

**Statement of  
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**U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments**

***Introduction***

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today to discuss the U.S.-Japan security relationship as we commence our second half-century under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The relationship between the United States and Japan has provided the foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Second World War, and it has become a fixture in the strategic landscape, not only for the United States and Japan, but as a public good for countries throughout the region and indeed, around the world. It is a unique relationship, built on common interests and shared values that bind together two very different countries – a relationship that has adapted and continues to evolve to address changes in the security environment, in our political systems, and in our respective capacities and capabilities.

***State of the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship***

I don't think it is a secret to anyone that the alliance has been in the news of late in connection with a variety of issues: the Government of Japan's decision to re-evaluate the plans for relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa prefecture, the termination of Japan's Indian Ocean refueling operations, and the so-called "secret agreements," among other topics. These news stories have led to understandable concern, in some quarters, about the state of the relationship.

But we need to put those concerns in perspective, in light of the much more difficult trials our alliance has endured in the past, the rich agenda of cooperation underway, and the even more active agenda for deeper and broader cooperation that lies ahead. While the Democratic Party of Japan's assumption of power following the historic elections last fall is significant, the change in government in Japan and the policy reexaminations that have accompanied that change, bear no comparison to far deeper challenges the Alliance faced in 1960, 1970, and 1972. My remarks will focus on the security aspects our relationship – and security issues remain a priority – but I also want to re-emphasize the longevity and

breadth of our total relationship with Japan and reiterate that we should not lose sight of the fact that the U.S.-Japan relationship encompasses a broad spectrum of bilateral cooperative activities beyond security.

By placing the alliance's progress in proper perspective –rather than simply reacting to today's newspaper headlines – we can see how far we have come in overcoming obstacles and building a foundation of strength. The alliance now enjoys some of its highest ever public support rates in both countries and symbolizes a relationship that others in the region view as a foundation of the regional security architecture.

Similarly, when we consider our cooperation on modern problems of non-proliferation, missile defense, reconstruction in Afghanistan and stability in Pakistan, countering piracy, and preserving open sea lines of communication, we see the foundation for an ever-more robust alliance and partnership. Of course, to make this vision a reality, much more will be required of Japan and our alliance in the coming months and years. I am confident that Japan will continue to step up and find ways to do more. It will do so not because the United States asks it to, but rather because Japan has interests at stake, responsibilities to bear, and the capacity to make a difference.

Indeed, today's alliance agenda goes well beyond the formal commitments the United States and Japan have made to each other under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, including the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, in return for Japan's commitment to provide facilities and areas for U.S. forces to use in defending Japan and in maintaining peace and security in the Far East.

For example, U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan has become a central element in the defense relationship. Japan's investments in four BMD-capable AEGIS destroyers, and the upgrades of its Patriot battalions to the PAC-3 capability, are going a long way towards augmenting and strengthening the missile defense capability that protects Japan and our forces stationed there. At the same time, the collaboration between the United States and Japan on the Standard Missile 3 Block IIA not only promises both of our countries the opportunity to improve our future capabilities, but will serve as the foundation for land-based missile defense capabilities that the United States aims to deploy in Europe in support of defense requirements for our NATO allies and partners in the Arabian Gulf region.

An additional area where we see the potential for an especially rich agenda of cooperation is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or HA/DR. At our most recent mini-security subcommittee meeting last month, both sides gave particular focus to securing bilateral agreements that would enhance U.S.-Japan HA/DR cooperation and embody new operational initiatives. We view our continued success in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation as a signature item we have achieved as part of our agenda for the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the alliance.

Furthermore, Japan continues to be a leader in the international nonproliferation community. Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Okada have been forthright in their support of President Obama's stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan relies on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States for its security. On December 24 2009, Foreign Minister Okada sent a letter to Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton requesting a bilateral dialogue on U.S. nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, and non-proliferation policy. As part of our 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary agenda this year, we have begun such a formal dialogue with the Japanese to address information and cyber security, space, and ballistic missile defense - all of which are important issues that contribute to extended deterrence.

