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(Original Signature of Member)

107<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

**H. RES. \_\_\_\_\_**

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**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Mr. GALLEGLY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the  
Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
**RESOLUTION**

Affirming the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-  
nization (NATO), supporting continued United States  
participation in NATO, ensuring that the enlargement  
of NATO proceeds in a manner consistent with United  
States interests, and for other purposes.

1       *Resolved,*

2       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

3           This resolution may be cited as the “Transatlantic  
4 Security and NATO Enhancement Resolution of 2002”.



1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 The House of Representatives makes the following  
3 findings:

4 (1) Since 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-  
5 nization (NATO) has played an essential role in  
6 guaranteeing the security, freedom, and prosperity  
7 of the United States and its partners in the Alliance.

8 (2) NATO, founded on the principles of democ-  
9 racy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, has  
10 proved to be an indispensable instrument for forging  
11 a trans-Atlantic community of nations working to-  
12 gether to safeguard the freedom and common herit-  
13 age of its peoples and promoting stability in the  
14 North Atlantic area.

15 (3) NATO is the only institution that promotes  
16 a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to  
17 issues concerning the security of North America and  
18 Europe and remains the only multilateral security  
19 organization demonstrably capable of conducting ef-  
20 fective military operations and preserving security  
21 and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

22 (4) The security, freedom, and prosperity of the  
23 United States remain linked to the security of the  
24 countries of Europe.

25 (5) NATO remains the most visible and signifi-  
26 cant embodiment of United States engagement in



1 Europe and therefore membership in NATO remains  
2 a vital national security interest of the United  
3 States.

4 (6) NATO enhances the security of the United  
5 States by providing an integrated military structure  
6 and a framework for consultations on political and  
7 security concerns of members which could impact  
8 the Alliance.

9 (7) The security of NATO member countries is  
10 inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe,  
11 and the consolidation and strengthening of demo-  
12 cratic and free societies on the entire continent is of  
13 direct and material importance to the NATO Alli-  
14 ance and its partners.

15 (8) The sustained commitment of the member  
16 countries of NATO to a mutual defense has been a  
17 major contributing factor in the democratic trans-  
18 formation of Central and Eastern Europe.

19 (9) Members of the Alliance can and should  
20 play a critical role in addressing the security chal-  
21 lenges of the post-Cold War era and in creating the  
22 stable environment needed for Central and Eastern  
23 Europe to successfully complete political and eco-  
24 nomic transformation.



1           (10) NATO should remain the core security or-  
2           ganization of the evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture  
3           in which all countries enjoy the same freedom, co-  
4           operation, and security.

5           (11) NATO's military force structure, defense  
6           planning, command structures, and force goals must  
7           be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its  
8           members, and should be capable of projecting power  
9           when the security of a NATO member is threatened,  
10          and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing  
11          partners among NATO members to defend common  
12          values and interests.

13          (12) NATO must act to address new post-Cold  
14          War risks emerging from outside the treaty area in  
15          the interests of preserving peace and security in the  
16          Euro-Atlantic area, including—

17                (A) risks from rogue states and non-state  
18                actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chem-  
19                ical weapons and their means of delivery;

20                (B) transnational terrorism and disruption  
21                of the flow of vital resources; and

22                (C) conflicts outside the treaty area stem-  
23                ming from unresolved historical disputes and  
24                the actions of undemocratic governments and



1 sub-state actors who reject the peaceful settle-  
2 ment of disputes.

3 (13) All NATO members should commit to im-  
4 proving their respective defense capabilities so that  
5 NATO can project power decisively and sustain op-  
6 erations over distance and time.

7 (14) The requirements to provide collective de-  
8 fense, to project power, and to sustain operations  
9 dictate that European NATO members possess mili-  
10 tary capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long  
11 distances, sustain operations for extended periods of  
12 time, and operate jointly with the United States in  
13 high-intensity conflicts.

14 (15) NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative,  
15 which is intended to improve the defense capabilities  
16 of the European Allies, particularly the deployability,  
17 mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of Alli-  
18 ance forces, must continue to be pursued by all  
19 members of the Alliance in order to develop balanced  
20 capabilities.

21 (16) With a few exceptions, European members  
22 of NATO have been deficient in maintaining re-  
23 quired military capabilities and providing defense  
24 spending at levels adequate to meet these capability  
25 shortfalls. Failure of the European NATO members



1 to achieve the goals established through the Defense  
2 Capabilities Initiative could weaken support for the  
3 Alliance in the United States over the long term.

