wrong with the Prime Minister saying that he had asked for help from the FBI? Can it be that the Prime Minister of a sovereign country – who

had just presided over an emergency meeting of his cabinet – was not aware that a foreign intelligence service was actively involved in a national crisis? This is especially of concern since no one on the island doubted that the situation was grave and that the state appeared incapable of controlling it.

This appeared to be especially the case of the long-standing – and, so far – futile efforts to bring a dangerous group to heel. The case of the militant Black Muslim group Jamaat al Muslimeen and its leader, Yasin Abu Bakr (née Lennox Phillips) has to stand as one of the most outrageous cases of justice denied in modern Caribbean history. In 1990 Bakr led 114 of his followers (some trained in Libya) in an attempted *coup d'état* which killed 24 people including a Member of Parliament, and caused some TT\$ 150 million in property damage. Charged with murder, treason and a slew of other offences, the Muslimeen group not only received amnesty but sued the state and were awarded TT\$ 2.1 million in damages. As of Fall, 2009 the following has transpired:

- 1) Abu Bakr has filed an affidavit claiming that in 2002 he had a political arrangement with the party then as now in power (the People's National Movement – PNM) to exchange favors.²⁸

- 2) The BBC reported that the Jamaat not only had links to criminal gangs, but also with Muslim extremists abroad.²⁹

The feeling is that the situations which led to the coup attempts of 1970 and 1990 have not been brought under control and have been left to simmer barely under the surface. The arrests for illegal weapons purchases in the US of some who were involved in both 1970 (as Marxists) and 1990 (this time as radical Muslims) are constant reminders of this. Quite evidently, the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago are faced with a scourge of criminal gangs as well as a criminal gang of converts to Islam. It is also quite evident the island's authorities appear incapable of bringing either under control.

Conclusions

After being in denial for too long, Caribbean societies are now fully aware of three indispensable realities:

1) There is no such thing as being “merely a stepping stone” route to the US. The drug trade eventually poisons every society along the way creating a veritable region-wide “culture area” of drugs.³⁰

2) There is a close link between traditional, general corruption and the corruption which allows organized crime to operate with virtual impunity.

3) Even as these small states do not have the law enforcement capacity to deal with these new threats to their national security, issues of sovereignty, nationalism and saving face are often obstacles to seeking external assistance.

Being largely tourist economies, there is a strong instinct to sweep bad news under the carpet.

Recommendations

There is much the US can do at home and so avoid accusations of perpetuating US hegemonic inclinations under a different, i.e., war on drugs, guise.

1) Speed up the allocation of US\$ 1.4 billion offered to Mexico under the Merida Initiative as well as the US\$ 45 to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. It is disheartening to read that only 2 percent of the amount pledged has been disbursed.³¹

2) Monitor and attempt to control two critical aspects of the international criminal enterprises: money laundering through US banks and the sale and export of small arms. The weapons used by the Jamaat al Muslimeen in their murderous attempted *coup d'état* in 1990 were purchased at a gun show in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.

3) Even as the US Supreme Court ruled in December, 2006 that the Federal Government could not deport people for drug misdemeanors, the US naturally has a sovereign right to deport criminal aliens. However, much closer coordination with island authorities is in order. The US might even consider alleviating the horrendous overcrowding in Caribbean jails by funding the building of jails for dangerous criminal deportees.

4) Keep the geopolitical initiatives in the Caribbean such as the Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation with Colombia over bases and jousting with President Hugo Chávez and Cuba separate from the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. These small Caribbean nations have excellent relations with Cuba and Venezuela. There is not a single case of one of their systems switching to a Cuban or “Bolivarian” type of regime. What threatens these nations is the drug-related criminality, in its domestic and international dimensions. This is what the US should concentrate on. In the Caribbean, US and regional security will probably best be enhanced by a substantial build up of the US Coast Guard, its naval and airborne branches.