As we move forward in the alliance, it is important that we continue to hold confidential discussions with the Japanese Government on this range of issues. One important aspect of extended deterrence includes maintaining a “credible” security presence in Japan and the region. With regard to a non-nuclear country like Japan, respecting this policy while still providing for credible extended deterrence for Japan and the region means the ability to maintain our “neither confirm nor deny” policy. Supporting a nuclear-free world and maintaining a nuclear presence are not mutually exclusive ideas. As President Obama stated in Prague last April, although he is committed to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, he also recognizes that our current reality requires maintaining credible extended deterrence even as we work towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Our efforts on missile defense, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and extended deterrence are just a few of the efforts under our 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary agenda intended to both celebrate the achievement of the alliance over the past 50 years, as well as position us for the challenges and opportunities of the next 50 years, including on such areas as information and cyber security and space.

### ***Realignment Implementation***

In the here and now, however, public focus has been on implementation of the 2006 bilateral Realignment Roadmap, specifically the relocation of Futenma Air Station. Given the amount of attention this has been receiving, it is important to keep in mind that Futenma relocation is a single key element of a larger set of interrelated initiatives that compose the Realignment Roadmap. This Roadmap was not developed in a vacuum, but was based on an agreed set of “common strategic objectives” that reflect the complexities of 21<sup>st</sup> century, including long-standing, shared regional security challenges such as unresolved border disputes, a growing missile threat from North Korea, the threat of climate-related disasters, and uncertainty over the intent of China’s rapid military modernization.

The goal of the Roadmap is to provide the alliance with the posture and the capabilities necessary to be able to meet our commitment to the defense of Japan, respond to challenges in the region, and around the globe. It will also allow us to continue to underwrite peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region for decades to come.

Through the presence, capabilities, and readiness across our military forces, we make clear that the United States will protect U.S. and alliance interests in this unpredictable region. The technologies and combat power at the disposal of our forward-deployed forces are both sophisticated and devastating to adversaries. The United States cannot meet its treaty obligation to defend Japan without forward-deployed forces equipped with the appropriate capabilities and training, nor can we meet our other commitments to regional peace and stability.

The only readily deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines located on Okinawa. And the Marines serve a much broader purpose in the region beyond merely deterring conflict and fighting in contingencies. III MEF forces led U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Burma – often in close coordination with their counterparts in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Given that hours matter following a natural disaster, the presence of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa is critical for ensuring a timely response with capabilities no one else can bring to bear.

We recognize that the U.S. presence, although critical to providing for Japan’s security and the security of the region, has real effects on local base-hosting communities. In 1972, the United States and Japan worked together to return Okinawa to Japanese control. Since that time, we have been in continuous cooperation to optimize our security capabilities while reducing any detrimental effect on the people of Okinawa resulting from the U.S. force presence, as we do with our own domestic base-hosting communities. Through the Realignment Roadmap, we believe we’ve achieved the best possible option, and the lightest possible footprint given our mutual objectives.

In this context, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab is one component of a larger plan to consolidate the U.S. presence on Okinawa onto existing bases, and move away from the densely populated southern portion of the island.

The full realignment package will allow us to reposition more than 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of land south of Kadena Air Base, benefiting the Okinawan people, addressing noise, safety, and environmental concerns, and creating a much more sustainable presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa, all without adversely impacting the Alliance’s operational needs and capabilities. The FRF has gone through several iterations since the initial agreement in 1996, with changes to the plans made in response to issues raised by local communities, the Okinawa government, and the Government of Japan. We recognize that implementing this agreement has been a challenge, over the course of three U.S. administrations and multiple Japanese cabinets

formed by both the current and former ruling parties. Although we believe we've identified the best possible option for Futenma relocation, we understand this is a difficult issue to resolve in a manner that takes into consideration all the complex interests at play. Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the issue by May, and we look forward at that time to resume work with the Government of Japan to fulfill our long-standing mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Okinawa to be more sustainable politically and operationally.