4 (17) Members of the Alliance must also recog-  
5 nize that the campaign against new and emerging  
6 threats to the security of the Alliance requires other  
7 non-military capabilities and efforts to be effective.  
8 Thus, the need to enhance intelligence-sharing and  
9 cooperation, both bilaterally between Alliance mem-  
10 bers and partners and within the Alliance collec-  
11 tively, the facilitation of enhanced coordination  
12 among Alliance member's law enforcement agencies,  
13 and improved police and judicial cooperation and in-  
14 formation exchanges are critical to the overall effort.

15 (18) NATO has embarked upon an historic mis-  
16 sion to share its benefits and patterns of consulta-  
17 tion and cooperation with other nations in the Euro-  
18 Atlantic area through both enlargement and active  
19 partnership.

20 (19) NATO has enlarged its membership on  
21 four different occasions since 1949.

22 (20) The NATO summit meeting to be held in  
23 the fall of 2002 in Prague will provide an historic  
24 opportunity to chart a course for NATO in the new  
25 millennium by reaffirming the importance of NATO



1 to the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic region,  
2 by addressing new threats, developing new capabili-  
3 ties, and by extending invitations to additional coun-  
4 tries of Europe to become members of the Alliance.

5 (21) The governments of NATO member coun-  
6 tries have stated that enlargement of the Alliance is  
7 a further step toward the Alliance's basic goal of en-  
8 hancing security and extending stability throughout  
9 the Euro-Atlantic region.

10 (22) The enlargement process of NATO helps  
11 to avert conflict, because the very prospect of mem-  
12 bership serves as an incentive for aspiring members  
13 to resolve disputes with their neighbors and to push  
14 ahead with reform and democratization.

15 (23) The Partnership for Peace, created in  
16 1994 under United States leadership, has fostered  
17 cooperation between NATO and the countries of  
18 Central and Eastern Europe, and offers a path to  
19 future membership in the Alliance.

20 (24) At the Washington Summit of the NATO  
21 Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state  
22 and government issued a communique declaring  
23 "[we] pledge that NATO will continue to welcome  
24 new members in a position to further the principles



1 of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to  
2 peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area”.

3 (25) In 1999 NATO launched a Membership  
4 Action Plan designed to help interested Partnership  
5 for Peace countries prepare for membership by offer-  
6 ing advice and assistance on programs and member-  
7 ship-related issues.

8 (26) The Membership Action Plan establishes  
9 certain political, economic, social, and military-re-  
10 lated goals that aspiring candidate nations are ex-  
11 pected to meet, including the peaceful resolution of  
12 territorial disputes, respect for democratic proce-  
13 dures and the rule of law, human rights, democratic  
14 control of the military and other military reforms,  
15 and a commitment to stability and well-being  
16 through economic liberty and social justice.

17 (27) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, nine  
18 nations of Europe issued a statement (later joined  
19 by a tenth) declaring that their countries will co-  
20 operate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the  
21 next round of NATO enlargement and since then  
22 have taken concrete steps to demonstrate this com-  
23 mitment, including their participation in Partnership  
24 for Peace activities and their commitment to the  
25 concept of the Membership Action Plan.



1           (28) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw,  
2           Poland, President George W. Bush stated “[all] of  
3           Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the  
4           Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the  
5           same chance for security and freedom—and the  
6           same chance to join the institutions of Europe”.

7           (29) The enlargement of the NATO Alliance to  
8           include as full and equal members additional democ-  
9           racies in Europe will serve to reinforce stability and  
10          security in Europe by fostering their integration into  
11          the structures which have created and sustained  
12          peace in Europe since 1945.

13          (30) As new members of NATO assume the re-  
14          sponsibilities of Alliance membership, the costs of  
15          maintaining stability in Europe will be shared more  
16          widely. The concurrent assumption of greater re-  
17          sponsibility and development of greater capabilities  
18          by new members of NATO will further reinforce  
19          burdensharing.

20          (31) The membership of the Czech Republic,  
21          Hungary, and Poland has strengthened NATO’s  
22          ability to perform the full range of NATO missions  
23          by providing bases, airfields, and transit rights for  
24          NATO forces during Operation Allied Force in the  
25          Balkans, by their contributions of military forces to



1 NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and by their  
2 support for Operation Enduring Freedom.

3 (32) The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Po-  
4 land, due to their similar recent history, have bol-  
5 stered NATO's capability to integrate former com-  
6 munist nations into a community of democracies and  
7 have served as mentors to other countries that as-  
8 pire to join NATO.

9 (33) In supporting NATO enlargement all can-  
10 didate countries must be fully aware of the costs and  
11 responsibilities of NATO membership, including the  
12 obligation set forth in Article X of the North Atlan-  
13 tic Treaty that new members be able to contribute  
14 to the security of the North Atlantic area, and fur-  
15 ther to ensure that all countries admitted to NATO  
16 are capable of assuming those costs and responsibil-  
17 ities.