Finally, the time might be ripe to initiate a true US-Europe-Caribbean concert similar to what existed in the post World War II period (the Caribbean Commission). The new involvement of the British, Dutch and French in the region warrants a more concerted effort at sharing not just patrols but also intelligence. This might well mean some concessions on the part of the US on its traditional regional dominance and on the part of the islands of some sovereignty, but the situation is urgent enough to make such concessions not just realistic but quite indispensable.³²

ENDNOTES

¹ For an early analysis of the changing perspectives on security by regional leaders, see Anthony P. Maingot, “Some Perspectives on Security by Governing Elites in the English-Speaking Caribbean ,” (Clarendon McKenna College: Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, 1985).

² See, Anthony P. Maingot, “Challenges of the Corruption-Violence Link,” in Ivelaw Griffith (ed.), *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), pp. 129-153.

³ US Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control: US Counter-Narcotics Cooperation with Venezuela has Declined,” Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 111th Congress (Washington D.C., July 2009).

⁴ Dick Lugar, letter of submission of GAO Report, 7-20-09.

⁵ See Robert M. Morgenthau, “The Emerging Axis of Iran and Venezuela,” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 8, 2009.

⁶ See Terry Biedermann, “Trail of Destruction,” *Financial Times Wealth* (Winter 2009), pp. 12-16.

⁷ GAO Report, p.10.

⁸ Cited in *Listin Diario*, December 6, 2009, p.10.

⁹ Further on this in Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 204-227.

¹⁰ *Jamaica Observer*, November 29, 2009, p. 2.

¹¹ See, “Exporting Shame,” *Jamaica Gleaner*, December 1, 2009; “PM Brushes Aside Tarnished Reputation Claim,” *Jamaica Gleaner On Line*, October 14, 2009; “Have we no Shame,” *Jamaica Gleaner On Line*, September 25, 2009; “Caribbean Strikes Back at UK Portrayal of Jamaica,” *The Gleaner*, July 7, 2009.

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- ¹² See *Jamaica Information Service*, May 22, 2009; *Jamaica Observer*, December 4, 2009; *The Gleaner*, December 4, 2009.
- ¹³ Dawn Ritch, *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, November 25 to December 1, 1994, p. 6.
- ¹⁴ World Bank, *A Time to Choose: Caribbean Development in the 21st Century* (2005), p. 53.
- ¹⁵ Source: Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey, 1999*, p. 23. 2.
- ¹⁶ *Jamaica Observer*, 9-28-09.
- ¹⁷ *Jamaican Gleaner*, October 4, 2009.
- ¹⁸ *Jamaican Gleaner*, October 4, 2009.
- ¹⁹ World Bank, *Jamaica Country Study* (2004), p. 118.
- ²⁰ Alfred Francis, Godfrey Gibbison , Anthony Herriott and Claremont Kirton, *Crime and Development, The Jamaican Experience* (Kingston: ISER, 2009), p. 68.
- ²¹ *The Nation*, May 23, 2009.
- ²² *Trinidad Guardian* February 2, 2009.
- ²³ www.guardian.com July 19, 2005.
- ²⁴ www.nationnews.com/print, May 23, 2009.
- ²⁵ *Trinidad Express*, September 27, 2009.
- ²⁶ *Trinidad Express*, November 12, 2009.
- ²⁷ www.guardian.com July 15, 2005.
- ²⁸ See “Bakr allegations demand clarification,” Editorial, *The Trinidad Guardian*, September 14, 2009.

²⁹ BBC News, “Profile: Jamaat al Muslimeen,” (June 3, 2007) at <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

³⁰ On this see, Anthony P. Maingot, “The Decentralization Imperative in Caribbean Criminal Enterprises,” in Tom Farer (ed.), *Transnational Criminal Enterprise in the Americas* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 143-170.

³¹ *The New York Times*, December 4, 2009, p. 17.

³² On this see, Anthony P. Maingot, “Modifying Traditional Hegemony and Sovereignty in the Caribbean,” in Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro (ed.), *Contemporary Inter-American Relations* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).