The 2006 Realignment Roadmap also specifically calls for providing joint training opportunities for U.S. and Japanese forces on the islands of Okinawa and Guam. Such joint training arrangements provide the basis for the continuous presence of Japanese forces on U.S. soil – a major step forward for the alliance. Additionally, we are moving toward greater operational cooperation through the co-location of U.S. and Japanese forces. Under the existing bilateral agreements, we are co-locating our air and missile defense commands at Yokota Air Base, and the Ground Self-Defense Force's Central Readiness Force with a transformed U.S. Army command and control structure. These opportunities for greater training and co-location of our forces play a vital role in enhancing the strength of our alliance. Forces who have established ingrained patterns of cooperation, deep friendships, and a better understanding of each other's plans and decision-making processes will be better equipped to respond with speed and efficiency in a crisis situation. Using increased bilateral training as a jumping off point, we will then also have an opportunity to broaden cooperation through trilateral and multilateral training exercises among the United States, Japan, and other partner nations.

However, even as we look ahead to a robust infrastructure on Guam for the Marines and for bilateral training, we must be realistic about the impact of this historic buildup on Guam's infrastructure, environment, and quality of life. We must proceed in a way that balances the continued priority to move forward expeditiously and the need to address environmental and infrastructure challenges created by the ambitious construction timeline.

### ***Host Nation Support***

In addition to providing bases, Japan's host nation support, or HNS, is a key strategic pillar of the Alliance. HNS is an important measure to share the cost the United States incurs in Japan to maintain some of the most advanced, and most expensive, military capabilities in the world. It is essential that Japan contribute to the alliance through HNS (as well as through its own forces and in other ways). Japan provides roughly \$3 billion per year in direct support, almost all of which is returned to Japan's economy in the form of rents, salaries, or services – a bargain considering the security Japan gets in return. (To put Japan's overall defense spending into perspective, Japan spends 0.89 percent of its GDP on defense. South Korea spends 2.7 percent, Australia 2.4 percent, Singapore 4.9 percent, and China officially spent 1.4 percent in 2008, although estimates based on

actual outlays are significantly higher. The United States spends more than 4 percent of its GDP on defense.) All this talk of figures might suggest that HNS is simply a type of security commodity that Japan pays for on behalf of the U.S. This is not the case. HNS is a mutual investment in our commitment to regional stability. Japan provides financial and logistical support. The U.S. provides resource and manpower capabilities. Each side compliments each other and creates a robust alliance capacity under HNS.

Although HNS is a strategic pillar of the alliance and an important contribution in terms of the overall cost of maintaining the security relationship, we understand that some in Japan question how the money is being spent. That is why, in 2008, we agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of host nation support to ensure that the Japanese taxpayers benefit from the most efficient program possible, just as we have every incentive to maximize the return on Japan's funding and our own taxpayer resources to support our forces and their families, and ensure quality of life while stationed in Japan.

### ***Status of Forces Agreement***

Some in the Government of Japan have suggested a review and revision of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Even though we always stand prepared to discuss with our ally any issues that their government chooses to raise with ours, I think it is important to understand that some of the arguments made to support such a review are grounded in misperceptions of how the SOFA is implemented. Although the SOFA is fifty years old, it is in reality a living document, with its implementation being continuously improved through consultation in bilateral mechanisms such as the Joint Committee. Calls for SOFA revision within Japan also sometimes reflect concerns about environmental issues associated with U.S. facilities. Our bases strive to partner with local communities as good environmental stewards and comply with the more protective of U.S. or Japanese national standards, consistent with our worldwide practice. We're always looking to improve our environmental practices and energy efficiency, and look forward to continuing to partner with the Government of Japan as we do so. So, the reality is that we are constantly working to review the SOFA to assure it is implemented in an appropriate fashion.

### ***International Contributions***

On January 15, Japan terminated its Indian Ocean refueling support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Japan's refueling, provided continuously since 2001 (with one interruption in 2008), supported counter-terrorism activities and enabled the participation of key partners, such as Pakistan, in those efforts as well. The decision to terminate refueling support was Japan's decision alone to make, and in the end, Japan determined that it could best support our shared regional security objectives through other means – most notably, with its \$5 billion pledge towards civil-sector efforts in Afghanistan. That money will go towards building civilian capacity, reintegration of militants, demilitarization, and economic development – all critical components of this

administration's Afghanistan strategy. Japan continues to assess what additional and appropriate contribution it may be able to make to missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force remains active in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, an operation that has contributed to regional security and the freedom of global commerce. We hope to continue to build our agenda of cooperation with Japan in maritime security in the region and globally.