18 (34) For those candidate countries that receive  
19 an invitation to join NATO at the Prague Summit,  
20 the process of joining NATO does not end with the  
21 invitation but rather with meeting the full respon-  
22 sibilities of a NATO member, including the comple-  
23 tion of issues identified by the Membership Action  
24 Plan, which will continue beyond Prague.



1           (35) In considering the enlargement of NATO  
2           at Prague and in issuing invitations to the candidate  
3           countries who have made significant progress toward  
4           achieving their objectives in the Membership Action  
5           Plan established by NATO, there is a recognition  
6           that each country invited to join NATO should ac-  
7           cede on a common date but before the date on which  
8           the next announced NATO summit is to take place.

9           (36) The countries that will be invited to begin  
10          accession negotiations with NATO at the NATO  
11          summit in Prague should not be the last such coun-  
12          tries invited to join NATO and there should be a  
13          continuing process and progress toward the admis-  
14          sion of additional democracies in Europe beyond  
15          2002 depending on the degree to which those coun-  
16          tries meet the criteria set forth in NATO's Member-  
17          ship Action Plan.

18          (37) The process of NATO enlargement entails  
19          the consensus agreement of the governments of all  
20          19 NATO member countries and ratification in ac-  
21          cordance with their constitutional procedures.

22       **SEC. 3. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN**  
23       **FEDERATION.**

24          The House of Representatives makes the following  
25          findings:



1           (1) The admission into the North Atlantic  
2 Treaty Organization (NATO) of new members from  
3 countries in Eastern and Central Europe, such as  
4 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, will not  
5 threaten any other country.

6           (2) Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has  
7 attached particular importance to the development  
8 of constructive and cooperative relations with the  
9 Russian Federation in order to overcome remaining  
10 vestiges of confrontation and competition in order to  
11 strengthen mutual trust and cooperation between  
12 NATO and the Russian Federation.

13           (3) In 1994, building on previous efforts at co-  
14 operation, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace  
15 Program, further enhancing the emerging NATO-  
16 Russian Federation dialogue.

17           (4) On May 27, 1997, in an expression of  
18 strong commitment to work together to build a last-  
19 ing and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area,  
20 the heads of state and government of NATO and the  
21 Russian Federation signed the ground-breaking  
22 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation  
23 and Security Between NATO and the Russian Fed-  
24 eration”.



1           (5) On March 18, 1998, the Russian Federa-  
2           tion formally established its mission to NATO and  
3           appointed a senior military representative to facili-  
4           tate military and defense-related cooperation be-  
5           tween NATO and the Russia Federation.

6           (6) Since 1998, NATO and the Russian Fed-  
7           eration have worked cooperatively with each other in  
8           the Balkans and elsewhere setting the stage for the  
9           ability of an enlarged NATO to continue the cooper-  
10          ative spirit embodied in the Founding Act.

11          (7) On May 28, 2002, in an historic step to-  
12          ward the Alliance's long-standing goal of building a  
13          secure, cooperative, and democratic Euro-Atlantic  
14          area, NATO took the decisive and substantial step  
15          of deepening the NATO-Russian Federation rela-  
16          tionship by establishing the new NATO-Russia  
17          Council.

18 **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.**

19          The House of Representatives declares the following  
20          to be the policy of the United States:

21               (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
22               (NATO) should remain the primary institution  
23               through which European and North American allies  
24               address security issues of transatlantic concern.



1           (2) The member states of NATO should reaf-  
2 firm, at the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002, the  
3 continued importance of NATO, renew their commit-  
4 ment to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, re-  
5 inforce unity within NATO, maintain a vigorous ca-  
6 pability to carry out collective defense, and har-  
7 monize security policies and strategies for trans-  
8 atlantic affairs.

9           (3) At the Prague Summit, the Alliance, while  
10 maintaining collective defense as its core function,  
11 should as a fundamental Alliance task, continue to  
12 strengthen national and collective capacities to re-  
13 spond to new threats wherever such threats occur,  
14 including from abroad.

15           (4) The Alliance, in addition to the strategic  
16 concept adopted by the Allies at the summit meeting  
17 held in Washington in 1999, must recognize the  
18 need to develop new capabilities, and agree to con-  
19 sider acting upon the threats posed by the prolifera-  
20 tion of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism  
21 by intensifying consultations among political and  
22 military leaders, and by developing comprehensive  
23 capabilities to counter these threats to the inter-  
24 national community.



1           (5) The Alliance should make clear commit-  
2           ments to remedy shortfalls in areas such as logistics,  
3           strategic airlift, command and control, modern  
4           strike capabilities, adequate shared intelligence, and  
5           the other requirements identified by NATO's De-  
6           fense Capabilities Initiative necessary to provide the  
7           ability to carry out the full range of NATO's mis-  
8           sions.