Japan is also sending its Self-Defense Force into more areas than ever before for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions – most recently, a deployment of 350 Ground Self-Defense Force personnel to Haiti to assist in reconstruction efforts. Generally, these contributions remain limited in size and scope. As a result of those limitations, Japan has long-emphasized the non-military side of international security contributions. Recently, we agreed to formally establish a bilateral working group to focus on issues in humanitarian aid, disaster relief, peace-keeping operations, and anti-piracy operations to identify even more opportunities to partner to advance these goals.

Over time, Japan may decide to relax some of the restrictions that currently prevent its forces from participating in some types of missions or from taking on some types of missions. Japan may even decide to relax its restrictions on collective self-defense and on defense export policies. Or Japan may decide the time has not yet come for those changes. Those are decisions for Japan to make. But regardless of the decisions Japan makes, I am confident that we will see Japan continue to find constitutionally acceptable ways to bear greater responsibility in addressing regional and global security challenges. At the same time, the United States and Japan will also continue to nurture the traditional and formal elements of our Treaty relationship, which remain as relevant today as they were 50 years ago, if not more so.

### ***Regional Relations***

Since they have come into power, the Democratic Party of Japan has taken great strides to strengthen Japan's ties with countries in the region. The U.S. welcomes these relationship-building efforts. Perhaps the most significant and positive recent development in regional relations has been the strengthening of trilateral ties among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The three nations share values, interests, and a common view of the dangers posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear developments. We have deepened these ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks. Just as the two Northeast Asian alliances are commemorating important anniversaries that symbolize the abiding U.S. commitment—the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the start of the Korean War—we are also charting a course to broaden and deepen trilateral defense ties.

Trilateral cooperation among the three nations has been vital in conveying a unified front and a common commitment to move towards complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. U.S. commitment to our allies and their security, together with their strengthening cooperation with each other, is critical to a coordinated, comprehensive approach to North Korea and increased stability and security for the region. This approach also provides a sound basis for broader, multilateral coordination and cooperation with China, Russia, and other countries.

Beyond the region, the contributions that Japan and South Korea are making to international security—from counter-piracy to stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan—also build partnership capacity. These efforts are making a positive contribution in current conflicts at the same time that they build capabilities and readiness to deter and, if need be, defend against future security challenges closer to home.

Security ties between Japan and Australia continue to grow as well. Our respective defense and foreign affairs agencies participate in a regular trilateral dialogue designed to improve trilateral operational cooperation to allow for closer partnerships in areas like maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping.

We do not see a strong U.S.-Japan alliance as incompatible with Japan's efforts to strengthen its bilateral relationships with its neighbors, including China. Defense Minister Kitazawa stresses that the United States and Japan will work to advance cooperative relations with China, welcoming it to play a constructive and responsible role in the international arena. At the same time, Japan shares our concerns about our limited insight on China's large and rapid military build-up.

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also crucial to the success of multilateral cooperation in the region, and we are committed to working with Japan to ensure that Asia's evolving multilateral organizations are inclusive, transparent, and solution-oriented. During a joint statement with President Obama on January 19, Prime Minister Hatoyama declared Japan's commitment to the alliance, remarking that the alliance is the cornerstone on which his concept of an East Asian community would rely. The United States and Japan can together make sure that these institutions have the capacity to bolster shared peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the region. As Secretary Clinton stated during a recent visit to Hawaii, "Our commitment to our bilateral relationships is entirely consistent with – and will enhance – Asia's multilateral groupings."

### ***Conclusion***

The Democratic Party of Japan government has made clear its commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as to principles of transparency and accountability in a vibrant democracy. There will certainly be differing ideas on how best to move forward together; that is only natural in discussions between two democracies. By working

patiently and persistently through areas of disagreement, we will ensure the continued expansion and strengthening of our relationship, even as the core commitments remain unshaken. As equal partners, we share a commitment to regional security, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and global peace-keeping operations. As President Obama said in Tokyo last year, the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance “represents an important opportunity to step back and reflect on what we’ve achieved, celebrate our friendship, but also find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it for the 21st century.” I look forward to the next 50 years of an alliance that will continue to be indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the United States, of Japan, and of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.