9           (6) The Alliance must ensure a more equitable  
10          sharing of contributions to the NATO common  
11          budgets and to overall national defense expenditures  
12          and capability-building.

13          (7) The President, the Secretary of State, and  
14          the Secretary of Defense should fully use their of-  
15          fices to encourage the NATO allies to commit the  
16          resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to  
17          rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain op-  
18          erations for extended periods of time, and operate  
19          jointly with the United States in high intensity con-  
20          flicts, thus making such NATO allies more effective  
21          partners.

22          (8) The member states of NATO should com-  
23          mit to enhanced intelligence-sharing, law enforce-  
24          ment, police, and judicial cooperation, and expanded  
25          information exchanges within and among Alliance



1 members in order to meet the challenges of new and  
2 emerging threats.


3 **SEC. 5. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-**  
4 **TION.**

5 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

6 (1) while maintaining its essential and inherent  
7 right to make its own decisions, the North Atlantic  
8 Treaty Organization (NATO) should seek to  
9 strengthen its relations with the Russian Federation  
10 as an essential partner in building long-term peace  
11 in Europe, and to that end, the new NATO-Russia  
12 Council, in which member states and the Russian  
13 Federation will work as equal partners on mutually-  
14 agreed matters, should be welcomed and supported;

15 (2) while retaining its primary commitment to  
16 collective defense, NATO enlargement should be car-  
17 ried out in such a manner as to underscore to the  
18 Russian Federation that NATO enlargement will en-  
19 hance the security of all countries in Europe, includ-  
20 ing the Russian Federation; and

21 (3) in seeking to demonstrate NATO's defen-  
22 sive and security-enhancing intentions to the Rus-  
23 sian Federation, it is essential that neither funda-  
24 mental United States security interests in Europe



1 nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a  
2 defensive alliance be jeopardized.

3 **SEC. 6. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT**  
4 **AND DESIGNATION OF COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE**  
5 **FOR NATO.**

6 It is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

7 (1) at the Summit to be held in Prague in the  
8 fall of 2002, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
9 (NATO) should extend invitations for accession ne-  
10 gotiations to any appropriate candidate country that  
11 meets the objectives and targets for NATO member-  
12 ship as outlined in the Membership Action Plan  
13 process established by NATO in 1999, including—

14 (A) a commitment to the basic principles  
15 and values set out in the Washington Treaty;

16 (B) the capability to contribute to collec-  
17 tive defense and the Alliance's full range of mis-  
18 sions; and

19 (C) a firm commitment to contribute to  
20 stability and security, especially in regions of  
21 crisis and conflict, and to be willing and able to  
22 assume the responsibilities of NATO member-  
23 ship;

24 (2) the candidate countries of Albania, Bul-  
25 garia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the



1 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania,  
2 Slovakia, and Slovenia should be commended on the  
3 significant progress such countries have made thus  
4 far in political and economic liberty and military re-  
5 form necessary for meeting the objectives for pro-  
6 spective members of NATO as set out in their own  
7 Membership Action Plans;

8 (3) each candidate country, despite recognized  
9 Membership Action Plan deficiencies requiring fur-  
10 ther refinement, could in its own way contribute to  
11 stability, freedom, and peace in Europe as a whole,  
12 as many of such countries have done thus far in the  
13 Balkans and in Afghanistan, and would make a  
14 positive contribution toward furthering the goals of  
15 NATO should it become a NATO member country;

16 (4) having made significant progress in reform-  
17 ing their societies and their military forces, and hav-  
18 ing developed reasonable, affordable, and sustainable  
19 plans to be able to work within the Alliance struc-  
20 ture and to contribute positively to the collective de-  
21 fense of the Alliance and other NATO missions, the  
22 most qualified candidate countries, as recommended  
23 by the Committee on International Relations of the  
24 House of Representatives, should be invited to begin



1 the accession process to join the Alliance at the  
2 Prague summit;

3 (5) with respect to candidate countries invited  
4 to join NATO, such countries should accede on a  
5 common date before the next announced NATO  
6 summit is to take place;

7 (6) after the Prague summit those candidate  
8 countries invited to join the Alliance should continue  
9 to participate in the Membership Action Plan until  
10 accession, and the accession process should take into  
11 account work conducted under the Membership Ac-  
12 tion Plan; and

13 (7) the process of NATO enlargement should  
14 continue beyond the inclusion of such candidate  
15 countries invited to join NATO at Prague, to include  
16 those candidate countries not so invited at Prague  
17 as well as other democratic European countries  
18 which may express interest in joining the Alliance,  
19 and which agree to utilize the Membership Action  
20 Plan to facilitate such NATO enlargement.

